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Editors' Introduction
Peter P. Budetti, Richard V. Burkhauser, 
Janice M. Gregory, and H. Allan Hunt
The number of older workers will nearly double in the next two 
decades. Without immediate attention to the issues they present to 
public and private health and income security programs, some worker- 
protection programs will be strained to bursting, and policymakers will 
migrate from one quick-fix solution to another as they scramble to 
respond to gaps in coverage and benefit inequities that become more 
urgent as they grow larger.
Individuals and institutions concerned about preparing for the 
sharp increase in the number of retired individuals in the United States 
can turn to many volumes of excellent work that profile the characteris 
tics and resources of present and future retirees, examine their impact 
on the retirement and health programs designed to support them, and 
suggest policy options to accommodate those programs to the future. 
For the next 20 years, however, those who will produce this future 
retirement bulge will first transform the workplace and the social insur 
ance programs that are designed to support individuals while they are 
working.
In 1999, almost 23 million Americans were between ages 55 and 
64. But aging members of the so-called baby-boom cohort (individu 
als born between 1946 and 1963) will nearly double that number in the 
next two decades. In 1999, the age 45-54 cohort numbered 35.3 mil 
lion, and the age 35-44 cohort checked in at 44.8 million. Who are 
these people? What will they want? Who among them will be vulner 
able? What will society ask of them? Should social insurance policies 
support a pro-work agenda that keeps these cohorts in the workplace 
longer? Or should those policies expand the income and health sup 
port programs available to older workers, even if it encourages early 
retirement? If so, how?
Responding to the phenomenon of an older workforce with ratio 
nal policies and structurally sound programs is vitally important to 
both the short- and long-term economic well-being of all of us. Many 
older workers are at the height of their earning capabilities, but they
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also frequently carry heavy family responsibilities and have the least 
ability to recoup and prepare adequately for their old age if disaster 
strikes. How well we respond to older workers will, to a considerable 
degree, dictate how much and what kind of assistance these same indi 
viduals will require when they leave the workforce.
Very little research is available to guide employers, employees, and 
policymakers through this period. This volume based on the 
National Academy of Social Insurance's 12th annual conference, 
"Ensuring Health and Income Security for an Aging Workforce," 
which was held in Washington, D.C., on January 26-27, 2000 begins 
to fill that gap. The conference kicked off a multiyear, interdisciplinary 
study of the social insurance problems of our aging workforce.
A group of papers were commissioned by the Academy about the 
implications of an aging workforce for various social insurance pro 
grams in the coming decades. Those papers are presented here, 
together with the comments of the assigned conference reactors. 
While authors were offered a chance to revise their remarks, the edited 
papers in this volume reflect the content of the conference very well. 
The papers in this volume provide a foundation for discussion of the 
social insurance challenges affecting these older workers and the pol 
icy issues that will be raised as they move toward retirement.
A critical feature of the Academy's work is its broad approach to 
social policy questions. This is essential to any effort to address the 
impact and needs of older workers; otherwise, efforts to deal with 
issues and problems related to older workers that appear in one pro 
gram can lead to dislocations in another program or create gaps in pro 
tection that had not been there before. For example, policies that make 
social security early retirement benefits less generous or that increase 
the age of "early" retirement will likely lead to greater use of disability 
programs. Policies designed to limit access to disability programs may 
put pressure on workers' compensation and unemployment insurance 
programs or may increase the number of individuals without adequate 
health care insurance. Hence, policymakers must consider the implica 
tions of any single policy change for the entire social safety net in 
order to mitigate the economic risks associated with exiting the labor 
force at older ages.
In the first section of this volume, four papers chart the current 
landscape of older workers' access to and use of health insurance,
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workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, and disability 
insurance. These examinations are then synthesized into cross-cutting 
themes. Subsequent sections of the book target the worker risks of job 
loss, chronic illness and disability, earlier (or later) retirement, and 
access to health care from the specific vantage point of the older 
worker.
SESSION I. CHARTING THE LANDSCAPE: 
WHAT RISKS DO OLDER WORKERS FACE?
Katherine Swartz and Betsey Stevenson analyze 1999 Current 
Population Survey data to provide a profile of health insurance cover 
age of current 55- to 64-year-olds. Striking a theme that will recur in 
other studies, they note that increases in the fraction of individuals in 
this age cohort with no health coverage could have more serious short- 
and long-term consequences than similar gaps for younger individuals. 
In the short term, older workers are more likely than younger ones to 
need medical care, and in the long term, because they are less likely to 
avail themselves of preventive care services, uninsured older workers 
may later increase Medicare costs. Determining the causes of cover 
age gaps among older workers will enable the development of better- 
targeted public policies to provide coverage for this group at a critical 
time.
John Burton and Emily Spieler examine older workers in workers' 
compensation programs and highlight another recurring theme: current 
programs often do not match the needs of older workers. In particular, 
chronic impairments and disabilities common among older workers 
present both diagnostic and therapeutic hurdles for workers' compen 
sation programs. These programs have focused on traumatic injury 
treatment and rehabilitation. However, many older workers are neither 
impairment-free nor fully disabled they are somewhere in between. 
Since workers' compensation programs are relatively unique among 
social insurance programs in that they recognize partial disabilities, 
pressure on these programs may intensify as the number of aged work 
ers increases.
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Of course, as the number of older workers swells in the next 
decades, the number of younger workers will decrease relatively. 
Christopher O'Leary and Stephen Wandner call for greater understand 
ing of the current and potential impact of unemployment insurance 
programs on the income security and labor force participation of older 
workers. They consider the labor market situation of older workers in 
the context of unemployment insurance policies, including the plight 
of older workers who move to part-time work or self-employed 
arrangements.
Mark Nadel examines older workers' risk of long-term disability, 
including circumstances under which long-term disability also leads to 
loss of employment and income among older workers. He also reviews 
systems of insurance coverage and gaps in protection of older workers 
with disabilities, as well as the implications for disability programs of 
increasing the age at which early retirement benefits are available.
Robert Haveman poses a central policy question arising from these 
profiles, i.e., how should social insurance policy respond to the needs 
of a growing group of older workers who tend to be more work- 
impaired than their younger peers and who face eroding personal capa 
bilities and difficult decisions regarding transitioning into retirement? 
Several additional questions flow from Haveman's overarching chal 
lenge: Should public policy promote a pro-work agenda or seek to 
improve the adequacy of income support? How can social insurance 
policies simultaneously address the needs of two very different groups 
of older workers, one group that is generally healthy, educated, and 
working and a second group that has health conditions that limit their 
ability to work, eroding job skills, and limited education? Where can 
older workers get the training they need to stay current in their career 
or to change to a new career? What access to public income support 
and publicly financed health benefits should be provided to older work 
ers who are working less than full time or in other "bridge" jobs prior 
to full retirement?
Session I concludes with the comments of Walter Maher and David 
Smith, who provide employer and union perspectives on these ques 
tions.
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SESSION II. JOB LOSS:
INCOME AND HEALTH COVERAGE
The use of employment-based insurance plans as the predominant 
source of health coverage has created a complex interaction between 
job status and access to health insurance. Not all individuals or fami 
lies will have the requisite employment link at all times in their lives, 
and not all employers will choose to offer coverage in a voluntary sys 
tem. Public programs have filled some of the inevitable gaps, but these 
programs are not comprehensive in their protection. Workers and their 
spouses aged 65 and over, as well as those workers who become so 
seriously disabled that they cannot work at all, are well covered by 
Medicare. Persons who are aged 65 and older, or are unable to work at 
all because of a disability and who are poor, are covered by Medicaid. 
In addition, children are also eligible for Medicaid if their family 
income is not substantially over the federal poverty level.
But other non-employed groups, such as "early retirees" and indi 
viduals "between jobs" who are not sufficiently poor, are not protected 
by public sources, nor are many workers younger than age 65 and their 
families whose employers do not offer affordable coverage. Problems 
of securing coverage in the private insurance market, especially for 
older persons or persons with chronic health conditions, are well docu 
mented. Thus, job loss has profound implications for older workers 
(less than age 65) with employment-based health coverage, because 
they are likely to fall outside of the scope of publicly provided health 
coverage and may not be able to find new employment or affordable 
private insurance that provides adequate coverage. This section 
focuses on this issue and others related to job loss at older ages.
Ann Huff Stevens and Sewin Chan assess the effects of job loss on 
the economic status of older workers. Analyzing Health and Retire 
ment Study (HRS) data on the employment history of displaced work 
ers aged 50 and over, they identified "large and lasting effects of job 
loss on the future employment probabilities of older workers." That is, 
workers who lose jobs at this stage of their lives are far less likely to be 
working at subsequent ages than their nondisplaced counterparts. 
Moreover, those who do find new jobs face substantial reductions in 
earnings, averaging only two-thirds of what they would have made if
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they had not lost their previous jobs. Finally, although the findings are 
less dramatic, displaced workers may use up their savings to cover lost 
earnings, and job loss may also lead to substantial reductions in pen 
sion benefits.
Jill Quadagno, David Macpherson, and Jennifer Reid Keene sur 
veyed and conducted in-depth interviews with bank officers shortly 
after layoffs were announced following a takeover of a major West 
Coast bank. Some losses in retirement benefits occurred, and younger 
displaced workers tended to spend down their retirement savings and 
assets. But, even some of those who were retained felt they were being 
set up to resign rather than being offered a generous severance pack 
age. In addition, older employees were less likely than younger ones 
to find new full-time jobs. Overall, however, most workers were 
employed at follow-up, and there was very little disruption in their 
health coverage. Thus, at least for this group of relatively well-edu 
cated and high-income workers, the effects of job loss were moderate.
Karen Pollitz reviews the effects of public policies with respect to 
the health and insurance status of older workers and early retirees, aged 
55-64. The health care needs of this age group are far greater than for 
younger individuals, but coverage opportunities may be less. Certain 
specific federal policies play an important role for this age group. 
COBRA continuation rights keep employment-related plans available 
for 1.5 years after job loss. Medicare and Medicaid help to make up 
for lower rates of work-based coverage in this age group, at least for 
those with disabilities. Because premiums are relatively expensive, 
even when people have the opportunity to buy individual insurance, 
other federal statutes have had uncertain or quite limited effects, and 
state laws and programs vary greatly in their ability to assist the near- 
elderly in obtaining coverage. New legislation may be required to 
assure adequate coverage as the baby boom enters this age group.
This session finishes with the observations of Katherine Swartz on 
the job problems and health insurance access problems of aging work 
ers.
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SESSION III. CHRONIC ILLNESS AND DISABILITY: 
POLICY ISSUES FOR AN AGING WORKFORCE
Jeffrey Biddle, Leslie Boden, and Robert Reville present evidence 
from three states (Washington, Wisconsin and California) that income 
replacement programs for permanent partial disability under workers' 
compensation programs vary greatly, but in each case they leave work 
ers with substantial losses. Older workers face particular problems; 
they suffer more permanently disabling injuries, and even though those 
disabilities are partial, older workers have higher rates of injury-related 
non-employment. In addition, at least for the first few years after 
injury, older workers recover a smaller proportion of their losses.
Richard Burkhauser, Mary Daly, and Andrew Houtenville raise an 
issue that becomes increasingly worrisome if the rate of disability 
among working-age individuals continues to grow. They found that 
workers with disabilities did not do as well as other workers during the 
recent economic expansion, and many had their employment and earn 
ings fall in times of expansion, not just recession. Incomes of house 
holds with working-age individuals with disabilities either lagged 
behind other households or actually fell below previous levels even 
during the economic boom of the 1990s. In particular, individuals with 
disabilities had lower levels of employment and lower annual earnings, 
and their households became increasingly dependent on public income 
transfers to sustain income.
Bruce Flynn reports on the results of a survey of disability man 
agement practices at large employers by the Washington Business 
Group on Health and Watson Wyatt Worldwide. They found that 
employer costs of disability have leveled off, or even decreased, in the 
past three years. This is largely due to market forces, but also partly to 
the emergence of integrated disability management programs. The 
implications for older workers in the areas of health care, functional 
outcomes, and workplace flexibility are discussed.
Commentary by Vicki Gottlich and Patricia Nemore focused on a 
consumer perspective of the problems that older workers and persons 
with disabilities have dealing with private health insurance, Medicare, 
and Medicaid. The session concludes with an overview by Barbara
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Wolfe. She provides a framework for and a detailed critique of the 
papers presented.
SESSION IV. IS WORKING LONGER AND RETIRING 
LATER POSSIBLE? IS IT DESIRABLE?
Finally, we return to the question asked by Robert Haveman in his 
overview: what about work at older ages? Is working longer and retir 
ing later possible, or desirable? Gary Burtless and Joseph Quinn argue 
that the burden of an aging population would rise more gradually if 
workers delayed retirement and thereby continued contributing to the 
health and pension systems rather than only being beneficiaries. After 
a long slide, the long-term trend for earlier retirement, especially 
among males, seems to have halted and perhaps even reversed in the 
United States. Burtless and Quinn outline policies that might reinforce 
this nascent turnaround.
Anna Rappaport explores these policies from the very different 
perspective of employers, for whom retirement is defined as an 
employee leaving a particular employer rather than exiting the work 
force completely. Employers focus on business need when structuring 
human resource programs, but they must also consider the constraints 
of public policy. She calls for additional research on the costs and ben 
efits of employing older workers.
Glen Pransky brings a medical perspective to the question of aging 
and work capacity. He asks whether recent success in mortality reduc 
tion has resulted in an aging population with more morbidity, less abil 
ity to function, and thus less average work capacity at a given age; or, 
have gains in morbidity paralleled the gains in mortality, with a prolon 
gation of functional capacity? He reviews the evidence and finds few 
broadly generalizable conclusions. Further research is needed to 
define and evaluate the issues.
In her commentary, Teresa Ghilarducci examines the issue of how 
much choice older workers should have over whether they continue to 
work or not. Who is to decide when enough work is enough, if not the 
worker him or herself? She cites falling male workforce participation 
rates as a demonstration of how workers have chosen to spend the
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increases in the nation's productive capacity. She questions whether 
public policy initiatives should encourage later retirement or whether 
alternative ways to enable worker choice should be found.
SESSION V. FILLING GAPS IN HEALTH COVERAGE: 
SHARING RESPONSIBILITY AND COSTS
Len Nichols makes a strong case for public policy initiatives to 
assist the age 55-64 cohort with health coverage despite their rela 
tively high insurance coverage rate by demonstrating, first, that their 
health needs and the risks they face from being uninsured are far 
greater than are those of younger cohorts, and second, that their num 
bers are rapidly expanding even as their likelihood of having employer- 
sponsored retiree health insurance is declining.
After examining the opportunities and limitations presented by 
public program and COBRA expansions, tax credits, and direct subsi 
dies, and outlining the high financial costs of the current-nongroup 
market and the high political costs of trying to reform that market, he 
presents and simulates the costs and effects of three promising subsidy 
policy options. He argues that major gains can be achieved at rela 
tively low cost by targeting those with the most pressing needs within 
the 55-64 age group, i.e., uncovered persons with low incomes and 
those whose health is fair or poor but not impaired enough to qualify 
for the current Medicare or Medicaid programs. Nichols concludes 
with a set of four principles for public policy based on the greater 
needs of these subgroups and the relative ease with which our society 
could address those needs.
Deborah Chollet examines these arguments with a critical eye. 
She wonders about the source of health care coverage, given experi 
ence with high-risk pools at the state level. She submits that a princi 
pal danger is to try and fix too much. Frank McArdle contributes an 
employer's perspective on the policy solutions of the Nichols paper. 
He finds merit in a defined-contribution approach to health care cover 
age for retirees. Diane Rowland urges that we not throw out the good 
in our public programs. Sometimes it is preferable to work on reform 
ing what is "in the box" rather than going "outside the box."
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CONCLUSION
After seven years of vigorous economic growth, not only has the 
federal budget been balanced for the first time in decades, but we are 
actually rolling up sizable surpluses. Politicians are competing over 
the most creative ways to invest this surplus, but it is clear that substan 
tial reforms of our social welfare system will be required to finance the 
growing income and health care needs of future cohorts of older work 
ers. The authors in this book provide a variety of ways in which our 
current public and private publicly financed safety net could be recon 
structed to provide this protection.
In a very real sense, the future is in our hands. It is time for both 
the public and private sector to focus on the special questions, chal 
lenges, and needs of the growing population of older workers on pay 
rolls across the land. The papers in this volume provide a beginning 
for this process. The National Academy of Social Insurance intends to 








of People in the Ten Years
before Medicare Eligibility
Katherine Swartz 
Harvard School of Public Health
Betsey Stevenson 
Harvard University
A decade remains before the oldest members of the baby boom 
generation begin to be eligible for Medicare. The potentially large 
effects on the economy and federal budget have made understanding 
this group's preretirement behavior essential. Small changes in behav 
ior regarding the age of retirement and the preretirement use of preven 
tive medical care could have dramatic consequences for Medicare 
expenditures. Thus, we need answers to questions such as, how many 
baby boomers will retire before the Social Security eligibility age, 
either by choice or because of illness? How many will be financially 
prepared, with health insurance as part of their preparation, to retire 
early? How many will have retiree health insurance benefits from a 
former employer and how many will be able to afford Medigap insur 
ance to supplement Medicare?
Different subgenerations or successive five-year cohorts of baby 
boomers are not all going to have the same preretirement experiences 
as the oldest baby boomers, because the entire group was born over a 
nearly 20-year span between 1946 and 1963. The different subgenera 
tions have had quite different economic experiences since reaching 
adulthood, and these different experiences are likely to have affected 
asset accumulation for retirement. However, it is likely that there are 
enough similarities among the subgroups to be able to gain insight into 
the potential behavior of at least the older half of the baby boom gener 
ation by studying the economic readiness to retire and health insurance 
coverage of the current cohort of 55- to 64-year-olds.
Much has been written about the retirement incentives inherent in 
access to employer-sponsored health insurance for retirees (e.g., Gust-
13
14 Swartz and Stevenson
man and Steinmeier 1994; Karoly and Rogowski 1994; Gruber and 
Madrian 1995; Blau and Gilleskie 1997; Loprest 1998; Madrian and 
Beaulieu 1998; Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese 1999), but we know 
much less about the types of health insurance coverage (or lack 
thereof) among people who are within 10 years of becoming eligible 
for Medicare coverage. What we do know has come from Swartz and 
Moon (1986), Jensen (1992), Johnson and Crystal (1997), and Loprest 
and Uccello (1997). With all of the fast-paced changes occurring in 
health insurance coverage and premiums and employer-sponsored 
retiree health insurance in particular policymakers need to know 
what types of health insurance coverage are held by people who cur 
rently are 55 to 64 years of age. Understanding who has what types of 
health insurance now will identify the types of people who are poten 
tially at financial risk when faced with expensive medical care needs. 
Further, identifying the characteristics of people who may need gov 
ernment assistance in obtaining health coverage prior to Medicare eli 
gibility will help in assessing the likely costs of such a program. 
Finally, such knowledge will also help identify the types of people 
most unlikely to have employer-sponsored health benefits when they 
retire.
In 1999, 22.9 million Americans were ages 55 to 64, according to 
the March 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS). Only 16.6 percent 
of this age group were retired, with just over half of the retirees being 
62 to 64 years of age. Two-thirds (65.6 percent) of the 55- to 64-year- 
olds had employer-sponsored health insurance, and another 8.4 percent 
had private, nongroup coverage. Just over 9 percent had some form of 
public health insurance (Medicare, Medicaid, a combination of Medi 
care and Medicaid or Medicaid and private coverage, or Champus/VA) 
during the year. Fifteen percent had no form of health insurance. His 
torically, 55- to 64-year-olds have accounted for the smallest percent 
age of the total population of the uninsured. For example, estimates 
from the March 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS), indicate that 
3.434 million uninsured people (less than 8 percent of the non-elderly 
uninsured) were 55 to 64 years of age. This is very close to the 8.3 per 
cent estimated from the March 1984 CPS (Sulvetta and Swartz 1986).
However, what is different between 1999 and 1984 is that the pro 
portion of the 55- to 64-year-old cohort without any coverage has 
increased from 13 percent to 15 percent. In part, this increase reflects
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the growth since 1984 in the total percentage of the population without 
health insurance. The proportion of each of the younger adult-age 
cohorts without health insurance has also increased in the intervening 
15 years (Table 1; tables start on p. 27). This implies that as all the 
baby boomers move through the 55- to 64-year-age range, we should 
anticipate higher fractions of near-retirees being uninsured.
The increase in the fraction of people approaching retirement who 
are without any health insurance coverage is cause for concern. As 
people age, they are statistically more likely to need medical care, and 
if they are uninsured, they are less likely to obtain preventive care. The 
delays in obtaining preventive care may lead to an increase in the cost 
of their medical care once they reach age 65 and are eligible for Medi 
care coverage. Thus, an increase in the average expenditure per Medi 
care recipient is likely just because higher percentages of younger age 
cohorts are uninsured prior to age 65. In turn, this suggests that pro 
jected expenditures for Medicare in the future may need to be revised 
upwards.
The Clinton administration has proposed (and is expected to pro 
pose again) that near-retirees who are uninsured be permitted to buy 
into Medicare. By providing them early Medicare coverage, there may 
be long-run savings stemming from obtaining timely preventive care. 
However, the potential for adverse selection with such a plan means 
that more information is needed about 55- to 64-year-olds who are 
uninsured in order to evaluate such a plan (Reischauer 1998; Swartz 
1998).
In addition, with the corporate downsizing that has occurred in the 
past decade, people 55 to 64 years of age were especially likely to lose 
their jobs or to become self-employed as consultants or contract work 
ers for projects of specified duration. Such workers have two federal 
protections that permit them to maintain insurance coverage. Under 
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 
(COBRA), such workers are permitted to continue their former 
employer-group coverage for up to 18 months so long as they pay up to 
102 percent of the total premium. Further, under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), workers who 
have had group coverage are able to convert such policies to individual 
coverage without fearing loss of coverage for preexisting medical con 
ditions. Yet, neither of these acts guarantees that the premium to be
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paid will be low or close to what a person may have paid for group cov 
erage. The number of 55- to 64-year-olds with nongroup coverage 
declined between 1998 and 1999 by 273,000 (from 9.9 percent to 8.4 
percent of the age cohort). It may be that this decline is a reflection of 
the rising costs of individual, nongroup policies. If so, the double-digit 
increases in premiums that are projected for the next several years may 
cause further erosion in the number of 55- to 64-year-olds covered by 
nongroup policies.
The proportion of 55- to 64-year-olds with employer-group cover 
age might be expected to provide an indication of the number of people 
who are likely to have employer-sponsored retiree health benefits to 
supplement Medicare coverage once they are 65 or older. However, 
within the past decade, employers have been reducing retiree health 
benefits and often are restricting such benefits to the worker rather than 
the worker and dependents (GAO 1997). Consequently, while it is 
important to know who among the 55- to 64-year-old cohort has 
employer-group coverage, it is likely that having employer-sponsored 
coverage before retirement is no longer a strong predictor of who will 
have employer-sponsored health benefits when they retire.
In this paper, we present findings from an analysis of health insur 
ance coverage among people 55 to 64 years of age in 1999 the age 
cohort born between 1935 and 1944, just before the baby boom began 
in 1946. This age cohort has been small by historical standards and has 
benefited financially from its relatively small size. As a result, it is not 
clear that its experiences with health insurance are good indicators of 
the experiences subsequent age cohorts will experience when they are 
55 to 64. But, if we view this age cohort's experiences as the most 
optimistic scenarios for subsequent age cohorts, they permit policy- 
makers to plan more realistically for the need for publicly funded or 
subsidized health insurance programs for near-retirees in the future. 
We particularly focus on the characteristics of the people who are in 
the major types of health insurance categories: employer-sponsored 
(with and without other private insurance), individual/nongroup cover 
age only, Medicaid, and no health insurance. Our intent is twofold: 
first, to identify the types of people who may not be able to afford med 
ical care and face health risks, and second, to show how socioeconomic 
characteristics are related to different types of health insurance cover 
age.
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OVERVIEW
As noted above, there were almost 23 million people 55 to 64 years 
of age in 1999. l This age cohort accounts for about 8.5 percent of the 
total U.S. population. To place the size of this cohort in perspective, 
the baby boomers in 1999 were in the 35- to 44-year-old and 45- to 54- 
year-old cohorts, which had 44.8 million and 35.3 million people, 
respectively.
Table 2 shows the distribution of types of health insurance that 
people 55 to 64 years of age had according to the March 1999 Current 
Population Survey (CPS). Two-thirds of the near-retirees have 
employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) and/or individual, non- 
group coverage and another 8.4 percent have individual, nongroup cov 
erage so, three-quarters of all 55- to 64-year-olds have some type of 
private health insurance. About 10 percent of the age cohort have Med- 
icaid, Medicare, Champus/VA, or a mix of these public types of cover 
age and private coverage during the year. Finally, 15 percent of the 
near-retirees are uninsured. We describe the characteristics of the peo 
ple who have these major types of coverage in more detail below.
In analyzing the types of characteristics that may be associated 
with different types of health insurance, it is useful to think about the 
near-retirees as being composed of two major groups. In one group are 
people who are seemingly healthy, working, with higher educational 
levels and earning high incomes, i.e., people who are likely to work 
until age 65 unless they decide that they have accumulated high enough 
assets that they can retire early. The second group consists of people 
who are less healthy, unemployed, or simply poor. This group includes 
the less educated or less skilled, those forced into early retirement 
because of employer downsizing, and those who have had other types 
of bad luck (perhaps in the form of becoming widowed or divorced, 
having lower incomes [in part because of no longer being married], or 
having to leave the labor force in order to care for an ailing spouse or 
elderly parent). A simple way of thinking of the two groups is to 
regard the first group as fortunate and the second group as unfortunate. 
One might expect the fortunate group to be largely covered by private 
health insurance, while those less fortunate might be expected to have a 
greater reliance on public coverage (Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid
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and Medicare, Medicaid and private coverage, or Champus/VA). As 
we show in the next section, both of these assumptions are true.
Although having employer-sponsored coverage prior to retirement 
is not a perfect predictor of retiree health insurance benefits, it is still a 
useful indicator. Thus, the fact that people in our first group, the fortu 
nate near-retirees, are more likely to have employer-sponsored cover 
age implies that proposals to shift the age of eligibility for Medicare to 
match the Social Security eligibility age will disproportionately hurt 
people who already have problems with health insurance coverage in 
their near-retirement years. Further, as the life expectancy of people 
increases, it is likely that a significant portion of the baby boomers will 
face choices between working to continue their own access to health 
insurance and reducing work efforts in order to care for elderly parents. 
This is especially likely to occur for those between the ages of 62 and 
the age of eligibility for full Social Security benefits. Thus, the pat 
terns of health insurance coverage of the near-retirees point to the need 
to determine the consequences of proposals to enable people to buy 
into Medicare at age 62.
CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH TYPE 
OF HEALTH INSURANCE
Not surprisingly, the type of health insurance coverage a person 
has is strongly linked to the person's labor force activity (Table 3). 
Among 55- to 64-year-olds, there seem to be only two major labor 
force activities: either working or else not in the labor force (i.e., only 2 
percent were either unemployed and looking for work or on lay-off). 
In 1999, almost three out of five 55- to 64-year-olds were working; the 
other 40 percent were not engaged in the workforce. Among those 
working, more than three-quarters were covered by employer-spon 
sored insurance, while among those not in the labor force, just under 
half had ESI.
Among the 9.2 million people who were not in the labor force, 
almost 90 percent provided reasons for not working (Table 4). Of 
those responding, almost half had retired, a third were ill or disabled 
and could not work, and almost a fifth worked without pay on family
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and home responsibilities. Among those who worked in the home 
without pay, 30 percent were uninsured, half had ESI, and 10 percent 
purchased their own nongroup coverage. Those who were retired were 
similar in their coverage, although there are fewer who are uninsured 
(17.5 percent). In sharp contrast, half of the ill and disabled had public 
coverage (Medicaid and/or Medicare), only a quarter had ESI, less than 
8 percent had individual coverage, and 12 percent were uninsured.
Given the impact of being in the labor force on type of health 
insurance, it should come as no surprise that family income is a strong 
predictor of the type of coverage held by 55- to 64-year-olds (Table 5). 
Among 55- to 64-year-olds, family income is somewhat skewed: 21 
percent had 1998 incomes below $20,000; 18 percent had incomes 
between $20,000 and $35,000; 16 percent had incomes between 
$35,000 and $50,000; and 45 percent had incomes at or above $50,000. 
Note that only when family incomes were above $20,000 do we 
observe at least half of the people in particular income groups with 
ESI, and family incomes have to exceed $35,000 before at least two- 
thirds of the income group has ESI.
Family income, however, can be deceptive because it is the sum of 
the incomes of all related people living in the same household. In the 
case of near-retirees, we know that living arrangements can change as 
an individual's financial situation changes. Thus, a widower or divor 
cee between the ages of 55 and 64 may find him- or herself living with 
adult children or with other adult relatives. In these circumstances, 
family income does not necessarily indicate the financial circum 
stances of the individual involved. Furthermore, insurance companies 
define "family" as including only married couples and their dependent 
children (or single parents and their dependent children), and therefore 
they do not permit elderly parents to be covered by a family policy of 
their adult children. Table 6 shows the insurance family unit types of 
55- to 64-year-olds by whether or not the person has any type of health 
insurance. Clearly, any 55- to 64- year-old who is living in a nuclear 
family with or without children at home has the lowest probability of 
being without health insurance. Single adults (with or without children 
at home), single or married parents living with their adult children, and 
adults living in other arrangements with related people are more likely 
to be uninsured. Because one-fifth of all 55- to 64-year-olds live in 
households where family income is more than the person's insurance
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family unit (IFU) income, it is important to examine the distribution of 
types of health insurance that people have by their IFU income. This 
provides a more accurate view of the insurance coverage of near-retir 
ees relative to their available financial resources.
As a comparison of Tables 5, 7, and 8 indicate, uninsured near- 
retirees are less likely to be poor than the rest of the non-elderly unin 
sured population. In 1998, 52 percent of uninsured 55- to 64-year-olds 
had family incomes below 250 percent of the poverty level, compared 
with 65 percent of the all the non-elderly uninsured. Although 26 per 
cent had family incomes at or above $50,000, over a quarter of this was 
the result of the uninsured near-elderly living with other relatives 
whose income was counted as part of the person's family income. That 
is, of the nearly 900,000 uninsured 55- to 64-year-olds with 1998 fam 
ily incomes at or above $50,000, almost a quarter of a million had 
"insurance family unit" incomes less than $50,000. Thus, as with all 
the non-elderly, near-retirees with high IFU incomes were likely to 
have ESI, while those with low IFU incomes were more likely to be 
uninsured. When we examine only Tables 7 and 8 to distinguish the 
near-retirees in terms of 55- to 61-year-olds and 62- to 64-year-olds, 
we find that at the lower IFU income levels, the older near-retirees are 
more likely to have public coverage than to be uninsured. This may 
reflect age related higher probabilities of being eligible for Medicaid 
and Medicare if one is disabled.
Not surprisingly, people who identify themselves as healthy are far 
more likely to have ESI, while almost half of those who report poor 
health (7.9 percent of the near-retirees) have public coverage (Table 9). 
Among those reporting fair health (almost 15 percent of 55- to 64-year- 
olds), almost half have ESI and a quarter have public coverage.
Given the differences between men and women in employment 
patterns and marriage status as they age, it is useful to examine the dis 
tribution of health insurance types for men and women separately. 
Table 10 provides an overview of the distribution of health coverage 
among men and women, for 55- to 61-year-olds and 62- to 64-year- 
olds. Women are less likely to have ESI than men in each of the age 
subgroups, but women are more likely to have nongroup private cover 
age than their male counterparts. For both age groups, women are 
more likely than men to be uninsured. Table 11 permits us to examine 
the male-female health coverage differences in terms of how marital
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status interacts with coverage options and decisions. Married people in 
all four sex/age subgroups are most likely to have ESI. Among men in 
both age subgroups, unmarried men are more likely to have either pub 
lic coverage or no insurance. Both married and widowed women in the 
older age group are more likely to have nongroup coverage. This find 
ing is consistent with the observation that women are often married to 
men one or more years older, and if the husband has retired or died, the 
woman may obtain nongroup coverage for the one to three years' time 
until eligible for Medicare. What is very clear from both tables is that 
being married is a big advantage in terms of having ESI and not being 
uninsured.
As with marriage, increasing levels of educational attainment raise 
the probability that a person will have ESI rather than have public cov 
erage or be uninsured. Table 12 indicates the distribution of type of 
health insurance by educational level of near-retirees. Among the 
nearly 20 percent of 55- to 64-year-olds without a high school diploma, 
50 percent are either uninsured or relying on public coverage, and only 
40 percent have ESI. In contrast, of the 37 percent with a high school 
diploma, two-thirds have ESI. Among those with a college degree or 
post-graduate education, more than three-fourths have ESI. This pat 
tern is not surprising, since higher levels of education allow people to 
choose jobs with better benefits and lower injury rates.
Finally, there are differences by race in the distribution of types of 
health insurance among 55- to 64-year-olds. Table 13 shows the distri 
bution for the two age subgroups (55 to 61 and 62 to 64 years of age). 
Approximately two-thirds of white near-retirees have ESI and about 14 
percent are uninsured. In contrast, just over half of 55- to 61-year-old 
blacks have ESI, and only 41.5 percent of 62 to 64 year old blacks have 
ESI. People in "other" racial categories (Asian, Native American, 
Pacific Islander, and other), who comprise 4 percent of near-retirees, 
are also more likely to have public coverage or no insurance at all.
In sum, near-retirees who have ESI coverage are most likely to be 
in higher income categories, to be married, white, in good health, and 
to have higher educational levels. For these people, raising the age of 
eligibility for Medicare to 67 is unlikely to leave them uninsured. 
However, for those near-retirees who are unmarried, nonwhite, in poor 
health, or simply have less education, raising the Medicare eligibility
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age is likely to exacerbate the already high percentage who are unin 
sured or relying on public coverage.
RELATIVE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS 
ON TYPE OF HEALTH INSURANCE
Examining the near-retirees' types of health insurance in terms of 
different characteristics does not provide us with the relative impor 
tance of each of the characteristics in predicting the type of coverage 
that a near-retiree may have. It is important to understand the relative 
effects because many of the characteristics examined in the previous 
section are correlated with one another (for example, education and 
income, or marital status and income). To estimate the relative effects 
of these characteristics and determine which are most important for 
predicting type of health coverage, we estimated a multinomial logit 
model with four outcomes: ESI coverage (including possibly double- 
coverage with nongroup), nongroup only, public coverage, and no 
insurance. Table 14 contains the estimated coefficients for the model 
with insurance family unit (IFU) income and other characteristics, 
along with ^-statistics. The coefficients indicate the effect of each 
characteristic on the probability (relative to having ESI) of having non- 
group coverage, public coverage, or no insurance. We also estimated 
the same model with family income substituted for IFU income. 
Although the overall results do not change substantially when family 
income is used instead of IFU income (as will be illustrated below), the 
model with IFU income is slightly better in terms of goodness of fit 
measures.
What is interesting about Table 14 is that almost all of the charac 
teristics are statistically significant in their effect on the probability that 
an individual would have each of the types of coverage. However, 
holding all the other characteristics constant, being 55 to 61 years of 
age rather than 62 to 64 is significant only in predicting nongroup cov 
erage relative to ESI, not in predicting public coverage or no insurance 
relative to ESI. Whether a person is a male or female also is not signif 
icant in predicting no insurance relative to ESI when all other charac 
teristics are held constant, which is surprising given the data in Table
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10. Being married (as opposed to any nonmarried marital state) is sta 
tistically significant only in predicting no insurance relative to having 
ESI. Whether or not a person is working is not statistically significant 
in predicting whether a person has nongroup private insurance relative 
to ESI, but if a person is working he or she is statistically significantly 
less likely to have public coverage or be uninsured. In contrast, being 
ill/disabled and unable to work or being retired and not working are 
both statistically significant characteristics for predicting type of health 
insurance. Similarly, being white (as opposed to nonwhite) is a statisti 
cally significant characteristic, making a person less likely to have 
either public coverage or be uninsured relative to having ESI. In gen 
eral, IFU income, educational attainment, and health status are the 
characteristics that have the largest effects on the probabilities of hav 
ing each type of coverage, which is consistent with the theme we began 
with, that the near-retirees consist of two distinct groups of people.
Tables 15 and 16 provide illustrations of prototypical male and 
female (respectively) near-retirees and their probabilities of having 
each of the four major types of insurance coverage. Both tables also 
indicate how using IFU income (rather than family income) yields 
somewhat different predicted probabilities of having each of the types 
of insurance, but does not yield different outcomes in terms of the 
types of insurance with the highest probability. This result is reassur 
ing given that family income is easier to obtain than IFU income, 
which often involves parsing out components of family income to the 
separate IFUs in a household. The illustrations clearly show that hav 
ing higher income, more education, and better health status increase 
the probability of having ESI rather than public coverage or being 
uninsured. Further, being ill/disabled and in poor health significantly 
lowers the probability of having ESI and increases the probability of 
having public coverage. Controlling for marital status, we find that 
early retirement (for reasons other than illness/disability) significantly 
lowers the probability of having ESI for men, but not for women. 
Undoubtedly, this is indicative of access to a husband's ESI coverage 
for women who retire early, while the reverse is less likely to be true 
for men.
To place the prototypical examples in perspective, Table 17 shows 
the distribution of near-elderly across the four types of health insurance 
and the proportions with various characteristics in each type. Among
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the people who have ESI coverage, for example, far greater proportions 
of the men and women are married than is true of the men and women 
with public coverage or no insurance at all. Similarly, the people who 
have ESI are far more likely to have higher levels of education than the 
people with public coverage or no insurance.
CONCLUSIONS
The age cohort of 55- to 64-year-olds can be roughly divided into 
two groups. The fortunate group consists of people who are able to 
work until at least age 65; this group is more likely to have higher edu 
cation and income levels, and better health, as well as employer-spon 
sored insurance. The unfortunate group is that who either have 
developed health conditions or otherwise find it difficult to continue 
working, and have fewer financial resources (including ESI) in the 
years before they reach age 65. The policy implication of this finding 
is that proposals to extend the age of eligibility for Medicare to match 
the age of eligibility for full Social Security benefits are more likely to 
harm the second group of near-retirees.
In terms of developing public policies to help near-retirees who do 
not have ESI and are uninsured, the major empirical issue is the extent 
to which adverse selection might occur if 55- to 64-year-olds were pro 
vided with a public program (Swartz 1998). One such option, pro 
posed by the Clinton administration, is to permit people to purchase 
Medicare coverage under restricted circumstances. Creating and eval 
uating a demonstration program targeted at 55- to 64-year-olds to learn 
how severe adverse selection might be would provide the empirical 
evidence needed to estimate the costs of permitting early enrollment in 
Medicare.
Finally, people who do not have health insurance prior to reaching 
age 65 are less likely to have retiree health insurance benefits or to buy 
Medigap policies to supplement Medicare. The fact that 15 percent of 
people currently 55 to 64 years of age are uninsured has implications 
for the health needs and costs of people when they reach age 65 and 
begin to be covered by Medicare, but to understand why near-retirees 
may not have health insurance, we need analyses of longitudinal data
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on people 50 years of age and older. We need to understand how 
changes in employment, income, health status, marital status and fam 
ily responsibilities over the ages of 50 to 65 affect access to health 
insurance for people of different educational and occupational back 
grounds. If all the 55- to 64-year-olds without health insurance lost 
such coverage because of health problems, that would suggest a strong 
need for expanding Medicare. Similarly, longitudinal analyses would 
provide estimates of the numbers of near-retirees who stopped working 
in order to care for older spouses or aging parents and used up their 
own savings in the process. Determining why near-retirees become 
uninsured, as well as how many people face pressures to retire early 
and lose insurance coverage, would enable us to develop better-tar 
geted public policies to help near-retirees maintain and obtain health 
insurance coverage.
Notes
Partial funding for this paper was provided by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
Grant no. 037484, which is gratefully acknowledged. The authors also thank Karen 
Neoh for her superb research assistance. Opinions expressed in this paper are solely 
those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Robert Wood Johnson Founda 
tion or Harvard University.
1. Data from the March 1999 Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
are the basis for the estimates of the numbers of people with various types of 
health insurance and their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Ana 
lysts disagree as to whether the CPS numbers on the uninsured refer to a point in 
time (i.e., March of the year of the survey) or to the previous calendar year. We 
believe the uninsured numbers are closer to point-in-time estimates than to esti 
mates of the number who were uninsured during all of the previous year, and 
therefore we refer to the year of the CPS when describing the uninsured as a par 
ticular year. See Swartz (1986) for more details.
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Table 1 Changes in the Percentage of Non-Elderly Age Cohorts without 
Health Insurance, 1984 and 1999
Share of age cohort 
Share of uninsured (%) uninsured (%)
Cohort


































SOURCE: March 1984 and March 1999 Current Population Survey.
Table 2 Distribution of Types of Health Insurance of 55- to 64-Year-Olds
Type of health insurance

































SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
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SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey. 
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup. 
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, Medicaid 
+ private, and other combinations.
Table 4 Health Insurance Coverage by Reasons for Not Working for 








































SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, Medicaid
+ private, and other combinations. 
c A dash ( ) indicates a sample size too small for a statistically reliable estimate.
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Table 5 Health Insurance Coverage by Family Income for 
55- to 64-Year-Olds
Total
Private3 Uninsured Total number 

























































SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group plus nongroup. 
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, 
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.





















































SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
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SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group plus nongroup 
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, 
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
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SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
3 "Pnvate" includes employer-group only and employer-group plus nongroup. 
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, 
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.



















































SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey. 
3 "Pnvate" includes employer-group only and employer-group plus nongroup. 
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, 
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
32 Swartz and Stevenson
Table 10 Health Insurance Coverage, by Sex among 55- to 61-Year-Olds 











































SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group plus nongroup. 
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, 
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
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Table 11 Type of Health Insurance among 55- to 61-Year-Olds and 
62- to 64-Year-Olds by Sex and Marital Status
Age/sex/marital 
group




















































































































































SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + private, and other combinations. 
c A dash ( ) indicates a sample size too small for a statistically reliable estimate.
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Table 12 Health Insurance Coverage by Educational Attainment among 
55- to 64-Year-Olds
Education level














































SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey. 
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup. 
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, 
Medicaid + pnvate, and other combinations.
Table 13 Health Insurance Coverage by Race among 55- to 61-Year-Olds 




























































SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey. 
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup. 
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, 
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.








































































































































































SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a The coefficients indicate the affect of each characteristic on the probability of having nongroup coverage, public coverage, or no insur 
ance relative to having employer-group coverage only and employer-group plus nongroup. 
b EFU = insurance family unit.
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Table 15 Predicted Probabilities of Four Types of Insurance Coverage for 
Prototypical Men
Private3 Nongroup Public"
Characteristics of person (%) (%) (%) Uninsured 
Using IFU income
1) 55- to 61-yr-old male, 
married, did not complete 
HS, working, white, EFU 
income $20,000-34,999, 
very good health
2) same as #1 except HS 
graduate
3) same as #2 except ill/ 
disabled and poor health
4) same as #2 except retired
5) same as #2 except nonwhite
6) same as #1 except 62-64 yrs 
of age
7) same as #6 except HS 
graduate
8) same as #7 except ill/ 
disabled and poor health
9) same as #7 except retired 










































1) 55- to 61-yr-old male, 
married, did not complete 
HS, working, white, family 
income $20,000-34,999, 
very good health 0.505 0.096 0.039
2) same as #1 except HS
graduate 0 645 0108 0.025
3) same as #2 except ill/
disabled and poor health 0.237 0.070 0.578
4) same as #2 except retired 0.556 0.123 0.107
5) same as #2 except nonwhite 0.605 0.074 0.035
6) same as #1 except 62-64 yrs
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Table 15 (continued)
Characteristics of person
Private3 Nongroup Publicb 
(%) (%) (%) Uninsured
7) same as #6 except HS
graduate
8) same as #7 except ill/
disabled and poor health
9) same as #7 except retired

















SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey. 
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup. 
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, 
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
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Table 16 Predicted Probabilities of Four Types of Insurance Coverage 
for Prototypical Women
Private3 Nongroup Public*3
Type of person_______(%)_____(%)_____(%) Uninsured 
Using IFU income
1)55-to 61-yr.-old female, 0.836 0.087 0.013 0.065 
some college (1-3 yr.), 
married, working, white, 
IFU income $50,000 or 
greater, very good health
2) same as #1 except IFU 0.682 0.166 0.020 0.132 
income of $20,000- 
34,999
3) same as #2 except not 0.694 0.150 0.030 0.125 
married
4) same as #1 except 62 to 0.850 0 066 0.011 0.073 
64 yr. of age
5) same as #4 except 0.801 0.078 0.054 0067 
retired
Using family income
1)55-to 61-yr.-old female, 0.832 0.089 0.012 0.067 
some college (1-3 yr.), 
married, working, white, 
family income $50,000 
or greater, very good 
health
2) same as #1 except family 0.687 0.167 0.022 0.124 
income of $20,000- 
34,999
3) same as #2 except not 0.642 0.164 0.041 0.153 
married
4) same as #1 except 62 to 0.848 0.067 0.011 0.075 
64 yr. of age
5) same as #4 except retired 0.785____0.081____0.054____0.079 
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey. 
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup. 
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, 
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
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Table 17 Proportion of People with the Listed Characteristics by Type of 
Health Insurance, 1999
Characteristic





Less than HS education (%)
HS diploma (%)
Some college (%)
College degree or more (%)
With family income less than 
$50,000 (%)
Working (%)




















































SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey. 
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup. 
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, 
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
Workers' Compensation 
and Older Workers
John F. Burton, Jr. 
Rutgers University
Emily A. Spieler 
West Virginia University
State and federal workers' compensation programs provide cash 
payments and medical benefits to workers disabled by work-related 
injuries and diseases. This chapter summarizes major issues facing 
workers' compensation, with a focus on aging workers. In the first sec 
tion, we give an introductory overview of workers' compensation that 
may be most useful to those relatively unfamiliar with the program. 
This section includes a description of eligibility requirements, particu 
larly the work-relatedness tests; a brief summary of the critical ways in 
which workers' compensation differs from other social insurance pro 
grams; and a description of recent cost trends. 1 The second section 
examines the particular issues of older workers relating to chronic 
impairment and disability, and the third discusses the problem of 
applying the standard of work-relatedness to chronic health conditions 
that do not fit easily into the traditional definitions of compensable con 
ditions, focusing on back conditions.2 The fourth section reviews some 
of the recent legislative and judicial changes that are most likely to 
impact older workers, particularly with regard to eligibility for bene 
fits.
In the final section, we briefly address the following question: what 
are the likely effects of changes in workers' compensation programs on 
the adequacy of this program for older workers with work-related or 
work-aggravated disabilities? Our attempt to answer this question 
must be read with the understanding that there has been little empirical 
investigation of the different experiences of older and younger workers 
in these programs. We are thus forced to speculate, and we hope to 
encourage additional research that will explore this question.
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Workers' compensation programs draw few overt distinctions 
based upon the age of the applicant for benefits. Exceptions to this 
general rule are discussed later in this paper. 3 Perhaps more important 
than overt age distinctions, however, is the inescapable fact that older 
workers are themselves different from younger workers: older workers 
are less prone to injuries resulting from traumatic events; they are more 
prone to impairments associated with aging, including heart disease 
and back conditions; they may take longer to heal and have greater 
impairments resulting from injuries than younger workers; and their 
mobility in the labor market may be more restricted than younger 
workers with occupational disabilities. Older workers may therefore 
be affected differently by certain aspects of the system. For example, 
because of the legal rules used to determine eligibility for workers' 
compensation benefits, health conditions associated with older age 
may be less likely to be compensated. We believe that recent develop 
ments in workers' compensation have increased the barriers to obtain 
ing benefits for these conditions and have limited the amount of 
available benefits for permanent disabilities that are more common in 
older workers. As a result, costs of workplace injuries and diseases are 
likely to be shifted to other public and private programs or to the work 
ers themselves and their families.
OVERVIEW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Unlike the civil justice system for compensation of injuries, work 
ers' compensation is a "no-fault" system: employers are liable without 
regard to fault, and employees only have to prove that the injury or dis 
ease is work-related, not that the employer was negligent. Employers' 
liability is limited to the benefits in the program, and employees cannot 
(with very limited exceptions) bring a tort suit against the employer 
and recover for full economic losses or for nonpecuniary losses such as 
pain and suffering. This limited liability/no fault scheme is often 
described as the two sides of the workers' compensation principle.
Workers' compensation provides benefits only to workers who suf 
fer from work-related injuries or illnesses and, in some instances, to 
their dependents. These benefits include medical treatment for the
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work-related condition; temporary total disability benefits for the 
period that the worker is recovering but is unable to perform his or reg 
ular job; permanent partial disability benefits to compensate for the 
worker's permanent loss of earnings (or, in some states, permanent 
level of impairment), although the worker is expected to return to 
active work; permanent total disability benefits for workers who are 
unable to work; and benefits to surviving dependents when a worker 
dies as a result of an occupational injury or illness.
Most employees are covered by the workers' compensation sys 
tem, although in some states there are exclusions for very small 
employers or particular categories of workers (most commonly, agri 
cultural and domestic employees). Persons who are not employees 
(e.g., independent contractors) are generally not covered. For a claim 
to be covered, the employee must incur medical expenses, suffer per 
manent impairment, or be absent from work because of a work-related 
health condition.
The most common type of workers' compensation claim involves 
an injury that requires medical treatment but no claim for cash benefits. 
In theory, these medical benefits are provided for the particular injury 
or illness for the duration of the condition, irrespective of whether the 
individual is working or is totally disabled. In fact, however, in cases 
involving more serious injuries, medical benefits may be included in 
cash settlements of claims, and workers may then not have medical 
coverage for the condition if it persists.
The most common type of claim for cash benefits is for temporary 
total disability benefits. Often, workers who suffer acute injuries will 
collect these temporary benefits for a limited period of time and then 
return to work. Once workers recover from the injury (reach "maxi 
mum medical improvement," or MMI) or return to work, they are no 
longer eligible for temporary total disability benefits. In some states, 
when workers return to a reduced work schedule, they may receive 
temporary partial disability benefits.
At the point of MMI or return to work, workers may be eligible for 
permanent partial disability benefits if they have a permanent impair 
ment or suffer wage loss or loss of earning capacity as a result of the 
injury. Permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits are theoretically 
designed to replace earnings lost as a result of the permanent impair 
ment. The expectation is that workers who receive these benefits will
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return to work, either at their old job or at a new one. PPD benefits are, 
in the aggregate, the most expensive (and most controversial) type of 
benefits in workers' compensation programs. Despite their expense, 
however, recent studies suggest that these, benefits do not fully replace 
lost earnings for injured workers (Petersen et al. 1997; Boden and Gal- 
izzi 1999; Biddle, Boden, and Reville 2001). Permanent total disabil 
ity benefits, which on average are the most expensive type of award, 
are rarely granted.4
Eligibility for Workers' Compensation Benefits: 
The Work-Relatedness Test
To be compensable, a claim must relate to an injury or illness that 
"arises out of and "in the course of employment. Eligibility for 
workers' compensation benefits is thus tied to the work-relatedness of 
the health condition or disability. In most states, the employee must 
meet four legal tests to establish that an injury is work-related and 
therefore the employee is entitled to benefits:
1) there must be a personal injury, which in some jurisdictions is 
interpreted to exclude mental illnesses;
2) that results from an accident, which is a test normally involving 
two elements: the injury must be unexpected or unusual, and the 
injury must be traceable, within reasonable limits, to a definite 
time, place, and occasion;
3) that must arise out of employment, which means the source of 
the injury must be related to the job (a worker shot at work by a 
neighbor because of a personal quarrel is unlikely to satisfy the 
arising out of employment test); and
4) that must occur during the course of employment, which nor 
mally requires that the injury occur on the employer's premises 
and during working hours.
Under the traditional rule, if a worker met these four tests, then he 
or she was generally entitled to full cash and medical benefits, even if 
the medical condition was due to multiple causes. There was, in short, 
generally no effort to apportion causation.
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These four tests are relatively easy to apply for injuries resulting 
from traumatic events, such as fractures or amputations resulting from 
malfunctioning machinery at work (which normally are compensable) 
or from automobile accidents (which normally are compensable if they 
occur as part of the job during paid time, and are generally not com 
pensable if they occur when a worker is driving to or from work). 
These four tests are also relatively easy to apply to medical conditions 
resulting from a single cause. For example, an asbestos-exposed 
worker with a diagnosis of mesothelioma is likely to meet the work- 
relatedness test for compensation because this rare cancer is almost 
always associated with exposure to asbestos (although there may be 
other obstacles to compensability, such as the application of rules gov 
erning time limits for the filing of claims).
The tests are more difficult to apply to diseases that occur regularly 
in everyday life, or that have multiple causation, or that result from 
long-term exposures at work. Historically, the exclusion of these dis 
eases was often based on the application of the "accident" test. Work 
ers' compensation statutes typically now have special compensability 
rules for diseases, although often these contain restrictions that are not 
used for injuries. Occupational diseases remain largely uncompen- 
sated today, as a result of a variety of factors: 1) the "accident" test per 
sists in some states; 2) statutes of limitations sometimes require that a 
claim be filed within a few years of the last exposure, and not all state 
systems have expanded the time limits to include diseases with long 
latency periods; 3) "ordinary diseases of life" are still often not com 
pensable, even if the particular individual's disease is occupationally 
caused; and 4) many occupationally caused diseases are not properly 
diagnosed by physicians. The result of these factors is that workers' 
compensation often does not provide benefits for disability associated 
with chronic diseases that are caused by work.
In addition, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests a sig 
nificant underreporting of work-related health problems to workers' 
compensation programs (Biddle et al. 1998; Michaels 1998; Morse et 
al. 1998; Pransky et al. 1999; Morse, Dillon, and Warren 2000). The 
underreporting is likely to be a particular problem for older workers, 
who are most likely to suffer the long-term effects of work exposures.
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Key Differences between Workers' Compensation and Other 
Major Social Insurance Programs
Several aspects of workers' compensation distinguish it from other 
social insurance programs in the United States. First, as noted in the 
prior subsection, the injury or illness must be work-related. The ques 
tion of work-relatedness is a difficult one, particularly when work and 
nonwork factors contribute to an individual's disability. Individuals 
whose conditions are deemed work-related by the compensation sys 
tems will receive benefits; those whose conditions are not deemed 
work-related will receive no benefits.
Second, workers' compensation programs emerged in the United 
States about 1910, when a federal workers' compensation program for 
private employees would have been unconstitutional. It is therefore a 
state, rather than a federal, program. More accurately, it consists of 
over 50 programs: one for each state, plus several federal programs for 
federal employees, longshore workers, coal miners, and so on. Despite 
several attempts during the last century, federal standards for the state 
workers' compensation programs have never been adopted. This 
means both that eligibility and benefit levels vary significantly among 
states and that it is difficult to formulate broad conclusions regarding 
trends without careful study.
Third, workers' compensation provides a variety of cash benefits 
that do not require total and permanent disability. The duration of a 
worker's cash or medical benefits may range from days to a lifetime. 
Unlike other social programs, workers' compensation provides partial 
benefits that recognize that a worker's earning capacity may be 
reduced, but not eliminated, by the disability.
Fourth, the financing scheme for workers' compensation includes 
private insurers and self-insurance, as well as state run funds. 
Although premium rates are regulated in many states, this is neverthe 
less primarily a private insurance market, more similar in some 
respects to the health insurance market than to Social Security or 
unemployment insurance.
Fifth, claims for workers' compensation benefits involve a substan 
tial amount of litigation in some jurisdictions.5 Unlike Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
claims, employers or their insurance carriers must pay the costs of
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claims, and therefore they have a strong incentive to mount a vigorous 
defense. Litigation tends to focus on issues of compensability, particu 
larly work-relatedness questions, and the extent or duration of perma 
nent disability.
Sixth, these disputed cases can be, and often are, resolved by 
"compromise and release agreements" that typically involve three ele 
ments: a compromise between the worker and the employer concerning 
the amount of benefits to be paid; the payment of the compromised 
amount in a lump sum; and the release of the employer from further 
liability for both cash and medical benefits. The terminology for com 
promise and release agreements varies among states: examples of alter 
native terms are "lump-sum settlements" and "wash-outs." It is likely 
that many workers use these settlements to meet immediate, rather than 
future, income needs.6
As a result of these differences, workers' compensation functions 
in a manner that is quite different from federal programs (e.g., Social 
Security), or state programs that operate with federal financing (e.g., 
vocational rehabilitation), or even state programs that are funded by 
payroll taxes and are governed by some federal guidelines (e.g., unem 
ployment insurance).
Financing and Cost Trends in Workers' Compensation Programs
Employers are nominally responsible for the cost of workers' com 
pensation, although a substantial portion of the cost is shifted to 
employees in the form of lower wages. Insurance premiums are paid 
based on a percentage of payroll. Insurance rates are experience-rated 
and vary among firms based on the benefits paid by all the firms in the 
employer's industry and, for larger employers, on the amount of previ 
ous benefit payments to the firm's own employees.
In 1998, workers' compensation programs provided $41.7 billion 
of benefits to workers disabled by work-related injuries and diseases 
(Mont, Burton, and Reno 2000). Cash benefits accounted for $25.8 bil 
lion (62 percent of total benefits) and medical and rehabilitation bene 
fits accounted for $15.9 billion (38 percent). Private carriers paid about 
53 percent of these benefits, state and federal funds about 25 percent, 
and self-insuring employers about 22 percent. Total employers' costs 
were $52.1 billion in 1998. The $10.4 billion difference between total
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benefits and employers' costs was attributable to various factors, 
including administrative expenses, profits for carriers, and attorneys' 
fees.
Current figures do not give the full picture of the rapidly changing 
costs and benefits paid by workers' compensation programs over the 
past 15 years. In fact, conditions changed rapidly over this period, with 
benefits paid and employers' costs increasing rapidly from 1984 to 
1991, and then declining rapidly from 1991 to 1998. From 1984 to 
1991, workers' compensation benefits (cash and medical) increased 
from $19.7 billion to $42.2, or an average annual increase of 11.5 per 
cent. Benefits increased from 1.21 percent of payroll in 1984 to 1.64 
percent in 1991. Employers' workers' compensation costs also 
increased during this period, from $25.1 billion in 1984 to $55.2 billion 
in 1991, an average of 11.9 percent increase per year. This rapid esca 
lation in costs far outpaced payroll growth. As a result, workers' com 
pensation costs as a percentage of payroll increased rapidly, rising 
from 1.66 percent in 1984 to 2.16 percent of payroll in 1991.
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, many employers and 
insurance carriers became concerned, if not alarmed, about these 
increasing costs of the workers' compensation program. One result 
was that employers and carriers supported a series of changes in the 
program that are examined later in this chapter.
These changes (or "reforms") were important factors in the trends 
in the aggregate benefits and costs for the workers' compensation pro 
gram after 1991. Benefits paid to workers in current dollars decreased 
from $42.2 billion in 1991 to $41.7 billion in 1998, which represented 
a 0.2 percent annual rate of decrease. While benefit payments 
declined, employment and payroll surged in the 1990s, and so benefits 
as a percentage of payroll peaked at 1.66 percent of payroll in 1992 and 
then plummeted to a low of 1.08 percent of payroll in 1998. The multi- 
year decline in benefits paid relative to payroll is unprecedented in 
duration and magnitude since at least 1948, when the annual data from 
the workers' compensation programs were first published for succes 
sive years. Accompanying the slowdown or decline in benefit pay 
ments to workers was a similar development for the employers' costs 
of workers' compensation. The costs were $55.2 billion in 1991, 
increased to $60.8 billion in 1993, and then fell to $52.1 billion in 
1998. Because payroll grew rapidly during the period, the employers'
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costs as a percentage of payroll plateaued briefly (2.16 percent of pay 
roll in 1991 and 2.17 percent of payroll in 1993) and then spiraled 
down to 1.35 percent in 1998.
The sources of the rapid increases in workers' compensation bene 
fits and costs between 1984 and 1991 and the stagnation or decline of 
these aggregate measures of the workers' compensation program dur 
ing the 1990s are examined in Spieler and Burton (1998) and Thoma- 
son, Schmidle, and Burton (forthcoming).
SPECIAL CONCERNS OF OLDER WORKERS
There are three relationships that are relevant to our interest in the 
responsiveness of the workers' compensation program to the concerns 
of older workers. First, what is the relationship between age and the 
prevalence of impairments? We use the term impairment to mean "a 
deviation from normal in a body part or organ system and its function 
ing" (American Medical Association 1993, p. 1/1). An impairment 
can result from an injury or an illness and can lead to the inability to 
perform activities of daily living (American Medical Association 
1993, p. 1/1). Second, what is the relationship between age and the 
prevalence of disability? We use the term disability to mean reduction 
or "alteration of an individual's capacity to meet personal, social, or 
occupational demands or statutory or regulatory requirements because 
of an impairment" (American Medical Association 1993, p. 1/2). Our 
particular concern is work disability. The extent of work disability 
resulting from an impairment is affected by personal attributes, such as 
age, education, and job experience, as well as external factors, such as 
the state of the labor market and the extent of job modifications. 
Third, what is the relationship between age and the prevalence of 
workers' compensation benefits? Even if work disability increases 
with age, the compensability rules for workers' compensation may 
preclude some of the disabled workers from obtaining benefits.
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Age and Impairment
The relationship between age and the prevalence of impairments 
varies by the source or type of impairment. The frequency of work- 
related injuries generally declines with age; severity, however, tends to 
increase with age (Wegman 2000). This pattern is shown in Table 1; 
the frequency of work injuries is lower for workers in the 45-64 years 
age category than for younger workers (ages 18-24 and 25-^-4), while 
the numbers of restricted-activity days and bed days associated with 
work injuries are higher for workers in the 45-64 years age category 
than for younger workers.
While the Table 1 data show that the frequency of work injuries is 
lower for older workers, the data shown in Table 2 indicate that the 
number of chronic conditions per 1,000 persons for those 45-64 years 
old is considerably higher than the rate for persons aged 18-44 for sev 
eral of the most common conditions, including intervertebral disc dis 
orders, orthopedic impairments of the back, hearing impairment, and 
heart disease. 7 It is these "border-challenging" conditions that present 
the most difficult issues regarding work-relatedness for workers' com 
pensation systems. We explore the historical treatment of one of the 
most common of these conditions, back injuries, in the following sec 
tion. 8
Table 1 Numbers of Episodes of Injuries at Work and Their 
Consequences per 100 Persons, by Age3
All ages 18-24yr. 25^44 yr. 45-64 yr.
Episodes of persons injured
Number of restricted- 
activity days associated 
with episodes














SOURCE: Adams, Hendershot, and Marano (1999), Tables 51, 53, and 55.
a Data are for the United States in 1996.
b An astensk (*) means the "figure does not meet standard of reliability or precision:
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Table 2 Number of Selected3 Reported Chronic Conditions 














































































SOURCE: Adams, Hendershot, and Marano (1999), Table 57.
a All conditions with at least 50 chronic conditions per 1,000 persons are included in
this table. 
b Data are for the United States in 1996.
Age and Disability
The relationship between impairment and disability is complicated 
because of the multiplicity of factors, including age, education, and 
experience, that interact with a given impairment to produce work dis 
ability. Isolating the effect of age per se on disability is especially 
complicated because age may be correlated with other factors, notably 
work experience. Berkowitz (1988) provided a good discussion of the 
difficulties of capturing the independent effect of age and also provided
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an unambiguous conclusion: age is related to disability even after con 
trolling for the other determinants of disability.
The general relationship between age and work disability (not con 
trolling for factors such as experience) is documented by Pransky 
(2001, Table 4). According to U.S. Census data from 1989, the per 
centage of persons who report work disability increases steadily with 
age. Thus, while 7.1 percent of 35- to 44-year-olds report work dis 
ability, 10.3 percent of those aged 45-54 and 22.3 percent of those 
aged 55-64 report they are disabled for work. Burkhauser, Daly, and 
Houtenville (2001, Table A2) present data from the Current Population 
Survey which indicate that disability is increasing over time for work 
ers in the same age category. Thus, 6.7 percent of persons aged 35 to 
44 reported they were disabled in 1999, up from 5.9 percent of persons 
in that age category in 1988. Similarly, 10.4 percent of persons aged 
45-54 indicated they were disabled in 1999, up from 9.1 percent of 
persons in that age category in 1988. These and other studies clearly 
demonstrate a general positive relationship between age and work dis 
ability. This association is compounded and partially explained for 
older workers by the general decrease in labor market mobility associ 
ated with advancing age (Hirsch, Macpherson, and Hardy 2000).
Age and Workers' Compensation
The evidence concerning the relationship between age and the 
receipt of workers' compensation benefits is more fragmentary and 
inconclusive. 9 Biddle, Boden, and Reville (2001, Tables 2, 4, and 7 
and Figure 1) have provided evidence that the proportion of workers' 
compensation cases paying permanent partial disability benefits 
increases with age; that earnings losses and injury-related non-employ 
ment for workers receiving permanent partial disability benefits 
increase with age; and that replacement rates (workers' compensation 
benefits as a percent of earnings losses) decline with age. Tattrie 
(2000) has presented some preliminary data suggesting that a young 
workforce has much lower costs per claim than a middle-aged work 
force, but that average costs per claim of older workers are only mod 
estly higher those of middle-aged workers.
Both of these studies provide clues that age is an important factor 
in determining the award and payment of benefits, but they are more
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tantalizing than conclusive about the exact nature of the relationship 
between age and the workers' compensation program. In order to bet 
ter understand the performance of workers' compensation in providing 
benefits to workers in different age categories, it would be useful to 
have data showing for various age categories the frequency of workers' 
compensation claims per 100,000 workers, the average benefits per 
claim, and the total costs of workers' compensation benefits per 
100,000 workers. These data should be disaggregated not only by age 
but also by the nature of the impairment or medical condition causing 
the disability. Specifically, the data should distinguish between disabil 
ity resulting from injuries and disability resulting from the chronic 
conditions identified in Table 2.
We are not suggesting that the patterns of workers' compensation 
payments for different age groups should necessarily match the pat 
terns of impairments or work disability for these age groups. Some of 
the conditions showing an increasing incidence of impairments for 
older persons in Table 2 may reflect the pure effect of aging. Workers' 
compensation, with its work-related test, presumably should not have a 
higher incidence of conditions for older workers that are due solely to 
aging. Yet, conditions that are substantially aggravated by work may 
be more prevalent among older workers. These conditions may be of 
greater concern, particularly in view of the changes in compensability 
standards (described later) that have occurred in some states. Some of 
these conditions, notably disorders involving the back, have tradition 
ally met the compensability tests for workers' compensation benefits. 
If the data indicate that the frequency of compensable back disorders 
does not increase with age, or if the overall frequency of compensable 
back or similar disorders is declining, the results will suggest that 
recent reforms of the eligibility rules for workers' compensation have 
had a particularly deleterious effect on older workers.
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BACKS: CASE STUDY OF A MEDICAL CONDITION WITH 
A HISTORICAL PROBLEM OF APPLYING THE 
WORK-RELATED TESTS
Work-relatedness, as we have noted, is the key to eligibility for 
workers' compensation benefits. The four legal tests described in the 
first section of this chapter are particularly difficult to apply to medical 
conditions resulting from multiple causes. Where impairments are 
caused by workplace exposures combined with personal lifestyle, 
aging, or hereditary factors, workers' compensation systems are con 
fronted with a particularly challenging problem. The chronic impair 
ments that increase with age (see Table 2) are among the conditions 
that are likely to fall into this category. All of these conditions can be 
considered "border-challenging" in the sense that they challenge the 
boundaries of the work-related tests for workers' compensation. Thus, 
a workers' compensation program is likely to have difficulty deciding 
whether the work-related test is met for a heart attack of a worker who 
is under job stress, smokes, is 55 years old, and has a family history of 
heart disease.
The workers' compensation programs in the various states have 
developed a variety of refinements to the work-related tests in order to 
deal with these more complex cases involving medical conditions 
resulting from exposures over time and/or conditions resulting from 
multiple causes. Back injuries provide an interesting case study. An 
examination of the issues pertaining to the compensability of back con 
ditions in workers' compensation programs is instructive because of 
the mixed etiology of many back conditions; the relative importance of 
back cases in the workers' compensation program (they account for 
about 40 percent of all benefit payments); and the prevalence of back 
disorders in older workers. Burton (1992) examined the medical and 
legal approaches to back disorders.
The Medical Approach
Three sources of back disorders can be distinguished from a medi 
cal standpoint. First, there are fractures and dislocations of the back. 
These conditions are relatively uncommon, although they can be quite
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serious. The common causes of fractures and dislocations are trau 
matic events such as direct blows and falls from heights.
Second, there are sprains and strains of the back. The back is the 
most frequently affected part of the body; each year nearly 1 out of 30 
persons of working age experiences a strain or sprain of the back of 
sufficient severity to either require medical care or restricted activity. 
In general, strains and sprains have less serious consequences than 
fractures and dislocations and are likely to result from less obvious 
events.
Third, there are diseases of the back, in which damage to the body 
results from a slowly developing condition rather than from an acute 
traumatic event. However, the symptoms of many diseases can be pre 
cipitated by trauma. Following the approach of Kelsey (1982), dis 
eases can be separated into those involving specific conditions of the 
back or neck (such as prolapsed discs, degenerated discs, and spondy- 
lolisthesis) and those of a more general nature that frequently affect the 
back (such as osteoarthrosis).
Prolapsed intervertebral discs (also known as herniated discs, rup 
tured discs, or "slipped" discs) are one of the most common sources of 
disability among the working-age population. At one time, physical 
trauma was believed to be the only cause of prolapsed discs. However, 
the accepted medical view now is that, although trauma is sometimes 
the precipitating event, many prolapsed discs occur without any ante 
cedent trauma, and trauma is seldom the underlying cause.
Two other diseases affecting the back are disc degeneration and 
spondylolisthesis. A confusing matter for each of these conditions is 
many people with x-ray evidence of the disease have no symptoms. In 
addition to the diseases specifically affecting the back, there are other 
diseases of a general nature that can affect the back, including arthritic 
disorders.
Burton (1992) made four generalizations about the medical 
approach to back disorders.
1) Pain in the back and neck are very common problems.
2) In a large portion of cases of low back and neck pain, a definite 
diagnosis cannot be made. This is partially because the symp 
toms often are not uniquely associated with a particular disease; 
partially because x-ray evidence of a disorder often is associated
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with no symptoms; and partially because a particular patient may 
have multiple disorders.
3) The contribution of the workplace to back disorders is difficult to 
ascertain.
4) The medical view of trauma as a cause varies among the three 
sources of back disorders. For a fracture or dislocation, a trau 
matic event normally is readily identifiable as the likely cause. 
For a strain or sprain, a less significant and therefore less identifi 
able trauma is the likely cause. For diseases, the role of trauma is 
much more problematic. Trauma or mechanical stress seems to 
be a precipitant or perhaps an aggravating factor, rather than the 
underlying cause for diseases affecting the back. The true culprit 
often is age, although factors such as hereditary disposition also 
may be involved.
The Legal Approach
Backs are almost always treated as injuries rather than diseases in 
workers' compensation programs. Consequently, the four legal tests 
for a compensable injury are normally used to decide whether back 
injuries are work-related. The most difficult legal test for claims 
involving backs is the accident requirement.
There appears to be little problem with reconciling the medical 
knowledge concerning fractures and dislocations with the legal 
approach to these back disorders. There is normally an external trau 
matic event that causes the back problem, and the application of the 
accident test is no more difficult than in most workers' compensation 
cases. However, fractures and dislocations represent only a small pro 
portion of the back disorders handled by workers' compensation, so 
there is little consolation to be derived from this congruence of the 
medical and legal approaches.
Among back disorders caused by disease, the legal approach 
makes it easier for herniated discs than for other back disorders to meet 
the accident test. This is largely because the law relies on an outmoded 
view of causation in which external trauma is assumed to be the cause 
of discal herniation. Probably the most serious problem with the legal 
approach, however, is the implicit assumption that herniated discs can
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be differentiated from other sources of back disorders, while medically 
this is often not possible.
Another aspect of the legal approach to back disorders resulting 
from diseases (other than herniated discs) is to hold that the accident 
test is met when unusual exertion is the precipitant of the back disorder 
but to deny compensation when there is only usual exertion. However, 
from the medical standpoint (aside from the few cases involving obvi 
ous trauma), there is little proof that pattern of use causes lower back 
disease. In fact, the conclusion that results from this review of the legal 
rules used to decide which back disorders are work-related (and there 
fore are compensable) is that these rules have little scientific validity.
While backs are the most important medical condition for which 
application of the work-related test causes problems, there are similar 
problems for other medical conditions such as heart disease, stress, and 
repetitive trauma, for which the etiology can involve a mixture of 
hereditary, degenerative, and occupational factors. The higher preva 
lence of these conditions in older workers poses a particular challenge 
for workers' compensation systems.
CHANGING RULES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION: 
RESPONSES TO THE COST INCREASES OF 1984-1991 10
The aggregate costs of workers' compensation, like those of other 
social insurance programs, are primarily affected by four factors: the 
number of claims that are filed, the number that are approved for pay 
ment, the amount of benefits paid in approved claims, and the amount 
of administrative and other costs associated with the provision of bene 
fits. Over half of the state legislatures passed major amendments to 
workers' compensation laws during the period 1989-1997, largely in 
response to organized political opposition by employers and insurers to 
escalating costs. During this period of retrenchment, these legislative 
changes (together with judicial rulings) tightened eligibility rules, low 
ered the amount of benefits paid on some claims, changed mechanisms 
and time periods for payment for permanent disabilities, instituted var 
ious health care cost containment strategies, and heightened require 
ments for applicants' burden of proof. This section describes some of
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these changes and speculates regarding the likely effects of these 
changes on older workers.
The specific changes in the availability of benefits vary consider 
ably among states. Moreover, since each state's program is an interde 
pendent system with its own history of tradeoffs among key provisions, 
it is important to be careful in making generalizations about trends. It 
is also important to note that the specific effects of these changes on 
older workers have not yet been subjected to careful empirical 
research; data based on age of applicants or beneficiaries are not gener 
ally available. It does appear quite likely, however, that many of these 
changes may particularly restrict the access of older workers to work 
ers' compensation benefits. The result of these restrictions is therefore 
likely to be a transfer of disability costs related to occupational morbid 
ity to other social insurance programs or directly to aging workers and 
their families. This is particularly true for those workers who cannot 
meet SSDI eligibility requirements because they are only partially dis 
abled, but who are unable to continue to work at their regular or similar 
wage jobs as a result of their work-related disabilities.
Reducing the Number of Claims in the Workers' 
Compensation System
The development of more restrictive rules governing eligibility for 
benefits has been a prevalent feature of workers' compensation 
changes in the 1990s.
Limitations on coverage when the injury involves 
aggravation of a preexisting condition
Perhaps the most significant development for aging workers is the 
growing restriction on compensation for disabilities when the worker 
suffers from a preexisting health condition. This means that a predis 
position to an injury or illness may bar a worker from receiving work 
ers' compensation benefits for an injury or illness caused by current 
workplace exposures, and that the systems are tightened for those con 
ditions that we have characterized as "border-challenging."
As noted above, under traditional workers' compensation theory, 
compensation did not depend on whether the worker's condition was 
caused, in part, by a prior injury or an underlying chronic condition.
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Thus, a worker who was aging or who had some preexisting nondis- 
abling condition was not barred from coverage for an injury occurring 
at work, even if the underlying condition contributed to the occurrence 
of the injury or to the extent of the resulting disability. Through a vari 
ety of legislative and judicial changes, rules governing compensation 
for preexisting conditions or aggravation have been tightened in many 
jurisdictions.
Most significantly, a number of states have now limited compensa 
tion when the current injury is not the sole or major cause of the dis 
abling condition. These limitations come in a variety of forms: 
requiring that work be the major or primary cause of the disability 
(e.g., Oregon, Florida, South Dakota, and Nevada); excluding from 
compensability injuries for which current work is merely the triggering 
factor (Missouri); and requiring that any preexisting condition be 
aggravated by a discrete accident, rather than chronic work exposures 
(Idaho). A few of these changes specifically target older workers, or 
the conditions that are prevalent among older workers. For example, 
several states now specifically exclude injuries or resulting disabilities 
or impairments from compensability if they are the effects of "the natu 
ral aging process" (e.g., Kentucky, Missouri, and Wyoming), and one 
state requires proof of a discrete injury if there is an underlying aging- 
related condition (New Hampshire). These changes are further 
strengthened both by heightened general evidentiary standards for 
claimants, including the requirements for "objective medical evidence" 
(discussed below) and by stricter rules and shorter time limits for 
reopening prior claims when progression of a condition occurs (e.g., 
West Virginia, Kentucky, Wyoming, and Idaho). These changes have 
resulted in the denial of claims involving cumulative trauma disorders, 
asthma and other respiratory conditions, low back and other muscu- 
loskeletal disorders, and so on."
In Oregon, the revised rule meant that a steel worker who was pre 
disposed to respiratory illness because of underlying airway irritation 
disease and who suffered from an occupationally caused lung disease 
was not entitled to compensation under the state workers' compensa 
tion law. 12 Subsequent developments in Oregon show the interesting 
underbelly of workers' compensation politics and litigation. Because 
the worker was foreclosed from seeking workers' compensation bene 
fits, he was successful in maintaining a common law tort action against
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his employer. The Oregon legislature then responded quickly to 
employers' concerns about this erosion of the usual workers' compen 
sation bar to civil actions, passing a revised state statute that extends 
workers' compensation exclusivity "to all injuries and to diseases, 
symptom complexes or similar conditions" arising out of employment 
"whether or not they are determined to be compensable under this 
chapter." 13 Under this provision, workers with occupationally exacer 
bated conditions are barred from recovering benefits both under the 
workers' compensation program and in a civil law suit, even if the 
injury was due to an employer's negligence. Another worker then chal 
lenged the new statute as an unconstitutional denial of remedies; in 
1997 an Oregon appellate court upheld its constitutionality. 14 As of 
August 28, 2000, this case was still under consideration by the Oregon 
Supreme Court. Similar cases are pending in other states, including 
Idaho. 15
In addition, second-injury funds (instituted initially to promote the 
employment of war veterans) historically provided insurance coverage 
for disability that resulted from the combined effects of a new injury 
and preexisting conditions. Over the past 20 years, costs associated 
with second injuries rose, and employers and insurers had little incen 
tive to defend against claims that would be charged to these funds. 
These funds were generally underfunded, but reformulated accounting 
principles forced states to recognize the magnitude of future unfunded 
liabilities. In the 1990s, the private insurance industry led a lobbying 
campaign for the elimination of the funds. Serious underfunding, 
when combined with unsubstantiated arguments that disability dis 
crimination laws have made these funds obsolete, resulted in the aboli 
tion or severe restriction of second injury funds in a number of states 
(e.g., Colorado, Utah, Florida, Minnesota, and New Mexico). To the 
extent that the disability discrimination laws do in fact result in 
increased hiring of previously injured workers, the elimination of the 
financial protection offered by second-injury funds means that employ 
ers might face increased workers' compensation liability for aggrava 
tion of old injuries or chronic conditions. With the abolition of these 
funds, employers have more incentive both to fight individual claims 
and to argue in the political arena for reduced workers' compensation 
coverage for injuries previously compensated by these funds.
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Although these changes vary in their scope, they all have the same 
effect: they limit the liability of workers' compensation systems when 
a worker brings to his or her current employment an increased level of 
risk of injury or disability. The likely result may be the exclusion of 
claims by workers, often older workers, with preexisting chronic mus- 
culoskeletal and pulmonary conditions and underlying chronic diseases 
that predispose them to injury and illness caused by work.
Procedural and evidentiary changes in claims processing that 
restrict compensability
More subtle, but equally restrictive, changes are occurring in the 
approach to the evaluation of evidence in many state workers' compen 
sation systems. For example, statutory changes in a number of states 
now require that a claimant prove that his or her injury was both prima 
rily work-related and that the resulting medical condition can be docu 
mented by "objective medical" evidence. These heightened 
requirements appear to be rooted both in a desire to save money and in 
a distrust of subjective reports of injuries by claimants. A broad 
requirement for objective evidence excludes from coverage those 
claims based upon the subjective reports of patients that cannot be sub 
stantiated by objective medical testing. Debilitating musculoskeletal 
injuries involving soft tissue damage and reports of pain and psycho 
logical impairment may be excluded from compensation based upon 
this requirement.
In addition, in some jurisdictions, claimants are being required to 
meet increasingly strict burdens of proof. In a landmark 1994 case 
under the federal black lung compensation law, the U.S. Supreme 
Court threw out the Department of Labor's "true doubt rule" under 
which the claimant won if the medical evidence offered by the claimant 
and the coal operator were equal in weight. The court ruled that, due to 
requirements in the Administrative Procedures Act, claimants must 
prove their cases by a "preponderance of the evidence." 16 Statutory 
amendments to some state statutes now require, either in all claims or 
for specifically delineated ones, that claimants meet this preponderance 
standard or, for some injuries or diseases, the even more difficult stan 
dard of "clear and convincing evidence." Because many compensation 
programs gave claimants the benefit of the doubt in close or marginal
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cases in the past, these changes could prove to be significant, particu 
larly for workers with "border-challenging" claims.
The general tightening of eligibility and compensability standards 
appears to have a predictable, but difficult to document, effect on the 
defense of claims. All over the country, claimants and their representa 
tives claim that workers' compensation insurance carriers are more 
likely to controvert or contest claims and less likely to offer what 
claimants view as reasonable settlements. The Workers Compensation 
Research Institute report regarding Massachusetts' experience supports 
this claim (Gardner, Telles, and Moss 1996). Similarly, a study by phy 
sicians at the Mount Sinai Center for Environmental Medicine in New 
York City found that 81 percent of workers diagnosed in their occupa 
tional medicine clinic with occupational cumulative trauma disorders 
had their claims contested or received no response from the insurance 
carrier when the claim was filed (Herbert, Janeway, and Schechter 
1997). Thus, even in those jurisdictions that nominally compensate for 
these injuries, many claims go uncompensated. This trend may further 
magnify the statutory and judicial changes that restrict workers' access 
to benefits for work-related injuries.
On the other hand, the interpretation of what constitutes objective 
evidence, an excluded preexisting condition, or the preponderance of 
the evidence is ultimately up to the courts. Judicial interpretations vary 
and may not always prove to be as restrictive as the statutory language 
appears to demand. 17 It is therefore difficult to assess fully the impact 
of these statutory changes without further study.
Changes in compensability rules for particular conditions
As noted above, workers' compensation systems have often failed 
to compensate occupational diseases. Because of changes in the state 
laws during the period following the 1972 report of the National Com 
mission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, claims for condi 
tions involving common physical and mental complaints (such as back 
or other nonacute musculoskeletal injuries and mental stress) rose in 
many states. As we have noted, these conditions challenge the bound 
aries of the traditional work-relatedness test and are often caused by 
chronic, rather than acute, exposures at work. They sometimes also 
involve a higher degree of medical ambiguity than do many acute inju 
ries, because they are not easily diagnosed using clearly objective med-
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ical tests. In those states in which compensation for these conditions 
was paid, however, insurers and employers regarded them as a primary 
cost-driver to the system. Perhaps not surprisingly, these types of con 
ditions became the focus of some attempts to exclude conditions in 
order to limit aggregate workers' compensation costs.
The two primary areas of exclusion have been psychological inju 
ries and cumulative trauma disorders (CTDs), also known as repetitive 
stress injuries. In the case of CTDs, as the reported incidence of inju 
ries caused by repetitive trauma skyrocketed, some state legislatures 
responded by tightening the eligibility standards for compensation. 
This was done using a variety of mechanisms: heightened burdens of 
proof; more specific causation requirements; or requirements for posi 
tive findings on specific diagnostic tests. In the most notorious case, 
the state supreme court in Virginia ruled that repetitive injury claims, 
including both carpal tunnel syndrome and noise induced hearing loss, 
were simply noncompensable under the language of the state workers' 
compensation statute. In response to the political reaction to these 
decisions, the Virginia legislature amended the workers' compensation 
statute to provide nominal, but very narrow, coverage for these condi 
tions. 18 It is important to note, however, that this is not a universal 
trend. The majority of states do provide some compensation for these 
conditions; in fact, in 1997, Oklahoma added cumulative trauma to the 
statutory list of terms denoting compensable injuries.
Stress and other psychological injuries present a more extreme pic 
ture. A number of states have made claims for psychological condi 
tions (in the absence of a physical injury) noncompensable. In a much 
smaller number of states, restrictions on compensation for psychologi 
cal injury even include those that develop as a result of physical injury 
and impairment. These restrictions have been designed in a number of 
ways. Some state laws simply now provide that purely psychological 
("mental-mental") claims are noncompensable (e.g., Wyoming, Okla 
homa, South Dakota, and West Virginia). A second approach restricts 
the availability of compensation by imposing heightened standards of 
causation or increased burdens of proof. A third approach reduces the 
amount of benefits: in Colorado, benefits for stress or mental injury are 
now limited to 12 weeks, with a maximum weekly benefit of 50 per 
cent of the state's average weekly wage.
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Several states explicitly limit mental-mental claims to situations 
not involving lawful personnel actions or to situations involving 
extraordinary or unusual circumstances (e.g., Hawaii, Connecticut, 
South Carolina, California, Idaho, Missouri, and New York). Psycho 
logical reactions to extremely stressful work situations that are not ille 
gal or unusual are therefore noncompensable in these states. Thus, 
while psychological sequelae from a physical injury remain compens- 
able in most jurisdictions, psychological symptomatology caused by 
events at work that do not involve physical injury are often no longer 
compensable.
The motivation for these limitations is clear. Workers' responses to 
physical and mental stressors at work are subject both to very individu 
alized real responses and to serious measurement problems. The costs 
are therefore both potentially large and uncertain. The filing of large 
numbers of claims involving CTDs and stress was a relatively new phe 
nomenon and appeared to be growing quickly in some jurisdictions. 
By changing the legal rules, claims are made to disappear from the 
workers' compensation programs. The result is that workers' compen 
sation is eliminated as a primary payer for significant numbers of dis 
abilities that are work-related, thereby externalizing costs from the 
workers' compensation system.
Restrictions on compensability of permanent total 
disability cases
Workers' compensation provides benefits for both long and short- 
term disabilities. The political and economic pressure to reduce costs 
has also been directed at the actuarially defined "long tail" of workers' 
compensation claims those benefits that may continue for years. 
Benefits for permanent disabilities, including permanent total disabil 
ity, are the major cost drivers in the system. The assault on these bene 
fits has taken two forms. First, eligibility has been restricted through 
the mechanisms described above and through a more direct assault on 
permanent total disability benefits. Second, as described in the next 
section, payment has been tightened on those claims that are approved.
Permanent total disability (PTD) benefits are generally paid to dis 
abled workers for life. 19 In view of the relatively high cost of a life 
time award, it is not surprising that state legislatures have attempted to 
reduce these costs. Prior to recent developments, many states had
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adopted the "odd-lot" doctrine, which allowed for the consideration of 
a claimant's age, education and skills in addition to the nature of injury 
in determining eligibility for benefits. Odd-lot workers were generally 
older workers with a combination of health impairments and a history 
of working in manual industries. This is the same population, for 
example, that may qualify for SSDI benefits under the more lenient 
provisions for workers who are over 55 years old and have limited edu 
cation and a long work history in manual labor. 20 Recently, many 
states have significantly restricted the use of the odd lot doctrine, most 
adversely affecting older workers. In addition, some states, like Flor 
ida, now require a "catastrophic" injury before a worker can be consid 
ered for a PTD award. Others have established impairment thresholds 
requiring the injury to result in a specified and very high level of func 
tional impairment before a worker can be considered for a PTD award. 
Many states have narrowed the definition of what it means to be perma 
nently and totally disabled by abandoning the claimant's prior work as 
a reference point. In Minnesota, the injured worker must be incapable 
of working at any occupation that produces an income; in Colorado, it 
is inability to earn a wage; in Oregon, a gainful occupation is defined as 
one that pays the minimum wage.
The results of these eligibility restrictions for PTD benefits have 
sometimes been startling. For example, in West Virginia, the adoption 
of a threshold requirement that a claimant have at least 50 percent 
functional impairment (within the definition in the Guides to the Eval 
uation of Permanent Impairment [American Medical Association 
1993]) resulted in a 97 percent reduction in the rate of permanent total 
disability awards, from 117 to 5.8 per 100,000 workers in the first two 
years after enactment (BNA 1997, p. 276). 21 This spurred legislative 
action in 1999 that relaxed the eligibility threshold to 40 percent func 
tional impairment. The effects of this change have not yet been deter 
mined.
Underfiling of claims and expansion of fraud prosecutions
State statutes during this period also expanded criminal liability for 
fraud. Substantial, and perhaps excessive, media attention has been 
focused on claimants who are viewed as illegally seeking to obtain or 
extend benefits. Often, these articles assert that large numbers of
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claims in workers' compensation involve fraud, resulting in a broad 
stigmatization of workers who file for benefits.22
Of course, the expansion and publicizing of fraud prosecutions of 
claimants deters intentionally fraudulent claims, but it also may dis 
courage the filing of legitimate claims. Current research indicates that 
large numbers of workers with occupationally caused disabilities do 
not file claims for workers' compensation (Biddle et al. 1998; Pransky 
et al. 1999; Michaels 1998; Morse et al. 1998; and Morse, Dillon, and 
Warren 2000). The decision by a worker not to seek benefits is a com 
plex one and has been found to be affected by the severity of the injury, 
the worker's level of knowledge about workers' compensation, and the 
worker's own fears regarding how the employer and others will react to 
the filing of a claim (Morse, Dillon, and Warren 2000). Older workers 
may have more access to alternative benefits; they are more likely to 
qualify for SSDI due to the consideration of age in the evaluation pro 
cess and they are more likely to have vested pension benefits due to 
duration of employment. To the extent that other programs lack the 
same level of stigmatization, workers may preferentially seek these 
alternative benefits, thereby shifting costs from workers' compensation 
to these other programs.
Reductions in the Amount Paid in Approved Claims
Reduction in the costs of approved claims is primarily being 
achieved through reductions in the amount that is paid for permanent 
disabilities. In general, weekly benefit rates have not been reduced, in 
large part because most states now provide that maximum weekly ben 
efits automatically increase each year as the state's average weekly 
wage increases.23
Reductions in payment of permanent partial disability benefits
A critical difference between workers' compensation and other 
social insurance programs is the availability of permanent partial dis 
ability benefits, designed to compensate the worker for loss of income 
resulting from the injury or illness although the worker remains active 
in the labor market. These benefits, which typically are the largest 
component of disability benefit costs, were a primary target for reform
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in the 1990s. These changes have particular consequence to older 
workers, whose injuries tend to be more severe (Wegman 2000).
Three patterns of reform are evident. First, there have been reduc 
tions in the duration or weekly amount of the PPD benefits. For exam 
ple, in Connecticut, an aggregate 27 percent reduction in PPD benefits 
was achieved in 1993 by reducing the nominal replacement rate from 
80 percent to 75 percent of spendable earnings; by reducing the dura 
tion for scheduled injuries (e.g., the number of weeks for loss of a leg 
was reduced from 238 to 155 weeks); and by reducing the maximum 
duration of nonscheduled PPD benefits from 780 to 520 weeks. Other 
states that curtailed the maximum number of weeks of PPD benefits 
include Massachusetts, Florida, and Maine. The result of these reduc 
tions is both to decrease the duration of compensation awards in the 
more serious cases and to reduce the value of claims when they are set 
tled early in litigation. According to a study by the Workers Compen 
sation Research Institute, these and related changes in Massachusetts 
drove the average lump sum settlement from $27,040 to $18,860 
(Gardner, Telles, and Moss 1996, p. 98).
Second, there was a substantial curtailment of the wage-loss 
approach to calculation of benefits in the 1990s. Pennsylvania enacted 
legislation in 1996 that reduced the employer's responsibilities to offer 
an actual employment opportunity in order to avoid responsibility for 
wage-loss benefits. Florida had been viewed as a pioneer in 1979 when 
it introduced a two-track system for PPD benefits, one track for impair 
ment benefits if the worker experienced an actual physical loss of a 
body member and another track that could be paid concurrently if the 
worker had actual earnings losses due to the injury. During the 1980s, 
the maximum duration for the wage-loss benefits was 525 weeks. In 
1990, the maximum duration of the wage-loss benefits was seriously 
curtailed (which reduced the actuarial valuation of the PPD benefits by 
48.4 percent). And in 1994, the impairment benefits track was elimi 
nated, the wage-loss benefits were restricted to a few workers with very 
serious injuries, and the overall duration for all types of benefits in PPD 
cases was limited to 401 weeks. The actuarial valuation indicated 
these 1994 reforms reduced the Florida PPD benefits by another 16.7 
percent (NCCI 2000, p. 101).
A third pattern in PPD reform in the 1990s was to move toward 
benefits that are primarily determined on the basis of the assessment of
68 Burton and Spieler
the extent of impairment, rather than on the basis of an evaluation of 
the extent of loss of earning capacity (or loss of actual earnings). The 
claimed rationale was that the impairment ratings were more objective 
and thus less prone to litigation. The switch to an impairment-only rat 
ing system was often associated with adoption of the AMA's Guides to 
the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment as the tool for assessment of 
impairment. The Guides relies primarily on purportedly objective 
medical testing but produces inconsistent ratings that may result in 
devaluation of common disabling injuries for workers. (Spieler et al. 
2000) The precise effect of the Guides' ratings has not been studied, 
but claimants' advocates assert that the adoption of the impairment- 
only PPD system is accompanied by reductions in the amount of PPD 
benefits paid.
Reductions in benefits based on receipt of other income
Significantly for older workers, many states now mandate that dis 
ability benefits be reduced by other income, most commonly Social 
Security Old Age benefits, or be terminated when the claimant reaches 
retirement age or becomes eligible to collect SSOA benefits.24 These 
offset or termination provisions, which are designed to reduce the cost 
of workers' compensation costs for employers, generally make no 
allowance for the reduction in retirement income resulting from the 
loss of wages associated with the disability. This means that workers 
who leave the workforce with reduced old age or pension benefits have 
their total income further reduced, often dollar for dollar, by the cuts in 
workers' compensation payments. These restrictions have been chal 
lenged in many states; state courts are split on whether this reduction or 
termination of workers' compensation benefits constitutes an unconsti 
tutional age-based classification.25
Medical Care Cost Containment
During the 1980s, workers' compensation health care continued to 
be paid entirely by the employer and to rely primarily on fee-for-ser- 
vice reimbursement arrangements with medical practitioners. During 
this same period, general group health insurance adopted and expanded 
a variety of cost containment strategies. The results of the disparate 
rules were that medical expenses for comparable conditions were con-
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siderably higher in workers' compensation than in the general health 
care system. Such disparities provided an incentive for providers to 
classify marginal conditions (such as backs) as work-related in order to 
receive higher payments.
Since about 1990, because of a perception that workers' compen 
sation was experiencing inordinate rates of increase in health care 
costs, many states made changes in the health care component of their 
workers' compensation programs. These included the adoption of "tra 
ditional" approaches to limiting health care costs in workers' compen 
sation (e.g., fee schedules, limits on the choice of treating physicians 
and on the amount or duration of health care); the introduction of man 
aged care networks; and some movement toward "24-hour coverage" 
which integrated workers' compensation health care with other cover 
age (Burton 1997, pp. 141-48).26 Most of these changes were designed 
to reduce the costs of health care delivery in workers' compensation 
and the cost shifting to workers' compensation from other payers. The 
likely results of these changes include the transfer of health care costs 
to the worker and to other health payers; decreases in medical costs in 
workers' compensation; increases in the control that the insurer or 
employer has over medical management; and, conversely, decreases in 
the worker's own control of his or her health care.
Some of these developments may have particular impact on older 
workers. For example, many states now restrict employees' choice of 
physician for both treatment and evaluation of workplace injuries, 
either directly or through employer-selected managed care net 
works.27 In these instances, the employer-selected physician may con 
trol both treatment and assessment of the worker for continuation of 
weekly cash benefits. Not surprisingly, organized labor and many 
workers argue that restrictions on employee choice of providers have 
an adverse impact on the injured worker, damage the provider-patient 
relationship, and lead to inferior treatment and premature return to 
work. This may be especially true for older workers with chronic 
health conditions, who are required to seek treatment from employer- 
chosen physicians for health problems with complex etiology.
In addition, there has been considerable concern and political agi 
tation regarding the issue of confidentiality of workers' compensation 
medical records. Under pressure from employers, some states have 
explicitly restricted the scope of confidentiality of medical records
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when an employee files for workers' compensation benefits, including 
allowing both oral and written communications between the employer 
or insurer and the employees' physician without a release by the 
employee (e.g., West Virginia) and requiring the release of all medical 
information relating to arguably relevant preexisting conditions (e.g., 
Nevada).
The effects of expansion of communication among third parties 
about a worker's health status have not been studied. It is however rea 
sonable to speculate that broad elimination of medical confidentiality 
may have several effects. On the one hand, providing the health care 
provider and employer with better information may promote appropri 
ate disability management and return to work. On the other hand, this 
erosion of confidentiality may discourage some workers from filing for 
workers' compensation benefits, particularly those with chronic health 
conditions who prefer not to reveal their health status to their employ 
ers. This last group of workers is likely to include an overrepresenta- 
tion of older workers.
Rise of Disability Management and Return-to-work Programs
Like the interest in expanding return to work for SSDI/SSI recipi 
ents, there has been a significant shift to a focus on disability manage 
ment and "return-to-work" programs in workers' compensation. In the 
past, whether a disabled worker would return to his or her old job, or to 
any job at all, was solely within the discretion of employers and was 
not viewed as the concern of workers' compensation programs. In 
contrast, work participation by disabled workers is now actively 
encouraged.
Disability management can accomplish two critical goals: it can 
save costs by decreasing both the length of time a worker is out of work 
and the higher permanent disability rating that is thought to result from 
longer absence from work, and it can improve quality of life for work 
ers by increasing successful postinjury work participation. Clearly, 
employers and insurers are economically motivated to decrease work 
ers' compensation liability by encouraging or forcing employees to 
return to work. Light duty programs are often designed specifically to 
bring workers back to work, often at temporary job assignments, after 
initial recovery from an occupational injury. In general, employers and
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insurers believe that earlier return to work will limit both the duration 
of temporary benefits and any psychological "overlay" which may 
result in increased permanent disability.
Not surprisingly, the strong economic motivation for insurers and 
employers to focus on rapid return to work makes many labor union 
officials and injured workers' groups wary of these developments. In 
many states, an offer of a job, even before the worker has reached max 
imum medical improvement after an injury, will lead to termination of 
temporary total disability benefits; in states that measure permanent 
disability based upon wage loss or loss of earning capacity, the job 
offer may limit permanent disability benefits as well. Not all states 
require that the job offered be an appropriate one that the worker can 
perform. Workers and their unions have charged that injured workers 
are asked to resume duties they are not yet physically capable of per 
forming.
Legal changes have both supported and reflected this shift toward 
disability management. Some of these changes are internal to workers' 
compensation statutes: expanding rehabilitation opportunities, making 
retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims actionable, and 
establishing both incentives and requirements for returning an injured 
worker to work. Other legal developments, outside of the workers' 
compensation laws, have both encouraged and reinforced these trends. 
Most importantly, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), state 
disability discrimination laws, and the Family and Medical Leave Act 
now regulate employers' treatment of injured workers. Workers with 
disabilities caused by work-related injuries and diseases are within the 
potential class of employees who receive the protection of these new 
laws. The ADA clearly supports the return-to-work concepts now 
espoused in workers' compensation. 28 However, the overall effective 
ness of the ADA in promoting employment of occupationally injured 
workers is currently in doubt (Acemoglu and Angrist 1998; American 
Bar Association, Commission on Mental and Physical Disabilities 
1998 and 2000; Colker 1999; DeLeire 1997).
The focus on return to work supports the decrease in the availabil 
ity of permanent disability benefits. It may therefore affect older work 
ers in two ways. First, if it results in successful extension of worklife 
through appropriate workplace accommodations, it will tend to expand 
both work earnings and retirement income levels. On the other hand,
72 Burton and Spieler
to the extent that it results in reductions in benefits without successful 
extensions of work, it will erode the cushion provided by workers' 
compensation benefits to those who face reduced earnings as a result of 
partial disabilities.
EFFECTS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
DEVELOPMENTS ON OLDER WORKERS AND OTHER 
SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS
The foregoing summary suggests that several factors must be con 
sidered when analyzing the adequacy of workers' compensation pro 
grams for older workers. First, workers' compensation has never 
provided compensation for all occupationally induced disabilities, nor 
has workers' compensation fully replaced lost wages when a worker is 
eligible for benefits. Workers' compensation is most adequate, from 
the standpoint of both eligibility and benefit rates, for workers who suf 
fer short term, acute injuries. Occupational diseases, chronic condi 
tions resulting from long-term job exposures, and conditions that are 
caused by multiple factors have never been fully compensated by these 
programs.
Second, under recent workers' compensation developments in 
some states, the likelihood that workers with chronic impairments will 
replace their lost wages through workers' compensation appears to be 
shrinking. The reductions are due to changes in eligibility rules, 
changes in the approach to permanent disability, and reductions in ben 
efits on receipt of other old age benefits.
Third, the combined effect of the various changes in compensabil- 
ity of conditions will have their greatest impact on conditions that are 
most medically ambiguous. Musculoskeletal conditions resulting from 
the wearing down of a worker's body and chronic diseases such as 
hearing loss, arthritis, respiratory ailments, and heart disease are all 
more prevalent in older workers. These conditions involve questions 
regarding causation; all are subject to challenge based on tightened evi 
dentiary standards; many cannot be clearly diagnosed and evaluated 
using "objective" medical tests; and several have been the specific tar 
get of tightened eligibility standards. Aging workers are overrepre-
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sented among people with chronic disabilities and diseases that are 
partially work-induced. Restrictions on compensation are therefore 
likely to affect older workers more adversely.
Fourth, aging workers face barriers in the labor market when they 
lose their jobs. The job mobility of all disabled workers is also limited. 
It is certainly likely that aging workers with disabilities face even 
greater barriers. Erosion of medical confidentiality, increases in stig- 
matization of workers who file for benefits, and generalized concern 
about labor market mobility may all act to increase the reluctance of 
aging workers to file claims for workers' compensation benefits, partic 
ularly if other benefits are available to cover their medical costs.
Fifth, the decline of long-tailed indemnity benefits means that 
workers' compensation is unlikely to be a useful source for wage and 
pension replacement for aging workers in the coming period. This 
problem is exacerbated by the practice of compromise and release, 
which allows for lump-sum, non-annuity payments to workers in order 
to end the adjudication of a claim.
Sixth, reductions in the availability of permanent disability benefits 
(both through eligibility and duration/amount restrictions) result in a 
loss of replacement income for injured workers. To the extent that this 
affects workers who may be eligible for SSDI or SSI, the federal pro 
grams become the primary payers for these disabilities.
Seventh, state legislatures and those who lobby for restrictions in 
workers' compensation benefits focus only on the costs of workers' 
compensation programs and not on the costs that are externalized to 
other programs (or to workers and their families). This means that 
there is little attention paid in the states to the effects of these legisla 
tive changes on other, primarily federal, benefit programs.
The implications of these factors for older workers and for other 
social and private insurance programs are troubling. Like other social 
insurance programs, workers' compensation was designed to provide 
protection against poverty and catastrophic losses. But more than other 
programs, workers' compensation was also expected to provide dis 
abled workers with a substantial proportion of the income lost as a 
result of the work-related injury or illness. This latter goal is reflected 
in various program design elements: relatively high maximum weekly 
benefits, provision of partial disability benefits for people who con 
tinue to work, a benefit structure designed to replace a substantial pro-
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portion of lost earnings, and so on. Currently, we are concerned that 
workers' compensation may be increasingly failing to meet both goals. 
Because of changes in compensability standards, workers suffering 
from occupationally induced morbidity may not meet the work-related- 
ness tests to qualify for benefits, and in a number of jurisdictions, per 
manent disability benefits designed to cushion the economic impact 
of injuries for workers have been significantly reduced.
As a result, workers may be less likely to be able to retain their 
economic status in the face of work-caused disabilities. To some 
extent, other programs will fill the gap. But many workers who are not 
totally disabled will face reductions in income that are not compen 
sated. To the extent that workers' compensation reduces the availabil 
ity of benefits to workers who cannot qualify for SSDI or other 
benefits, the costs associated with these disabilities are transferred to 
the workers (and their families). The reductions in benefits after dis 
abled workers reach the age of 65 may mean that levels of poverty for 
these workers will grow, since workers' compensation benefits will no 
longer compensate for the reductions in pension and SSOA benefits 
that were caused by the reduced lifetime earnings resulting from work 
place injuries.
In addition, although conclusive evidence is not available, there are 
some data that suggest workers turn to SSDI for income support when 
workers' compensation benefits are unavailable. 29 The proportion of 
workers with occupationally caused disabilities may therefore rise in 
the DI program. This means that the SSA expectation that workers 
whose disability is occupationally caused will find benefits elsewhere 
may be increasingly misplaced. Similarly, the growing restrictions on 
both compensability and medical care are likely to transfer health care 
costs from workers' compensation to Medicare (if the worker qualifies 
for SSDI) or to Medicaid (if the worker is impoverished or does not 
qualify for Medicare). From the standpoint of injured workers, the 
effect of this is mixed. On the one hand, SSDI benefits tend to be lower 
and the disability eligibility requirements have historically been stricter 
than in workers' compensation programs. On the other, applicants for 
DI benefits are unlikely to face equivalent resistance from employers or 
carriers to their claims, and once eligibility for SSDI benefits has been 
established, the benefits are more secure and the health care provided is
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more comprehensive than that available through workers' compensa 
tion.
Costs are also likely to be shifted from workers' compensation to 
employment-based insurance programs offered by employers. This 
includes short- and long-term disability and general health plans. 
Since the premium costs of these programs tend to be sensitive to spe 
cific employer experience, this may then encourage large employers to 
expand the integration of benefit and disability plans, including work 
ers' compensation, in order to gain control over the firm's total expen 
ditures on disability.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the recent decline in workers' compensation costs and 
benefits in part reflects a decline in the adequacy and availability of 
these benefits. In particular, workers in the second half of their work 
lives are likely to be adversely affected by these declines. Although 
workers' compensation will continue to provide adequate compensa 
tion for acute short-term injuries, the availability of benefits for perma 
nent disabilities, particularly those associated with aging, appears to be 
declining in many states. This trend is likely to shift additional eco 
nomic burdens to other social and private insurance systems. To the 
extent that other social insurance programs fail to provide replacement 
of a substantial proportion of earnings lost due to partial disability, 
these costs are being transferred to workers and their families.
Notes
We appreciate the assistance of several persons who provided comments or other assis 
tance during the preparation of this chapter: Keith Bateman, Leslie Boden, Ann Clay- 
ton, Alan Ducatman, Donald Elisburg, H. Allan Hunt, William Johnson, Barbara 
Markiewicz, and Greg Wagner. We absolve them of responsibility for any remaining 
errors of fact or analysis.
1. A more extensive description of the program and additional references can be 
found in Spieler and Burton (1998).
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2. We use the term border-challenging for these often chronic conditions with com 
plex etiology, in the sense that these conditions are on the border of the traditional 
definitions of compensable conditions.
3. Three exceptions to the general rule are the following: 1) the doctrine of the "odd- 
lot" worker (which considers age as a component of evaluation of eligibility for 
permanent total disability benefits); 2) the reduction or termination of cash bene 
fits when a worker receives Social Security Old Age benefits, reaches a particular 
age (usually 65), or is eligible for a pension or other benefits; and 3) the use of age 
adjustments to the ratings assigned to particular impairments (e.g., respiratory dis 
eases and hearing loss). The first two of these exceptions are discussed in the 
fourth section of this chapter.
4. Countrywide data indicate there are 6,837 workers' compensation cases per 
100,000 workers, of which only 7 per 100,000 workers involve permanent total 
disability benefits (NCCI 2000, Exhibit XII). The average total benefits per case 
(including cash and medical benefits) for all workers' compensation cases are 
$5,244, while the average total benefits for permanent total disability cases are 
$513,284 (NCCI 2000, Exhibit XI).
5. The Workers Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) has published a series of 
administrative inventories of state workers' compensation programs. One of the 
measures of litigiousness used in these studies is requests for workers' compensa 
tion agency intervention to resolve contested cases involving cash (or indemnity) 
benefits Ballantyne and Shiman (1997, p. 75) summarized the results for 11 
states the WCRI has recently studied. The low end of the range was from North 
Carolina, where 9 percent of indemnity claims involved a hearing request; similar 
results were found for Wisconsin (10 percent). States where litigation (as mea 
sured by agency intervention to resolve disputes) was most extensive were Wash 
ington (40 percent of state-fund indemnity claims involved a protest filing), 
Missouri (43 percent of indemnity claims involved at least one meeting at the 
agency), New Jersey (35 to 55 percent of indemnity claims involve one or more 
claim petition filings), and Illinois (68 percent of indemnity claims involved 
agency intervention).
6. Thomason and Burton (1993) surveyed the limited literature on the use of com 
promise and release agreements. One of their conclusions (p. S12) is that the evi 
dence "suggests that claimants who settle for lump sum awards are in a more 
precarious financial position after their injury compared to claimants who do not 
settle."
7. The data in Table 2 are inconsistent with the following statement in Bernard 
(1997, p. B-2): "The prevalence of MSDs [musculoskeletal disorders] increases as 
people enter their working years. By the age of 35, most people have had their 
first episode of back pain . . . Once in their working years (ages 25 to 65), how 
ever, the prevalence is relatively consistent..."
8. Pransky (2000) provides additional evidence (in his Table 2) of "the dramatic age- 
related increase in prevalence of selected chronic diseases and the number of per 
sons with . . any limitations in ability to do usual life activities."
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9. The relationship is particularly elusive because of the general underreporting of 
work-related health problems (discussed earlier) that are likely to be especially 
prevalent among older workers.
10. Much of the information in this section is drawn from Berreth (1992, 1994, 1996, 
1997), Brown (1993, 1995), Tinsley (1990, 1991), and Whittington (1998, 1999, 
2000).
11. In Idaho, for example, the Supreme Court has upheld denial of benefits in the fol 
lowing types of claims where there was a preexisting condition: carpal tunnel syn 
drome (Reyes v. Kit Manufacturing Co. [Id. 1998], Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren 
IDGAS Enterprises, 879 P.2d 592 [Id. 1994]), asthma (Combes v. State of Idaho, 
ISIF, 942 P.2d 554 [Id. 1997], second appeal pending, Idaho Supreme Court No. 
25407); lumbar back pain (Demain v. Bruce McLaughlin Logging, 979 P2d 655 
[Id. 1999]); and flexor tenosynovitis secondary to underlying diabetes (Nycum v. 
Triangle Dairy, 712 P.2d 559 [Id. 1985]).
12. Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 888 P.2d 544 (Or. 1995). The com 
pensation bureau had denied him workers' compensation benefits because "his 
work was not the 'major cause' of his condition and, thus, he did not suffer 'com- 
pensable injury' within meaning of exclusivity provision."
13. 1996 Oregon Rev. Statutes, Title 51, Section 656.018.
14. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer Inc., 941 P.2d 1065 (Or. App. 1997), appeal 
granted 977 P.2d 1170 (Or. Nov 24, 1998); pending as of August 28, 2000.
15 Combes v. State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, Idaho Supreme 
Court No. 25407; pending as of August 28, 2000.
16. Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S.Ct. 2251 (1994).
17. See, for example, some of the cases decided by the Oregon appellate courts under 
the more restrictive standards that were adopted by the legislature: Conner v. B&S 
Logging, 957 P.2d 159 (Or. App. 1998); Beverly Enterprises v. Michl, 945 P.2d 
658 (Or. App. 1997); SAIF Corp. v. Wilhamson, 882 P.2d 621 (Or. App. 1994) (a 
finding of impairment may be based on a physically verifiable impairment or on 
the physician's evaluation of the worker's description of the pain that she is expe 
riencing.)
18. Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 467 S.E.2d 795 (Va. 1996), carpal tunnel; Allied 
Fibers v. Rhodes, as: 23 Va. 101, 474 S.E.2d 829 (Va. 1996), noise-induced hear 
ing loss. The amended statute is Virginia Code Sec. 65.2-400(c) and 65.2-401.
19. It is important to note the following. First, PTD awards have always been rela 
tively infrequent in workers' compensation programs (see note 4). These data 
may, however, be somewhat misleading, since the frequent practice of settling 
claims (termed compromise and release agreements or lump sum settlements) 
often means that awards for significant disabilities are classified as permanent par 
tial disability benefits, even when the workers' medical and economic conditions 
could justify permanent total disability awards. Second, although the majority of 
states provide for lifetime weekly benefits, some states set a maximum period of 
eligibility for PTD benefits even before the recent legislative changes in these 
types of benefits.
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20. According to §608 of the 1997 Social Security Handbook (13th ed.),
two special provisions may establish disability for persons who are unable to 
perform any of their past relevant work.
A. A finding of disability may be made where the individual:
1. Has long-time work experience (35 years or more) limited to 
arduous, unskilled, physical labor; and
2. Has little education; and
3. Has a significant impairment that prevents performance of 
the previous kind of work; and
4. Has not demonstrated ability to do lighter work. 
B. A finding of disability may also be made where the individual:
1. Has no past relevant work; and
2. Is of advanced age (55 years or older); and
3. Has less than a high school education; and 
4 Has an impairment that is more than "not severe" (see §606). 
However, considering age, education, and work experience, a younger or bet 
ter educated worker, or one who has transferable skills to work that could be per 
formed despite the impairment(s), might not be considered disabled. Although 
advancing age may affect a person's capacity to work in competition with others, 
unemployment due primarily to age (i.e., employers may not wish to hire older 
workers) does not show inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by rea 
son of a medical impairment.
21. The rate of PTD awards in West Virginia prior to the 1995 legislative amendments 
far exceeded the national average of 7 per 100,000 (NCCI 2000, Exhibit XE). 
The rate of PTD awards after the changes was below this national average. As 
discussed in note 19, these data can be somewhat misleading (Spieler 1995).
22. Burton and Thomason (1993) provided a dispassionate critique of a series of arti 
cles in the New York Times that alleged there was a "vast amount of fraud" in the 
workers' compensation system.
23 In January 1990, 32 of 51 jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) had 
maximum weekly benefits for temporary total disability that were at least 100 per 
cent of the jurisdiction's average weekly wage; by January 1998, 34 jurisdictions 
met this standard. Again, this is not a universal development. Connecticut and 
Massachusetts cut the nominal replacement rate for temporary total disability 
benefits, and several states (including Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Texas) 
reduced the maximum number of weeks of temporary total disability benefits 
(usually to a limit of 104 weeks).
24. There are specific federal rules regarding offsets between SSDI and state workers' 
compensation systems for workers who are below the age of SSOA eligibility (see 
20 C.F.R. 404.408). In general, with the exception of some states that were 
"grandfathered," SSDI benefits are reduced based upon receipt of total benefits 
that exceed caps on income established in the Social Security Act. This is differ 
ent from these new offset provisions, which generally provide for an automatic 
dollar for dollar reduction in workers' compensation benefits after the worker
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becomes SSOA eligible, or which simply terminate workers' compensation bene 
fits at age 65 without regard to the total income the retiree is receiving. 
25 Cases that have held that these provisions are unconstitutional include Golden v. 
Westark Community College, 969 S.W.2d 154 (Ark. 1998); State of West Virginia 
ex rel. Boan v. Richardson, 482 S.E.2d 162 (W.Va. 1996); and Industrial Claim 
Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62 (Colo. 1996). Cases that have upheld these 
provisions include Sasso v. Ram Property Management, 431 So.2d 204 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1983), aff'd, 452 So.2d 932 (Fla.1984); Tobin's Case, 675 
N.E.2d 781 (Mass. 1997); and Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, 937 S.W.2d 
856 (Tenn. 1996).
26. For a more complete discussion of medical care cost containment in workers' 
compensation, see Dembe (1998) and Spieler and Burton (1998).
27. A survey by the Workers Compensation Research Institute indicated that, as of 
1998, workers' compensation programs in 14 states gave employees an unre 
stricted initial choice of the treating provider, a number that has been cut in half in 
the last decade (Tanabe 1998, p. 41). Four jurisdictions required employees to 
select from an insurer's or employer's list of providers, and 12 required the 
employee to choose from within a managed care organization if one exists. The 
employer selects the initial treating provider in 17 states Four other states have 
choice rules that vary by circumstances.
28. See particularly, EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Workers' Compensation and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, Reasonable Accommodation (September 3, 
1996).
29. Mont, Burton, and Reno (2000, p. 25) speculate that
the opposite trends in workers' compensation and Social Security bene 
fits during many years since the mid 1970s raise the question of whether 
adjustments in one program increases demands placed on the other, and 
vice versa. The substitutability of DI and workers' compensation for 
workers with severe, long-term disabilities that are, at least arguably, 
work-related, or might be exacerbated by the demands of work, has 
received little attention by researchers and is not well understood.
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Unemployment compensation in the United States is provided 
through a federal-state system of unemployment insurance (UI). UI 
provides temporary partial wage replacement to active job seekers who 
are involuntarily out of work. Eligibility for UI benefits and compen 
sation levels depend on recent earnings experience, the conditions of 
job separation, and continuing job search activity. The amount of com 
pensation paid for any week of joblessness can be affected by current 
income from other sources, including part-time work and pensions.
During the second half of the working life, decisions about the pro 
cess and timing of movement toward full retirement move to the fore 
front. For many, the sequence is voluntary and orderly; for others, job 
displacement greatly disrupts plans. While UI is critical for income 
security of the latter group, it may also play an important role for the 
former.
Most economic analysis of retirement patterns has focused on the 
financial incentives created by public and private pension systems. 1 
Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990, p. 5) pointed out that while an 
abrupt and complete transition from full-time work is still the most 
common avenue to retirement, a variety of others paths are often taken. 
A crucial concept in their research is that of the career job. The career 
job is the one in which a worker spends the bulk of his or her working 
life, usually working full time. If transition from the career job to 
retirement is not immediate, it may involve an hours reduction to part- 
time work on the career job. Alternatively, there may be an exit from 
the career job to full- or part-time work on another job, which most 
often is not in the same industry and occupation.
85
86 O'Leary and Wandner
Bridge employment is what Quinn (1999) calls work between the 
career job and complete retirement. He estimates that a minimum of 
49 percent of women and 34 percent of men engage in bridge employ 
ment and that the great majority of bridge employment involves fewer 
hours per week and less compensation per hour than the career job. 
The probability of involuntary exit from the career job later in life is 
high and has risen in recent years (Farber 1997). Furthermore, the 
chance of gaining reemployment after displacement from a career job 
diminishes with age (Chan and Stevens 1999).
Job and income security after age 45 and strategies for transition to 
retirement can be greatly influenced by the institutional arrangements 
of UI. Many issues at the forefront of the current UI policy debate are 
also issues of prime importance to those in the second half of their 
working life. Issues occur in all the standard areas of UI policy: cover 
age, eligibility, benefit adequacy, duration of benefits, work incentives, 
benefit financing, and interaction with other programs. We will exam 
ine issues of prime concern to older workers in these areas of UI policy 
after providing a brief background sketch of the labor market situation 
of older workers.
BACKGROUND
Whether they can admit it to themselves or not, the second half of 
their working life starts by age 45 for the great majority of Americans. 
In this chapter, we examine the labor market and UI beneficiary experi 
ence of those aged 45 and over relative to those who are younger. The 
investigation is summary in nature and is meant to suggest topic areas 
where focused research would be valuable. We rely on published sum 
mary statistics reported in the Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics 
(Jacobs 1999), the Social Security Administration's publication Income 
of the Population 55 or Older—1996 (Social Security Administration 
1998), on samples drawn for evaluation and modeling in the states of 
Michigan and Washington, and on unpublished data provided by the 
U.S. Department of Labor based on their Benefit Accuracy Measure 
ment (BAM) system of random audits. 2
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The percentages of older workers among the labor force, the total 
unemployed, and the insured unemployed are reported in Table 1 for 
the United States in 1998; the data are based on monthly averages for 
the year. The table indicates that those aged 45 years and over made up 
one-third of the labor force, encompassed only one-fifth of those expe 
riencing unemployment, but included one-third of all UI beneficiaries. 
Table 2 provides an age distribution of insured unemployment by state 
for 1998. Note that the retirement states Arizona and Florida reason 
ably mimic the national shares of UI receipt by age, whereas the Dis 
trict of Columbia pays a disproportionately large share to older 
workers, and payments are weighted heavily toward younger workers 
in Maryland, Oregon, and Puerto Rico. The national average numbers 
suggest that older workers shoulder a proportionately small share of 
the unemployment burden while enjoying a higher-than-average 
chance of receiving UI compensation while jobless and seeking work.
These summary statistics on UI recipiency for older workers are at 
odds with trends experienced by the work force as a whole since the 
state UI reforms following the 1975 and 1982 recessions. Vroman 
(1991) summarized research into causes of the decline in the ratio of 
the insured unemployment rate to the total unemployment rate (IUR/ 
TUR). Burtless (1983) identified a raft of factors including tightened 
eligibility requirements, a rising level of UI exhaustions, and the intro 
duction of income taxes on UI benefits. This last factor operates 
because those from higher-income households are less likely to apply 
for benefits. Blank and Card (1991) found the decline partly explained 
by tightened eligibility, but largely due to a decline in UI benefit appli 
cation rates. They estimated the overall take-up rate among those eligi 
ble for UI benefits to be only about 65 percent. Corson and Nicholson 
(1988) identified declines in unionism and manufacturing employment 
as causes of a declining IUR/TUR ratio. Concerning older workers, 
Corson and Nicholson (1988) suggested that changed treatment of the 
pension benefit offset required by the federal unemployment compen 
sation amendments of 1976 may explain part of the declining IUR/ 
TUR. Details about the treatment of pensions in UI are provided 
below.
One factor that could partly explain higher recipiency rates among 
older unemployed workers is that a large share of older UI claimants 
may be dislocated workers. In employment policy and research defini-
Table 1 Labor Force and Unemployment Concepts by Age for the United States, 1998
Labor force3 (000)
% of labor force
Total unemployed13 (000)
% of total unemployed








































1 Data from Jacobs (1999, Table 1-6).
b Data from Jacobs (1999, Table 1-26).
c Unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Labor, UI Service. Age information not available for 1.8 percent of beneficiaries.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Unpublished U S Department of Labor data on claims filed for UI in the week including 12th of each month. 
a INA = age information not available for this percentage of UI beneficiaries.
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tions, dislocated workers are those with long job tenure who become 
permanently separated from their employer. 3 Being dislocated 
increases workers' chances of eligibility for UI benefits. Unfortu 
nately, such circumstances may increase the probability of UI benefit 
exhaustion. Relying on data from Hippie (1999a), Table 3 shows that 
job dislocation increases with age; Farber (1997) found similar evi 
dence.4 Table 3 also shows that employment rates decline precipitously 
after age 54 and that the prospect of returning to full-time reemploy- 
ment after displacement is 30-70 percent lower for older workers. 
Less than one-tenth of displaced workers under 55 years of age leave 
the labor force, but more than one-fourth of workers aged 55 to 64 and 
nearly half of those 65 and over exit. Chan and Stevens (1999) simi 
larly found that involuntary job loss reduces reemployment chances 
more for older job seekers, who often make early transitions to being 
permanently out of the labor force (i.e., fully retired).
Unpublished data from the displaced worker survey (Hippie 
1999b) revealed that while only 51 percent of all displaced workers 
received UI, the percentage rises as durations of unemployment 
increase. Three-quarters of displaced workers unemployed for five or 
more weeks received UI, and, among those unemployed for 15 or more 
weeks, the proportion rises to four-fifths. Thus, it appears that some 
displaced workers never file for UI benefits, as they search for jobs and 
become reemployed quickly; only one-fifth of displaced workers 
unemployed for less than five weeks collect benefits. These data also 
indicate that while the rate of recipiency of UI is stable among age 
groups around the mean of 51 percent, exhaustion rates rise sharply 
with age.
The path of employment and income transition from a career job to 
retirement income can be rocky. As shown in Table 3, displaced work 
ers become reemployed at rapidly declining rates as they age. Older 
displaced workers who gain reemployment also suffer larger earnings 
losses. Among displaced workers aged 55 to 64, the earnings loss was 
20 percent or more for 38.2 percent of those who got reemployed, 
while an earnings reduction of that magnitude was experienced by less 
than a quarter of younger displaced workers.
For those who do ultimately receive UI benefits, the Benefits Accu 
racy Measurement (BAM) audit data provides a picture of their charac 
teristics. 5 Such a summary is provided in Table 4. Men tend to draw a
Table 3 Long-Tenured Displaced Workers by Age Group, 1995-1996 (%)
Characteristics
Displacement rates
Employment status, February 1998
Employed
Unemployed
Not in labor force
Among displaced
Reemployed full-time
Of those reemployed full time, %























































SOURCE: First six rows, Hippie (1999a); last two rows, Hippie (1999b). 
a Percentage not reported where the base is less than 75,000. 
b Values for age 55 and over.
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SOURCE: BAM data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.
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larger share of UI benefits up until age 65. Older beneficiaries tend to 
have lower levels of formal educational attainment. Beneficiaries over 
age 54 are less likely to be Black or Hispanic and more likely to be 
White1 or Asian/Pacific islander. The age distribution of the prior occu 
pation is different for the oldest workers. After age 64, larger shares of 
beneficiaries are from sales and services occupations and smaller 
shares are from structural occupations. These results are consistent 
with a movement into bridge occupations prior to full retirement.
COVERAGE
"The coverage provisions of state UI laws determine the employers 
who are liable for contributions and the workers who accrue rights 
under the laws" (U.S. Department of Labor 1999, p. 1-D). Original 
federal requirements limited coverage to employers of 8 or more work 
ers in each of 20 or more weeks in a year (Blaustein 1993, p. 162). UI 
coverage today is nearly universal, with only four main exclusions 
remaining: agricultural workers, household workers, employees of reli 
gious organizations, and the self-employed (Bassi and McMurrer 1997, 
pp. 54-61)
Exclusion of the self-employed is an issue of particular importance 
to older workers. Table 5 indicates that 6.8 percent of all nonagricul- 
tural workers participate in self-employment, but the share rises to 10.9 
percent of those aged 55 to 64 and to 17.2 percent of those aged 65 and 
over. It is even more important among workers in agriculture, for 
whom a majority of those 45 years of age and over are self-employed.
Since the depression-era beginnings of the federal-state UI pro 
gram in the United States, the self-employed have generally not been 
covered. The main reason is to avoid problems of moral hazard.6 With 
UI for self-employment, those who would pay premiums and be eligi 
ble for benefits would also manage the risk of unemployment and make 
decisions about work stoppage. In particular, there is an inability to 
determine whether individuals are involuntarily unemployed, to mea 
sure the economic loss of income, and to determine whether an individ 
ual is employed or unemployed for a given week. UI is social



















































































































































SOURCE: Employment and Earnings 46(1), January 1999, Table 15.
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insurance and extending coverage to the self-employed compromises 
the insurance nature of the program.
California is the only state that has a limited form of UI coverage 
for the self-employed. The California scheme operates on a fully reim 
bursable basis. This method of coverage has been used widely in the 
UI program first for governmental agencies and since 1972 for private 
nonprofit firms. In 1998, reimbursable benefits accounted for 5.7 per 
cent of all payments in the federal-state system, with 42 percent of 
these reimbursables going to employees separated from nonprofits 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1998). Reimbursement may not be a par 
ticularly effective approach to UI coverage, but it is a method of avoid 
ing the moral hazard issue by not allowing manipulation of the system 
for one's own benefit (Bassi and McMurrer 1997). Under the reim 
bursable approach, repayment is due in the calendar quarter following 
disbursement of benefits. Such a system would amount to short-term 
loans to self-employed for reintegration back to regular wage and sal 
ary employment. Feldstein and Altman (1998) suggested individual UI 
savings accounts that could be established with pre-tax contributions 
and might be particularly appropriate for the self-employed.7
While the UI system is not currently structured to provide tempo 
rary income replacement to the self-employed, in several states UI ben 
eficiaries can start their own business instead of searching for wage and 
salary employment. 8 While they establish their self-employment activ 
ity they can receive self-employment assistance (SEA) payments in 
lieu of UI weekly benefits. To date, 11 states have enacted conforming 
state legislation.9
The SEA program, like similar programs in nearly 20 other OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) nations, 
has been very small. 10 In 1996, no state had as many as 0.5 percent of 
its regular UI recipients receiving SEA payments. SEA participants 
are generally successful at starting up their own business; about two- 
thirds do so. These participants differ dramatically from other UI 
claimants: they are older; less likely to be a minority (particularly His 
panic); more likely to be from professional, managerial and technical 
occupations; have higher educational attainment; and are more likely to 
be dislocated workers (Vroman 1999).
When the U.S. Department of Labor began the SEA experiments in 
Massachusetts and Washington in the 1980s, the overrepresentation of
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older workers was not expected. Participating states imagined that the 
program would be particularly valuable for minorities and women. It 
did not turn out that way either in the experiments or the early program 
operations." Rather, older permanently separated workers have found 
SEA to be a promising alternative, apparently because of their greater 
difficulty in finding wage and salary employment and because of skills 
acquired through years of employment.
ELIGIBILITY—INITIAL AND CONTINUING
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, eligibility for UI bene 
fits depends on recent earnings experience, the conditions of job sepa 
ration, and continuing job search activity. Rules regarding recent 
earnings activity call for checking for sufficient prior labor force 
attachment in Ul-covered work. 12 Essentially these rules ensure that 
UI premiums have been paid before compensation is granted. Earnings 
are considered for a base period consisting of four calendar quarters, 
which are usually the first four of the previous five completed quarters 
for administrative practicality. 13 Table 1 showed that workers aged 45 
and over make up only one-fifth of the unemployed, but they total more 
than one-third of all the UI beneficiaries. This suggests that a high pro 
portion of unemployed older workers had sufficient prior earnings to 
qualify for UI benefits.
The conditions of job separation were set to minimize insurance 
problems of moral hazard by essentially ensuring that the separation 
was involuntary and primarily due to lack of work, not due to controlla 
ble factors such as a quit, a collective bargaining dispute, or discharge 
for misconduct. Joblessness is compensable in all states for voluntary 
separations for good cause, which may include 1) sexual harassment, 
2) illness, 3) leaving to accept other work, 4) joining the armed forces, 
or 5) compulsory retirement (Nicholson 1997, p. 103). The last of 
these is of interest to older workers. As Quinn (1999) pointed out, 
mandatory retirement was outlawed entirely in 1986. Workers dis 
missed for reason of age have been illegally discharged and are there 
fore entitled to UI benefits, with the separating employer liable for 
benefit charges.
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The final requirements for jobless benefits are known as continuing 
eligibility conditions. These are set to ensure continuing labor force 
attachment. They are of two types: job search requirements and limits 
on refusing suitable work. The job search rules are known as "able, 
available, and actively seeking work" requirements. Administration of 
these rules is more art than science. 14
Job search requirements are not imposed on beneficiaries who are 
still waiting to be recalled by the employer liable for benefit charges. 
One of the original aims of UI was to prevent the dispersal of the expe 
rienced workers for an enterprise. Employers may temporarily fur 
lough workers and promise the employment security agency that the 
workers will be recalled to their old jobs. Using the BAM data, Table 6 
summarizes the recall status of UI beneficiaries by age, as well as the 
age distribution of various work search requirements. Workers aged 45 
and over are more likely to be on recall status during their period of UI 
benefit receipt, and the proportion awaiting recall appears to increase 
with age. Direct data on work search requirements suggest that the rate 
of job attachment among UI beneficiaries increases with age, and, as a 
result, there is a slight downward trend with age in required work 
search.
The UI system was designed to operate for full-time, permanently 
attached members of the labor force. Both initial and continuing UI 
benefit eligibility issues are raised when part-time employment is con 
sidered. As seen in Table 7, relative to those aged 25 to 54, part-time 
work is popular among both younger and older workers. For those 
aged 55 and over, more than one-quarter of all workers were employed 
part-time in 1998. Furthermore, over 30 percent of unemployed job 
seekers aged 55 and over were seeking part-time employment.
We now consider two questions concerning part-time work and ini 
tial UI eligibility, and then two different questions about part-time 
work and continuing eligibility.
A) If a part-time job is lost and the job seeker is without work, are 
prior earnings and hours sufficient to qualify for benefits?
The crux of this issue is the current use and measurement of 
monetary eligibility for UI using a measure of quarterly or 
annual wages. Such measures have traditionally been used by 
state UI programs to measure labor force attachment. The Advi-
























































































SOURCE: Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.
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Table 7 Employed and Unemployed Full-Time and Part-Time by Age in 
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SOURCE: Employment and Earnings 46(1), January 1999, Table 8.
sory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC 1996) 
addressed this issue for both part-time and low-wage workers. 
States examine earnings and hours in a base period that consists 
of four calendar quarters to see if UI claimants can demonstrate 
labor force attachment. In many states, someone working either 
half-time at the state average covered wage or full-time at the 
state minimum wage would not qualify for UI benefits. The 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC 
1996, p. 20) recommended that "each state should set its law so 
that its base period earnings requirements do not exceed 800 
times the state's minimum hourly wage, and so that its high quar 
ter earnings requirements do not exceed one-quarter of that 
amount." The intent of the ACUC was to improve the likelihood 
that part-time and low-wage workers who work at least 40 per 
cent of the work year would be able to collect UI.
B) If two or more part-time jobs were held and one is lost, is there 
eligibility for UI benefits?
Eligibility is possible in many states, but the answer depends 
on the level of prior income and current income. All states will
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pay a weekly UI benefit to claimants with sufficient prior earn 
ings if current weekly income drops to a low but positive level. 
Most states have a lump sum earnings disregard. There are 11 
states which have both a disregard and a benefit reduction tax 
rate on earnings.
In 1994-1995, a field experiment was conducted in Washington 
state to evaluate whether liberalizing the benefit reduction formula 
would increase work effort. l5 The control group of 208,818 UI benefi 
ciaries from that experiment provides some insight into earnings by 
older workers while in claims status. For the control group, under 
then-existing Washington state law, the earnings disregard was $5 per 
week and benefits were reduced by 75 percent of weekly earnings 
above $5. As shown in Table 8, workers 45 years of age and older 
tended to have more weeks with a UI payment and more weeks with 
reported earnings and a UI payment. Note that this pattern is most 
exaggerated for the oldest group of workers (those 65 years of age and 
over), who also had a significantly lower average weekly benefit 
amount.
C) Will a beneficiary lose UI eligibility for refusing a new job 
because it is full-time rather than part-time?
State UI laws would generally disqualify beneficiaries from 
the receipt of benefits. The beneficiary would lose eligibility for 
refusing suitable work, provided that the available job was in the 
usual occupation and paid a wage close to that paid for recent 
similar work. Thus, the UI program continues to expect that the 
norm for labor force participation is full-time employment and 
that only job seekers for such jobs should continue to receive UI.
D) Will a beneficiary lose UI eligibility for refusing a new job 
because the hours of work would conflict with required hours on 
a currently held part-time job?
State rules would suspend UI benefit eligibility for failing to 
satisfy the availability requirement for job search. Current UI 
eligibility rules are based on the assumption that people leave 
full-time work and seek return to full-time work.
Thus, all part-time workers experience severe difficulty when they 
apply to receive benefits. Even if they succeed in initially receiving
Table 8 Part-Time Earnings and UI Benefits in Washington State, 1994-95
Earnings/benefits
Earnings when on UI 
claim ($)
UI amount received ($)
UI when earning ($)
UI when not earning ($)
% of UI dollars
When earning
When not earning
Weeks with UI receipt
Weeks UI when earning
Weeks UI when not
earning
% of weeks with UI
When earning
When not earning
Weekly benefit amount ($)
Base period earnings ($)
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benefits, they are in danger of loss of benefits if they are not prepared to 
accept a full-time job. Since they participate in part-time work at a 
greater rate than others, older workers are particularly disadvantaged 
from receiving UI by these eligibility rules.
ADEQUACY OF BENEFITS
Unemployment insurance provides temporary partial wage 
replacement to active job-seekers who are involuntarily out of work. 
The level of the weekly benefit amount (WBA) is directly related to the 
prior level of earnings. Having a wage-related benefit reinforces the 
concept that unemployment insurance is an earned right, based on con 
tributions required by law to be paid by the worker's employer as 
"insurance premiums" against the risk of unemployment. The wage- 
related benefit is intended neither to improve a prior low standard of 
living nor to support a sumptuous living standard created by a high 
income. Because UI is a social insurance program with the fundamen 
tal social aim of preventing wide-spread poverty, all states impose UI 
maximum benefit rates to spread benefits as widely as is practical.
The adequacy of the WBA in performing the income maintenance 
function can be gauged by the percentage of lost income which benefits 
replace (i.e., the replacement rate). Since the beginning of the federal- 
state UI program in the United States, there has been general accep 
tance of the idea that the weekly benefit should replace one-half of the 
worker's lost weekly wages (O'Leary and Rubin 1997, pp. 166-169). 
More broadly, adequacy depends on how well UI benefits help to main 
tain usual levels of household expenditure. We will briefly examine 
both of these concepts for older workers. Naturally, the latter considers 
all sources of income while out of work, including dissaving, pensions, 
and other household members. To understand the role of UI in sup 
porting income security of older workers, it is important to clearly 
understand the interaction of pensions and UI. We give special atten 
tion to this topic.
As shown in Table 9, the weekly benefit amount (WBA) for UI 
claimants rises steadily with age up until age 65. While the WBA aver 
aged $202 in 1998 across all age groups, it averaged only $157 for
Table 9 Benefit and Earnings Measures for UI Beneficiaries in the United States by Age Group, 1998
Measure
Weekly benefit amount 
(WBA) ($)





Base period wages (BPW) 
($, 000)
High quarter wages (HQW) 
($, 000)
HQW+BPW (%)
Base period weeks worked 






































































SOURCE: Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.
a Also called the "reservation wage."
b Average weekly wage is computed as base period wages divided by base penod weeks worked.
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workers aged 24 or less and reached $216 for workers aged 55 to 64. 
The average WBA for workers 65 and over was only $174. The 
decline for these oldest workers most likely is related to the fact that 
workers aged 65 and over often move into lower-wage bridge employ 
ment as they near full retirement age (Quinn 1999). As shown in Table 
9, the normal hourly wage for the 65-and-over group is appreciably 
lower than that for the 55-to-64 age cohort. This dip translates into a 
dip in the base period wage rate, since base period weeks worked are 
on a par with those of younger age groups.
A common summary measure of UI benefit adequacy is the wage 
replacement ratio. While this gross average ratio of mean WBA to 
mean weekly earnings is a crude measure of adequacy with well docu 
mented deficiencies, it is a commonly used measure. 16 By this mea 
sure, Table 9 suggests that UI wage replacement tends to decline with 
age until after age 64. Meeting the UI benefit adequacy standard of 
one-half wage replacement may actually mean beneficiaries are receiv 
ing more than half of potential future wages. This is most likely true 
for displaced workers, who gain reemployment at average wages 20 
percent below prior levels and suffer greater wage reductions if they 
are forced to find work in a new industry or occupation. 17 Even if not 
displaced, it may be true for many older workers who voluntarily seek 
bridge employment after job separation later in their careers. Quinn 
(1999) points out that bridge employment is usually for fewer hours if 
in the same occupation and for lower wages if in a different occupation 
than the career job.
The receipt of pension income had no effect on weekly UI benefit 
payments until the advent of federal rules applied for special extended 
benefits that were authorized during the 1961 recession. In response to 
these recessionary rules, the states experimented with alternative treat 
ment of pension income by UI beneficiaries. Merrill Murray (1967) 
investigated the question, "Should pensioners receive unemployment 
compensation?" based on a collection of 12 state studies of practices 
and effects. He argued that there should be no reduction in UI benefits 
because of pension receipt, that UI is social insurance based on prior 
work experience that should be paid with dignity and dispatch to eligi 
ble claimants with no means test applied. Furthermore, he asserted that 
the state studies showed pensioners who were UI beneficiaries were 
not becoming wealthy from "double dipping." He wrote that "the chief
108 O'Leary and Wandner
reason that pensioners work or seek work is economic necessity. Pen 
sions are, in most instances, insufficient to provide even a modest but 
adequate income" (Murray 1967, p. 37).
Nonetheless, 1976 federal UI amendments (Public Law 94-566) 
required a dollar-for-dollar reduction of UI payments against any gov 
ernmental or other pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or any 
other similar periodic payment which is based on the previous work of 
such individual (U.S. Department of Labor 1999, p. 4-19). The rule 
applies only to payments from plans established by the base period or 
UI chargeable employer. States may disregard pension income if 
established by other than a base period employer, except that Social 
Security and Railroad Retirement benefits reduce UI dollar-for-dollar 
regardless of when entitlement was established. Also, states are per 
mitted to reduce UI by less than each dollar of pension income if an 
employee's own contributions helped establish the pension benefit.
Currently among the 53 state UI programs, 38 prorate UI benefit 
reductions for employee contributions to pension plans, and 28 states 
disregard benefits received from pensions established outside of the 
base period. In recent years, states have experienced administrative 
difficulty when pension accumulations in employer-established defined 
contribution plans (401k) are rolled over into individual retirement 
accounts (IRA). Since the IRA may have been previously established 
with direct personal contributions, the state faces a complex problem 
determining the proportion of IRA distributions to disregard. The 
problem is further complicated when it is recognized that 401k type 
funds may include both employer and employee contributions.
To understand the importance of UI in maintaining living standards 
for older workers, consider the percentage of aged household units 
with income from various sources. Table 10 shows that the proportion 
having income from earnings declines with age. For the three age 
groups 55-61, 62-64, and 65 plus, the respective percentages with 
earnings were 80, 63, and 21; conversely for the same three groups, the 
percentages with retirement income were 27, 63 and 93, respectively. 
A uniform 61-63 percent had asset income, and a uniform 6 percent 
had income from public assistance. UI benefits were received by 6 per 
cent of the 55-to-61-year-old group, by 3 percent of those 62-64, and 
by only 1 percent of those 65 or over. Table 11 considers the same 
three age groups and shows that the majority of aggregate income
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Table 10 Percent of Aged Units3 with Money Income from Various 


























































SOURCE: Social Security Administration (1998), Table I.I.
3 An aged unit is either a married couple living together or a nonmarried person.
Table 11 Aggregate Income of Aged Units3 by Source of Income and Age 
in the United States, 1996





























SOURCE: Social Security Administration (1998), Table I.I.
a An aged unit is either a married couple living together or a nonmarried person.
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comes from earnings and retirement benefits, with the latter most 
important for the oldest group. The bulk of remaining income is pro 
vided from assets, less than 1 percent from public assistance and 
approximately 2 percent from other sources, including personal contri 
butions and UI.
Only a small fraction of older citizens receive UI, and in total it 
amounts to a small proportion of their aggregate income. An important 
question regards the role of UI in maintaining living standards for older 
workers who do receive UI: would their economic position be dramati 
cally altered if UI benefits were not provided? These questions were 
exhaustively examined by Daniel Hamermesh. The following are 
some of his main findings which anticipate effects of the 1976 UI 
reforms (Hamermesh 1980, pp. 83-84).
  Unemployment insurance equalizes the distribution of income 
among older workers compared to what it would be in the 
absence of UI benefit payments.
  Dollar-for-dollar reduction of UI for receipt of private or public 
pension income would reduce UI payments by more than 25 per 
cent among workers aged 59-64 and by over 40 percent among 
workers aged 61-66. Because older Americans generally have 
lower incomes, this increases the income gap between older 
workers and others.
  Within the population of households headed by older workers, 
instituting the pension offset will increase income equality. This 
is because the majority of those receiving both pension and UI 
benefits are in the upper deciles of the income distribution for the 
older population. These households also have a greater ability to 
maintain consumption during periods of unemployment.
  Among older UI recipients, about half have access to past savings 
or borrowing in sufficient amounts such that the pension offset 
would not cause hardship. Families without the capacity to bor 
row when the head is unemployed cut back mostly on consump 
tion of luxury goods.
  The availability of UI benefits neither induces older workers to 
remain in the labor force, nor does it facilitate quicker exit from 
the labor force. However, UI functions as an income transfer to 
workers who have made the decision to retire.
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The social insurance aspect of UI explains the presence of maxi 
mum and minimum weekly benefit amounts (WBAs). 18 States impose 
maximum WBAs because the aim is to prevent widespread descent into 
poverty, not to perfectly smooth consumption for high wage earn 
ers. 19 The minimum WBA is probably of more concern to older work 
ers, many of whom are involved in part-time and low-wage work. 
WBA minimums are set in part to relieve the administrative burden of 
processing weekly payments smaller than some reasonable amount, but 
the minimum WBA often replaces more than half of lost wages 
because of the social adequacy requirement to provide at least a modi 
cum of cash income.20 If UI system changes meant to broaden recipi 
ency by low-wage and part-time workers are considered, investigation 
of minimum WBA policy is needed.
DURATION OF BENEFITS
In the absence of severe economic conditions which trigger benefit 
payments of extended duration, the maximum entitled duration of UI 
benefits is 26 weeks in all but two states. 21 Based on the Benefits 
Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data, the average duration of benefits 
across all age groups is 15.9 weeks, with the average duration increas 
ing steadily with age (Table 12). 22 Benefit durations for workers 24 
years of age or less averaged 14.7 weeks; the average duration 
increased with each age group and reached 16.7 weeks for workers 65 
years of age or older.23
In recent years, some countries experiencing severe labor surplus 
conditions have added a feature to unemployment compensation which 
is targeted to older workers and is intended to provide income pay 
ments as a bridge to private and/or public pension income receipt. In 
1976, the Netherlands began paying benefits through age 65 to persons 
exhausting regular entitlement at age 60 or over; in 1981, the U.K. 
extended the duration and increased the benefit rate for long-term 
recipients aged 60 and over; in the mid 1980s, Germany increased the 
maximum duration of benefits from 12 to 32 months for those aged 54 
and over (Blackwell, Okba, and Casey 1995, p. 84). Such early retire-
Table 12 Outcomes Observed for UI beneficiaries in the Benefits Accuracy Measurement Audit Data
Outcome
Weekly benefit amount ($)
Duration of benefits (weeks)3
Entitlement based on earnings in more than 
one state6 (%)
Outcomes during the key week:
Earnings reported ($)
Benefit reduced because of earnings ($)
Other income reported ($)


















































SOURCE: Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.
a The duration of benefits is measured from the Benefit Year Beginning (B YB) date to the key week. The key week is the week in which a
payment was sampled for the BAM data. 
b Called a combined wage claim.
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ment uses of unemployment compensation also became a popular tool 
for supporting the transition to a competitive labor market in the for 
merly planned economies of eastern and central Europe. For example, 
in Hungary, where full public pension payments may begin at age 60 
for men and 55 for women, early retirement unemployment compensa 
tion payments were offered at even younger ages beginning in 1991.24 
Within the past 15 years, additional countries have relaxed work search 
rules for older workers, thereby permitting longer benefit durations.25
Given the tight labor market conditions in the United States at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, it is unlikely that UI program fea 
tures intended to remove workers from the labor force will be consid 
ered in the near future. The pattern of full- and part-time work by older 
UI beneficiaries suggests a desire for prolonged labor force attachment 
and greater flexibility in choosing employment and income sources. In 
addition to recognizing the importance of work transitions between 
career and bridge jobs and from bridge jobs to full retirement, switches 
between bridge jobs should be accommodated. Flexibility in UI bene 
fit duration, wage replacement, initial entitlement, and continuing enti 
tlement are all elements in shaping a decision context to encourage 
continued labor market involvement by older workers.
WORK INCENTIVES
In providing partial wage replacement, the UI system has the 
potential of prolonging spells of unemployment. Several economists 
following Feldstein (1974) have reported evidence suggesting that UI 
lengthens jobless spells beyond what would occur in the absence of UI 
compensation. Decker (1997) summarizes estimates of how the enti 
tled duration of benefits and the rate of wage replacement affect the 
length of joblessness. 26 None of the previous research has reported 
how these effects of UI vary by age.
Two opposite solutions have been tried to solve this principal-agent 
work-incentive problem. Traditional policy has been to monitor work 
search, while positive reemployment incentives were evaluated through 
field experiments in the 1980s.
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To ensure continuing labor force attachment by beneficiaries and to 
guard against avoidable joblessness, work search requirements have 
been part of continuing eligibility rules since the inception of UI. In 
terms of carrot-and-stick incentives, work search rules represent the 
stick. The stringency and enforcement of such rules has varied greatly 
across the states, and the majority of benefit overpayment errors have 
been traced to improper application of work search rules.27
Work search rules of varying stringency were evaluated in a field 
experiment conducted in Tacoma, Washington, in 1986-1987. Johnson 
and Klepinger (1991, 1994) found that eliminating the work test would 
greatly lengthen the duration of UI benefit receipt. They also found 
that requiring attendance at a job search workshop four weeks after the 
claim and an in-person eligibility review interview halfway through the 
entitled duration of benefits would measurably reduce UI benefit 
receipt. A subgroup analysis of impacts by age found that those under 
25 and those 55 and over behaved similarly to each other and some 
what differently from other age groups. Both groups increased UI 
receipt by the most of all age groups when the work search test was 
relaxed (about 3.3 weeks more for both groups), and both reduced UI 
receipt by the least of all age groups when the work test was strength 
ened (about -0.4 weeks for both groups). The work test appears to be 
particularly effective in changing the work search behavior of older 
workers.
In the 1980s, inadequate forward financing of UI benefits, com 
bined with political efforts to restrain tax increases, led to the explora 
tion of new means for dealing with work disincentive problems while 
retaining the income maintenance function of UI. A variety of new ini 
tiatives were tested as field experiments, with the UI reemployment 
bonus gaining considerable attention.
Decker and O'Leary (1992, 1995) examined the effect of offering 
cash bonus payments to UI beneficiaries who return to work quickly in 
Pennsylvania and Washington. Across the two experiments, the aver 
age bonus offer of about 4 weeks of benefits for return to work within 
about 10 weeks shortened UI benefit receipt by just under half a week.
A subgroup analysis by age for the Pennsylvania experiment sug 
gested that the bonus impact decreased with age and had virtually no 
impact on those over age 55; the Washington results suggested a gener 
ally opposite pattern, with older beneficiaries responding more
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strongly. 28 However, in Washington, workers aged over 45 had an 
appreciably smaller response to the biggest bonus offer, which had the 
largest overall effects. In a pooled analysis of Pennsylvania and Wash 
ington data, bonus impacts were virtually identical across the three age 
groups: under 35, 35 to 54, and 55 plus.29 Age is neither a legal nor an 
effective characteristic on which to target reemployment bonus offers; 
however, recent research suggests that bonus offers targeted to those 
most likely to exhaust benefits may be more cost-effective.30
FINANCING BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL 
NEW LEGISLATION
UI is social insurance; it is neither private insurance nor social wel 
fare. 31 Social insurance embodies incentive aspects found in private 
insurance contracts and eligibility and benefit features required by con 
siderations of social adequacy. Key features which distinguish UI as 
insurance are related to the financing provisions. UI benefits are 
financed by employers through experience-rated payroll taxes. 32 
Experience rating means that employer UI tax rates increase with their 
experience in laying off workers who subsequently draw UI benefits. 33
When the federal-state UI system was established by the Social 
Security Act of 1935, the experience rating of employer UI taxes 
greatly helped make the program acceptable to employers. It was rea 
soned that allocating benefit costs to businesses responsible for unem 
ployment benefit claims would make UI consistent with the free 
market system. The costs of the goods and services produced by 
insured workers would thus reflect the costs of any UI benefits paid to 
them.
Experience rating results in employer involvement in initial eligi 
bility determination and reduces the risk of moral hazard. The United 
States is the only nation in the world which finances unemployment 
compensation benefits with experience-rated taxes. 34 It is the main 
cause of business-labor involvement in the system, but experience rat 
ing ensures that UI will not become a dole on a par with social assis 
tance. No stigma attaches to the receipt of UI, "which provides
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compensation for wage loss as a matter of right with dignity and dis 
patch."35
Limitations of state UI tax systems mean that benefits are not 
always completely charged back to prior employers. Tannenwald and 
O'Leary (1997) identified a number of factors which interrupt the oper 
ation of perfect experience rating: maximum and minimum tax rates, 
limits on the taxable payroll, time lags, and exclusions. 36 Among the 
exclusions are state contributions to extended benefits, benefits paid to 
former employees of bankrupt firms, and dependents allowances. Ben 
efit payments which are not charged back to prior employers are said to 
be socialized. They are paid for by tax features that are usually not 
experience-rated, but instead are collected as a fixed percentage of the 
taxable payrolls at UI covered employers.
For 65 years, the experience-rated UI tax system has operated to 
finance hundreds of billions of dollars in UI benefits. Except for occa 
sional and temporary loans to the states, the basic system has operated 
independent of general tax revenues. The federal/state UI system cur 
rently holds in excess of $50 billion in the Unemployment Trust Fund 
(UTF) and has annual revenues and benefit payments of about $20 bil 
lion (U.S. Department of Labor 1999). Since the Unified Budget Act 
(UBA) of 1969, money held in the UTF is accounted for in the annual 
budget of the United States government (West and Hildebrand 1997, p. 
575). From the time of UBA enactment through 1997, the federal gov 
ernment experienced annual budget deficits; in these years, the UTF 
surplus was hoarded to improve federal unified budget reports. The 
current federal government budget surplus and projections for future 
surplus budgets have raised policy interest in expanded uses of UTF 
money.
A particular policy concern of the Clinton administration has been 
the decline in the ratio of the insured to the total unemployment rate 
(IUR/TUR), that is, the decline in the recipiency ratio. This decline 
threatens both the aggregate adequacy of income replacement and the 
built-in stabilizer function of the UI benefit system for the macro-econ 
omy.
We have recognized that displaced older workers have difficulty 
gaining reemployment at wages which match their career jobs and that 
voluntary transition from career jobs is often done gradually by a shift 
to part-time work on the career job, or to a bridge job which usually
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pays substantially less per hour of work. Late in life, workers make 
transitions from career jobs to bridge jobs, between bridge jobs, some 
times back to career jobs, and eventually to full retirement with income 
from pensions and assets. What improvements in the federal/state UI 
system would best facilitate these transitions, and what would be their 
financing implications?
Changes in UI eligibility rules to accommodate workers in low- 
wage labor markets and workers with preferences for part-time work 
could be financed within the current experience rating framework. 37 
As recommended by the ACUC (1996), permitting initial eligibility for 
those working at least 800 hours in the base period, regardless of base 
period wages, would benefit the low-wage group. Changing continu 
ing eligibility requirements concerning the refusal of suitable work to 
include not only customary wage and occupation, but also customary 
hours per week, is a practical solution. These expansions would 
impose UI tax cost increases on employers in low-wage industries such 
as retail and hospitality, who customarily pay UI taxes at the minimum 
rate. However, such increases would be shared in part by employees 
through moderation in wage increases, and UI tax subsidies flowing 
from these industries to high-wage, high-layoff industries such as con 
struction and manufacturing would diminish.
Some other Ul-related policy accommodations to older workers, 
which may be tempting given federal budget surplus projections and 
the aim of broadening UI recipiency, would most certainly be financed 
from socialized rather than experience-rated taxes. Dependents' allow 
ances are financed by socialized taxes because they stretch the social 
insurance standard, which sets a weekly maximum on partial income 
replacement because of the aim to prevent a desent into poverty. While 
not relevant to older workers, in the spring of 1999, President Clinton 
announced his desire to use the UI system to provide "Birth and Adop 
tion Unemployment Compensation." Such a program would most cer 
tainly be financed by socialized UI taxes. 38 A similar financing scheme 
would be most natural for extensions of UI more relevant to older 
workers, such as paying health insurance premiums for the unem 
ployed or providing early retirement unemployment compensation 
payments to support transition to pension income.39
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INTERACTION WITH OTHER 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS
While discussing the adequacy of UI for older workers, we 
described the interaction between UI and Social Security retirement 
payments: federal law requires that UI benefits be reduced by one dol 
lar for each dollar of Social Security benefits received. In this section 
of the chapter, we examine UI interactions with other employment pro 
grams which may be of relevance for older workers.
The strongest linkage between UI and Employment Service (ES) 
programs is provided through the work test for continuing UI eligibil 
ity. Many state UI laws require registration with and active use of ES 
services to maintain established UI benefit entitlement. For a variety of 
reasons, including the fact that UI payment errors have often been due 
to improper application of statutory work search rules, many states 
have relaxed their work test.40 These changes have weakened the link 
between UI and ES.
The UI-ES linkage was renewed and strengthened in 1993 by fed 
eral legislation creating the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Ser 
vices (WPRS) system. The legislation required states to establish 
procedures for early identification of UI beneficiaries most likely to 
exhaust their UI benefit entitlement and to refer these persons quickly 
to special reemployment services. State UI and ES agencies were 
identified as key partners in the WPRS, and Job Training Partnership 
Act (JTPA) service delivery agencies were encouraged to cooperate 
and provide reemployment services, particularly for their Economic 
Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) Act clients.
Most states choose to implement the WPRS system using a statisti 
cal profiling model. The U.S. Department of Labor developed a proto 
type statistical model and provided training to the states in how to 
adapt principles of the prototype for their own uses. To examine the 
model's sensitivity, the preliminary prototype prepared by the U.S. 
Department of Labor included an age variable to help predict the likeli 
hood of UI benefit exhaustion. This variable and certain others, how 
ever, are prohibited by federal civil rights legislation and were 
excluded from the final model recommended by the Department of 
Labor. Nonetheless, an analysis was conducted to determine the
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impact of dropping the prohibited variables. In the case of age, it was 
found that even though age was a significant variable, the effect of the 
age variable was largely accounted for by the variable for tenure on the 
prior job, which was adopted in the final model (Wandner 1998).
Table 13 presents predicted and actual UI benefit exhaustion rates 
by age group, computed on a sample of beneficiaries drawn in Michi 
gan before the WPRS was implemented. This sample was used to esti 
mate the Michigan WPRS profiling model (Eberts and O'Leary 1996). 
Because of the civil rights prohibition, age was not included in the logit 
models estimated to predict UI benefit exhaustion in Michigan. The 
table shows that the actual UI exhaustion rate for beneficiaries aged 65 
and over is appreciably higher than for other age groups and that the 
Michigan model predicts a modestly higher exhaustion rate for that 
group. However, the actual exhaustion rate for all the age groups less 
than 65 is nearly uniform, ranging between 21 and 25 percent. The 
Michigan profiling model was estimated using nonlinear methods and 
predicts the likelihood of exhaustion to increase exponentially with 
age. This pattern was most likely captured by the tenure variable. The 
model indirectly identifies those permanently separated from their 
employer and industry, because they are likely to be long-term UI ben 
eficiaries. Research by Chan and Stevens (1999) and others suggests 
that unemployed older workers have a greater risk of prolonged jobless 
spells. Data are not available on the age distribution of those referred 
to WPRS job search workshops, but it is likely to include older workers 
in high proportion to their numbers in UI benefit receipt. It should be 
mentioned that both program staff and participants have responded 
very positively to the special services given those profiled and referred 
by the WPRS system (Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer 1999).
In addition to the WPRS system, several other global changes are 
now altering the way that UI interacts with other employment pro 
grams and the way that clients interact with UI. The local administra 
tion of UI is rapidly changing from conducting in-person interviews to 
taking claims by telephone. The new telephone systems are being used 
for the filing of both new initial claims and continuing claims. Less 
and less do unemployed workers wait in line at a UI claims center. 
Unless older workers are either called in to attend a job search work 
shop because of the WPRS or called to attend an eligibility review 
interview to go over their job search efforts and plans, they may never
Table 13 Predicted and Actual UI Benefit Exhaustion Rates by Age in Michigan, 1994
Measure
Predicted UI exhaustion rate


























SOURCE' For the control group used to develop the Michigan Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services model 
(Eberts and O'Leary 1996)
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enter a physical location for UI services. By 1998, half or more of con 
tinued claims in 35 states were taken by telephone (24 states took 
more than three-quarters of these claims by telephone). Furthermore, 
11 states took about half or more of their initial claims by telephone.41 
This move to telephone claims is now accelerating.
Sweeping change in the public reemployment services landscape is 
coming soon because of requirements of the Workforce Investment Act 
(WIA) of 1998. This law requires that public one-stop career centers 
be established in local areas to deliver a coordinated package of reem 
ployment services including UI, ES, skill retraining, and referral to 
other employment programs. While UI is a required partner at one- 
stop career centers, the trend toward telephone claims suggests that it 
may be present simply as a telephone on the wall over which UI claims 
can be made.
By July 2000, when WIA becomes operational nationally, an older 
worker reaching a one-stop career center in most areas will find a dif 
ferent mix of training and employment services than has been offered 
under JTPA. Under WIA, there is a more structured approach to the 
provision of services. It is expected that all individuals entering a one- 
stop career center will first be offered core services that will consist of 
self-service and modest staff-assisted services. Only if these core ser 
vices do not suffice will the individual be offered intensive services 
which will involve greater staff assistance. Skill training will be 
offered only after other avenues to employment have been exhausted. 
It is expected that training will be provided to a smaller proportion of 
clients than under JTPA.
Under JTPA, most of the services received by older workers were 
from two special programs, the Senior Community Service Employ 
ment Program and Services for Older Workers (JTPA Title II, Section 
204(D)). Older workers usually did not participate in regular JTPA 
programs for disadvantaged adults. Older workers were greatly under 
represented in their receipt of service under the program for disadvan 
taged adults (Title IIA). Workers 45 years of age and over amounted 
to about 45 percent of the eligible population in program year 1995, 
but those 45 and over received only 13 percent of services. Notably, 
those aged 55 and over received only 2 percent. For the dislocated 
worker program (Title III), workers 45 years of age and over were pro-
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portionally represented, being about one-third of both the eligible and 
service receiving populations (Poulos and Nightengale 1997).
The aim of new one-stop career centers under the Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA) is to attempt to serve all workers who seek 
assistance. No single group is targeted for services under WIA; 
instead, a wide variety of services can be accessed by all workers.
Under the JTPA program, services for older workers were specified 
under Section 204(D), and section 202(c)(l)(D) required that 5 percent 
of the federal allocation to states had to be used for these older worker 
services. No similar provision exists under the WIA to differentiate 
older workers from other adults. On the other hand, in the establish 
ment of the one-stop delivery system under WIA, there are a number of 
required partners and programs. Some activities provided by the Older 
Americans Act of 1965 are part of the required partnerships.42 The 
result is that older workers will have certain activities available under 
WIA, but these activities will not have special funding. Older workers 
will be treated differently, but they will be subject to the same funding 
constraints and have the same availability of services as any other adult 
worker when entering a one-stop career center.43
There is a separate employment program funded by the federal 
government for older workers. The Senior Community Service Pro 
gram provides part-time employment, at least 20 hours per week, in 
community service activities for older workers. This program is 
funded by an annual federal appropriation. Strong congressional sup 
port has resulted in a stable funding level for this program in recent 
years. Congress appropriated $440.2 million for the program in the 
1998 and 1999 fiscal year budgets and has appropriated the same 
amount for the year 2000, which will be the first year of full operation 
under WIA.
TOPICS FOR FUTURE POLICY ANALYSIS 
AND RESEARCH
In studying economic security for older workers, considerable 
attention should be given to unemployment insurance (UI) as a source 
of income security and as a potential influence on work incentives.
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Current policy reviews, such as the one by the Committee for Eco 
nomic Development (1999), which have explored how the private sec 
tor can make better use of older workers in the labor force, consider the 
impact of governmental policy with respect to Social Security and 
Medicare on older workers, but they do not address the important role 
ofUI.
Previous policy analysis and research which does examine UI and 
older workers has tended to be based on an earlier and more simplistic 
model. It was a model of a single transition near the end of the work 
ing life: a one-step move from full-time work in a career job to full 
retirement. That model is rapidly being replaced by one involving a 
chain of employment transitions: from career job to bridge job, 
between bridge jobs, perhaps back from a bridge job to a career job, 
and finally a gradual movement into full retirement.
New research should address how UI influences the choice and 
timing of the wide variety of labor market transitions which happen in 
the second half of the working life. Many older workers are already 
electing to work rather than retire and to remain in their current com 
munities rather than to move to retirement communities. This trend is 
likely to continue strongly in the future. In particular, the role of part- 
time work and self-employment are likely to be very important in the 
future. A recent survey sponsored by the American Association of 
Retired Persons (AARP) found that four-fifths of all workers born 
between 1946 and 1964, the "baby boomers," intend to continue work 
ing after retirement: 58 percent in part-time employment; 5 percent in 
full-time employment "doing something different"; and 17 percent in 
self-employment (Roper Starch 1999).
Demographic patterns in United States labor markets at the start of 
the twenty-first century suggest that it would be wise to investigate and 
develop policies to encourage the continued labor market participation 
of older workers. Employer groups are increasingly concerned about 
maintaining labor market participation of older workers, given the 
smaller cohorts that will follow. They want the supply of skilled labor 
that older workers embody available for productive use. The new study 
by the Committee on Economic Development (1999), entitled "New 
Opportunities for Older Workers," is really about what employers and, 
to a lesser extent, government can do to retain and hire older workers. 
This study seems to focus more on the basic decision to work or not,
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rather than the ongoing decisions that older workers continually need 
to make about what type of employment to pursue and what to do if a 
given job ends. More attention needs to be paid to the impact of UI as 
a source of income and as an influence on work incentives for older 
workers.
Changes in UI rules concerning initial eligibility, continuing eligi 
bility, wage replacement, and partial benefits should all be examined to 
evaluate effects on the likely employment patterns of older workers. 
Particular attention should be given to UI features affecting the choice 
of self-employment, part-time work, seasonal work, and agricultural 
jobs.
The financing consequences of possible UI program changes 
should also be estimated, as should the macroeconomic impact of 
broadening recipiency. UI program features that would promote flexi 
ble and extended labor force participation by older workers should also 
enrich the employment choice environment for other workers. There 
fore, it-would be useful to examine the impact of such program changes 
on UI as a built in stabilizer of aggregate expenditure.
The UI program has an impact on whether workers choose to work 
or to enjoy leisure. The potential impact of policy change in the areas 
outlined would probably have a greater impact on the behavior of older 
workers than on that of younger workers, who are strongly attached to 
the labor force. As our society tries to retain older workers in the labor 
force, we need to look closely at the current and potential role of UI.
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1. Burtless (1999) summarizes retirement trends and the economic research focusing 
on retirement incentives.
2. Methods for collection and use of the Benefits Accuracy Measurement (BAM) 
data is given in U.S. Department of Labor (1996). BAM samples are drawn 
weekly in the 50 states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. Procedures are 
designed to ensure that each sample is representative of paid claims in the state 
that week.
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3. Policy definitions are given in the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment 
Assistance (EDWAA) Act of 1988. These definitions largely earned over to the 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998. An overview of research applications 
of this concept are given in Leigh (1990).
4. Hippie's (1999a) data is from the Displaced Worker survey, which is conducted 
every two years by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to provide information on the 
number and characteristics of persons who have been displaced from their jobs 
over the past three years. Based on a supplement to the February 1998 Current 
Population Survey, the latest study is for the period 1995-1996. It reveals that 
between 1995 and 1996, 2.2 million workers aged 20 years or older lost jobs they 
had held for three or more years due to the plant or company closing or moving; 
positions or shifts being abolished; or the employer not having enough work for 
them to do. The data show that during the 1990s there was a steady decline in the 
displacement rate of long-term workers from 3.9 percent in 1991-1992, to 3 3 
percent in 1993-1994, to 2.9 percent in 1995-1996.
5. The BAM data are used to assess the accuracy of UI benefit payments by selecting 
key weeks of benefit payments. Beneficiaries who have long durations of UI ben 
efit receipt have a higher probability of being selected for the weekly BAM sam 
ples.
6. The problem of moral hazard is present when the insured can affect the chance of 
experiencing the unfavorable outcome insured against, without being observed by 
the insurer. In unemployment insurance, moral hazard is present if a worker can 
affect the chance of being unemployed while not being detected by the state 
unemployment agency. The state agency will disqualify UI beneficiaries when a 
job separation or continuing joblessness is determined to be avoidable.
7. For older workers, an appealing feature of Feldstein and Altaian's (1998) proposal 
is that borrowing from the government takes place when accounts are exhausted, 
and "negative account balances are forgiven at retirement age."
8. A temporary UI self-employment program was established in 1993 as part of the 
North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA). Federal legislation in 1998 perma 
nently gave states the option to provide self-employment assistance with UI trust 
fund money.
9. The 11 states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Minne 
sota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Among 
these, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Rhode Island have not yet implemented their 
programs.
10. Wandner (1992) provided an overview of the international experience. He also
summarized the two U.S. experiments which predated the NAFTA authorizing
legislation. 
11 About the experiments, see Benus, Wood, and Grover (1994); about the programs,
see Vroman( 1999). 
12. In many states there is also a requirement that a certain number of hours must
have been worked in the reference period called the base year.
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13. Following a 1994 decision by the U S. Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit 
case of Pennington versus Didnckson, many states have implemented alternate 
benefit year (ABY) rules which consider income and hours in the four most recent 
calendar quarters if eligibility is not established using the standard rule. The 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC 1996, p. 19) 
endorsed general adoption of ABY rules.
14. Anderson (1997) examined state rules and practices in administering continuing 
UI eligibility.
15. O'Leary (1997) found that liberalizing the benefit reduction formula increased 
earnings reported to the employment security department but did not increase 
work effort.
16. O'Leary (1998, pp. 66-71) discussed the deficiencies of such aggregate average 
measures.
17. See the estimates of Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993).
18. A thorough discussion of these matters is provided by O'Leary and Rubin (1997, 
pp. 194-199).
19. The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC 1996) recom 
mended a federal standard requiring the maximum weekly benefit amount to 
equal two-thirds of the statewide average weekly wage, so as to allow a majonty 
of covered workers to receive at least 50 percent wage replacement.
20 A 1962 Department of Labor recommendation urged that the minimum "be 
related to the weekly wages of the lowest wage group in the state for which the 
unemployment insurance program is considered appropriate" (U.S. Department of 
Labor 1962).
21. Both Massachusetts and Washington offer regular benefit durations as long as 30 
weeks Woodbury and Rubin (1997) provided an exhaustive review and critique 
of UI extended benefit programs.
22. The Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data measures the duration of bene 
fits from the beginning date of a worker's benefit year the date at which they 
established their eligibility for benefits until the date when that worker's claim 
was investigated (the key week).
23 These duration estimates underestimate claimant duration because the data is cen 
sored. The claimant's benefit history is measured up until the BAM key week is 
selected but not after.
24 In Hungary, the unemployment compensation financing system partially subsi 
dized early retirement payments for surplus workers in struggling enterprises and 
fully paid such benefits when the enterprise was bankrupt (O'Leary 1995, p. 732).
25. Australia in 1987, Belgium in 1985, and New Zealand in 1992 either eliminated 
or greatly relaxed the work search requirement for older unemployment compen 
sation beneficiaries (Blackwell, Okba, and Casey 1995, p. 85)
26. Lengthening the entitled duration of benefits by one week is estimated to lengthen 
joblessness by between 0.1 and 0.5 weeks, while a 10 percent increase in the wage 
replacement rate is estimated to increase the joblessness by between 0.3 and 1.5 
weeks.
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27. Burgess and Kingston (1987, p. 235) cited "difficulty in monitoring claimant 
compliance with weekly eligibility criteria" as a prime cause for UI payment 
errors associated with the work test
28. Impact analyses by age for the Pennsylvania experiment are reported by Corson et 
al. (1992, p. Ill), while those for Washington are reported by Spiegelman, 
O'Leary, and Kline (1992, p. 127).
29. Decker and O'Leary (1992, p. 54) reported impact estimates by age group for a 
pooled Pennsylvania and Washington sample while controlling for the interaction 
of age with other factors.
30. Recent research suggests that when a low bonus amount with a long benefit dura 
tion is targeted to those most likely to exhaust benefits (displaced workers), it 
appears to be cost-effective (O'Leary, Decker, and Wandner 1998).
31. These arguments are developed more completely by Blaustem, O'Leary, and 
Wandner (1997, pp. 11-17).
32. Employees make small direct contributions in Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsyl 
vania, but it has been estimated by Anderson and Meyer (1995) that employer UI 
taxes are partly paid by workers who contribute to the system through accepting 
lower wages.
33. Principles of experience rating UI taxes are explained in Tannenwald and O'Leary 
(1997). Estimates of the degree of experience rating among states are provided by 
Tannenwald, O'Leary, and Huang (1999).
34. The Netherlands and Poland have considered adopting experience rating of unem 
ployment compensation taxes. Countries outside of the United States often levy 
employer and employee contributions with rates set on a socialized basis to cover 
recent benefit payments Unemployment compensation payments often are subsi 
dized by central government general revenues; occasionally this is the only source 
of financing.
35. Blaustem (1993), p. 47, from a statement of UI objectives issued by the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, in 1955.
36. For example, when an employer's UI tax rate is at the maximum of the range, 
additional UI benefit charges do not change the tax rate on wages. Tannenwald 
and O'Leary (1997) explained that, in such circumstances, subsidies flow from 
other employers.
37. These and related issues are discussed in a broader context by O'Leary and Wand 
ner (1997, pp. 714-716). Other policies to increase UI recipiency, such as broad 
ening coverage to seasonal workers and employees of small farms, are to a lesser 
degree important to older workers, but could also be financed within the experi 
ence rating framework.
38. The proposed rule for Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation allows 
states to determine whether the benefits would be experience-rated or socialized 
(Federal Register 64, no. 232, pp. 67971-67979). Pear (1999) described the polit 
ical dispute over President Clinton's plan to pay cash benefits to those on parental 
leave from the unemployment trust fund.
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39. In 1995, President Clinton "mentioned finding some way to help workers who 
lose their jobs keep their health insurance while they look for work. Under fed 
eral law they can continue their policy for a year and a half by paying 102 percent 
of the combined employer-employee premium, but many cannot afford to do so. 
Clinton favors some form of subsidy to help them" (Rich 1995). On December 
17, 1999, the Ticket to Work and Work Incentive Improvement Act (Public Law 
106-170) was enacted; it allows the extension of Medicare for those on Social 
Security Disability Insurance and Medicaid for those on Social Security Income 
after recipients earnings rise above a given level.
40. Burgess and Kingston (1987) identify the work test as a main source of UI over 
payments, citing the complexity of the ES-UI monitoring as part of the problem.
41. Based on state UI Benefits Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for 1998.
42. WIA section 121(b)(l)(B)(vi).
43. A training and technical assistance guide has been developed for providing spe 
cial services for older workers under the Workforce Investment Act.
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Getting Older in the 21st Century
The Risks and Consequences of Disability
MarkV. Nadel 
Social Security Administration
Among the fearful risks facing workers as they get older, disability 
looms large. As insurance salespeople never tire of telling us, for 
younger workers the risk of disability is greater than the risk of death. 
It is a risk that is somewhat mitigated in that some workers can start 
drawing pensions before they are in their mid sixties and nearly all 
workers have been able to draw Social Security early retirement bene 
fits starting at age 62. Yet, until reaching the age where retirement 
income is available, workers confront an increased risk of disability as 
they age. In light of the gradual increase in the normal retirement age 
that began in January 2000 and concomitant diminution in early retire 
ment benefits, the risk to older workers of becoming disabled is a par 
ticularly timely issue. We are concerned about two groups of older 
workers: those in what is commonly regarded as the latter years of 
"normal employment age" (ages 55 to 64) who will be affected by 
changes in the Early Retirement Age benefits and those 65 and older 
who will be affected by current and proposed changes in the normal 
retirement age.
This chapter has four objectives. The first is to examine older 
workers' risk of disability, primarily the long-term disability that may 
limit or end employment for the rest of a worker's life. The second is 
to examine the risk of loss of employment resulting from disability and 
the characteristics of workers that affect that employment risk. While 
impairment does not necessarily equate to a loss of employment, being 
able to overcome the impairment and work by no means guarantees 
that anyone will give the older worker a job. Moreover, even with the 
same impairment, different individuals have very different risks of los 
ing employment or income. Third, I examine the systems of insurance 
coverage against those risks; who is insured, by whom, and how ade-
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quately? Last, I consider the public policy implications of older work 
ers' risk of disability, in particular the implications for proposals to 
raise the retirement age. In this chapter, the term impairment is used to 
mean diminished physical or mental health; disability refers to an 
impairment that results in loss of employment or serious reduction in 
income.
THE RISK OF DISABILITY
As we get older, we confront a greater risk of becoming disabled. 
Almost one quarter of older Americans report that they have a signifi 
cant disability that affects their ability to work. Data from the 1995 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) show that 15.7 percent of 
individuals aged 55 to 64 reported that they were unable to work due to 
a disability. An additional 7 percent report that they are limited in their 
work activity by a disability. In contrast, 7.9 percent of the 45- to 54- 
year-old age group reported inability to work, but about the same pro 
portion (6.5 percent) reported limitations in work.
It should be noted at the outset that these data, while the best avail 
able, should still be viewed with caution. The findings are based on 
self-reported assessments, and it is likely that some unknown number 
of respondents prefer to ascribe their lack of work to a disability than to 
the less socially acceptable reason that they just do not want to work 
any more. If such fudging overstates the true state of disability, there is 
also a countervailing trend. Almost one million 55- to 64-year-olds 
who report that they have no disability simultaneously report that they 
are unable to work due to health reasons. This may be due to some 
people having an acute but temporary problem, and it probably 
includes a number of mentally ill individuals.
We will soon have a much better assessment of the prevalence of 
health impairments in the population. The Social Security Administra 
tion (SSA) is embarking on an ambitious survey of disability status and 
functioning in the population that will provide an estimate of the num 
ber of people in the population who are severely disabled enough to 
qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. 1
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Trends
The current prevalence of disability tells us just part of the story. 
Ideally, we would want to know what this portends for older workers in 
the future, and the best way to forecast the future is to examine recent 
trends in disability.
From the time that the 1983 amendments enacting changes in the 
normal retirement age were passed, there was concern that longer life 
spans did not necessarily translate into longer work life. An important 
article by Ernest Gruenberg advanced the argument that recent medical 
successes in postponing death only resulted in the prolongation of sick 
ness (Gruenberg 1977). That concern was underscored by subsequent 
studies that pointed to evidence of deteriorating health and disability 
status among the older working-age population from the late 1960s 
through the 1970s. More recently, however, the data show a very dif 
ferent picture. Crimmins, Reynolds, and Saito (1999), using data from 
the National Health Interview Survey, analyzed trends in work ability 
and work limitations during the period 1982 to 1993 for the 50- to 69- 
year-old population. They found that in the later years of that period, 
both men and women older than the age of 61 are less likely to report 
inability to work. The size of the annual average decline in inability to 
work ranged from 40 to 70 percent for men and 50 to 70 percent for 
women. This improvement is also seen in older individuals.
Given the increase in the normal retirement age, disability trends 
for individuals older than 65 are also relevant. The trend toward better 
health is manifest for that group as well. For the 12 years between 
1982 to 1994, analyses of the National Long Term Care Survey 
(NLTCS) data have shown that the fraction of the 65- to 74-year-old 
population that is not chronically disabled grew by 2.6 percentage 
points, from 85.9 to 88.5 percent, and the fraction of the 75- to 84-year- 
olds not chronically disabled grew by 5.4 percentage points (Manton, 
Corder, and Stallard 1997). These findings support the idea that as the 
health and ability to work among older and younger retirement-age 
workers improve, increasing the age of full eligibility for Social Secu 
rity will not be as detrimental to older workers as some have argued.
However, the effect of health status is more complex than a simple 
snapshot of point-in-time impairment would indicate. A recent analy 
sis of the longitudinal Health and Retirement Survey found that it is not
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just poor health, but rapid declines in health ("health shocks") that 
explain retirement behavior. What we don't know is whether the pro 
portion of workers affected by the onset of such health shocks is also 
declining. Presumably, those who do retire early due to such health 
issues would be disproportionately affected by increasing the retire 
ment age.
In summary, while becoming older increases the risk of disability, 
the situation for workers is better than it was. Living longer does not 
necessarily mean living sicker, and in the aggregate, the possibility of 
longer work lives is somewhat less constrained by health concerns than 
was true a generation ago (Bound et al. 1999).
International Perspectives
The decline in disability in the United States has also been seen in 
other industrial countries. Waidmann and Manton (1998) reviewed 
studies from 10 industrial countries and found that these nations also 
recently experienced moderate to large declines in chronic disability in 
the elderly. For example, Canadian studies have shown there was a sig 
nificant increase in life expectancy free of severe disability for both 
males and females at age 65 from 1986 to 1991. In Great Britain, anal 
yses of Britain's three General Household Surveys in 1976, 1981, and 
1985 found an improvement over time in the expectation of life with 
out disability in for 65- and 75-year-olds. Also, in Italy, the Nether 
lands, and for females in Switzerland, there were relative increases in 
disability-free life expectancy (DFLE) over the respective time periods.
The reasons behind the improvement are hinted at by findings in 
France, where disability-free life expectancy at birth increased signifi 
cantly for both males and females from 1981 to 1991. For individuals 
65 and older, DFLE also increased sizably in absolute and relative 
terms for both males and females. Robine, Morrniche, and Sermet 
(1998) assessed whether declines in disability were due to delayed 
onset of morbidity or improved management of potentially disabling 
conditions once they exist. The results showed that the prevalence of 
potentially disabling conditions rose significantly between 1980 and 
1991. However, the propensity of those having these conditions to 
report themselves disabled fell (Robine, Mormiche, and Sermet 1998). 
These findings, Waidmann and Manton argued, suggest the possibility
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that the treatment or management of diseases has improved or that 
rehabilitation rates have increased.
Trends and Projections in the SSDI Program
As I discuss in more detail below, self-reported impairments are a 
far cry from qualifying for SSDI. Nonetheless, Social Security disabil 
ity awards seem to reinforce the findings of the recent survey research. 
This can be seen by looking at the percentage of older workers who are 
awarded disability benefits at different time periods. In 1975, among 
55- to 59-year-olds, the disability incidence rate (i.e., the proportion of 
workers in that age range who were determined to be disabled by 
Social Security) was 2.1 percent; by 1997, the percentage had declined 
to 1.4 percent. More notably, the incidence among workers aged 60- 
64 declined from 2.9 to 1.6 percent (Social Security Administration 
1999). This decline may be due largely to the trend toward early retire 
ment, but the administrative data do not reveal the extent to which 
older workers in declining health opt for early retirement in lieu of 
applying for DI benefits. However, an analysis of HRS data by 
Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips (1996) found that the men who retired 
early (at age 62) do not significantly differ in the prevalence of health 
limitations from those who wait. While they caution that this does not 
mean that health is unimportant, the finding at least casts some doubt 
on the assumption that raising the retirement age will automatically 
cause a proportional response in DI applications.
While trends in self-reported impairments for older workers and DI 
award incidence rates show a slight decline, Social Security actuarial 
estimates project an increase in the proportion of the workforce on the 
rolls. This is not in contradiction to the improving health trends. 
Rather, it is a reflection of the greater trend of the aging of the popula 
tion as the baby boom bulges through middle age. An increasing pro 
portion of the population will be in the over-50 age range, with its 
higher disability incidence rates. The Social Security Actuary's inter 
mediate projections of the disability insurance incidence rate in 2008 is 
5.9 per thousand, compared with 4.7 per thousand in 1998. The esti 
mate takes into account the increase in the normal retirement age, with 
its consequent incentive for workers over 62 to seek to get on the SSDI 
rolls.
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Who Gets Impaired and How?
As we contemplate the possible effects of current and potential 
increases in retirement age, we can get a more complete understanding 
of the consequences by getting behind the aggregate figures and exam 
ining the disability status of different subgroups in the population. It is 
useful to consider the categories of disabilities affecting older workers 
and how disabilities are distributed across subgroups of older workers.
Not only are older workers more likely to be impaired, but the 
nature of the probable impairments also change over the lifespan. Fig 
ures 1, 2, and 3 show the prevalence of the three largest categories of 
disability among different age groups (Social Security Administration 
1998, p. 219). Not surprisingly, the prevalence of musculoskeletal and 
circulatory disorders rise dramatically with age. Mental disorders do 
not necessarily decrease with age in the population. Rather, the 
decreasing proportion in that category for older workers reflects the 
growth in mental impairment SSDI allowances for younger age work 
ers and the consequent larger numbers of younger works in that cate 
gory.
Age is not the only demographic characteristic for which disability 
varies. Numerous studies have documented differences in health status 
among racial and ethnic groups across the life cycle in the United 
States. For example, compared with whites, African Americans report 
higher rates of hypertension, diabetes, and arthritis, while Hispanics 
report higher rates of hypertension and diabetes and a lower rate of 
heart conditions (Kington and Smith 1997). Obviously, socioeconomic 
status must be considered in assessing the independent effect of race. 
In fact, Kington and Smith demonstrated that socioeconomic status 
plays a significant role in explaining racial and ethnic differences in the 
ability to function once a person has a chronic illness, but it plays a rel 
atively minor role in explaining differences in the prevalence of 
chronic disease. This seems to suggest that lower socioeconomic sta 
tus may lead to poorer outcomes once a disease develops because of 
such factors as reduced access to health care services.
Race and ethnicity are also related to employment. Crimmins, 
Reynolds, and Saito (1999) found that relative to non-Hispanic whites, 
African Americans are more than twice as likely to report inability to 
work. Even looking across people with the same education levels (i.e.,
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Figure 1 Distribution of SSDI Beneficiaries with Musculoskeletal System 
Diseases by Age
Under 30 30-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Age
Figure 2 Distribution of SSDI Beneficiaries with Circulatory System 
Diseases by Age
Under 30 30-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Age
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Figure 3 Distribution of SSDI Beneficiaries with Mental Disorders 
by Age
Under 30 30-39 60-64
controlling for education), being African American increases the likeli 
hood of being unable to work by about half. Similarly, Hispanics are 
about one and a half times more likely than non-Hispanic whites to 
have work disability; however, Hispanics' relative likelihood of being 
unable to work is about 25 percent less than that of non-Hispanic 
whites when education is controlled. For example, looking at the age 
group of particular interest, their logistic regression estimated that the 
probability of being unable to work among 62-year-old men with 10 
years of education was 26.1 for African Americans, 18.4 for whites, 
and only 14.4 for Hispanics. The pattern is similar for women.
These data are also mirrored by the composition of SSDI rolls. As 
seen in Figure 4, African Americans are at higher risk of being severely 
enough disabled to qualify for SSDI.2
AGING AND THE EMPLOYMENT RISKS OF IMPAIRMENT
This section focuses on the economic risk of disability in general 
and the risk to older workers in particular. Age clearly has an effect on
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SOURCE: Table 5.A1, Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement 1998, 
p. 185. Data for General Population: Table No. 22, Resident Population, by Race and 
Single Years of Age • 1997, U.S. Bureau of the Census.
gaining and sustaining employment. Not only are older workers more 
likely to get DI benefits, data from Social Security's New Beneficiary 
Survey show that, once on the rolls, older beneficiaries have a lower 
tendency to return to work; once working they have a higher tendency 
also to stop working (Hennessey 1997, p. 16). Age by itself, of course, 
is not the only factor limiting an individual's ability to work in the 
economy. Similarly, a medical impairment, by itself, does not neces 
sarily limit an individual's ability to work in the economy. Rather, the 
ability to work is a function of individual factors and factors in the 
environment. Figure 5 presents a simple model of the process. The 
following discussion gets below the aggregate data on disability and 
focuses on factors that either mitigate or exacerbate the risk of loss of 
employment once impairment has occurred.
144 Nadel





condition     ^.impairment \Jobsmatching
capacities
SOURCE: Adapted from Curtis et al. (1998).
The Impact of Underlying Economic Conditions
Whether a medical impairment becomes a cause of unemployment 
is affected substantially by economic factors. First, economic incen 
tives play a critical role in the decisions of people with disabilities to 
participate in the labor force or to seek disability benefits. An individ 
ual's decision to apply for benefits is influenced by a variety of such 
factors. Examples of these factors might include the availability of 
potential sources of other income such as pensions or savings, the 
availability of health insurance and noncash benefits, and the costs 
associated with the application process (Stapleton et al. 1998).
Secondly, underlying economic conditions affect the economic risk 
of disability for workers who are already out of the labor force or who 
are laid off. Rupp and Stapleton (1995) summarized the results of 
numerous econometric studies estimating the effect of the business 
cycle on Disability Insurance (DI) applications, awards, and caseloads. 
The results varied in magnitude across these studies but remained con 
sistent in direction. The authors reported strong results in two studies 
they conducted. The first study analyzed DI applications and awards 
using 1988-1992 data; the second looked at DI initial determinations
Session 1: Charting the Landscape 145
and initial allowance rates using 1988-1993 data. Stronger effects 
were found for applications. Specifically, they found that a 1-percent 
age-point increase in the unemployment rate resulted in a 4 percent 
growth in DI applications.
Similarly we would expect that disability insurance applications 
should fall when the economy rebounds from a recession. In fact, the 
DI application rate growth declined from a peak of 13.2 percent in 
1991 to 2.7 percent in 1994, as the economy rebounded from the reces 
sion. These results suggest that the labor market affects the number of 
workers applying for SSDI, but note that this evidence covers only a 
relatively short period of time, and the DI application rate, just as the 
DI approval rate, is also affected by changes in SSA policy and imple 
mentation practices. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to infer that 
workers with disabilities would be more likely to seek SSDI benefits 
when they have fewer alternatives in the economy.
Recent evidence indicates that the economic risk of disability does 
not occur only during economic downturns but is present even when 
the economy is robust. Burkhauser et al. (1999) evaluated how the 
1990s business cycle impacted working-age disabled people. As 
expected, they were able to quantitatively demonstrate the dispropor 
tionately negative impact the downturns in the business cycle had on 
people with disabilities relative to those without disabilities. What is 
more disturbing, however, is that employment and labor earning of 
individuals with disabilities declined over the entire 1990 business 
cycle, although less so in recovery than in recession.
Mitigating Factors
Although aging does increase the risk of disability, and the econ 
omy (expressed by the unemployment rate) can affect workers posi 
tively or negatively, there are a number of factors for the individual and 
for society that mitigate the economic risk of impairment for at least a 
segment of the workforce. For the individual, these factors might 
include employer accommodations, a supportive family, and good 
medical care. In the aggregate, two factors of particular importance are 
the changing nature of work and educational attainment.
146 Nadel
The changing nature of work
Whether a particular impairment results in loss of employment 
depends largely on the kind of work one is doing when disabled and 
the kind of jobs that are available. This relationship, in turn, depends 
on broader trends affecting the physical nature of work. The replace 
ment of high-paying manufacturing jobs with relatively low-paying 
service sector jobs is seen by many as an important factor in DI appli 
cation and award growth. Rupp and Stapleton (1995) suggested that in 
the short-run this trend may increase the DI application rate, as workers 
with disabilities who lose their manufacturing jobs may not find new 
work in the service sector and then apply for disability benefits. In the 
long run, however, it is thought the effect might be to reduce the num 
ber of applications, because service sector workers are less susceptible 
to disabling injuries and illnesses. Rupp and Stapleton suggested that 
these long-run effects may vary across different impairment groups. 
For example, workers with physical impairments would be less likely 
to require DI benefits, while those with mental impairments would be 
more likely to do so. If they are correct, another correlate of this differ 
ence is that as work requires greater cognitive skills, those with mental 
impairments will be less likely to retain or gain employment due to a 
lack of skill match. At the same time, those with physical impairments 
but lacking requisite cognitive skills for other reasons will also be less 
likely to be employed because of a decline in jobs requiring only phys 
ical exertion.
The importance of education
It has become a cliche to report that both income and likelihood of 
employment are positively related to levels of education but, like 
many cliches, it is true. The current economy requires higher-skilled 
workers, and while there is an undersupply of more-skilled workers, 
there is an oversupply of less-skilled workers (Bassi, Benson, and 
Cheney 1996). Accordingly, among the general population, the jobless 
rate is directly related to education. For example, the unemployment 
rate of men who were not high school graduates was 61 percent higher 
than those who were. Similarly, those whose education stopped at high 
school graduation had a jobless rate 26 percent higher than those who 
had been to college (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998).
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The data on the relationship between education, disability, and 
employment (while controlling for other factors) is more scant (Curtis 
et al. 1998). Nonetheless, there have been studies that point to the 
importance of education in allowing persons with disabilities to con 
tinue working. For example, two-thirds of the relative reduction in 
inability to work over the time period analyzed by Crimmins, Rey 
nolds, and Saito (1999) was accounted for by the higher education 
level of the older age cohort in the most recent time period studied. 
Similarly, education level is a factor positively associated with those on 
DI going back to work (Hennessey and Muller 1995).
The good news here is that the educational level of the population 
has been rising. In 1969, 36 percent of the 35- to 45-year-old age 
cohort had less than a high school degree. In 1994, only 12 percent of 
this cohort had so limited an education. Similarly, the percentage of 
that age group having college degrees has doubled to 27 percent (Fried- 
land and Summer 1999).
INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR THE RISK OF DISABILITY
When the onset or worsening of an impairment results in the 
inability to work, workers may be covered by a combination of public 
and private benefit plans. Workers generally are covered by Social 
Security disability programs, workers compensation, and, to a much 
more limited extent, private disability insurance.
The first issue to raise in considering disability coverage is one of 
scope. Far fewer individuals receive any disability insurance income, 
public or private, than have self-reported work impairments. Using 
data from the 1994 National Health Interview Survey on Disability, 
Adler (1997) found that while 16.9 million working-age adults 
reported having a work disability, only 9.1 million received benefits 
from any disability program. Many of the respondents with self- 
reported disabilities may have only short-term disabilities or may be 
overstating their condition, but we simply do not yet know how many 
are in those categories and how many are have serious need for assis 
tance but lack benefits.
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The Protection Offered by Social Security Disability Insurance
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) is the 
broadest protection available for workers who become disabled, and it 
is the only disability insurance that the vast majority of Americans 
have. In 1998, 133.4 million workers were insured for DI benefits. To 
be disability-insured, workers over age 31 must have worked 5 of the 
last 10 years immediately preceding their period of disability.3 As of 
1997, 80 percent of the working-age population was SSDI insured, but 
the smaller proportion of younger workers who are covered lower this 
percentage. As a result of the exclusion of some categories of workers 
(such as domestics and most government workers) from Social Secu 
rity in the earlier years of the program, the percentage of covered work 
ers also trails off slightly starting with the age 50-54 cohort (Figure 6). 
This is especially true for women, probably because they were dispro 
portionately out of the labor force earlier in their lives or exempt as 
teachers (i.e., employees of local governments).
Figure 6 Age Groups that Are SSDI Insured (estimated)
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Age
SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1998, p. 181.
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While most workers are covered by Social Security, the extent to 
which the SSDI program actually provides benefits in case of serious 
impairment is limited by two factors: the criteria for receiving benefits 
and the amount of those benefits relative to previous earnings.
The criteria for being awarded SSDI benefits are very stringent. 
The law defines disability as the inability to engage in any "substantial 
gainful activity" by reason of any medically determinable physical or 
mental impairment(s) which can be expected to result in death or 
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of 
not less than 12 months. Moreover, SSDI benefits generally do not 
begin until five months after the onset of the disability. Many more 
individuals apply for DI benefits than actually receive them. At latest 
count, approximately 49 percent of applicants are ultimately awarded 
benefits either initially or through the final administrative appeal.
Once awarded, the SSDI benefit amount, like retirement benefits, 
is related to earnings, but is also progressive. That is, the more you 
have earned, the more you get in benefits, but lower-wage workers 
receive an amount that represents a higher proportion of the predisabil- 
ity earnings than higher-wage workers. The benefits and replacement 
rate for a 50-year-old worker at different income levels is shown in 
Table 1. Note that individuals on SSDI may earn up to $700 per month 
and not lose any benefits. Benefits are generally also paid to spouses 
when there is a dependent child and also to those children. In 1997, 
those benefits averaged $178 to wives and $129 to husbands. Children 
received an average of $195 ($292 if they were also disabled).
Table 1 Earnings Replacement Rates for Steady Workers Entitled to 
SSDI (1998)a
Earnings 
















a For a 50-year-old worker at four levels of covered earnings.
b Shown for illustrative purposes. Benefits are paid on a monthly basis.
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Accounting for Age
The connection between age and disability is inherent in the Social 
Security Disability program. The initial cash benefit program estab 
lished in the Social Security Amendments of 1956 provided benefits 
only for disabled insured workers who were between the ages of 50 
and 65. The House Ways and Means Committee Report on the legisla 
tion stated
retirement protection for the 70 million workers under old-age and 
survivors insurance is incomplete because it does not now provide 
a lower retirement age for those who are demonstrably retired by 
reason of a permanent and total disability. We recommend the 
closing of this serious gap in the old-age and survivors insurance 
system by providing for the payment of retirement benefits at age 
50 to those regular workers who are forced into premature retire 
ment because of disability.
Thus, disability insurance was conceived of as a necessary early retire 
ment program for older workers.
In 1960, Congress removed the minimum age requirement of 50 
years for disability insurance beneficiaries. Nonetheless, the Social 
Security Administration considers age to be a significant factor in the 
disability decision process. It is not that age makes an individual more 
disabled; rather, the agency's assumption is that people in the latter 
stages of work life who have impairments are less likely to be able to 
adjust to new employment opportunities. To understand the place that 
age plays in disability determination, it is useful to review briefly how 
SSA determines that an individual is disabled for purposes of receiving 
SSDI. SSA uses a five-step sequential evaluation process (Figure 7).
It is at step five determining whether there are other jobs the indi 
vidual can perform that age comes into account, as required by the 
Social Security Act. For younger persons (under age 50), SSA does 
not consider that age will seriously affect one's ability to adapt to a 
new work situation. Social Security regulations state that "if you are 
closely approaching advanced age (50-54) we will consider that your 
age, along with a severe impairment and limited work experience, may 
seriously affect your ability to adjust to a significant number of jobs in 
the national economy." "Advanced age" (55 or over) is that point
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Figure 7 Social Security Sequential Disability Decision-Making Process
1 Is the applicant engaging in substantial gainful activity? 
(Earning more than $700/month) 
No Yes —> Deny
2. Does the applicant have severe impairment(s) that limits
basic work activities? 
Yes No  ^ Deny
Is the impairment expected to last 12 months or result in death? 
Yes No —*• Deny
3. Does the impairment meet or equal the medical listings7 
Allow •<———— Yes No
(Assess residual functional capacity)
4. Does the impairment prevent doing past work?
Yes No ——^ Deny
I 
(Consider the applicant's age, education and work expenence)
5. Does the impairment prevent any other work
that exists in the national economy? 
Allow -4———— Yes No ——>• Deny
where SSA regards age as significantly affecting a person's ability to 
perform substantial gainful activity.
Both the increasing numbers of workers in the older age ranges and 
the impact of the easing of standards for them in step five can be seen 
in the proportion of persons who successfully apply for DI benefits 
(Table 2).
The Protection Offered by Supplemental Security Income
As the name implies, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) pro 
gram supplements the coverage provided by SSDI. As a means-tested 
program, it does so in two ways. First, it provides disability benefits to 
individuals who are not covered by SSDI. For individuals who meet 
the low income and assets test, the sequential evaluation to determine 
whether they are disabled for Social Security purposes is the same as it
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Table 2 SSDI Awards and Applications by Age, 1997a
Applications allowed 













SOURCE: Social Security Administration unpublished data.
a Both applications and awards are the total of first-time and reapphcations.
is for SSDI. Secondly, even for individuals who are receiving SSDI but 
whose benefits are very low (currently below $500 a month), SSI pro 
vides supplemental coverage with a total benefit somewhat higher than 
$500 a month. Last year, 5.3 million persons received SSI on the basis 
of a disability.4 Currently, out of 6.3 million SSDI beneficiaries, 1.6 
million receive SSI as well. In addition to federal benefits, 44 states 
also provide additional benefits. Unlike SSDI, every dollar of earnings 
after the first $65 a month results in a 50-cent reduction in SSI benefits.
The Increased Retirement Age
In reviewing Social Security coverage for disability, we cannot 
look only at the DI and SSI programs. Medicare and retirement bene 
fits must also be considered as part of the protection available to work 
ers who become disabled.
Medicare is provided to persons who have received SSDI benefits 
for two years. While health insurance is obviously an important issue 
for any adult, it is particularly important for persons with disabilities 
because there is substantial evidence that they are at greater risk for 
additional health complications (Marge 1998). Individuals who get 
SSI benefits then get Medicaid immediately rather than having to wait 
for Medicare. Medicaid, ironically, can be more useful to these indi 
viduals because, unlike Medicare, it provides prescription drug cover 
age.
Social Security retirement benefits are also closely linked to work 
ers' financial status if they become disabled. Workers on DI automati 
cally transition to retirement benefits upon reaching 65 years of age,
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but that retirement age is gradually increasing to 67. To the extent that 
individuals retire early due to poor health, the current increase in the 
normal retirement age and the eventual reduction in the amount of ben 
efits from 80 to 70 percent of normal retirement for those workers who 
retire at 62 is an incentive for more workers to seek SSDI. The amount 
of SSDI benefits would be comparable to their normal retirement bene 
fit. If they can get SSDI, they then convert at the normal retirement age 
to whatever their full Social Security retirement benefit would be and 
never suffer a reduction in benefits. GAO (1999) argued that while 
future increases in the retirement age would result in net trust fund sav 
ings, there would be some increase in disability insurance payments. 
However, for workers who were in poor health but could not meet the 
strict disability standards of SSDI, they would either have to continue 
to work until normal retirement age or accept a reduced retirement ben 
efit. In short, the Social Security retirement age affects how workers 
mitigate the risk of disability as they age.
However, the relationship between health and retirement plans may 
not be as simple as is sometimes assumed. As noted above, HRS data 
indicate that the men who retired early (at age 62) do not significantly 
differ in the prevalence of health limitations from those who wait 
(Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips 1996). The Congressional Budget 
Office (1999) also found that only 8 percent of men and 11 percent of 
women who took early retirement had non-Social Security income 
below the poverty line and a work-related disability. This may suggest 
that only a small proportion of early retirees are rendered extremely 
dependent on early Social Security benefits retirement by virtue of both 
disability and income.
Insuring against Workplace Injury—Workers Compensation
While the Social Security Disability Insurance system covers 
workers with severe disabilities regardless of how they developed those 
disabilities, workers' compensation (WC) insurance is a nearly univer 
sal system to provide reimbursement of wages and expenses for work 
ers who become disabled as a result of their job. WC will be discussed 
only briefly here.
Private insurance companies provide WC insurance, but it is not an 
entirely private system. Employers are generally required to provide
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the insurance, but its existence also protects employers from legal lia 
bility. WC began in the early 1900s and now has separate programs for 
each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Since the basic goal 
of WC is to restore workers to their previous abilities, the programs 
strongly emphasize rehabilitation. WC is fully funded by employers. 
Benefits include a weekly amount until maximum medical improve 
ment has been realized, with payments thereafter based on the degree 
of disability; medical care is also covered. Benefit payments, which 
include both cash payments and medical care, totaled $42.4 billion in 
1996.
Insuring against Disability—Private Plans
While Social Security provides financial protection for workers 
who become severely disabled over the long term and workers com 
pensation provides coverage for those who become injured or sick on 
the job, private disability insurance falls between these systems. It 
should be noted at the outset that private plans are not independent of 
Social Security; they developed in a climate that already included 
Social Security and other public benefits. The private plans assumed 
the existence of Social Security and generally are tailored to integrate 
with it, by offsetting their benefits by the amount of Social Security 
benefits. Private disability plans are broadly divided into two catego 
ries, short-term and long-term, but beyond that there is great variety 
and no standard terminology.
The definitions of disability within the types of plans vary to some 
extent, but they generally share major characteristics. Short-term plans 
typically cover impairments that are judged to prevent employees from 
engaging in their usual occupation. They generally pick up workers 
after sick pay is exhausted, although the plan may be in lieu of sick pay. 
Benefit periods generally range from 30 days to six months. Nearly all 
employees who end up getting short-term benefits return to work within 
two months. Others may, if they are covered, "graduate" to long-term 
disability coverage. Generally, long-term plans are more restrictive, 
particularly after the first two years. While they initially provide pay 
ments for employees unable to perform their usual occupation, after 
two years the definition usually requires the employee to be unable to 
perform any occupation. The earnings replacement rate of these long-
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term plans is about 60 percent, up to a contractual maximum dollar 
amount. However, this generally includes any SSDI payments.
Private plans provide a useful measure of protection. The problem 
is that relatively few workers are covered. According to Bureau of 
Labor Statistics data, about 40 percent of full-time workers have short- 
term policies, and about one-third of workers have employer-provided 
long-term policies. As shown in Figure 8, workers in smaller firms are 
less likely to have long-term policies. Note that blue-collar workers in 
all categories of employers are the least likely to have long-term dis 
ability insurance. That is, workers in the most arduous occupations are 
least likely to be covered.
Individually purchased disability plans are also available, but we 
were unable to obtain data on participation rates for such plans. They 
are, however, mostly limited to highly compensated employees or self- 
employed individuals. These plans may replace up to 80 percent of 
earnings, though more typical replacement rates are 60-70 percent. 
Often these plans do not offset payments by the amount of Social Secu 
rity benefits.










SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics 1997 Employee Benefits Survey.
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As with individual and small-group health insurance, the disability 
income insurance market is heavily underwritten. The workers we are 
concerned about here, with their greater risk of disability, would likely 
be deemed uninsurable or face extremely high premium payments. 
Thus for most workers, especially most blue-collar and small-firm 
employees, Social Security is the only game in town.
The extent of coverage and the resulting economic risk of disabil 
ity-related employment loss can be put in perspective by comparison 
with other countries, even though comparisons are inexact due to 
broader definitions of disability in other nations and the use of disabil 
ity rolls to cover more general unemployment. First, a higher propor 
tion of the working-age population is receiving disability insurance 
benefits in most European countries. Second, the economic well-being 
of men with disabilities in the United States is often not equal to their 
counterparts in those other countries. Burkhauser and Daly (1998) 
made this point by comparing the experience of U.S. and German men. 
Using cross-sectional data, they found that the average-income Ger 
man who has a disability lives in a household which has an income that 
is virtually the same as that of the average German without a disability. 
In contrast, the income gap in the United States between those with and 
without disabilities is approximately 25 percent. Additionally, in Ger 
many the pre-tax and transfer income (composed largely of own wage 
earnings) of men with disabilities is nearly 80 percent of that of men 
without disabilities, whereas in the United States the pre-tax and trans 
fer income gap for men is almost 35 percent.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY ISSUES
Older may be wiser, but it often is also weaker. For the individual, 
the story is mixed. While any given individual is far more likely to be 
impaired in the second half of work life than in the first, the good news 
is that that individual is likely to be somewhat healthier than his coun 
terpart of 20 years ago. For the social insurance system, however, the 
improvements in health and functioning are still going to be trumped 
by increased number of people in their late fifties and early sixties. It
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could have been worse, but demographic factors still present three key 
policy problems having to do with distributional issues.
The first problem is that health status is not randomly distributed in 
the population. Minorities and those with low educational levels are 
more likely to have impairments affecting their employment. What 
ever the covariance and root causes of the unequal health status of 
minorities, under present trends, minorities will constitute a dispropor 
tionate number of those with health impairments at the same time that 
they are becoming a larger proportion of the general population.
The second problem is that the impact of disability on employment 
is concentrated. Those with higher educational status are both less 
likely to need to leave a job due to impairment and more likely to 
regain employment after losing it because of disability. This factor 
also reinforces the problem facing minority groups.
Finally, just as workers are admonished to have private pensions 
and savings in addition to Social Security (completing the famous 
three-legged stool), SSDI provides a benefit level that does not hold 
workers harmless in the event of disability. The replacement rate is 
less than 50 percent for most workers. However, while most people 
have at least short legs on their stool for retirement, a similar supple 
ment to Social Security Disability Insurance is generally not available. 
We do not know the size of the assets of SSDI beneficiaries, but since 
their average income tends to be low, it is very unlikely that their sav 
ings are of much help when they become disabled. Similarly, private 
long-term disability insurance covers only about one-third of workers. 
Like employer-provided health insurance, it tends to be offered to 
workers who are already better off. In short, the health risk to the older 
population is not randomly distributed, and the consequences of 
impairment add additional risk to traditionally disadvantaged groups.
In addition to the aging baby boomers, the other contextual issue 
for assessing disability is the currently scheduled and potential 
increases in the retirement age-. While we know that many people pre 
fer to take Social Security retirement benefits at age 62, raising that age 
will not affect as high a proportion of workers with impairments as 
would have been true 20 years ago. Nonetheless, that trend will be 
scant comfort to those who seek to retire early for health reasons but 
whose impairments do not meet SSDI criteria. We are still learning 
more about their numbers and characteristics, but suffice it to say for
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now that there will be groups that will be worse off if they must defer 
retirement beyond the current early retirement age or take further 
reductions in retirement benefits.
The current policy response to the increased prevalence of disabil 
ity among older workers is to make it relatively easier for older work 
ers to be awarded SSDI. To the extent that workers are required to 
work longer to receive retirement benefits, additional options may be 
considered. These would include modifying (i.e., easing) the sequen 
tial evaluation system for older workers, allowing a partial disability 
benefit for older workers, or lowering the Medicare eligibility age to 
reduce health costs for workers forced to retire on reduced benefits. 
These are all expensive propositions, but nonetheless, the impact on 
older workers in fragile health must be considered as we examine pol 
icy options to improve the solvency of the system.
Notes
Mark V. Nadel is Associate Commissioner, Office of Disability and Income Assistance 
Policy, Social Security Administration. This paper was written with the assistance of 
Stephane Philogene. Howard Bradley also provided useful help. I appreciate com 
ments from Jane Ross, Eli Donkar, Kalman Rupp, and Michael Marge. The views 
expressed in this paper are entirely my own and do not necessarily represent the posi 
tion of the Social Security Administration.
1. The National Study of Health and Activity will do medical examinations and 
functional assessments and collect other data from a sample of 5,500 working-age 
individuals, most of whom will have been previously screened to get a sample of 
individuals with some degree of impairment. SS A disability examiners will deter 
mine whether individuals not now on the roles would qualify for benefits on the 
basis of impairment.
2. The disability and survivors insurance features of Social Secunty are particularly 
important to blacks. While a smaller proportion of all black beneficiaries receive 
retirement benefits than do whites, a larger proportion of black beneficiaries 
receive DI benefits than do whites (25 percent for blacks compared to 12 percent 
for whites). See Hendley and Bihmoria (1999).
3. To be insured for DI, workers under age 65 must 1) be fully insured and 2) have 
recent covered earnings, as follows. Workers age 31 and over must have covered 
earnings in at least 20 of their last 40 quarters ending with the quarter in which the 
worker became disabled. Workers who become disabled before age 31 may meet 
an alternative to the 20/40 test: younger workers must have quarters of coverage 
equal to at least half of the quarters in the period between the quarter of attain-
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ment of age 21 and the quarter of onset of disability. (Any odd number of quarters 
in that period is rounded off by one.) Even the youngest workers, however, must 
have a minimum of 6 quarters. Workers who meet statutory blindness require 
ments need only be fully insured and need not meet the second requirements for 
recent earnings.
4. SSI can also be paid, if the low income and asset test is met, to the aged (65+) and 
to children with disabilities
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INTRODUCTION: OLDER WORKERS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD THEM
Older workers those older than, say, 45 years, but younger than 
the normal retirement age face a set of constraints on their activities 
that increases economic insecurity and vulnerability. An increasing 
proportion of these older workers experience eroding strength and 
health, and many of them are perceived by both their employers and 
their younger worker peers as "long in the tooth," or "over the hill." 
Often these perceptions guide employer and public decisions, and 
these lead to both higher rates of job loss among older workers, and 
feelings of economic insecurity.
This set of circumstances is undeniable and is a normal accompa 
niment of the aging process. However, it is these circumstances that 
account for the relatively high incidence of reliance by older workers 
on the nation's social insurance system. The preceding chapters have 
taken apart the social insurance system for older workers and focused 
on four policy areas of special concern to them: health and health 
insurance, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), workers' com 
pensation, and unemployment compensation (UI). Interestingly, none 
of the conference presentations dealt with the Social Security Retire 
ment or Medicare programs, which are, in fact, the two largest pro 
grams affecting older workers.
There is one overarching national policy issue that is central to the 
situation of older workers:
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How should social insurance policy respond to the needs of a 
growing group of older workers who tend to be less strong and 
healthy than their younger peers and who face eroding personal 
capabilities and difficult decisions regarding phasing into retire 
ment?
Should we be promoting a pro-work agenda for older U.S. citizens by, 
for example, reducing the bite of pension plans that discourage contin 
ued work or by changing the employer culture regarding older workers, 
or by modifying public benefit programs and public regulations that 
inhibit flexible work arrangements? Or should we be seeking to 
improve the adequacy of income support arrangements for these work 
ers as they phase into retirement given existing institutions and incen 
tives?
SOME BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF OLDER WORKERS
Before discussing this public policy issue, it is important to recog 
nize several basic attributes of the older worker population. First, older 
workers (those aged 45 to 65) are one-third of the workforce, one-fifth 
of the unemployed, and one-third of the insured unemployed. Hence, 
relative to younger workers, they shoulder a smaller burden of unem 
ployment and reap a larger share of UI benefits. 1
Second, on average and relative to the remainder of the workforce, 
older workers have less education, fewer skills, and less flexibility in 
changing responsibilities and accepting new challenges. There are 
fewer minorities among them. They earn higher wages than the 
remainder of the workforce, even though a larger proportion of them 
are in poor health. These higher wages, of course, are related to their 
longer job tenure.
Third, the males in the group of 45- to 65-year-olds have shown a 
rapid increase in the willingness to stop regular employment and 
 accept retirement.2 On the other hand, women in this age group appear 
to have an increasing propensity to engage in formal work.
Fourth, today's cohort of older workers will live longer than prior 
cohorts of older workers. As a result, today's cohort has more years of 
expected retirement ahead of them than did prior older worker cohorts. 3
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Americans now measure retirement in decades rather than years. As a 
result, this cohort is under more social pressure to remain active in the 
labor market than prior cohorts. Perhaps as a result of this increasing 
social pressure, today's older workers confront a general public that 
believes that access to support from both private and public programs 
should be more difficult and that the support provided should be less 
generous than it in fact is.
A final characteristic of today's older workers is that they can be 
roughly allocated to two groups, with quite different policy implica 
tions.4 The first and largest group is generally healthy, educated, work 
ing, and tends to be white. For them, the primary issue is the difficult 
set of decisions regarding the phasing into retirement and the lifestyle 
to be adopted in retirement. For a sizable (and growing) proportion of 
these older workers, increasing years of work will be desirable.
The second group of older workers consists of those with health 
problems5 or with few years of schooling; minorities are prevalent in 
this group. These workers tend to be marginal to the labor market, and 
for them, the issue is the adequacy of support programs and access to 
economic and health care resources. Except for the small proportion of 
totally disabled workers among this population, SSDI is likely to be 
unavailable to them. Moreover, early retirement benefits have eroded, 
and unemployment compensation provides only temporary help if per 
manent loss of a regular full time job occurs. For many of these more- 
marginal older workers, policy changes enacted over the past few 
decades have caused economic hardship. This situation is not likely to 
improve for subsequent cohorts of older workers.
OLDER WORKERS AND ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY
The case for social insurance rests on the inability of the private 
market to adequately protect individuals (and hence society) against 
risk and uncertainty and on the need to assure an acceptable minimum 
living standard for all citizens. Hence, designing social insurance pro 
grams to meet the needs of older workers requires that the economic 
status and vulnerability of older workers be understood. Consider the
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following generalizations regarding the economic well-being of the 
population of older workers.
A primary problem for the group of regular workers who are 
employees stems from the higher costs faced by employers in provid 
ing them health insurance coverage and retirement pensions. 6 As a 
result, when pressures to reduce costs due to competition or declining 
demand are encountered, employers are less likely to retain older 
workers than young workers with the same sets of skills and competen 
cies. Hence, job displacement for older workers is substantially more 
likely than it is for equivalent young workers. 7 Moreover, older work 
ers are less likely to be reemployed full-time if they are displaced.8 It 
follows that such displaced older workers who draw UI benefits are 
more likely to exhaust their benefits than are younger workers.9
Relative to younger workers, the population of older workers is 
more likely to be self-employed; 10 percent of older workers are self- 
employed compared with but 4 percent of younger workers. Relying 
on the prospects of an individual enterprise for income is risky, as the 
failure rate for single proprietorships is substantially higher than for 
larger enterprises (notwithstanding the relatively high prevalence of 
legal and medical professionals in the population of self-employed 
workers).
If they are working and are not self-employed, older workers are 
more likely to be employed part-time than are younger workers. As a 
result, they are less likely to be eligible for unemployment insurance 
benefits if they lose their jobs, as UI covers only full time, regular 
employees. Many of these part-time workers will be engaging in 
"bridge employment," which typically carries less compensation and 
fewer benefits than regular employment. 10 Many of these bridge 
worker-retirees have been displaced from their regular jobs and have 
exhausted their unemployment insurance benefits.
If they are not working most likely a result of taking early retire 
ment they will be dependent on income from a combination of pri 
vate pensions and early-retirement Social Security benefits. While 
about one-half of the group of older workers is covered by employer- 
supported pensions, this proportion is shrinking over time. Moreover, 
those who are covered with defined-benefit plans face eroding real ben 
efits.
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However, on average, these older workers have higher wage rates 
than younger workers, primarily because of longer job tenures. More 
over, they typically have fewer family responsibilities than do younger 
workers.
Further, these older workers are more likely to have employer- 
sponsored health insurance and less likely to be uninsured than are 
equivalent younger workers, 11 although the percentage with employer- 
sponsored health insurance has been decreasing.
Finally, if they are severely disabled, older workers are more likely 
to receive SSDI benefits than equivalent younger workers, and once on 
the disability benefit roles they are less likely to leave.
Given this profile, overall and on average it is hard to make the 
case that older workers as a group are a particularly vulnerable seg 
ment of American society. While they appear to face substantially 
higher risks of job loss, part-time work, and exclusion from some 
social insurance benefits, the average older worker starts from a higher 
earnings and income base than does the average younger worker and is 
less likely to be without health insurance and private pension coverage.
To find real vulnerability, we need to dig deeper into this popula 
tion. In fact, such digging will reveal that second group of particularly 
vulnerable older workers emphasized by Kathy Swartz namely, those 
with low education, few skills and minority status. Moreover, even 
among this group, all marginal to the labor force, true vulnerability is 
found by digging deeper still, to locate those with ill health, those with 
ill spouses, and those who have experienced job loss or perhaps the 
loss of a spouse. Although people with these characteristics tend to be 
at the bottom of any larger population grouping with which one begins, 
the policy implications are quite different for those at the bottom end of 
the distribution of the older worker group because of their age.
SELF-SUFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF 
RECENT SOCIAL POLICY CHANGES
As economic and political changes have occurred over the past 
decade or so, there have been a number of developments that have 
affected the self-sufficiency of the group of older workers, and more
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particularly that of the most vulnerable among them. In the following 
pages, I will flag some of these developments but will not document 
the details of each.
Perhaps the most significant development for older workers has 
been the substantial increase in cost consciousness that has affected 
most firms, especially those enterprises confronting increasingly severe 
international competition. Because of the higher costs of employing 
older workers both higher wage costs as well as higher benefit 
costs they have been the first to have experienced job loss and, for 
many, unplanned early retirement. Those older workers who retained 
their jobs have experienced the stress that accompanies decreased job 
security.
This same concern for employment costs has led to an erosion of 
employer-sponsored health insurance coverage among older workers. 
For those remaining covered, the private sector plans have tended to 
shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans. Although this 
shift has increased work incentives among those covered, it has also 
reduced the adequacy of expected pension benefits. For many older 
workers, this trend has increased the perceived need to postpone retire 
ment and to continue to work.
In addition to these changes, the brunt of which have tended to fall 
on the most vulnerable group of older workers, there has also been a 
downward trend in real wage rates for unskilled labor since the early 
1970s. In relative terms, the wage rate gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers has increased during this period, resulting in 
increased inequality and a perception by older unskilled workers that 
they have been left behind in the process of economic growth. 12 This 
focus on gaps, however, masks the absolute deterioration of earnings 
for those workers with few skills or low education; since the early 
1970s, the real hourly wage rate for a man with a high school degree 
(but no more education) has fallen by about 35 percent.
However, and to some extent offsetting these changes, there has 
been a substantial decrease over time in the physical demands associ 
ated with work; remaining employed today typically requires more 
mental and less physical effort than it did a few decades ago. Indeed, a 
survey taken in 1950 inquired as to whether workers were in "physi 
cally demanding" jobs, and about 20 percent of this older-worker 
group answered "yes." 13 Today, only about 7 percent of older workers
Session 1: Charting the Landscape 169
answer this question affirmatively. When this shift is combined with 
increasing average education levels of older workers, it enables some 
of them to remain in the workforce longer, and with less effort, than 
was the case a few decades ago.
Simultaneous with these demand-side changes in employment and 
wages and the decrease in the physical demands of work have been 
changes in social policy that have affected older workers. Perhaps the 
most visible change has been the legislated increase in the Social Secu 
rity full-benefit retirement age and the increase in the penalty for taking 
early retirement. 14 These changes embody the social decision that 
working lives should be extended and retirement pushed further up the 
age distribution. 15
There have also been a large series of rule changes in workers' 
compensation that have reduced access and compensation if disabled. 
The background paper on workers' compensation by John Burton and 
Emily Spieler emphasizes that, while few were watching, legislation 
and judicial rulings since 1989 have substantially restricted the accessi 
bility and generosity of workers' compensation benefits. Eligibility 
has been tightened. Benefits have been lowered. Payment mechanisms 
have been made more restrictive and health costs more tightly con 
trolled. 16 As a result of these changes, health-related costs have been 
increasingly shifted to recipients and their families or to other pro 
grams such as SSDI and away from employers. An increased burden 
of proof has been imposed on covered workers. All of these changes 
have tended to fall most heavily on older workers. 17
Finally, there is the more recent development that colors all discus 
sions of the economic self-sufficiency of all worker groups, namely, 
eight years of sustained prosperity. Clearly the prosperity of this 
period has benefited nearly all groups, in part through its promotion of 
both the demand for and supply of labor. 18 Moreover, this development 
has resulted in a run up in asset values for some, but not all. While 
both of these developments have made the future less uncertain for 
some older workers, there has been a disturbing increase in disparities 
in both wealth holdings and earnings over time. Moreover, while the 
prosperity has opened up additional options for phased retirement for 
some older workers, it has imposed increased work demands and pres 
sures on those who continue to work full time.
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POLICY ISSUES REGARDING OLDER WORKERS
The economic and policy developments mentioned in the previous 
section raise several important issues that the nation should address in 
terms of its treatment of older workers. The chapters of this book all 
fasten on the following overarching policy issue:
Should the nation's major social insurance programs be 
restructured to provide a more adequate safety net, or 
should they be redesigned to increase work incentives for 
older workers? Or, should policy changes seek to accom 
plish both objectives?
Nestled in this issue are a number of important subquestions: 19
  Should public regulations inhibiting flexible work arrangements 
be redesigned so as to increase the availability of this option?
  In the face of apparent reluctance by employers to provide train 
ing for older workers,20 should training opportunities for retooling 
or moving to bridge jobs be supported by public money?
  In the face of large disincentives for continued work beyond some 
early eligibility retirement age in numerous private pension 
arrangements,21 and the apparent reluctance of employers to 
change plans that contain these disincentives, should public regu 
lations designed to encourage the restructuring of private pension 
arrangements so as to increase incentives for continued work be 
implemented?
  Finally, should access to income support and benefits while work 
ing less than full time or not working at all be expanded?
At any time, including the present, there are numerous policy pro 
posals on the nation's table that address these questions. While some 
of these proposals seek to increase the adequacy of programs targeted 
on older workers, others stress work-continuation goals. The following 
menu is designed to set the stage for the subsequent discussions of 
numerous policy suggestions that were presented at the conference and 
are contained in this volume.
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Social Security Retirement
In addition to the now-resolved issue regarding the elimination or 
reduction of the earnings test, there have also been proposals to 
increase the normal retirement age still further, and perhaps to increase 
the early retirement age along with it. Like the elimination of the earn 
ings test, both of these measures would promote work continuation. 
Consistent with this thrust, there has been little discussion of increased 
adequacy in benefit payments.
Medicare
Should we allow workers to buy into Medicare at age 62 a recent 
proposal from the administration or should we restrict Medicare cov 
erage to receipt of full retirement benefits given an increasing retire 
ment age? The first of these options aids vulnerable older workers, but 
it clearly contains troublesome problems of adverse selection. The sec 
ond option promotes continued work, but it simultaneously imposes 
costs on vulnerable older workers.
On another front, should we return the employer-as-first-payer pro 
vision in Medicare to its 1982 standard, a standard that reduced health 
insurance costs for employers, and hence, is a pro-work policy? Or do 
the costs in reduced health care coverage and adequacy override the 
pro-work gains?
Social Security Disability Insurance
For SSDI, should we adopt some subset of the several proposed 
reforms designed to promote work? These proposals include a supple 
mental EITC for SSDI recipients, allowing Medicare access to older 
workers who leave SSDI (with perhaps an earnings-conditioned pre 
mium), and the provision of vouchers for training for existing SSDI 
recipients? Again, all of these are pro-work. We could also consider 
changes in the benefit structure that would increase the adequacy of 
income support to the most vulnerable older workers.
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Unemployment Compensation
Currently, self-employed and part-time workers are excluded from 
the UI program, and that imposes a relative hardship on them; should 
these workers be integrated into the unemployment insurance system? 
For example, should we reduce the required hours of work in the base 
period for initial eligibility? Such a change would encourage flexible 
and partial retirement and facilitate the move from full work to retire 
ment.
As an alternative, should we support tax-preferred savings 
accounts for older workers as a means to encourage a flexible move 
from full work to retirement? Should UI be used to support health 
insurance premiums, an adequacy concern? Still further, should the 
work option in UI be expanded to include more choice such as bridge 
jobs?22
In terms of adequacy, should the minimum benefit award be 
expanded? This award is targeted on older workers and, in particular, 
vulnerable older workers. Should we increase the benefit duration for 
the group of older workers? Or, should a self-employment assistance 
program with the UI system be expanded (a change that would also be 
pro-work)?
Workers' Compensation
One hardly knows what to say about workers' compensation, given 
its diversity among the 50 states. Should there be some attempt to sys 
tematize workers' compensation coverage, eligibility, and benefits? 
Should there be efforts to reverse the reduced access and generosity of 
workers' compensation that has occurred since the late 1980s?
CONCLUSION
These, then, form the major policy suggestions that one finds in 
this book and that were talked about by participants in the NASI con 
ference. We hope that the information regarding the composition and 
self-sufficiency of older workers, how they are and have been treated 
by our institutions and policies, and how they could be treated by pol-
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icy changes, sets the stage for the more in-depth analysis in subsequent 
chapters of this volume.
Notes
1. See O'Leary and Wandner (2001)
2. There is evidence that this trend has slowed, or disappeared, in recent years. See 
Quinn (1999).
3. In 1965, an older worker who reached age 65 could expect 13 years of retirement. 
Today, such a worker can expect 18 years. See Gendell (1998).
4. This point was emphasized by Katherine Swartz in her discussion of health and 
health insurance for older workers (Swartz 2001)
5. Although about 25 percent of those aged 55 to 64 have some work limitation, the 
prevalence of ill health appears to be decreasing over time While health prob 
lems are more prevalent among older workers than in the remainder of the work 
force, conditional on having a problem, it is more likely to be age-related and less 
traumatic. Their health problems tend to be from exposure to adverse environ 
ments over time, stem from multiple causes, have long latency periods, and not be 
directly job-related. Because these health problems tend not to be directly job- 
related, establishing eligibility for work-related support such as workers' compen 
sation is often difficult. Because these health problems are unlikely to be totally 
disabling, establishing eligibility for SSDI is also more difficult See Nadel 
(2001) and Burton and Spieler (2001).
6. One study suggests that health insurance costs are twice as high for males over 50 
than for male workers aged less than 50 (Clark 1994).
7. The displacement rate for older workers is about 3.5 percent, relative to a 2.5 per 
cent rate for younger workers (O'Leary and Wandner 2001).
8. Indeed, the reemployment rate for displaced older workers displaced is about 50 
percent, compared with a 70 percent reemployment rate for younger workers 
(O'Leary and Wandner 2001).
9. Sixty percent of displaced older workers exhaust their benefits compared with 40 
percent for younger workers (O'Leary and Wandner 2000).
10. One survey found that 49 percent of men and 34 percent of women over 55 were 
"bridge, partial retirement" workers (Quinn 1999).
11. About 80 percent of older workers aged 55 to 65 are covered by employer spon 
sored health insurance; only about 15 percent of this group is uninsured. See 
Swartz (2001) and Committee for Economic Development (1999).
12. The earnings premium received by a college graduate, relative to a worker with a 
high school degree or less, increased from about 30 percent in the 1970s to over 
60 percent by the early 1990s.
13. From C. Eugene Steurele, Rich Johnson, and Chris Spiro, The Urban Institute, 
1998; cited in Committee for Economic Development (1999).
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14. The legislative change in early retirement benefits increased the penalty for early 
retirement from 20 percent of the primary insurance amount to 30 percent. See 
Committee for Economic Development (1999).
15. In fact, these changes have also improved the neutrality of the Social Security sys 
tem. An interesting question with respect to these legislated changes is whether 
they will lead to increased prevalence of disability claims among future older 
workers and an increase in SSDI applications.
16. An example of this trend is the adoption by workers' compensation plans in sev 
eral states of the requirement that employer's physicians make the final determi 
nation regarding the work-related nature of injuries and illnesses and hence 
coverage by workers' compensation plans.
17. It should be noted that the incentives designed to increase the employment of 
workers with disabilities implicit in the Americans with Disabilities Act tend to be 
offset by the pattern of reduced coverage of these workers by both the UI and the 
workers' compensation programs.
18. A recent study concluded that, if the unemployment rate were 4 percent, about 18 
percent of older workers who lose their jobs would retire; however, if the unem 
ployment rate were 8 percent, retirement would be chosen by about 44 percent of 
older worker job losers. See Sandell and Baldwin (1990).
19. At the time of the Academy Conference, one of these sub-questions was, Should 
the earnings test in Social Security be relaxed or eliminated so as to promote con 
tinued work by retirement benefit recipients? Congress and the President have 
now acted positively on this issue, and this anti-work continuation measure has 
become a relic of the past.
20. In a recent survey of employers, 19 percent of younger workers report having 
been given training; 13 percent of older workers so report (Armrault 1992).
21. In some pnvate pension plans now, there is an implicit tax of up to 50 percent on 
continued work beyond some early eligibility retirement date. One study of about 
1000 private pension plans found that working beyond the early retirement eligi 
bility date typically implied sizable reductions in lifetime benefits, ranging up to 
30 percent (Kotlikoff and Wise 1989).
22. One possibility would be to ease the policy of denying benefits if full-time work is 
available but not taken for older workers. This denial of benefits policy imposes a 
relative hardship on older workers.
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Well, good morning, and congratulations on making it here. I'm 
Wally Maher. I'm with DaimlerChrysler Corporation and I want to 
first really congratulate the Academy on the initiative it's taken to 
tackle this problem. It's a very real problem. I've been asked to com 
ment on the various background papers from the perspective of an 
employer. As the background papers and the summary that you just 
heard reflect, for many employers, including my company, there is con 
siderable linkage between the public and private plans covering health 
care, pension, and disability benefits. And for this reason, a major ben 
efit of the Academy effort will be to help assure that these linkages are 
understood by policymakers, lest anyone believe that you can cut back 
on one without impacting the other.
As I begin this morning, I'm sure that and if it isn't, it should be 
clear to all of you that my company and my industry is not your typi 
cal U.S. employer relative to the types of benefit plans that we offer. 
First, the great majority of our employees are represented by a union, 
the UAW, and notwithstanding the fine and substantial efforts of the 
organizing staffs of the AFL-CIO member unions, this is not true of 
most U.S. employers. Second and not totally divorced from the 
first is the fact that we provide comprehensive benefits for our 
employees and retirees that relate to the subject of this conference: 
health care, pension, disability, and life insurance.
Third, my company and our industry and this may come as a sur 
prise to some of you is in the relatively early stage of a massive num 
ber of retirements and related hiring, based largely on the fact that we 
had a large hiring binge in the mid to late 1960s. So we at my com 
pany, and I'm fairly sure that this is true of GM and Ford, are actually 
witnessing the start of a reduction in the average age of our workforce, 
and I'm sure that this phenomenon is being experienced by some of the 
larger auto supply firms with similar benefit structures. Finally, it is 
very clear that there are many companies with an aging workforce that 
do not provide the health and disability benefits that we do, and it is
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here where the risks that the Academy is studying can be most pro 
found.
The reason I wanted to point these facts out is that I believe they 
tend to validate the data that was portrayed particularly in the paper by 
Katherine Swartz, which shows that there is progressively less insur 
ance coverage among the various baby-boomer cohorts that are moving 
through the system and approaching retirement age. I believe that this 
could reflect both the then-current trend towards less unionization of 
workplaces and the shift in U.S. employment away from traditional 
manufacturing jobs.
Now, despite what I said about the fact that we have at my com 
pany an average age that is starting to decline, we still have many older 
employees, and I do want to discuss the major challenges that we face 
to assure that these workers continue to have productive jobs and that 
we're able to reduce the cost associated with having disabled workers. 
I also wish to discuss the fact that while the benefit programs we have 
in place are not representative of the employer population generally, 
there are indeed many employers with similar plans, and these 
employee protections could well be jeopardized by ill-conceived public 
policies.
Let me first discuss the major challenges that my company is con 
fronting as we face the reality of an older workforce. First, it has 
become very clear that there is a priority in designing jobs in a way to 
reduce the risk of injury. It has been established in our industry that 
standardized work practices are critical to injury prevention. Second is 
training: you can have all the standardized work practices in the world, 
but unless workers are adequately trained to perform the job as 
designed, you're not going to avoid the risk of injury. Third, we have 
to have adequate supervision. Finally, in addition to these core require 
ments, we've also found that it's been quite helpful to have available 
for employees wellness programs and other information so that they 
understand the value of healthy lifestyles.
Now, if all that fails, another challenge is to have the resources at 
hand to retrain workers to be able to perform jobs that are compatible 
with their physical limitations. And since I brought up the subject of 
retraining, I should point out that this is an issue which I personally 
believe as a country we would be well served to focus more attention 
on, specifically the need to have adequate programs in place to assist
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workers who are unable to perform the jobs that they currently have 
and who have lost their jobs as a result. Now this could be the result of 
disability or it could also be the result of the continued globalization of 
the economy. In either case, just as my company has an interest in hav 
ing all of our employees working productively, the country has a simi 
lar interest in having every American living as productive a life as 
possible. The private sector has lots of experience in, and understands 
the value of, retraining, and we would hope that more and more of that 
filters into the public sector, because retraining truly can open new 
horizons for workers.
Now what about some of the other concerns that I mentioned? 
First as I mentioned earlier and as you just heard in the summary and 
in the background papers there are many employers that don't pro 
vide the level of benefits that we do, and my concern is that despite the 
continued and sustained level of prosperity that we've enjoyed here in 
the United States, there are many employers that still do not provide 
even a basic level of health benefits for their employees, not to mention 
short- and long-term disability benefits or a pension plan with a PTD 
component.
What are some of the reasons for this? First, of course, they're not 
required to by law. Second, they may not be able to afford it. And 
third, they may not have to in order to attract employees. And this is 
particularly true for lower-paid and lower-skilled jobs, and I frankly 
don't see this changing. One reason it's unlikely to change is the ever- 
increasing cost of health benefits. In this regard, it's been pretty evi 
dent that health benefits are particularly cost-sensitive, and that's why 
most employees today find themselves in some form of managed-care 
plan and why many employers offer only HMOs because that's all 
they can afford.
So a concern I have is what do you think will happen if, as a result 
of increased regulations, health premiums rise even faster? Or, more 
daunting, if the eligibility age for Medicare is increased to 67 or 70? In 
my judgment, you can bet that fewer employers will offer health bene 
fits. If the Medicare eligibility age is increased, the cost of health ben 
efits for workers who elect to continue working until 67 or 70 will rise 
sharply, and the incidence of employer-provided retiree health benefits 
will continue to plummet. The same will be true for lesser provided 
benefits like disability plans.
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I continue to wince every time I hear the proposal to increase the 
Medicare eligibility age to 67 described as one merely intended to 
bring Medicare eligibility in sync with Social Security. I mean, while 
numerically this is correct, there is one fundamental, compelling differ 
ence which argues against using this analogy. It's the fact that today, 
given the existing, steadily increasing eligibility age for full Social 
Security benefits, if any American chooses to remain in the workforce 
beyond age 65, so as not to experience a reduction in Social Security 
benefits, that American is assured at the very least of getting cash 
wages from an employer equal to the minimum wage, and in most 
cases substantially more. However, that same employee has zero 
assurance of getting any health benefits from the employer. And in lieu 
of that, if they tread out into the private insurance market to buy a pol 
icy for the employee and a spouse at age 65 or 66, you can imagine the 
portion of the person's take home pay that that premium would repre 
sent. So that's the reason that I tend to wince about that when I hear 
that analogy used.
Now clearly, is the Medicare program a perfect program? No. Is it 
in need of reform? Yes. Does it have to more resemble the type of 
plans that employees have available today, including structures to help 
retard cost increases? Yes. Do benefits have to be modernized? Yes. 
But as we embrace and try to craft those reform strategies, we have to 
endeavor not to adopt reforms that will exacerbate the problems of the 
uninsured.
I would be remiss if I didn't point out that the biggest challenge we 
confront is to assure that any actions we take to address the problems 
of an aging society are consistent with maintaining a strong economy. 
As the background papers made clear, as the U.S. unemployment rate 
increases, the incidence of disability increases geometrically. Further, 
having a strong economy and the resulting surpluses could eliminate at 
least one of the barriers for improving many social programs designed 
to assist the elderly, the ill and disabled. So there's a compelling rea 
son to keep U.S. employers competitive in the global economy and to 
keep good paying jobs here in the United States, both of which are 
essential ingredients for a strong economy.
I bring this up because it should be recognized that if we, in an 
effort to moderate the cost of public safety-net programs, shift costs to 
employers or otherwise pass laws which have the same effect and
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unreasonably increase labor costs, there will be two inevitable results, 
neither of which is good for workers or the economy. While employers 
like us and those in our industry are unlikely to cancel our benefit 
plans, there could be some impact on overall compensation plans; or 
worse, if we become less competitive, employment opportunities could 
stall. Again, neither of those is good news. Worse, however, is that 
many employers could just drop or substantially diminish their benefit 
plans, and new employers would be less likely to implement them in 
the first place. Again, neither is good news for workers.
As the cost of health and disability benefits continues to increase, 
in part due to an older workforce, it's important to recognize that 
employers do need some flexibility to manage their health and disabil 
ity benefit programs, including the cost of workers' compensation, to 
keep them more affordable. We can't forget the fact that, under the 
current laws of this country, the provision of benefit programs, includ 
ing health and disability benefits, is voluntary, and if employers drop 
their coverage, the cost shifting that results from a diminishing number 
of employers providing benefits will continue to grow.
In conclusion, I believe it is possible for employers to maintain 
programs which are sensitive to the needs of an older workforce and to 
act reasonably to keep the costs of these programs in line. I also 
believe that as a nation we are prosperous enough to have safety-net 
programs to meet the needs of an aging society. I hope that we are able 
to pursue both paths in a way that continues to provide a strong econ 
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Good morning. As I was walking in this morning I was reminded 
that the time must have been 1978 or 1979, and I was due at a meet 
ing here. I was teaching at the University of Massachusetts at that 
point, got on a plane in a blizzard in Boston, and the plane landed at 
National just like it was supposed to. I got on the subway and got to 
my meeting. Seven or eight people were supposed to be there, all of 
whom lived in the District, none of whom made it. You're to be con 
gratulated for your perseverance this morning.
Let me begin by echoing something that Wally said. The Academy 
is to be not only congratulated, but encouraged to do more. All four 
papers deal with pressing issues. They deal with them intelligently. 
They pose a compelling agenda and raise questions in an enormously 
thoughtful way. Bob's summary and discussion of cross-cutting issues 
highlighted that. He also made my job of trying to respond either more 
difficult or easier, depending on which way you think about it.
Let me make five points; none of them will come as a surprise 
because of the extraordinary good work that went into the preparation 
for this panel. First, Bob noted, and I think we need to underscore, the 
enormous asymmetry in both circumstance and access to benefits 
among older workers, whether it's the asymmetry in health status, the 
asymmetry that results from different employment relationships which 
in turn create an asymmetry with access to the public side of the pro 
gram, and most importantly (as I'll come back to and as Wally men 
tioned), asymmetry in access to employer-provided benefits, 
particularly for workers who've left their permanent attachment to the 
workforce.
The difference between a unionized DaimlerChrysler employee 
and her access to an employer-provided benefit system in the early 
years of her retirement or the late years of her working life and the 
access that most workers (sadly, a growing proportion of workers) have 
to those supports is enormous. There is a clear racial dimension to this 
asymmetry, and increasingly, I think we'll find that there's a gender
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dimension to it as well; and, of course, it is attenuated by differences in 
health status. We have to pay an enormous amount of attention to that, 
and Bob framed and I think purposefully Bob framed a question in 
an either/or fashion. He framed it as, should we be encouraging work, 
or should we be improving the adequacy of the public safety net and 
social insurance systems or should we be doing both?
I think the asymmetry argument (among others, but powerfully) 
leads you (or me, at least) to the answer that I suspect Bob wanted us 
all to come to: obviously, both. There are good reasons; first, but not 
only, labor market reasons. The fulfillment of older workers' hopes for 
the shape of their own lives and the increase in longevity argue that we 
ought to be trying to encourage work and we ought to remove perversi 
ties from both the public and private benefit systems that discourage 
work or inappropriately tax it. But we don't all come to that moment 
in our lives similarly situated. Many of us come to that moment more 
dependent on the safety net and the social insurance system. We find it 
badly structured and in many cases quantitatively insufficient, and we 
need to be strengthening it as well. So there is not a simple answer to 
the work-or-safety-net question, and we won't do ourselves a service 
by trying to answer Bob's question in any way except "both."
Let me make a third point, which builds on something that Wally 
said and try to put a sharper point on it. The employer-based, collec 
tively bargained system, as you all know, is eroding. And Wally made 
a point which I think sort of helps us understand this in a deeper way. 
It's eroding even more dramatically than aggregate data show, and 
more than we often think because the workers covered by it are older. 
They are older than the average worker. Just as Chrysler faces a shift 
down the demographic ladder, as a huge cohort of older workers retire, 
we took a look at union retirements anticipated retirements of all 
organized workers in the first decade of this century and it's a 45 
degree line going up the graph. We are going to find an enormous 
increase in the retirement of represented workers in the next decade, 
and that means we are also going to see an enormous decrease in the 
number of workers who are represented in places where employer-pro 
vided benefits are the norm. While some firms, like Chrysler, will be 
replacing those workers, the covered share, all else being equal, will 
continue to decrease, and decrease very dramatically through about
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2018, when we'll begin to see the same phenomenon among our mem 
bers of a substantial increase in younger workers.
That ought to make us enormously careful, for exactly the reasons 
that Wally mentioned about tinkering with the existing apparatus in 
ways that make it more difficult to access. The number and share of 
rehires who are going to need it will increase; the number of people 
who are going to come into their early retirement years or their late 
work years without the protections that have allowed some to suggest 
increasing the retirement age will also increase; and we, therefore, 
must be enormously cautious, particularly about Medicare eligibility.
Let me make a fourth point that I've talked about a little bit, and 
Bob mentioned it particularly in terms of older workers. Do we need 
to modify the public side of the safety net to take account of changing 
employment relationships? The answer is obviously yes, but I caution 
against thinking that that's a problem which we can isolate to older 
workers. The number of people entering the labor force in some sort of 
nonstandard arrangement contract work, temporary work, serial 
employment is increasing (sharply in some sectors of the economy). 
And, the number of part-time workers is already large; it isn't increas 
ing, but is already a big chunk of the labor force. None of our systems 
of social insurance adequately reflect the changing nature of our 
employment relationships. It may be a particularly acute problem in 
the short run for older workers, but it is a problem that isn't limited to 
that part of the population. I underscore that for reasons that you all 
know well both employer preference and to a large extent the conse 
quences of the maturation of the entry of women into the labor force  
these nonstandard arrangements are unlikely to go away. Even with 
the relatively strong enormously strong, in fact employment growth 
over the last three years, the rate of increase in nonstandard attachment 
has continued to accelerate. We should expect that to continue.
Let me just make one last comment provoked by something that 
Wally said, which is the issue of training. We do a terrible job. 
Chrysler, AT&T, a handful of other corporations do a decent job, but as 
a society we do an enormously inadequate job of providing training for 
people during their working lives. We don't spend enough money. We 
spend about 1 percent of payroll. We skew it up the income ladder. We 
devote 7 or 8 times as many training dollars (private training dollars) to 
managers as we do to front-line workers, and we provide almost no
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training at the bottom of the labor market where folks are most mobile. 
This is a problem that will haunt us for the productivity reasons that 
Wally mentioned, but also for the demographic reasons that we have 
both talked about. We are going to be replacing a significant share of 
the American workforce over the next decade, and we will have sys 
tematically underinvested in those replacements. 
Thank you very much.
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The Effects of Job Loss 
on Older Workers
Employment, Earnings, and Wealth
Sewin Chan 
Rutgers University
Ann Huff Stevens 
Yale University
The impact of job loss on an older worker's economic well-being is 
likely to be substantial, with the displacement affecting both subse 
quent employment patterns and financial resources available before 
and after retirement. This paper uses data from the Health and Retire 
ment Study (HRS) to examine employment, earnings, and wealth 
changes that follow involuntary job loss among workers aged 50 and 
over.
We find that job loss leads to very long spells of non-employment, 
with large differences in the employment rates of displaced and nondis- 
placed workers lasting for more than five years. In addition, the earn 
ings of those who do return to work are dramatically reduced over the 
remaining years of the working life. Even six years after job loss, earn 
ings are significantly below those of similar, nondisplaced individu 
als. Although employment-based pensions are not typically lost with 
displacement, account balances and expected annual pension benefits 
may be somewhat diminished. Among displaced men, nonhousing- 
related asset holdings also tend to fall after a job loss.
These results are particularly pertinent in light of the dispropor 
tionate increase in job loss rates among older workers during the last 
recession (Farber 1997). While job loss rates for all age groups have 
subsequently declined, the aging of the workforce in the United States 
makes it important to better document and understand the effects on 
older workers.
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THE DATA
To examine job loss and its effects on earnings, assets, pensions, 
and employment, we used publicly available data from the first three 
waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which were con 
ducted in 1992, 1994, and 1996. We include all men and women aged 
50 and over as of 1992 who remain in the survey at least through the 
second wave.
We identified and followed job loss among older workers in the 
HRS using the extensive information on earnings and employment col 
lected at each wave, including information on job changes that took 
place between the waves. We also used information collected at the 
initial survey wave on up to two previous jobs. First, for those working 
at the wave 1 survey date, we used information on their current earn 
ings and employment characteristics; for those who are not working at 
wave 1, we used information on their previous job, including when and 
why it ended and their final earnings. Second, all individuals at wave 1 
(employed or not) were asked to provide information on their most 
recent previous job that lasted at least five years, thus giving us retro 
spective data on relatively long-term jobs that ended prior to wave 1. 
In subsequent waves of the HRS, employed individuals were asked 
whether they hold the same job as in the previous wave; if not, the rea 
son for leaving was ascertained. Non-employed individuals were also 
asked about what happened to their last job. All of this employment 
information enabled us to construct a continuous series of monthly 
indicators, designating each individual as working or not in each month 
from 1992 through the final survey date in 1996.
Based on these jobs that end before or during the course of the 
three waves, we defined as our sample of "displaced" workers those 
who respond that their job ended when either 1) the "business closed" 
or 2) they were "laid off or let go." While the second part of this defini 
tion may include some individuals fired for cause, we included them 
for consistency with many recent definitions of displaced workers and 
to include individuals who have been "downsized." 1 Thus, our sample 
of job losses consists of reported displacements from long-term jobs 
ending prior to wave 1, jobs held immediately prior to becoming non-
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employed at the wave 1 survey date, (up to two) jobs ending between 
waves 1 and 2, and (up to two) jobs ending between waves 2 and 3.
For each of the jobs documented in the HRS, information was also 
collected on pension eligibility, structure, and benefit amounts. 
Employer-matched pension-provider data have been gathered as part of 
the HRS and used recently by several researchers. 2 We note however, 
that we are relying on self-reported pension information from the three 
surveys, because the matched pension file provides details for a single 
point in time only (wave 1). Given that our interest is in how pensions 
change with displacement, we had to use the self-reported longitudinal 
data. While concerns have been raised regarding the accuracy and 
completeness of self-reported pensions in the HRS (see Gustman and 
Steinmeier 1999), it is the only available source of detailed longitudi 
nal data on private pension wealth and eligibility rules among older 
workers.
Additional information was collected from the HRS surveys 
regarding health status and demographic information, as well as 
income and assets. Summary statistics for men and women by their 
displacement status are shown in Appendix Table 1.
EMPLOYMENT
We analyzed the probability and timing of returning to work, as 
well as the durability of postdisplacement employment, by estimating 
hazard models both for entering and exiting employment. The esti 
mated transition rates are then used to describe the employment pat 
terns of displaced workers following an involuntary job loss. 3 The full 
details of this estimation strategy and the results are discussed in Chan 
and Stevens (forthcoming).
First, we estimated the probability that a non-employed individual 
returns to work in a given month, controlling for individual characteris 
tics, whether the worker is non-employed due to a recent job displace 
ment, and the length of the current spell of non-employment. This 
provided us with an estimate of how many displaced workers return to 
employment and how quickly they do so.4
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Second, we examined the persistence of postdisplacement employ 
ment for older workers who return to work by estimating the probabil 
ity of leaving employment, again, controlling for demographic 
characteristics and whether the individual has experienced a job loss in 
the recent past. 5 This allowed us to consider whether displaced indi 
viduals are more or less likely to leave employment than are compara 
ble individuals who have not been displaced. If postdisplacement jobs 
offer lower wages or other less desirable job characteristics or repre 
sent poor matches between workers and firms, we would expect 
recently displaced workers to leave employment at a higher rate.
To understand the total impact of displacement on employment 
among older workers, we calculated the employment rates implied by 
the estimated coefficients of the transition probability models. In each 
month, the coefficients from the entry-to-work model along with an 
individual's characteristics tell us the probability that a non-employed 
individual returns to work. Once a displaced individual does return to 
work, the coefficients from the model for exiting employment tell us 
the probability of leaving the workforce. Using the estimated transi 
tion probabilities in this way, we produced a series of monthly employ 
ment patterns over several years for workers who are displaced at a 
given age and for comparable workers who are employed and not dis 
placed at that age.
Results from the probit estimation of transition probabilities from 
non-employment to employment and from employment to non- 
employment are shown in Table 1. Although our main focus will be on 
the employment rates implied by these transition probabilities, we 
briefly summarize the key results from the hazard models. The rates at 
which older workers return to work implied by these coefficients are 
fairly low, ranging up to 8 percent per month. For non-employed men 
and women in their fifties, the variables for a prior job loss are positive 
and statistically significant, indicating that displaced workers in their 
fifties return to the workforce more quickly than similar workers who 
are not employed for reasons other than displacement. This is not 
surprising, since many of the nondisplaced have retired voluntarily. 
For workers in their sixties, however, displaced and nondisplaced 
individuals return to work at similar rates. For example, a married, 
recently displaced man aged 55, with a high school education and in 
excellent health, has roughly a 5 percent probability of returning to the
Table 1 Entry to Work and Exit from Work Probabilities1
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b Standard errors in parentheses.
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workforce each month. A similar nondisplaced man has only about a 2 
percent chance of returning to work each month. Differences between 
displaced and nondisplaced women are similar in magnitude.
The probability of exiting employment also depends on a worker's 
displacement experience. The coefficient for a prior job loss in the 
model for leaving employment is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that individuals with a previous job loss are more likely to 
leave employment than similar nondisplaced individuals. Thus, even 
after returning to work, recently displaced individuals are less likely 
than others to remain employed at each subsequent age.
Other individual characteristics have the expected effects on entry 
into and exit from the workforce. Poor health and disabilities reduce 
the probability of returning to work and increase the likelihood of leav 
ing the workforce. There are no statistically significant effects of race 
or education for men or women. Married women are much less likely 
to go back to work, and married men are less likely to leave employ 
ment.
To better summarize the employment patterns of displaced and 
nondisplaced workers, charts A and B of Figure 1 show the probability 
of employment over the next 10 years for two groups of workers: indi 
viduals displaced at age 55 and individuals working and not displaced 
at age 55. Charts C and D repeat the analysis for men and women dis 
placed and working as of age 60. These take into account both the 
rates at which workers return to work and the predicted rates at which 
they subsequently leave the workforce.
Focusing first on the workers losing jobs at age 55, the fraction 
working in each month initially rises quickly but flattens out after 
approximately three years. One year after the job loss, 50 percent of 
displaced men and 46 percent of displaced women are working, com 
pared with 95 and 92 percent of men and women who were working as 
of age 55. After two years, 61 and 55 percent of displaced men and 
women are back at work, compared with 91 and 88 percent of the non- 
displaced group. This employment gap is due both to the initial period 
of unemployment and to postdisplacement employment instability 
among those reemployed. For example, taking the entry rates alone 
would imply that 74 percent of displaced men return to work by two 
years after displacement. Once we consider subsequent exit behavior, 
however, employment rates fall to 61 percent. These results also high-
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Figure 1 Fraction Employed by Displacement Status at Age 55 and 60
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light the long-term nature of the impact of displacement on the 
employment rates of older workers. It takes at least seven years after a 
job loss for the employment rates of displaced and nondisplaced work 
ers to converge to within 10 percentage points of each other. Only 
when the nondisplaced workers begin to retire more rapidly, at age 62, 
does the employment gap narrow substantially.
The monthly employment probabilities following displacement or 
work at age 60 are similar to the results at age 55. The main difference 
is that the fraction of those working at age 60 who are still working in 
each subsequent month declines more rapidly as this cohort moves 
through ages of much higher retirement probabilities. The older dis 
placed workers, however, also return to work more slowly, and so there 
remains a significant gap in the employment rates of the two groups.
These results suggest that workers who have lost jobs in the later 
portion of their careers have substantially different employment and 
retirement patterns throughout their fifties and sixties. One concern, 
however, is whether the results can be correctly interpreted as the 
impact of displacement, or whether they instead reflect worker hetero 
geneity that is correlated with job loss probabilities. We have tried 
including several additional controls for potential unobserved differ 
ences that could bias our findings. Including controls for predisplace- 
ment wages, pension eligibility, assets, and retirement expectations had 
virtually no effect on our estimated employment patterns. Moreover, 
when we limited the sample of displaced workers to those losing jobs 
only through plant or business closings (which may be more exoge 
nous with respect to worker characteristics than layoffs), we also 
obtained very similar results.
EARNINGS
For displaced workers who do return to work, we next examine the 
earnings on postdisplacement jobs. Many researchers have docu 
mented the large earnings reductions that accompany job loss for 
workers of all ages.6 Older workers may face particularly large earn 
ings reductions because they are likely to have been with their previous 
employers for many years and may have large stocks of firm-specific
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skills that are rendered useless by displacement. To measure the 
effects of job loss on earnings, we followed many recent studies and 
estimated fixed-effects regressions to control for both observable and 
unobservable worker characteristics that might be correlated with dis 
placement probabilities. The results, shown in Table 2, use all wage 
observations from 1980 and later. 7 Earnings reported from jobs start 
ing or ending prior to 1980 were eliminated because of concerns about 
the accuracy of retrospective information from more than a decade ear 
lier. The dependent variable is the log of annual salary based on full- 
year full-time work: individuals were asked how much they earn on a 
given job, and these reports were converted to earnings on an annual 
basis.
Table 2 Earnings Effects of Displacement (fixed-effects estimates)3
log(annual full-time earnings)13
Characteristic
1 year prior to displacement
1 year after displacement
2 years after displacement
3 years after displacement
4 years after displacement
5 years after displacement
6 or more years after displacement
After displacement x <3 years 
predisplacement tenure
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b Dependent variable.
c Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Among our sample of older workers, the earnings reductions asso 
ciated with job loss are large and persistent, in line with much previous 
research on the effects of displacement. In the year before job loss, our 
estimates indicate a 4 percent earnings reduction for men and an 11 
percent reduction for women. 8 Such predisplacement earnings reduc 
tions have been found by many other authors. We have also included a 
control for two years before job loss but found this had no significant 
impact and, so we restricted the effect of two or more years prior to job 
loss to be zero. Following job loss, there is a 32 percent reduction in 
earnings for both men and women, much of which persists for several 
years. Six or more years after job loss, displaced men and women face 
earnings reductions of 23 and 29 percent, respectively. These effects, 
of course, are estimated only for individuals who are reemployed fol 
lowing displacement. It is very likely that these results overstate the 
wage opportunities available to a typical displaced worker, because 
those who are not reemployed may receive lower wage offers and have 
generally worse postdisplacement earnings opportunities.
We also interacted the postdisplacement earnings reduction with 
workers' predisplacement job tenure, which may serve as a proxy for 
the amount of specific human capital or the quality of the job match 
that has been lost. The main effects shown in the table are for the omit 
ted category of workers with between 3 and 10 years of predisplace 
ment job tenure. Average tenure prior to displacement in this sample is 
approximately 11 years. We find that the effect of job loss on earnings 
increases with predisplacement tenure. Individuals with fewer than 
three years of predisplacement tenure are estimated to face signifi 
cantly lower earnings losses than those with higher predisplacement 
job tenure.
WEALTH
We next consider the effects of job loss on older workers' holdings 
of wealth, including both pension and nonpension assets. We begin by 
exploring the effects of job loss on pension eligibility and benefit lev 
els. The first question that arises is whether older workers who lose 
jobs typically retain pension benefits from their previous employers. If
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workers are not fully vested, the loss of a job might also result in the 
loss of future pension benefits. Given that all workers in our sample 
are at least 50 years of age, and on average have relatively high tenure 
with their predisplacement employers, we expect the complete loss of 
pension benefits with job loss to be relatively rare. Most of the workers 
losing jobs are already vested in their pension plans or have accumu 
lated defined-contribution accounts that can be moved to a new 
employer or rolled over into an IRA.
This is confirmed in Table 3, which tabulates answers to the ques 
tion "What happened to the pension associated with your previous 
job?" that was asked of all recent job-changers, whether the change 
was voluntary or involuntary. Fewer than 3 percent of displaced work 
ers with defined-contribution (DC) plans on the previous job, and less
Table 3 Pensions from Previous Jobs (%)a
Plan/status13
DB plan on previous job
Receiving benefits now
Will receive benefits in future




DC plan on previous job
Transferred to a new employer
Rolled over to IRA




































a Percentages do not sum to 100 because multiple responses were allowed (but were
rare) and because of rounding. 
b DB = defined-benefit; DC = defined-contribution.
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than 6 percent of those with defined-benefit (DB) plans report that they 
completely lost pension accounts, benefits, or eligibility along with the 
job loss. Slightly more of those voluntarily changing or leaving jobs 
report losing pensions. Among those with DB pension accounts, 43 
percent report that, despite having lost the job, they expect to receive 
pension benefits sometime in the future. An additional 33 percent of 
job losers are currently receiving benefits from their previous employ 
ers' DB plans. As might be expected, those with DC accounts gener 
ally retain their pension rights in some form after losing jobs. Sixty- 
five percent of displaced workers with DC accounts on the previous job 
either leave their accounts to continue accumulating, transfer them to a 
new employer, or roll them over into an IRA. A substantial fraction of 
displaced workers (19 percent of those with DB plans and 26 percent 
of those with DC plans) also report receiving cash settlements for their 
prior job pensions.
Because we did not find that pension plans are frequently lost with 
displacement, in the remainder of this analysis we focus on changes in 
pension wealth following job loss, conditional on having some pension 
plan prior to the job loss. Since displaced workers may have (at a min 
imum) several years in which they do not have a pension plan with 
their current employer, one possible effect of displacement may be to 
reduce the total amount accumulated in defined-contribution accounts. 
At the very least, employers will not be contributing to these accounts 
in the years following job loss. In addition, the lengthy spells of non- 
employment and reduced earnings that follow job loss may mean that 
individuals are more likely to withdraw funds from DC accounts. As a 
result, we should expect total pension wealth held in DC accounts to be 
reduced by displacement.
To explore this hypothesis, the first column of Table 4 shows 
results from regressions of the natural logarithm of the total amount 
accumulated in workers' DC accounts on indicators for before and 
after job loss.9 We also controlled for age, health, education, race and 
calendar year. We used only the initial postdisplacement observation 
for each person because displaced individuals are only asked about 
account balances in the survey immediately after the job ended; in sub 
sequent waves we cannot trace withdrawals or additions to these 
accounts. 10 Men with DC accounts in the years prior to job loss have 
roughly the same accumulated wealth in pension accounts as men who
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will not lose jobs. In the years after job loss, the estimated coefficient 
is -0.497, suggesting a reduction in DC account balances of 39 per 
cent. Prior to job loss, women who are eventually displaced have DC 
accounts that are approximately 10 percent above those of nondis- 
placed women, although this difference is not statistically different 
from zero. After job loss, displaced women have account balances that 
are approximately 15 percent below those of nondisplaced women. 
The difference between the variables for prior to displacement and 
after displacement is statistically significant for men but not for 
women. Men who lose jobs face substantial reductions in their 
defined-contribution pension accounts, but there is no evidence of sta 
tistically significant reductions in these pension holdings for women 
who are displaced.
We also estimated fixed-effects regressions of DC account bal 
ances on job loss indicators. These specifications use the within-per- 
son variation in pension balances from before to after job loss to 
estimate an effect of displacement on account holdings. Including a 
person-specific fixed-effect in the regressions means that we are using 
only individuals who are observed both before and after job loss to 
identify the effect of job loss on pension wealth, rather than estimating 
average effects for before and after job loss and relying on the differ 
ence as our measure of displacement's impact. The fixed-effects 
results for DC account balances are similar to those estimated by ordi 
nary least squares regressions. There is a sizable impact of displace 
ment among men (a coefficient of -0.44, or a 36 percent reduction) and 
no statistically significant effect for women.
The effect of job loss on defined-benefit pension plans is more dif 
ficult to anticipate. We know that workers rarely report losing eligibil 
ity for such pension plans completely, but the effects on benefit 
amounts are less obvious. One possibility is that displacement may 
result in workers being eligible for some benefits from their previous 
employer, but not at the "optimal" or wealth-maximizing age. That is, 
a worker who loses a job at age 55 may be eligible to collect some pen 
sion benefits from the employer from whom she has separated, but 
would have been eligible for higher benefits if she had remained with 
the employer to age 62 or 65.
Examination of individual records for displaced workers who 
reported DB pension plans prior to job loss suggests that displacement
Table 4 Effects of Displacement on Pensions and Assets













































































a A dash ( ) indicates that the variables were not included in the fixed-effect regressions. 
b Standard errors in parentheses.
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results in both changes in the age at which pension benefits are 
received and changes in the amounts of these benefits. Prior to job 
loss, for example, a worker may report an expected annual pension 
benefit of $20,000 that can be received no earlier than age 62. After 
displacement, the same worker reports that he is currently receiving 
pension benefits from the previous job (despite being younger than age 
62), but the annual benefit amount is smaller than that expected before 
displacement. Partial or reduced pension benefits may be offered as a 
form of severance package for workers displaced prior to reaching the 
"normal" eligibility age. Alternatively, Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1999) report that individuals in the HRS appear to be quite unin 
formed with respect to early eligibility ages for employer pension ben 
efits, and thus it is not surprising that displaced individuals seem to 
receive benefits despite being younger than their self-reported eligibil 
ity age.
To understand the effect of job loss on benefits available from DB 
pensions, we estimated regressions of the log of current or future 
annual pension benefit amounts on job loss indicators for the sample of 
individuals reporting DB pension plans; the results are reported in the 
middle columns of Table 4. Men who will be displaced in a future year 
have expected annual pension benefits that are approximately 10 per 
cent lower than those of similar workers who will not be displaced. In 
the years after job loss, annual benefits are reduced further. Men have 
benefit amounts in the years after job loss that are 36 percent lower 
than those of nondisplaced men. Women face similar reductions in 
annual benefit amounts. Prior to displacement, women have benefits 
that are 17 percent below the benefits of women who are not displaced; 
after job loss, displaced women report benefits that are 43 percent 
below those of nondisplaced women. Again, taking the difference 
from before to after displacement as our measure of displacement's 
impact, men and women are estimated to lose 30 and 32 percent of 
their annual benefit amounts.
The fixed-effects results for defined-benefit pensions paint a some 
what different picture. For women, the fixed-effects results are similar 
to the OLS results, suggesting a reduction in pension benefits of 24 
percent. Among men, however, the fixed-effects results show no evi 
dence of reductions in pension benefits. The fact that the results for 
men are not robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects suggests
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that the benefit reductions reported here should be viewed cautiously. 
Work by Haider and Stephens (1999) using employer-provided pension 
data from the HRS points to modest negative effects of displacement 
on pension wealth.
These findings suggest that job loss may significantly reduce pen 
sion wealth, particularly for those with defined-contribution accounts, 
and for women with defined-benefit accounts. Some additional caveats 
should also be mentioned here. First, because we are using self- 
reported pension data, it is possible that displaced workers may know 
more (or less) about their actual pension coverage and wealth than the 
comparison groups. 11 If this knowledge is correlated with job loss, it 
could bias our estimates of displacement effects on pensions. Second, 
if job loss results in pension wealth being transferred to savings 
accounts or IRAs, the above calculations could overstate the loss in 
total wealth since they include only DB plans or DC accounts. To 
examine this issue and to further our understanding of the overall effect 
of job loss on older workers' economic well-being, we next examined 
the effects of job loss on workers' asset holdings, including IRAs and 
other potential retirement savings.
The final columns of Table 4 show the effect of job loss on the log 
of nonhousing assets in the three waves. 12 The drawback of using the 
log specification here is that we must eliminate individuals who report 
zero or negative values of nonhousing assets (roughly 10 percent of 
men and 15 percent of women). 13 As expected, displacement reduces 
nonhousing wealth, although the estimates are not statistically signifi 
cant for women. 14 The coefficients on the variable indicating workers 
prior to job loss shows that there are large differences in nonhousing 
(nonpension) asset levels prior to any displacement. For women, there 
is not a statistically significant difference between the pre- and postdis- 
placement coefficients, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that dis 
placement has no effect on their nonhousing asset holdings. The fixed- 
effects results for women are consistent with this finding. Because 
many women in our sample are not the primary earners in their house 
hold, displacement among older women may have a relatively small 
impact on household-level asset holdings.
For men, the coefficient for after job loss is statistically different 
from the predisplacement control and implies that the displacement of 
older men reduces nonhousing asset levels by approximately 15 per-
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cent. Fixed-effects results for men show a slightly smaller effect of 
displacement on nonhousing wealth that is significant at the 10 percent 
level. This is consistent with recent evidence reported by Gruber 
(1999) for younger workers. He finds that wealth holdings decline 
substantially with realized unemployment durations. Because older 
displaced workers typically have much longer spells of non-employ 
ment than younger displaced workers, it is not surprising that we find 
significant wealth reductions. As shown above, far less than half of 
older displaced workers have returned to work within one year, and it 
appears that private wealth holdings may provide a mechanism for 
replacing lost earnings in the short run.
CONCLUSIONS
Our findings point to large and lasting effects of job loss on the 
future employment probabilities of older workers. Two years after a 
job loss at age 55, just 61 and 55 percent of men and women are 
employed, compared with employment rates of more than 80 percent 
among nondisplaced men and women who were working at age 55. 
Even four years after job loss, there is a gap in employment rates of 
approximately 20 percent between the displaced and nondisplaced 
groups. These long-term employment effects of displacement come as 
the result of both the rates of return to employment after displacement 
and elevated rates of exit from postdisplacement jobs.
The earnings of individuals who return to work following job loss 
are also dramatically affected. Immediately after displacement, earn 
ings are only two-thirds of their expected value had the job loss not 
occurred. Even six years after the job loss, displaced men and women 
face earnings reductions of more than 20 percent.
Our findings with respect to pension and nonpension wealth are 
less stark. Most displaced workers over the age of 50 do not lose pen 
sion eligibility or benefits with displacement, and many of them begin 
to receive benefits immediately from their future employer, expect ben 
efits at a later date, or receive a cash settlement. Nevertheless, we do 
find some evidence of possible reductions in the amount of defined- 
benefit pension payouts and in defined-contribution account balances.
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Finally, for men, there is evidence that nonpension asset holdings are 
reduced following displacement.
The long spells of non-employment, large earnings reductions, and 
perhaps some reductions in pension and nonpension wealth point to 
significant costs of job loss for workers in their fifties and sixties. Even 
if these workers were well prepared for retirement prior to a job loss, 
changes in earnings and wealth associated with displacement may sig 
nificantly reduce the private resources available to them during retire 
ment. Our future research will focus on understanding how shocks to 
earnings and asset holdings such as those following job loss may affect 
the behavior and welfare of these workers as they consider retirement.
Notes
The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foun 
dation, grants 9905275 and 9907824.
1. Other possible responses to the question regarding how the previous job ended 
include "quit," "retired," "temporary layoff," and "wanted a better job."
2. See Gustman and Steinmeier (1998), McGarry and Davenport (1997), and Vend 
and Wise (1998), among others.
3. Blau (1994) and Peracchi and Welch (1994) similarly focused on transition proba 
bilities between different employment states for older workers.
4. Specifically, the probability h" of making a transition from nonwork to work in 
each month, given that the individual is not currently working, is represented with 
a standard probit functional form (<D is the standard cumulative normal distribu 
tion):
where ylt = f"(Ageu, Xlt, Months-not-working,,, Prior-job-loss,,). 
That is, the hazard h", gives the probability that nonworking individual i returns 
to work in month t, conditional on age, other individual characteristics (X), 
months since the individual last worked, and whether the individual has lost a job 
in the recent past. We can interpret ylt as an underlying latent variable that takes a 
value greater than zero if a transition from nonwork to work occurs. Interactions 
between the variables Age, X, Months-not-working, and Prior-job-loss are 
included in the/" function. 
5. This second hazard is of the form:*;-*(«„)
where zlt = f w (Age,r, Xlt, Prior-job-loss,,). This gives the probability that work 
ing individual i makes a work to nonwork transition in month t, conditional on 
age, other control variables X, and Prior-job-loss status.
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6. See, for example, Ruhm (1991), Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), Stevens 
(1997), and Schoeni and Dardia (1997).
7 We obtain similar results using a balanced sample in which each individual con 
tributes four wage observations to the sample, one in each survey wave and one 
from a long-term job prior to wave 1.
8. In Table 2, the dependent variable is in log form and the percentage effect is given 
by e$ -1, where |3 is the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable of interest.
9. Individuals who claim to have a defined-contribution plan but have missing values 
for the amount held in the account were dropped from the sample.
10. These data limitations are thoroughly discussed in Uccello and Perese (1999).
11. In future work, we can explore this issue by utilizing restricted-access employer 
reports of pension plans. While these are currently available only for wave 1, we 
can at least make comparisons at wave 1 between nondisplaced workers, those 
displaced prior to wave 1, and those who will lose jobs after wave 1.
12. We have also examined total assets, including the value of housing, and several 
other subsets of the wealth variables. We find that housing does not respond to 
job loss, and so we focus on nonhousing-related assets.
13. We have examined the effect of job loss on the level of assets for those individuals 
who start out with zero or negative assets and found no statistically significant 
effects. The log specification results in a substantially better fit than a specifica 
tion using asset levels.
14 Couch and Gallo (1998) have also examined asset changes using data from the 
first two waves of the HRS. They found reductions in nonhousing net worth of 
roughly 20 to 30 percent following displacement, although the effects are also not 
always statistically significant.
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Although the financial consequences of the wave of mergers and 
acquisitions between large corporations in the 1990s have been well 
documented, the human costs in the form of downsizing and job losses 
are often ignored. The problems associated with the loss of a job may 
appear less compelling in the current prosperous economic environ 
ment, when workers who lose their jobs have a good chance of finding 
new employment. Yet there are longer-term risks that may not be visi 
ble until workers who have experienced a series of job losses reach 
retirement age. In this chapter, we document the effect of job loss on 
the employment experiences, benefits, and retirement savings of 
former officers of First Interstate Bank, who were among 7,500 bank 
employees who lost their jobs following the 1996 merger with Wells 
Fargo Bank. This case study of banking employees provides a detailed 
account of the life course consequences of job loss among employees 
in a service sector industry where the rate of job loss has increased in 
the 1990s (Farber 1997) and who face different risks and different 
opportunities than the blue-collar job losers of the 1980s.
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TRENDS IN JOB LOSS
The Distribution of Job Loss
During the 1980s job loss was greatest in the manufacturing sector 
(Gordon 1996). Blue-collar workers still make up a majority of dis 
placed workers, but there has been an increase in job loss among ser 
vice-sector workers, who comprise over 75 percent of the workforce in 
the United States (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1995). The first to 
lose their jobs in the service sector were lower-level employees. For 
example, Sears automated many of its customer service operations and 
eliminated 21,000 positions between 1990 and 1993 (Marks 1994). 
Recent mergers have eliminated jobs at all levels. The job losers of the 
1990s are more educated and older than those of the 1980s. College 
graduates are now most likely to have a job loss because their job was 
abolished. In fact, the most dramatic increase in job loss rates has 
occurred among managers (Farber 1996, p. 16).
The Consequences of Job Loss
The effect of a job loss varies depending on the age of the worker. 
Younger workers are more likely than older workers to report experi 
encing a job loss, but older workers, particularly those 55 years and 
older, have a more difficult time finding new employment. Older 
workers are also less likely than younger workers to find employment 
at previous wage levels (EBRI 1997b, p. 9; Ruhm 1989). Older work 
ers may have a difficult time with job searches because their skills have 
become obsolete or because of discrimination by employers (Mor- 
Barak and Tynan 1993).
Workers are currently saving only 35 percent of what they will 
require to maintain their preretirement lifestyle through retirement, 
even though they have more opportunities than ever to save for retire 
ment (Bernheim 1997). One factor that reduces retirement saving is 
the loss of a job. Workers who experience a prolonged job search may 
be forced to deplete their personal savings and their retirement funds to 
pay for basic living expenses for themselves and their families (New- 
man 1989). Many retirement plans provide for the distribution of the 
individual's accrued vested benefits in a lump sum payment when ser-
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vice with the employer is terminated. Although workers are allowed to 
preserve their retirement savings after a job loss by "rolling over" the 
account balance into an IRA or into a new employer's plan, most 
employees who receive a lump sum payment spend it rather than sav 
ing it for retirement. One study found that only 28 percent of workers 
who received lump sum payments rolled them over into tax-qualified 
savings plans (Basset, Fleming, and Rodriguez 1996). Other research 
indicates that fewer than half of all workers who receive a lump-sum 
distribution roll over any portion of it (EBRI 1997b, p. 13). One might 
expect older workers to be savers, but only one-third of workers over 
age 55 who receive a lump-sum distribution invest that money in a 
retirement annuity or savings account (Salisbury 1993). Results from 
the Health and Retirement Survey demonstrate a similar pattern: only 
25 percent of older workers (45-54) saved a defined-benefit (DB) plan 
distribution, and fewer than half saved a defined-contribution (DC) 
plan distribution (Korczyk 1996). Overall, spenders are more likely 
than savers to be younger, as well as less educated, female, low-paid, 
and African American (Salisbury 1998; Hardy and Shuey in press). It 
seems likely that displaced workers who are insecure about their 
immediate financial futures may choose not to roll over their lump 
retirement fund but rather keep it available during the period of unem 
ployment (EBRIb 1997, p. 13). While such a decision makes sense as 
a short-term hedge against uncertainty, it is likely to have long-term 
consequences in the form of lower retirement income.
Job Loss and Health Insurance
The health care system in the United States is employer-based 
(Harrington Meyer, and Pavalko 1996). Individuals with full-time, 
year-round jobs are the most likely to have health benefits. In 1996, 64 
percent of Americans were covered by employer-provided plans either 
directly through their employer or indirectly as a dependent (EBRI 
1997a); 75.9 percent of individuals in families headed by full-year, 
full-time workers were covered by employer-provided health insur 
ance, compared with 38.2 percent of individuals in families headed by 
other workers and 18.6 percent of individuals in families headed by 
nonworkers (EBRI 1997a, p. 7).
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Because the majority of American families depend on employers 
for health benefits, the loss of a job has significant implications for 
health care coverage. According to the Current Population Survey, just 
over half (50.3 percent) of workers who were displaced in the period 
from 1993 to 1995 had health insurance at the job they lost. Of those 
displaced workers who were still unemployed in 1996, only 37.3 per 
cent now had health insurance (EBRI 1997b, p. 11).
Job Loss in the Banking Industry
The banking industry provides a useful case for studying the long- 
term consequences of job loss in the service sector because of heavy 
rates of job loss resulting from a series of mergers and takeovers that 
began in the 1980s as a consequence of deregulation. Unlike most 
other industrialized nations, which have fewer than 1,000 commercial 
banks, the United States lacks a national banking system in which a 
few banks have branches throughout the country. In 1993, there were 
more than 12,000 commercial banks, 2,000 savings and loans, and 
16,000 credit unions in the United States. In contrast, only 3,000 banks 
serve the entire European community; Japan has only 170 commercial 
banks (Marks 1994). The presence of so many banks reflects the effect 
of federal regulations, which until recently have restricted the ability of 
these financial institutions to open branches (Mishkin 1994).
During the 1980s deregulation allowed bank holding companies 
headquartered in one state to purchase banks in another state. Recent 
changes in banking regulation allow banks to operate branches across 
state lines. A few large banks have taken advantage of the opportuni 
ties opened by deregulation to engage in an aggressive series of take 
overs to eliminate competition and expand their asset holdings. 
Industry experts predict that the banking system will consolidate to 
only 2,000 early in the twenty-first century (Zey 1993).
Each merger has resulted in job losses among employees at all lev 
els, from bank tellers to bank officers. Along with declines in employ 
ment has come a paring of employee benefits. In some cases, workers 
have become ineligible for any benefits. For example, during a period 
of restructuring, the Bank of America cut the hours of the bottom of its 
workforce (the low-paid full-time tellers) to 19 hours a week, making 
them ineligible for fringe benefits (Marks 1994). Another component
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of the fringe benefit strategy has been ending the "paternalism" of 
defined-benefit pension plans. For example, J.P. Morgan and Company 
changed its benefit package from a defmed-benefit plan to a defined- 
contribution plan. Similarly, following its 1988 merger, the Bank of 
America eliminated its defmed-benefit plan and installed a defined- 
contribution plan.
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY
In 1997, the ninth largest bank in the United States was Wells 
Fargo. Wells Fargo achieved its position in the banking industry as a 
result of an acquisition campaign, which began when Wells Fargo 
bought National Corporation and Crocker Bank ($19.2 billion in 
assets) in 1986. Then, in 1987, it purchased the personal trust busi 
nesses of Bank of America, and in 1988, the Barclay's Bank of Califor 
nia ($1.3 billion in assets). In 1989, Wells Fargo reached a cooperative 
agreement with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. 
According to the agreement, HSBC would service the overseas bank 
ing needs of Wells Fargo customers, while Wells Fargo handled 
HSBC's retail customers in California. A new bank jointly owned by 
the two companies would provide trade, finance, and international 
banking services. That same year Wells Fargo also purchased the Bank 
of Paradise ($61 million in assets) and its three branches in California, 
as well as five other smaller California banks and their subsidiaries 
(Wells Fargo Today: www.Wellsfargo.com, February 27, 1996). On 
January 23, 1996, Wells Fargo announced plans to purchase First Inter 
state Bancorp (FIB) at a purchase price of $11 billion.
On April 1, 1996, the date the merger took effect, over 1,700 First 
Interstate employees were notified that their positions would be elimi 
nated. On April 18, Wells Fargo announced it would close 25 branches 
throughout Orange County in Los Angeles and lay off 187 branch 
employees. Statewide, the bank closed 260 branches and laid off 
another 2,000 branch employees. By the end of 1996, another 7,200 
First Interstate employees lost their jobs through attrition and further 
layoffs (Wells Fargo, 1996c).
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In April 1996, we mailed a short survey to 5,326 officers at FIB 
immediately after the first round of layoffs was announced. We 
obtained the work addresses of the officers from the 1995 company 
phone book provided by a FIB officer. A letter accompanying the sur 
vey explained the objectives of the project and asked the workers to fill 
out the form and return it. The main purpose of the first survey was to 
obtain basic demographic data and the home addresses and telephone 
numbers of the First Interstate employees. A total of 1,006 surveys 
were returned, for a response rate of 19 percent. The actual response 
rate is likely higher than 19 percent: we estimate that at least 1,000 
workers did not receive the survey because they were dismissed or left 
FIB before the survey arrived.
The mail survey was followed by in-depth telephone interviews 
with 20 randomly selected respondents. The telephone interviews pro 
vided background information on how FIB employees were notified 
about the merger, what options FIB and Wells Fargo were offering to 
employees, and how employees responded to the threatened layoff.
A second survey was mailed in mid October 1996 to the homes of 
all individuals who had responded to wave 1 and who agreed to partic 
ipate in follow-up interviews. The survey included questions on cur 
rent employment status, previous employment history, savings 
behavior, health, and family finances. Respondents were also asked to 
complete a financial statement concerning current salary, salary while a 
FIB employee, receipt of a severance package, and severance package 
expenditures. A total of 750 workers completed both the first and sec 
ond surveys. In addition to the mail survey, another 32 in-depth tele 
phone interviews were conducted. One year after the merger, we 
mailed a third survey as a follow-up to survey 2. By wave 3, we had 
lost 222 subjects to attrition, leaving a sample of 528.
Table 1 presents the descriptive characteristics of the respondents 
at wave 3. They ranged in age from 25 to 66. Forty percent were 45 or 
older, 36 percent were 37 to 44, and 24 percent were younger than 37. 
Forty-five percent were male and 55 percent were female, a distribution 
that reflects the feminization of the banking industry (Rich 1995). 
Eighty-seven percent were white, 3.8 percent of Hispanic origin, 2.8 
percent African American, and 2 percent "other." A substantial fraction 
of the former First Interstate Bank managers were well educated. Over 
63 percent of the officers had graduated from college, including one-
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Table 1 Percentage of Respondents by Employment Status at Wells 
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third who had some graduate education; fewer than 10 percent had 
only a high school diploma. Salaries were well above median income. 
About one-third earned more than $65,000 per year and nearly two- 
thirds earned more than $45,000 annually.
RESULTS
The Effect of a Job Loss on Employment
At the wave 1 timepoint, 360 of the respondents had been laid off, 
482 were told they would be employed in a new job with Wells Fargo, 
and 264 did not yet know whether they would be laid off. At wave 3, 
nearly half (46 percent) had been retained by Wells Fargo, over one- 
third (36 percent) were now employed elsewhere, 7 percent were 
unemployed, and 11 percent had left the labor force. Among respon 
dents who had been laid off, older employees were less likely than the 
youngest employees to be employed full-time (63 percent versus 80 
percent) and more likely to be employed part-time, unemployed, or out 
of the labor force entirely (Figure 1).
In the open-ended interviews, many older workers expressed feel 
ings of insecurity about their jobs. Some who were retained by Wells 
Fargo felt that they were not terminated because Wells Fargo feared an 
age discrimination suit. As Sandra Shanahan explained, "The job was 
given to me because of my age. I'm 58 and one-half. And its tempo 
rary. Originally, I was going to be terminated. It's a good job. I think 
they gave me a job because of a lawsuit. I don't think it will last 
beyond the first quarter of next year. I'm too young to retire but too old 
to get another job."
Older workers who were retained by Wells Fargo also felt they 
were being given difficult assignments to push them to retire. In 
response to the question, "Do you feel you were placed in a dead-end 
job?", 18 percent of younger and middle-aged workers, but 24 percent 
of older workers, said "Yes." John Cole, a 56-year-old project analyst, 
had worked for FIB for 20 years. He was targeted for a layoff until he 
questioned the company's age bias. As he explained, "Like so many 
50+ employees, I have been removed from a line position in favor of
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Figure 1 Employment Status of Leavers by Age
Full-time Part-time Self-employed Unemployed 
Employment Status
Not in labor force
younger, less-qualified, lower-pay employees." He had been a team 
leader with six people reporting to him. When new management came 
in, they got rid of the team leaders and gave them impossible goals. 
John got put on special projects that were a dead end. When he com 
plained, he was told there was nothing he could do. Then the bank pro 
posed a program that would add years of service toward his retirement 
benefit if he would retire early. He was told, "Just to help you make 
your decision, just to let you know, by the end of the year your job will 
be eliminated." Four people were told that, all four over 50.
By contrast, the merger provided an opportunity for 32-year-old 
Thomas Chan to change jobs, something he had planned to do anyway. 
This was his first job. When he graduated college, he saw his class 
mates taking temporary jobs but decided he wanted more stability in 
his life. "Now," he cynically explained, "every job is a temporary job. 
There are people who believe in company loyalty. If you do a good 
job, you will be rewarded. It hasn't worked for me." Thomas became 
an auditor for FIB in asset-based lending, then transferred to the real 
estate department, doing budgets and forecasting. Before the merger 
was announced, he was planning to quit anyway because he doesn't 
like being office-based, so the severance package was a windfall for
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him. A Berkeley graduate with foreign language skills, he has been 
offered a new position with San Wah Bank, a subsidiary of a Japanese 
parent bank, in international banking. He will get a raise on this new 
job and can pursue his interest in business prospects overseas. For 
Thomas, the merger was "a blessing in disguise," yet he is cautious 
about his future. He won't take just any job. He needs to figure out 
what he can do best with his time. "The question is, are you flexible 
enough to change? Being flexible is pretty important. You have to 
keep pace or strike out on your own. I can't work for somebody the 
rest of my life. I don't want my future to depend on how other's see 
me." So maybe he'll work for San Wah or maybe he'll open a restau 
rant.
The Severance Package
When the merger occurred, FIB employees were offered a gener 
ous severance package by industry standards. Terminated FIB employ 
ees were eligible for a severance package of one month of separation 
pay for each year of service. Vice presidents were guaranteed one year 
of severance pay, regardless of years of service, and senior vice presi 
dents were guaranteed two years of severance pay. Terminated 
employees had the choice of taking the severance package as monthly 
salary or as a lump sum (Wells Fargo 1996a). Those who took the sal 
ary continuation plan also received health insurance for up to two years 
and continued 401(k) benefits. However, terminated employees who 
found a new job had to take a lump-sum package. Anyone who quit 
voluntarily lost all rights to severance pay, as did those who were fired 
for poor performance.
Because of the generosity of the severance package, employees 
jockeyed to be terminated without quitting. As one woman explained 
about two of her co-workers, one aged 47 and the other 48, "They had 
high salaries, they wanted the severance package. They were con 
nected and could get it." Her own situation was more precarious. She 
feared she might be fired because a recently diagnosed illness had 
made work more difficult for her:
If I'm terminated because of lack of performance, then there 
would be no severance package. There are many people who have 
gotten attorneys for one reason or another . . . When all this
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started, at the beginning of the year the merger was announced, 
we all knew. I became very ill this year. I was diagnosed with 
epilepsy ... In the meanwhile, I've lost no time off from work. I 
spent three days in the hospital but I didn't tell my employer. The 
minute I tell them, they say there is an expectation that you fulfill 
it or you leave. I'm tired all the time. I have to go home from 
work and lie down. They haven't given out that many severance 
packages. They've done little groups at a time so it doesn't get in 
the newspaper. I do know people who got it. It's managers who 
make 80 grand a year. They know someone in the hierarchy.
Seventy-seven percent of the terminated respondents received a 
severance package. Older managers were more likely than younger 
respondents to receive a severance package. Eighty-four percent of 
older workers received some severance pay, compared with 80 percent 
of the middle group and only 66 percent of the youngest officers. 
Some received just a few weeks of salary, while long-term employees 
or high-ranking officers received more than 200 percent of their former 
salary. Not surprisingly, the older officers had larger severance pack 
ages than younger respondents, no doubt because of their longer tenure 
at First Interstate as well as their higher salary levels and higher posi 
tions. Nearly 35 percent of workers 45 or older received a severance 
package that was 200 percent or more of their previous salary.
One year after the layoff, some of the former FIB employees had 
saved their severance packages while others had spent it all and also 
dipped into personal savings. The likelihood of saving varied by age. 
Half of the younger respondents spent their entire severance package, 
but 70 percent of both middle-aged and older workers saved their sev 
erance package (Figure 2).
The Effect of Job Loss on Pension Benefits
FIB had provided three retirement plans for its employees. The 
first was a defined-benefit plan open to employees with at least five 
years of service. The benefit amount was based on age, average yearly 
salary, and years of service. Regular retirement began at age 65 and 
early retirement at 55, with an early retirement penalty of 68.5 percent 
of the full benefit (First Interstate Bancorp 1995).
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FIB employees who had been employed for five years also could 
contribute to a defined-contribution (40Ik-type) plan (First Interstate 
Bancorp 1993). In addition, the FirstMatch Long-Term Savings Plan 
was introduced in 1979. FirstMatch allowed all employees who had 
completed at least one year of service to contribute up to 16 percent of 
salary with a maximum of $9,500 (according to federal regulations at 
that time). First Interstate matched 6 percent of these contributions and 
10 percent were not matched. The matched portion of the contribution 
included $1 of base pay contributed by the company for every $2 con 
tributed by the worker. Wells Fargo had terminated its own defined- 
benefit pension in 1984 but it did have a defined-contribution plan. 
Employees who were offered jobs with Wells Fargo received a lump 
sum that they could convert from FirstMatch to the Wells Fargo 401(k) 
plan (Wells Fargo 1996a).
The company's share of pension contributions was invested in First 
Interstate Bancorp common stock. Laid-off workers who were vested 
received two-thirds of a share of Wells Fargo stock for every share of 
First Interstate common stock owned, the same arrangement provided 
for all First Interstate shareholders. However, employees were not
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fully vested in the company's contributions to the plan until they had 
been contributing for a minimum of four years. Thus, any employee 
who had worked for FIB for less than four years lost a portion of the 
company's match, with the amount of loss decreasing for longer-tenure 
workers.
Under the terms of the merger agreement, laid-off FIB employees 
who had up to nine years of service when their severance payments 
ended could begin receiving a pension at age 65. Those with 10 or 
more years of service could begin receiving a pension at age 55. How 
ever, the period in which they were receiving severance pay would not 
count toward "years of service" for the defmed-benefit plan. Thus, 
although workers who were not offered jobs with Wells Fargo retained 
their eligibility for the First Interstate defmed-benefit pension, they 
stood to lose the years of benefit accrual while they were receiving sev 
erance pay plus the cost of any additional years out of the labor market. 
The loss of pension income was the hidden price of the merger.
The Effect of Job Loss on Retirement Savings
The layoff reduced the retirement savings of the young and mid 
dle-aged respondents, but not that of the older respondents. As Figure 
3 shows, the median retirement savings of younger workers who kept 
their jobs was $40,000, compared with only $30,000 for leavers. There 
was an even greater disparity in retirement savings among workers 
aged 37 to 44, with stayers having $102,000 in retirement savings com 
pared with only $70,000 for leavers. This trend was reversed among 
former FIB employees age 45 or over, with median retirement savings 
being higher among leavers ($273,000) than stayers ($259,000). 
Apparently the older group used their generous severance package to 
augment their retirement savings.
How did the spenders spend their money? A very few former FIB 
employees chose to spend their savings to pursue new opportunities or 
different life course paths. One young man opened his own business. 
One woman quit her job and used her retirement package to stay home 
and take care of her baby. She hoped to rebuild her retirement funds 
soon. Most, however, were forced to spend their retirement assets. 
Bruce Winters, a 43-year-old African American, got his first job in the 
banking industry in 1970. After working for 18 years for the Bank of
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Figure 3 Median Retirement Savings by Age
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America, he lost his job in a 1988 merger. When he left the Bank of 
America, he received two checks. One was the lump-sum value of his 
defined-benefit pension, the other his severance pay. He was out of 
work for six months. During that period of unemployment, he depleted 
all his savings, including his children's college tuition.
Bruce finally found a position with First Chicago bank and moved 
to Los Angeles. That was a costly move in terms of housing. He sold 
for $400,000 the home he had purchased in the Bay area for $200,000, 
a nice profit, and then bought a new home in Los Angeles for the same 
price, around $400,000. However, he financed his new home at a 
higher interest rate and, because the new home was assessed at the 
higher value, his taxes increased. As a result, his house payments in 
Los Angeles were much higher than they had been, and he had the 
additional expense of moving costs. Then First Chicago was bought 
out and he lost his job again. He was fortunate to find a new job at First 
Interstate after being out of work for only three months. He was 
employed for five years at First Interstate. Now he is unemployed 
again and starting a job search. He worries that if he has to sell his
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home and move again, he will lose money because housing values in 
his neighborhood have declined. Each position he has had represents a 
step back in terms of financial security, because he has been unable to 
replace his lost savings. His youngest child will start college next year, 
and he worries about how he will pay for her education.
Thirty-five-year-old Hosanna Batista tells a similar story. She 
experienced her second lay-off when Wells Fargo bought out First 
Interstate. She had been employed at her previous job for 10 years 
when she was laid off. She was unemployed for nine and a half 
months. During that period she wiped out her savings, her 401k, her 
IRAs, and had to pay a tax penalty. She is still trying recover finan 
cially from the first layoff experience and will only receive two 
months' salary as severance pay because she has only been employed 
by First Interstate for two years.
By contrast, the merger has provided an opportunity for 48-year- 
old Mitchell Freeman to increase his retirement savings and make an 
attractive life change. "I look at it as a golden opportunity, because I'm 
young enough and strong enough to do something else. The merger 
allowed for a wonderful severance package." He doubled his salary at 
his new job as president of a food distribution company. It also was a 
boon to Bruce Bloom. Bruce managed a team of technical people who 
rapidly found new jobs rapidly in the Phoenix area. He had been 
employed by First Interstate for 26 years there and was anticipating the 
merger. Now he hoped to use his past teaching experience to find a job 
teaching business. He currently has $125,000 in a 401k plus a defined- 
benefit plan that will pay him $2,040 at age 65. He will receive two 
years' severance, which he will take as salary and work on a contract 
basis. He plans to be debt free by then, with his mortgage paid off. 
Others among his co-workers fared even better. Among the top tier of 
vice presidents in his group, 13 received three years' salary plus three 
years of bonuses, which he called a "golden parachute."
The Effect of Job Loss on Health Insurance
Since most workers have health insurance through their jobs, the 
loss of a job poses the risk of the loss of health insurance as well. 
Among the employees in this study, however, health insurance cover 
age was virtually unaffected by the merger. One year after the merger,
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98 percent of the leavers had health insurance coverage. Those who 
stayed with Wells Fargo were covered by their employer. All those 
who received the severance package as salary continuation had health 
insurance benefits. Among respondents who elected to receive the sev 
erance package as a lump-sum benefit, some purchased COBRA con 
tinuation coverage and others had coverage through a spouse or from a 
new job.
CONCLUSION
The stream of mergers in the 1990s is just one component of a 
larger pattern associated with the mobility of the workforce in the 
United States, as employers increased their use of contingent, tempo 
rary, and part-time work arrangements (Mishel and Bernstein 1994). 
In 1991, more than half of all employees had less than five years of ten 
ure with their current employer (Korczyk 1996). The question that 
remains unanswered is how the increasingly transitory nature of the 
employment relationship affects benefits, particularly retirement plan 
vesting, pension portability, and continuity of health care coverage 
(EBRI 1997b, p. 3).
Most research indicates that a job loss poses a greater risk to an 
older worker than to a younger worker. Older workers often take 
longer to find a new job and are more likely to experience a drop in sal 
ary when they do (Ruhm 1989). Older workers with long tenure at a 
firm may have expected to retire gracefully, only to find themselves 
pushed into early retirement in the wake of a merger. The degree of 
choice workers have, as well as the amount of preparation and plan 
ning, are important predictors of how they experience the transition to 
retirement, as well as their satisfaction with the outcome (Hardy and 
Quadagno 1995). Unplanned retirement may create emotional anxiety 
and make the transition more difficult. Older workers who spend their 
retirement savings during a period of unemployment also have little 
opportunity to rebuild their portfolios. Older workers who lose their 
jobs also might lose their health insurance and have to purchase expen 
sive private policies, or worse, find themselves uninsurable. Then they
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have to pay for health care out of pocket or forego needed exams and 
procedures.
The banking officers in this study lost their jobs under optimal con 
ditions. As a group, they were well educated and well paid. Most rap 
idly found new jobs, their health insurance was not interrupted, and 
many received a generous severance package. Many older workers 
took advantage of this opportunity to increase their retirement savings, 
but a substantial portion of the youngest group of employees spent a 
considerable share of their retirement savings and assets. Unlike work 
ers of previous generations who believed in the permanence of the 
employer/employee attachment, younger workers seem to hold fewer 
expectations that they will have lifetime employment. This conclusion 
is indicated by the fact that younger workers are less likely than older 
workers to participate in their employer's pension plan, which suggests 
that they do not view their jobs as long term. Yet what this study shows 
is that even if younger workers don't expect long tenure with a single 
employer, job turnover does pose a long-term threat to their economic 
security in terms of lost retirement savings.
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Extending Health Insurance
Coverage for Older Workers
and Early Retirees
How Well Have Public Policies Worked?
Karen Pollitz 
Georgetown University
Our voluntary system of health insurance, regulated by a patch 
work of federal and state laws, leaves many gaps for older Americans. 
There are gaps of access that is, coverage can be denied or made 
more difficult to obtain specifically because of a person's advancing 
age and declining health. There also are gaps of affordability faced by 
uninsured Americans of all ages who have low incomes and who sim 
ply cannot afford the cost of health insurance.
This chapter does not attempt to measure the prevalence of prob 
lems of access and affordability faced by older Americans. Such prob 
lems are a distinct possibility for older Americans, and when they do 
arise, they can have tragic results. Many of us take comfort in the con 
ventional wisdom that the uninsured do, eventually, somehow, obtain 
the health care they need. This conventional wisdom is wrong.
The American College of Physicians-American Society of Internal 
Medicine recently compiled and summarized the findings of over 100 
scientific studies documenting that "lack of health insurance is not sim 
ply an inconvenience . . . [It] is a public health risk that results in 
poorer health and earlier death" (ACPI-ASIM 1999). Mortality and 
morbidity are higher among the uninsured. People who lack coverage 
delay or forego care and medications that they need, but cannot afford. 
They suffer greater complications and unnecessary hospitalizations 
when manageable health conditions go untreated. Cancer is detected at 
later stages, diminishing treatment options and the chances for sur-
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vival. And the uninsured who manage to get hospital care nevertheless 
are much more likely to die than are people who are privately insured. 
This mounting evidence notwithstanding, we do not have a guaran 
tee of health security in America for people under the age of 65. 
Instead we have adopted a patchwork of public policies, federal and 
state, that seem to help some people in some circumstances and leave 
gaps in assistance for others. This chapter examines the health and 
insurance status of older workers and early retirees, aged 55-64. It 
reviews the menu of public policies we have adopted to promote access 
to and affordability of coverage. It concludes that some of these public 
policies have added tangible protections for the near-elderly, while oth 
ers have not, and that significant gaps in health security remain for 
older workers and early retirees in the United States.
HEALTH STATUS AND COVERAGE 
OF THE NEAR-ELDERLY
A recent report to the Congress by the General Accounting Office 
documented the health status and the health insurance status of Ameri 
cans between the ages of 55 and 64. Relative to other non-elderly 
Americans, people between these ages have the highest rate of health 
insurance coverage. In 1996, 13.8 percent of this near-elderly age 
cohort were uninsured, compared with almost 18 percent of all non- 
elderly Americans. Further, health coverage for the near-elderly has 
remained relatively stable over time, while the proportion of uninsured 
has climbed steadily for younger age groups (GAO 1998, p. 38).
The near-elderly's relative advantage in health insurance status 
should not, however, necessarily be viewed as a health security success 
story. It may well be that because their need for health insurance cov 
erage is so pressing that people in this age bracket will tolerate higher 
expenses, job lock, deferred retirement, or other inconveniences or 
hardships in order to maintain coverage. Indeed, researchers at the 
Urban Institute who studied how health insurance needs are factored 
into retirement decisions found that both the availability and afford 
ability of coverage were important considerations that shape people's 
plans for retirement (Loprest and Zedlewski 1998).
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This finding is not at all surprising, given the health care needs of 
the near-elderly. Advancing age tends to bring a decline in health sta 
tus. Less than half of the near-elderly report themselves to be in excel 
lent health, compared with almost three-quarters of 25- to 34-year- 
olds. Almost one-quarter of the elderly report themselves to be in poor 
health, compared with 6 percent of 25- to 34-year-olds (GAO 1998, pp. 
27-29). The incidence of serious and chronic health conditions is far 
more prevalent among the near-elderly than among younger people. 
Ironically, the onset of these health conditions, which make the need 
for health coverage more pressing, also makes the near-elderly more 
"uninsurable" (Table 1).
The near-elderly, like other Americans, rely primarily on 
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) for their health coverage. Two- 
thirds of people aged 55-64 have employer-based health coverage. 
ESI is more common among the near-elderly who work full time, but 
early retirement does not necessarily mean the loss of ESI. Almost half 
of the near-elderly who do not work have employer-based coverage, 
through a working or retired spouse, through their own employer-spon-
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sored retirement health benefits, or through COBRA. Even so, the rate 
of ESI coverage is lower for the near-elderly than for most younger 
people. As a result, the near-elderly today rely disproportionately on 
individually purchased health insurance coverage and on Medicare. 
This is especially the case for the oldest near-elderly, i.e., between the 
ages of 62 and 64 (Table 2).
Trends suggest this reliance on individual coverage and public pro 
grams may increase over time. In particular, the prevalence of 
employer-sponsored retiree health benefits has declined over the past 
decade and shows evidence of continuing to do so. Fewer employers 
are offering such benefits to retirees and, among those that do, eligibil 
ity standards and required retiree contributions are becoming more 
stringent (McArdle et al. 1999). People who retire without employer- 
sponsored health benefits before the age of Medicare eligibility are 
more likely to be uninsured (Table 2).
Table 2 Percentage of Insured and Uninsured Individuals by Source of 
Insurance and Age Group, 1996
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WHAT PUBLIC POLICIES HAVE BEEN ADOPTED 
TO PROMOTE HEALTH INSURANCE ACCESS 
AND AFFORDABILITY?
Private health insurance markets tend to distinguish customers 
based on their health and risk status, and they sell (or renew) coverage 
accordingly. Low-cost, low-risk customers are the most profitable, and 
insurers will try to attract them and discourage high-cost, high-risk 
customers through their medical underwriting practices, benefit 
design, and premium pricing. Left unregulated, these practices make it 
more difficult for the near-elderly to obtain health insurance and leave 
them vulnerable to losing the coverage they have as they age and as 
health declines. Risk segmentation and selection practices are less of a 
threat to a near-elderly person in large group coverage (where the 
impact of any one person on an entire group's premium will be less) 
but become more so as group size declines. Access and affordability 
are most problematic in the individual market, where an older person 
with preexisting health conditions is unlikely to find standard coverage 
at standard rates and may find it unavailable at any price.
Over the past 15 years, states and the federal government have 
enacted health insurance reform laws to curb risk segmentation and 
selection practices. How well these policies have improved protections 
for older workers and early retirees depends on the type of health cov 
erage and where it is obtained.
Access to Group Coverage
COBRA 1
As noted above, early retirees depend primarily on employer-spon 
sored health insurance for their coverage. When retirement health ben 
efits are not offered, many early retirees have the option under COBRA 
of remaining in their former group plan for a limited time. Assuming 
for a moment that an early retiree may be leaving work because of 
health problems, this option becomes especially important. It allows 
people not only to remain covered, but to keep their current policy  
with its covered benefits and providers on which they already 
depend.
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COBRA requires some group health plans to offer temporary con 
tinuation of coverage for people who would otherwise lose it due to a 
qualifying event. A recent study estimates that at any time, some 4.7 
million people rely on COBRA for their health coverage (Levitt and 
Gabel et al. 1999).
Workers and their dependents qualify for COBRA continuation 
coverage when employment ends due to retirement, voluntary separa 
tion, layoff, or when eligibility for health benefits ends due to a reduc 
tion in hours worked. COBRA continuation coverage resulting from 
these qualifying events can last up to 18 months. In some cases, when 
a disability causes the end of employment or reduction in hours 
worked, COBRA continuation can extend an additional 11 months.
Dependents also qualify for continuation coverage when they 
become divorced or widowed from a covered worker, when they age 
out of dependent status, or when the covered worker relinquishes cov 
erage upon reaching Medicare eligibility. Under these qualifying 
events, COBRA continuation can last up to 36 months. Each covered 
worker and dependent has an independent right to elect COBRA. Con 
tinuation coverage must be the same as that offered to active workers.
COBRA's protections have limits. First, certain changes can oper 
ate to cut short COBRA continuation coverage. COBRA coverage 
ends when the employer ceases to offer health benefits to active work 
ers. If an older worker retires involuntarily, for example, when a firm 
goes out of business, there may no longer be a health plan in which to 
continue. COBRA also ends if a covered person moves out of their 
COBRA health plan's service area. Early retirees who are "snow 
birds" need to consider whether they can use their COBRA coverage if 
they move.
Second, COBRA applies to group health plans offered by employ 
ers with 20 or more workers. People separating from coverage spon 
sored by smaller firms don't have federal COBRA protections. 
However, 38 states have enacted "mini-COBRA" laws requiring con 
tinuation coverage under small-employer plans for fewer than 20 work 
ers. Some of these state laws mirror federal COBRA protections. 
Others offer shorter periods of continuation coverage (e.g., three to six 
months).
Finally, individuals electing COBRA must pay the full premium, 
including the portion formerly contributed by the employer, plus an
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administrative charge of up to 2 percent. While COBRA's guarantee of 
access to group rates generally makes coverage more affordable than it 
would otherwise be in the nongroup market, the sticker shock of losing 
the employer's premium subsidy can be considerable. In general, 
about one in five people eligible for COBRA coverage elect it. This 
election rate increases with age, however; reaching 38 percent for those 
age 61 or older (Flynn 1992 and Loprest 1997, as cited in GAO 1998, 
p. 89). One study suggests that COBRA election is very high (up to 75 
percent) among early retirees who have no other coverage options 
(Gruber and Madrian 1993, as cited in GAO 1998, p. 89)
On average, 61- to 64-year-olds who elect COBRA remain in that 
coverage for 12 months (Flynn 1992, as cited in GAO 1998). This sug 
gests COBRA may be an important bridge helping early retirees to 
remain covered until Medicare eligibility begins. .
HIPAA
Another potentially important contribution to the health security of 
the near-elderly when they are covered under group health plans  
was made by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996, or HIPAA. 2 HIPAA established national standards to protect 
access to group health coverage. These national standards apply to all 
group health plans sponsored by employers with two or more workers. 
They include
  Nondiscrimination: Employers and group insurance carriers may 
not set rules for group members' eligibility for health coverage 
based on any health status-related factor. Nor can plans and car 
riers vary benefits or premium contributions for enrollees based 
on health status-related factors. These factors include medical 
history, claims experience, evidence of insurability, and genetic 
information.
  Limits on preexisting condition exclusions: No group health plan 
can impose a preexisting condition exclusion period longer than 
12 months (or 18 months for late enrollees). HIPAA defines a 
preexisting condition as one for which diagnosis, medical advice, 
care, or treatment was actually recommended or received in the 
six-month period immediately preceding enrollment in the group 
plan.
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  Portability: HIPAA limits the repeated imposition of preexisting 
condition exclusion periods by group health plans by requiring 
that persons get credit for qualifying prior coverage. Most prior 
coverage (including group and individual coverage, Medicare, 
and Medicaid) is creditable as long as it was not interrupted by a 
lapse of more than 63 days in a row.
  Special enrollment periods: All group health plans must offer 
individuals who previously declined coverage a special opportu 
nity of at least 30 days to enroll in group coverage when their 
insurance or family status changes. For example, special enroll 
ment periods must be offered to people when they marry or have 
a child, or when they lose other coverage due to a change in jobs 
or expiration of COBRA benefits. Enrollment during these spe 
cial periods is not considered a late enrollment.
  Certificates: So people can document their coverage history, 
HIPAA requires health plans and carriers to issue certificates of 
creditable coverage. Certificates must describe the content and 
length of coverage and must be issued automatically when cover 
age ends. Certificates also must be provided at other times on 
request.
Older workers and early retirees are more likely to rely on HIPAA 
group health plan protections, given their poorer health status. Though 
not prevalent in group health plans prior to HIPAA, lifetime exclusions 
of preexisting conditions were not unheard of. HIPAA limits on such 
exclusion periods could be important to older workers and early retir 
ees. HIPAA requirements for portability and special enrollment peri 
ods can help people manage the transitions of work and family status 
that arise increasingly in this age group.
Enactment of this federal law was an important contribution 
because these protections were not applicable in all states and all health 
plans before 1996. Prior to HIPAA, states had been active in enacting 
similar reforms in their small group markets. State reforms varied 
widely and often were not as comprehensive as the federal law required 
(Pollitz et al. 1999; Institute for Health Policy Solutions 1998). Only a 
handful of states applied insurance reforms in the large group market 
and, of course, no states could regulate coverage under self-insured 
employer plans. Thus, the enactment of HIPAA expanded legal protec-
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tions for all Americans in group health plans. Older workers and early 
retirees who maintain group coverage and who need to switch between 
group health plans can be assured of more consistent and comprehen 
sive protections no matter where they live or what level of government 
regulates their group coverage.
State insurance reforms beyond HIPAA
Some states have gone beyond the national floor of group health 
protections guaranteed by HIPAA. These additional state protections 
may be most helpful for older workers or early retirees who decide to 
establish their own business or who work for very small firms. 
Because these protections vary so widely, however, it is important for 
older workers and early retirees to familiarize themselves with the laws 
in their own state.
Fifteen states (Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Washing 
ton) have applied some or all of their group market reforms to the self- 
employed or groups of one. In Arizona, Colorado, North Carolina, and 
Rhode Island, the self-employed are guaranteed access only to certain 
small-group policies; they are not guaranteed the issuance of all prod 
ucts as HIPAA requires for groups of 20-50. In Maryland, the self- 
employed are guaranteed access to small-group policies only during 
semiannual open seasons. In New Mexico, the self-employed can be 
considered a group if they buy family coverage, but only through the 
state's small-employer purchasing alliance. In South Carolina, spouses 
who work together in a family-owned business can be considered a 
group of two. For older workers who leave a job to set up their own 
business, these state reforms can be very helpful.
Most states also have gone beyond HIPAA's requirements to estab 
lish rating limits in their small-group markets. It is in small groups that 
one older worker's age or poor health may have a more tangible impact 
on the entire group's premium. State small-group rating reforms also 
vary considerably. Two states (New York and Vermont) require pure 
community rating, under which neither the age nor the health status of 
workers may cause a small group's premium to vary. Ten states require 
modified community rating, which permits no premium variation due 
to health status but allows variation based on other demographic fac-
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tors such as age. In three states (Hawaii, Michigan, and Pennsylvania), 
community-rated coverage is available only through certain carriers. 
Thirty-one states impose rate bands that allow limited rate variation 
based on health status, as well as variations based on age and other 
demographic factors. Two states (Arizona and New Mexico) require 
modified community rating for some small-group products and rate 
bands for others. Virginia imposes rate bands on only two products 
sold to only certain small groups. Only Illinois and the District of 
Columbia have no small group rating restrictions at all (Pollitz et al. 
1998).
Affordability of Group Coverage
In addition to guaranteeing access to group coverage that is offered 
by employers, federal law does provide one protection that may 
improve the affordability of health coverage for some older workers 
and early retirees in limited circumstances.
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was passed in 1993 
primarily to help workers balance the needs of job and family.3 It may 
also provide important, though short-lived, assistance to older workers 
who leave the workforce involuntarily due to illness or to care for a 
sick relative.
The FMLA guarantees up to 12 weeks of job-protected leave for 
workers when they become ill or disabled or when they need to care for 
a newborn or for a sick or disabled family member. The law guaran 
tees only unpaid leave, although people must be allowed to draw sick 
pay, vacation pay, or disability income insurance benefits they have 
accrued. The law also requires employers to continue health benefits 
during leave. Unlike HIPAA and COBRA, therefore, the FMLA does 
provide for a subsidy to make group coverage affordable.
According to the Bipartisan Commission on Family and Medical 
Leave, family leave to care for a seriously ill family member and medi 
cal leave for one's own health accounts for almost 80 percent of all 
leave taken by employees. When surveyed about their future need for 
family and medical leave, about 40 percent of employees responded 
that they expect to need such leave within the next five years. The most 
frequently cited reason was to care for a seriously ill parent. While the 
length of leave varies depending on the reason for taking leave, the
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median length for all leave-takers is 10 days. Eighty-four percent of 
people taking leave return to work, 10 percent remain on leave, and 
only 6 percent do not return to work (Bipartisan Commission on Fam 
ily and Medical Leave 1996).
The FMLA can offer some early retirees a brief bridge of afford 
able health coverage before they move on to COBRA or other group or 
individual insurance. However, because the law only applies to firms 
with 50 or more employees, because the benefit guarantees are so time 
limited, and because it is structured primarily to be a reform to help 
people return to work, it is unlikely that FMLA health coverage pro 
vides much of a lifeline to very many individuals.
Access to Individual Coverage
As noted above, the near-elderly rely more heavily on nongroup 
coverage than do younger people. Reliance on individual coverage 
may increase if current trends toward declining employer-sponsored 
retirement health benefits continue. Individual insurance markets are 
much less tightly regulated than group markets, and the near-elderly 
will tend to be vulnerable purchasers of coverage in individual mar 
kets.
Individual insurance markets are characterized by the aggressive 
ness of their carriers' underwriting practices. Where such practices are 
not regulated, individual market insurers may deny coverage altogether 
to an applicant determined to be a bad risk. Insurers also may sell cov 
erage that temporarily or permanently excludes coverage for a health 
condition or an entire body part or system. In addition, they may 
charge higher (substandard) premiums based on an applicant's health 
status. Premiums may be further increased, typically by a factor of 
three or higher for people in their early 60s, due to age and other demo 
graphic factors (Chollet and Kirk 1998, p. 44). For older workers and 
early retirees who need to buy insurance on their own, these underwrit 
ing and rating practices can pose substantial barriers to access. Con 
sider the story of one 52-year-old woman who recently "retired" to 
Florida.
We moved to Florida with insurance [under my husband's 
COBRA plan] and tried to buy individual coverage. [I] was 
turned down by no less than 5 companies because of a preexisting
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condition that was corrected 30 years ago! Was told by BC/BS of 
Florida to get a job or get arrested. Since I don't like stripes, I 
took a job. Since my husband and I had just retired from New 
York, I was not amused, but I am now insured. Our concern now, 
is what. .. will [happen] ... to us AFTER COBRA! My husband 
is going to be 62 in 1/00! I've found many of my neighbors in our 
new community have the same problem. We all didn't come with 
"retirement insurance" from our companies, and due to some 
minor problems (i.e., heel spurs) many have returned to work 
because they cannot get insurance here!4
Federal health reforms have done little to improve this situation, 
though some states have acted to secure access to coverage for the 
near-elderly and other individuals.
HIPAA
While HIPAA added significantly to people's legal protections 
under group health plans, it added little to their protections when buy 
ing individual coverage. Whether this result was intended is hard to 
know. On the one hand, early retirees and older workers leaving group 
coverage to set up their own businesses were typical of the people Con 
gress sought to help through HIPAA. On the other, as an incremental 
reform, HIPAA was limited and incomplete by design. Congress also 
was especially deferential to the goal of state flexibility when it drafted 
HIPAA's individual-market provisions. The combination of HIPAA's 
small reform increment and great state flexibility left people in the 
individual market with little more real protection under the new federal 
law than they had before.
HIPAA contained two key protections in the individual market. 
First, it required all coverage, including individual policies, to be guar 
anteed renewable. That is, carriers are prohibited from canceling or 
refusing to renew coverage due to advancing age or declining health. 
Second, HIPAA contains "portability" protections for people leaving 
group coverage to buy individual insurance when they have maintained 
a substantial and continuous coverage history. These people, called 
federally eligible individuals, must have had at least 18 months of con 
tinuous coverage that was not interrupted by a lapse of more than 63 
days in a row. Their most recent day of coverage must have been under 
a group health plan, and they must have elected and exhausted any
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available COBRA continuation benefits. Once people become feder 
ally eligible, they must purchase individual coverage within 63 days. 
HIPAA guarantees federally eligible people access to all policies sold 
in the individual market. States can adopt an alternative mechanism for 
guaranteeing access to health coverage for federally eligible individu 
als, and 39 states did so.
HIPAA lacked one key protection for people buying individual 
coverage: rating limits. Consequently, while all individual policies are 
now guaranteed renewable in all states, nothing in federal law prohibits 
insurers from raising renewal rates so high as to deter people from con 
tinuing their coverage. Only where states had already acted to limit 
this practice do people have such protections.
The lack of rating protections also made hollow HIPAA's right of 
guaranteed issue to private individual coverage. Eleven states and the 
District of Columbia adopted this new guaranteed issue protection for 
their federally eligible residents. None of these dozen jurisdictions 
have individual market rating reforms, however. 5 Consequently, poli 
cies sold to federally eligible individuals in these areas are priced as 
high as 400 to 600 percent of standard rates (Scanlon 1998).
In the 39 alternative-mechanism states, people do have some rating 
limits but few new access protections. HIPAA's requirements were so 
flexible that all but a few states simply made minor adjustments to the 
reforms they had previously enacted. As a result, most people in these 
states have the same or similar right of access to individual coverage 
after HIPAA as they did before (Pollitz et al. 1999).
In summary, where HIPAA granted a new access protection for 
people in the individual market, it was rendered almost meaningless 
because the lack of rating reforms let carriers deter access by changing 
prohibitive premiums. And, where HIPAA deferred to states in design 
ing individual market access protections, most states decided to keep 
reforms they already had in place. The result for older workers and 
early retirees is that coverage options remain about the same.
State-legislated protections
For the near-elderly, then, like other Americans, access to individ 
ual market coverage remains a function of health status and geography. 
Some states offer greater access protections than others. The woman 
quoted above who retired to Florida might have found it easier to
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obtain individual coverage had she moved to one of the other states 
described below.
Access to all individual market policies is guaranteed for all resi 
dents in six states. In all of these states, individual policies must be 
priced according to community rating or modified community rating 
(Figure 1).
In five other states, all residents are guaranteed access to at least 
some products sold by some carriers (for example, a Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield plan). One of these states does not limit rates that can be 
charged for these policies (Figure 2).
Seven jurisdictions require periodic open seasons during which 
residents are guaranteed access to some or all individual market prod 
ucts (for example, some states require HMOs to conduct annual open 
enrollment periods.) Rating protections exist in only four of these 
seven states (Figure 3).
Other states have enacted access protections in the individual mar 
ket to people who were previously insured. Residents in six states have 
broader portability rights than under HIPAA. For example, residents in 
these states typically are guaranteed access to some or all individual 
coverage whenever they switch health plans, not just when they switch 
from group to individual coverage as HIPAA permits. Often only sev 
eral months to one year of prior coverage is required to gain such port 
ability rights. Again, however, rating protections are only applied in 
five of the six states (Figure 4).
In 31 states, early retirees and other leaving group coverage are 
guaranteed conversion rights, meaning their group carrier must issue 
them an individual policy regardless of health status. Only 10 of these 
states limit premiums that can be charged for conversion coverage. In 
the other 21 states, conversion rights tend to be hollow (Figure 5).
Affordability of Individual Coverage
In addition to guaranteeing access to coverage, a few states offer 
subsidies for private individual coverage purchased by low-income res 
idents. These programs, funded with state-only dollars, tend to be 
fairly small. Health Access New Jersey, for example, subsidizes the 
purchase of commercial health insurance by people under age 65 hav 
ing family incomes below 150 percent of the poverty level. The pro-
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Figure 1 States that Require Guaranteed Issue of All Individual Market 
Policies at Community Rates to All Residents
Figure 2 States Where All Residents are Guaranteed Issue of Some 
Individual Products
*no rating limits apply
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Figure 3 States Requiring Open Season Enrollment for Some or All 
Individual Market Policies
* no rating limits applied
Figure 4 States with Portability Protections for Previously Insured 
Residents that are Greater than HIPAA Requires
*no rating limits apply
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Figure 5 States Requiring Conversion Rights for Individuals Leaving 
Group Coverage
* no rating limits apply
gram had over 14,000 enrollees in 1997. In Massachusetts, the 
Medical Security Plan makes subsidized coverage available to people 
under age 65 having family incomes below 200 percent of the poverty 
level. This program also provides partial premium subsidies for 
COBRA continuation coverage for families with incomes below 400 
percent of the poverty level. Over 15,000 Massachusetts residents par 
ticipated in this program in 1997 (Summer 1998).
Public Coverage Options
Public coverage options tend to offer both access and affordability. 
Eligibility under these programs, even entitlements, is limited, so older 
workers and early retirees may not always be eligible.
Federal initiatives
Coverage under the federal Medicare program is only available to 
people before the age of 65 if they are disabled or suffer from end-
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stage renal disease. As noted earlier, about 6 percent of people aged 
55-64 qualify for Medicare coverage this way.
Medicaid also offers coverage to certain low-income people who 
become disabled and can no longer work. In the closing days of 1999, 
Congress enacted the Work Incentives Improvement Act to expand 
access to Medicare and Medicaid for some disabled individuals who 
want to return to work.6 People under age 65 who have left the work 
force because of a disability may now have the option of returning to 
work because of the enactment of this law. It gives states the option to 
permit working individuals with a medically improved disability to buy 
into Medicaid and to eliminate income, asset, and resource limitations 
for those workers who do. It also provides $400 million for demonstra 
tion programs and incentive grants to states to encourage the expansion 
of these Medicaid buy-in options. In addition, the law permits disabled 
Medicare beneficiaries who return to work to continue their Medicare 
coverage for six and one-half years, which is significantly longer than 
the current 24 months. This extension of health coverage through pub 
lic plans may address a key cause of involuntary retirement and enable 
more people to return to work without jeopardizing their health insur 
ance.
Medicare and Medicaid eligibility have not yet been changed to 
extend coverage for non-disabled older workers who prefer to take 
early retirement. In 1997, President Clinton proposed legislation to 
establish a Medicare buy-in option at actuarially neutral premiums for 
certain people between the ages of 55 and 64, but it was not enacted.
State programs offering subsidized coverage
A number of states have used Medicaid 1115 waivers to make low- 
income uninsured adults eligible for Medicaid coverage. For example, 
Hawaii's Quest program offers subsidized coverage for low-income 
uninsured individuals under age 65 with incomes below 300 percent of 
the poverty level. MinnesotaCare offers limited benefit coverage at 
discounted premiums for adults under 175 percent of poverty and for 
parents of minor children with family incomes below 275 percent of 
poverty (Summer 1998).
Washington offers subsidized public coverage funded entirely with 
state money. The Basic Health Plan offers comprehensive coverage for 
a sliding scale premium based on income. Residents with gross
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monthly income up to about $2300 (for a family of 3) could qualify for 
eligibility in 1999. Approximately 128,000 residents were enrolled at 
the end of last year (Washington State Health Care Authority 1999).
State high-risk pools
Twenty-five states have high-risk pools to guarantee access to cov 
erage for the medically uninsurable. Most of these state pools operate 
with limited funding, however, and enrollment in all but a few is very 
small (under a few thousand individuals). For older workers and early 
retirees, the access guarantee offered by many state high-risk pools 
might seem particularly incomplete. All state high-risk pools price 
premiums using age rating. Premiums for a 64-year-old range from 
two to five times higher than those charged for a 24-year-old. Depend 
ing on the state and benefit package, it is not uncommon for the near- 
elderly to face premiums in excess of $500/month under high-risk 
pools. A number of state high-risk pools have other shortcomings. 
Covered benefits under seven state high-risk pools are subject to signif 
icant limitations (such as an annual cap of $75,000 on covered services 
in California). Six state high-risk pools set premiums at 200 percent of 
standard rates before adjustments for age and other demographic fac 
tors are applied. Two states cap enrollment under their high-risk pools, 
and so deny access to coverage for the uninsurable when state funding 
runs short. 7 However, two states (Connecticut and Wisconsin) do offer 
premium subsidies through their high-risk pools (Pollitz et al. 1998; 
Communicating for Agriculture 1999).
CONCLUSION
As Americans age, their need for health insurance grows but, cov 
erage opportunities may decline. People leaving the workforce need 
both access to health insurance coverage and the means to pay for it. 
The erosion of employer-provided retirement coverage may make both 
access and affordability more problematic in the future, and as the 
baby-boom generation ages, these problems will be faced by greater 
numbers of people.
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Some federal efforts to promote health insurance access have been 
significant. The enactment of COBRA and HIPAA group market 
reforms in particular have created a floor of protections, though limited 
in scope, that people can count on no matter where they live. The near- 
elderly, most of whom are covered by employer-sponsored health 
insurance, are among those whose access protections have been 
enhanced as a result.
Older workers and early retirees do rely disproportionately on indi 
vidual coverage. In these health insurance markets, their age and 
higher risk status threatens their access to coverage. HIPAA did not 
add significantly to individual market protections, however, so people's 
coverage options were left pretty much unchanged.
Neither of these federal reforms provide subsidies, which are key 
to the low-income uninsured gaining private coverage. One recent fed 
eral initiative did improve access and .affordability of public coverage 
for those disabled older retirees who qualify for Medicare or Medicaid 
and who may wish to return to work. Federal policy has not changed 
public coverage options for nondisabled older workers and retirees.
Some states continue to try to fill some of the gaps in access and 
affordability left by limited federal reforms. However, state efforts are 
limited, too, and their success varies. For older Americans, especially 
those who relocate later in life only to find themselves covered by a 
new and different set of rules, this patchwork of state rules and protec 
tions may seem particularly unreliable and confusing. Without the 
enactment of more sweeping federal reforms, it seems likely that there 
will continue to be no guarantee of health care access or affordability 
for the near-elderly.
Notes
1. COBRA stands for the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1985. Among other things, this law amended ERISA to require temporary group 




4. This comment was left anonymously by a visitor to Georgetown's Health Insur 
ance Consumer Guide home page, www.georgetown.edu/research/ihcrp/hippa. 
October 1999.
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5. The state of Maryland does limit rates that can be charged only for certain policies 
sold to federally eligible individuals
6. P.L. 106-170
7. In Illinois, where the high-nsk pool is part of the state's alternative mechanism 
under HIPAA, the enrollment cap may not be applied to people who are federally 
eligible.
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Commentary
Katherine Swartz 
Harvard School of Public Health
I thought maybe that cold air was supposed to make us more cog 
nizant of what it's like to be one of the unfortunates. I've been asked to 
pinch-hit as a discussant on these three papers, so let me try to do a rea 
sonable job here I want to focus my comments more about the aspect 
that Karen just talked about, the dynamic issues involved with job loss, 
income, and health insurance coverage. That is to say, if we start with 
a job loss, that increases the probability (as Ann was describing) that a 
person will have a subsequent job loss, and all of this has ripple effects 
on a person's pension, the ability to save (and therefore what kinds of 
nonpension savings a person has when starting retirement), and on 
health insurance. These papers highlight the dynamic issues that are 
involved here. We have unemployment spells, spells without health 
insurance, and spells that are short-lived (we hope) of having poor 
health.
The first comment I want to make has to do with the bank merger 
case study. I found this especially interesting because many people 
who lose jobs in these huge bank mergers are lower-wage, less-edu 
cated groups of workers. Judging by the response rates to the study's 
survey, however, the study has respondents who happen to be older 
workers who were better educated and had higher incomes when they 
lost their jobs.
I happen to live in Boston now, and as some of you know, Boston 
(and New England) has been experiencing bank mergers recently. I 
can tell you from colleagues and friends that the recent Bank Boston 
merger with Fleet Bank targeted older employees for severance. 
They've been provided with very generous severance packages in 
part because of their long tenure with the banks so "that the bank 
would not be sued for the age discrimination that Jill talks about in her 
paper. Her discussion of this issue resonated with what I am observing 
in Boston.
However, what I found distressing about this case study is that I'm 
seeing similar subtleties at work now in other types of firms and not
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just banks. For example, we now see changes in job descriptions that 
are intended to drive workers from their jobs. Changes such as requir 
ing a worker to know how to use a new computer system or a new 
accounting system are not uncommon. At the same time, employers 
are not doing enough of the training, which Wally Maher and Dave 
Smith talked about earlier, that would enable workers to learn the new 
systems. This situation then leads to what appears to be a voluntary 
change of job, so you have a voluntary spell without a job. Or is this 
really a "push and shove" and an involuntary job change? The inter 
pretation, of course, has impacts on the kinds of health insurance one 
may have, what happens to one's pensions, and what happens to one's 
current income and ability to save.
I find all of this quite chilling. It leads again to the comment that 
Burt Seidman raised earlier about some kind of balance being needed 
between flexibility for employers in terms of their employee labor 
costs and protections for workers. Employers do need flexibility with 
labor; as we have seen in Western Europe, employers complain vocif 
erously about all of their labor costs tied up with fringe benefits. On 
the other hand, there is a need for employee protections, particularly 
for workers 50 and older, who face higher probabilities of chronic 
health problems and demands to care for aging parents. Right now, we 
have a 10-year demographic trough in terms of the people who are 55 
to 64 years old, but I can assure you being on the leading edge of the 
baby boom, as are many of you in this room we haven't seen any 
thing yet in terms of the needs for employee protections. I suspect, 
since the baby boomers have led the way on a lot of things over the last 
50 years, we will be heard on this issue as well.
The second point I want to make has to do with the effects of job 
losses on incomes and pensions. The finding that Ann and her coau 
thor have that earnings are significantly lower after a job loss (between 
a quarter to a third less) is incredibly important for those of us who are 
studying the issue of job loss among older workers. It means that not 
only are such workers' earnings less, but so is their ability to save 
money for retirement to round out Social Security and for any health 
care costs that they're going to have to incur once they are 65 and older.
Also, the finding that pensions are no longer so connected to par 
ticular employers really does alter the incentives to retire or not and to 
change jobs. These changed incentives may increase the probability of
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having a spell without health insurance; I found that quite interesting 
and would like to see it explored further.
My third set of comments relate to the loss of jobs and the effect on 
health insurance coverage. I'll spend more time on this area since my 
own research has focused on health insurance. We're primarily talking 
here about the effects of an involuntary loss of a job. That's why my 
earlier point about how much of job changing or job loss is involuntary 
versus voluntary is really important to know. People who are married 
and who voluntarily switch jobs are very likely to be relying on a 
spouse as a source of access to health insurance. We know that losing a 
job does not necessarily cause loss of health insurance, because fre 
quently job losers or job changers are covered by health insurance from 
their spouse.
However, if a person is not married (and in my paper I show that 
the "unfortunates" are much less likely to be married), then clearly los 
ing a job increases the probability of having a spell without health 
insurance, or it increases the probability of using up a great deal of 
one's savings to be able to purchase some type of nongroup health 
insurance policy. In addition, if a person has any type of preexisting 
health condition that he/she knows about or is concerned about because 
of a familial history, then being in a spell without a job and without 
health insurance is very scary. The health condition may crop up sud 
denly and an individual may not have the money to pay for care. Older 
workers also fear that they are less likely to gain a new job because a 
potential employer may say, "Well, you look like you're a little older 
and even though I worry about age discrimination, I'll just say that the 
other person was more qualified for that job." We ought to be worried 
about these subtle effects related to preexisting health conditions and 
what they do for employment and health coverage.
A third point about job changes and health insurance (as Karen 
aptly describes) is that COBRA is not as helpful as it's cracked up to 
be. A person has to work for an employer with at least 20 employees to 
even be covered by COBRA. A person also has to have an employer 
that offers health care coverage. Thus, if an employer goes bankrupt 
and the business folds, so a worker loses his or her job, the workers do 
not have access to the former employer's health insurance. A person 
also needs to have a lot of money to retain coverage under COBRA, 
because 102 percent of a premium is a lot of money, especially if a
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former employer offers generous coverage that costs $4,000 or more 
annually.
Another issue with COBRA is that people are often misled about 
their eligibility at a time when they're most vulnerable. COBRA is 
available not just for people who lose a job voluntarily or involuntarily; 
it's also there for 36 months for people who, through divorce or the 
death of a spouse, lose their access to the employer-sponsored cover 
age they have had. Those of you who have been through such circum 
stances know that's a particularly vulnerable period of time, and yet,a 
person has only 30 days to decide to continue coverage under COBRA.
So, COBRA is not all its cracked up to be, and as Karen pointed 
out, HIPAA also does not provide much protection for people. It 
doesn't prevent insurers from increasing premiums when a person 
changes from group coverage to nongroup coverage. There's nothing 
in HIPAA that says that the insurance company can't set whatever pre 
mium it deems appropriate. Although HIPAA did help place a floor on 
the protections that individuals have when they shift from a group pol 
icy to a nongroup policy, it is still the case that the states have the right 
to regulate the nongroup, individual insurance market. These markets 
are not competitive in terms of premium competition. Rather, they are 
competitive in the way that the insurers go about selecting who they 
want to cover and who they want to stay far away from. One group that 
insurers particularly want to stay far away from is anybody over the 
age of 50. They can do this by setting high premiums, say, $15,000 to 
$20,000 a year, and most people then say, "I can't afford that." So 
technically, while older people may not be denied a policy, they really 
are not offered a policy.
Let me add one other observation about the difficulties faced by 
older people in trying to purchase affordable nongroup health insur 
ance policies. This relates to the web site Karen mentioned: I am 
struck by the fact that it is very difficult to find a high-deductible insur 
ance policy. This is also true if you have access to insurance through 
employer groups. I cannot get a high-deductible policy, and my hus 
band's employer does not offer a high-deductible insurance policy. 
Most people whom I've asked cannot get a high-deductible insurance 
policy from where they work. If you go into the nongroup market and 
try to buy a high-deductible, catastrophic policy, I suspect that you will 
find enormous difficulty because insurers are immediately suspicious.
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Somebody who wants a high-deductible policy knows something  
adverse selection is the issue. Insurers fear that you know that you 
have cancer or some kind of cardiovascular problem and you're expect 
ing to use medical care in excess of $10,000 a year.
All of which brings me back to where I started the dynamic 
aspects of income, pensions, and health insurance facing people who 
lose jobs, particularly people who are older than 50 or in the 55- to 64- 
year-old group that we're talking about in this conference. The issue 
that we really have to be thinking hard about is how do we develop 
public policies to help people during these spells or periods of time 
when they are experiencing loss of a job, loss of health insurance, loss 
of income without at the same time increasing the moral hazard 
incentives for somebody voluntarily to enter a spell without a job. I am 
very concerned about unintentionally creating incentives, then, for an 
employer to feel that somebody who is 55 to 64 years of age is expend 
able because a public safety net exists that will catch a person shoved 
from a job. How do we put in place public policies that help older 
workers in spells without jobs without at the same time increasing 
incentives for more people to enter these spells?
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Many older workers develop disabling health conditions or suffer 
disabling injuries. The labor-market consequences of disability can 
include job loss, reduced income, earlier retirement, and greater reli 
ance on private and social insurance systems to provide income secu 
rity. One important source of disability is work-related illness and 
injury. In this chapter, we examine the labor-market consequences of 
work-related disabling injuries and their relation to the age of the 
injured in three states: California, Wisconsin, and Washington. We 
also report estimates of the adequacy of income benefits received for 
these injuries from workers' compensation.
Earnings losses and related labor-market consequences result from 
workplace injuries in a number of ways. Most workers who suffer 
workplace injuries have temporary disabilities: complete recovery 
from the injury is expected, though some time out of work to recover is 
often needed, resulting in lost earnings. During that time out of work, 
workers qualify for temporary disability benefits from workers' com 
pensation, which replaces some of the earnings loss. In some cases, a 
workplace injury results in a permanent impairment or loss of physical 
or mental health. This permanent impairment may result in permanent 
loss of earning capacity and therefore of actual earnings. The perma 
nent impairments incurred on the job do not typically result in the level
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of disability that qualifies for SSDI or SSI benefits. Still, income secu 
rity is often threatened, and the onset of retirement may be substan 
tially hastened by workplace injury and illness.
A considerable amount is spent compensating workers with perma 
nent disabilities from workplace injuries. In California, permanent 
partial disability (PPD) income benefits for workers' compensation 
paid in 1997 totaled $1.1 billion, which is more than the total amount 
paid for the higher number of temporary disabilities. As we will dis 
cuss below, this $1.1 billion is only a fraction of the lost earnings of 
these injured workers. The remaining burden is shouldered by the 
workers and their families, as well as by other private and social insur 
ance programs.
As the workforce ages, the issue of permanently disabling work 
place injuries potentially becomes more significant. While the proba 
bility of a workplace injury decreases with age, according to Mitchell 
(1988), the probability of disabling injuries (and death) increases with 
age. Recovery from injury often takes longer and is less complete for 
older workers (Chirikos and Nestel 1989).
This chapter examines the losses experienced by workers with per 
manent disabilities in three states and compares the adequacy of com 
pensation received from the states' workers' compensation systems. 
We present evidence that older workers suffer proportionately more 
injuries with permanently disabling consequences and that the losses 
suffered by older workers are greater, on average, than those of 
younger workers. We also find that injury-related non-employment is 
higher among older workers. Moreover, the older workers in states we 
have studied appear to recover a smaller proportion of their losses from 
workers' compensation than do other injured workers.
The data we present come from recent estimates of lost earnings of 
injured or ill workers in three states: Washington (Biddle 1998), Wis 
consin (Boden and Galizzi 1999) and California (Peterson et al. 1997; 
Reville 1999). We summarize these recent studies and report new 
information about lost earnings from workplace injuries. The esti 
mates we present use administrative data on workers' compensation 
claims linked to longitudinal earnings data to directly estimate the 
earnings losses of injured or ill workers. They follow in the tradition of 
earlier "wage loss studies" by Johnson, Cullinan, and Curington (1978)
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and Berkowitz and Burton (1987). Both of these studies linked claims 
data to Social Security earnings records.
We begin with a brief description of workers' compensation per 
manent disability benefits in California, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
We then present the methodology used to derive estimates of injury- 
related lost earnings. Next, we describe lost earnings in the three states 
and how these losses are related to the age of injured workers. Finally, 
we review estimates of adequacy of workers' compensation benefits 
and discuss implications for the income security of older workers.
COMPENSATION FOR PERMANENT 
PARTIAL DISABILITY
Workers' compensation is a state-based administrative system that 
provides benefits to workers injured on the job without regard to fault. 
The benefits are set by formulas that differ from state to state. In Cali 
fornia, Wisconsin, and Washington, as in many other states, both tem 
porary total disability (TTD) benefits and permanent partial disability 
(PPD) benefits are paid. TTD benefits are intended to provide income 
support during recovery. PPD benefits are intended to compensate 
workers for the losses associated with a permanently disabling work 
place injury.
Setting compensation levels for TTD benefits is relatively straight 
forward. The goal is income replacement during recovery. Typically, 
the benefit amount is set at a level lower than the preinjury wage (often 
two-thirds) to provide the worker with an incentive to maintain safety 
in the workplace and to return to work when recovery is complete. 1 If 
injured workers receive temporary disability benefits for all eligible 
workplace injuries and if these benefits are paid for the full duration of 
injury-related lost work time, evaluating the adequacy of temporary 
disability income replacement is straightforward, since it is set by for 
mula. The actual time out of work is usually relatively short days 
instead of weeks.
Setting the benefit level and schedule of payments for permanent 
disability benefits is considerably more difficult. Unlike TTD benefits, 
PPD benefits are intended to compensate for current and future lost
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earnings capacity. The administrative burden and adverse incentive 
effects of a system that pays injured workers as the losses are experi 
enced (referred to as a wage loss system) are regarded in most states as 
prohibitive. For this reason, most states (including the three states 
compared in this study) set the benefit level for permanent disabilities 
prospectively. Formulas are often complex, and the basis of PPD bene 
fits varies from state to state. No states have set the benefit levels or the 
schedule of payments for PPD benefits with empirical knowledge of 
the economic consequences of disabling workplace injuries. For this 
reason, the extent to which PPD benefits achieve the goal of income 
replacement is unknown.
We compare estimates of the adequacy of income benefits in three 
states (California, Wisconsin, and Washington). The approaches 
adopted in these three states to compensating workers with perma 
nently disabling injuries are described below. For a discussion of the 
method of calculating permanent disabilities benefits in every state, see 
Earth and Niss (1999).
To estimate the impact of disability from occupational injuries, we 
estimate the losses experienced by injured workers over the years after 
the injury in each of the three states.2 The estimation of losses requires 
comparing postinjury earnings to a counterfactual: earnings for the 
same individual while uninjured. Let y] represent the earnings while 
injured, where I denotes "injured" and the subscript t denotes time 
from the injury. Let the counterfactual earnings be represented by yfu , 
where U denotes "uninjured." For any individual, the undiscounted 
earnings loss between the time of injury, which we will denote t = 0, 
and some future date, 7, is
Eq. 1 earnings loss = £ (y^ — y] )
t=0
In the next section, we will describe the estimation of earnings 
losses, which is complicated by the need to estimate the counterfac 
tual vu .
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To compare the adequacy of benefits across states, we also esti 
mate the fraction of earnings loss that is replaced by benefits for the 
average PPD case, i.e., the replacement rate:
. benefits 
Eq. 2 replacement rate =
earnings loss
THE ESTIMATION OF LOSSES
We report the estimates of earnings losses for PPD cases from 
Reville (1999), Boden and Galizzi (1999), and Biddle (1998). The 
results have been updated in some cases (for instance with a longer 
period of postinjury earnings for California than in Reville [1999]), and 
the analyses have been modified to make estimates as comparable as 
possible. However, due to data limitations in each state, the compari 
son groups available and therefore the approaches adopted to estimat 
ing losses in those papers and among states in this paper are different. 
In particular, in each state, a different control group is used. In this 
section, we describe the statistical problem raised by the estimation of 
losses and the solution adopted in each of the three states. In future 
work, we plan to obtain more comprehensive databases in each of these 
states (and in several others) in order to compare losses among states 
using identical methods.
The statistical problem in the estimation of earnings losses arises 
from the unobservability of the counterfactual ;y u in Eq. 1. If we 
could observe both injured and uninjured earnings for every injured 
worker, estimating earnings loss would be straightforward and given 
by Eq. 1. However, y, cannot be observed, and an estimate, yfu imist 
be constructed.
At an administrative level, workers' compensation programs must 
also estimate yu when setting benefits, and typically they use the pre- 
injury earnings. However, particularly for estimating the long-term 
consequences of permanent disabilities, the preinjury wage is not a sat 
isfactory proxy. First, without the injury, the worker may have experi 
enced wage growth over time, which the preinjury earnings will not 
measure. Second, if the injury had not occurred, it is possible that the
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injured worker would have been unemployed or exited the workforce 
for different reasons. It is not appropriate to assume that they would 
have earned the preinjury earnings in every postinjury earnings period.
Instead of using preinjury earnings, we estimate uninjured earnings 
in the postinjury period using the earnings of a comparison (control) 
group. This approach draws its inspiration from the training program 
evaluation literature (Dehejia and Wahba 1996; Heckman and Hotz 
1989; Holland 1986; LaLonde 1986). The control group comprises 
workers who were similar to the injured workers with respect to demo 
graphic and economic characteristics but who did not experience a 
workplace injury during the time period under examination.3
Biddle (1998) and Boden and Galizzi (1999) as well as the esti 
mates from Washington and Wisconsin reported below, each used 
workers with minor injuries as comparison groups. To correct for 
observed differences between injured workers and controls, a fixed- 
effect earnings regression model is estimated. Reville (1999) and our 
estimates for California (reported below) used uninjured workers at the 
same firm as controls. Observed differences are corrected for using a 
case-control matching methodology. In the remainder of this section, 
we describe the particular estimation approach and the data used for 
each state.
Washington and Wisconsin
In Biddle (1998) and Boden and Galizzi (1999), as well as in the 
Washington and Wisconsin estimates reported below, yu is estimated 
from the earnings of workers with minor workplace injuries. The 
minor injuries used in the Washington study resulted in less than three 
days out of work and no permanent disability benefits (referred to as 
medical-only cases). The Wisconsin minor injuries resulted in 8 to 10 
days out of work and no permanent disability benefits. In both states, 
earnings regressions were estimated using longitudinal data on real 
quarterly earnings for a pooled sample of controls and injured workers. 
Independent variables included age in the quarter of observation and 
calendar year and quarter dummies to control for business cycle effects 
common to the earnings of all workers. Also, pre- and postinjury earn 
ings were allowed to follow different trends depending on the severity 
of the injury. 5
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The regression coefficients were used to project what the earnings 
of the injured worker would have been in the quarter of injury and the 
postinjury quarters, using that worker's estimated fixed effect and the 
coefficients estimated for the comparison group. The earnings loss 
estimate for each postinjury quarter was set equal to this earnings pro 
jection minus the actual earnings of the injured worker. Quarterly 
earnings loss estimates for the quarter of injury and 14 subsequent 
quarters were then discounted at a 2.3 percent rate5 and summed to pro 
duce a single loss figure.
To check the quality of the control group, the preinjury earnings of 
the controls and the injured workers were compared in both Washing 
ton and Wisconsin. In Wisconsin, preinjury differences in quarterly 
earnings growth6 between the controls and injured workers were small 
(under $8) and statistically insignificant (Boden and Galizzi 1999); in 
Washington, the difference was about $17 per quarter.
In Washington, the claims data are from the Washington Depart 
ment of Labor and Industries and consist of a sample of workers' com 
pensation injuries from July 1993 to June 1994. The sample includes 
8769 medical-only cases and 34,618 workers receiving income benefits 
(TTD and PPD). The claims data are linked to 21 quarterly reports on 
earnings provided by employers in the state to the Washington 
Employment Security Department. 7 The earnings are from six quarters 
before to 14 quarters after the injury. The Wisconsin claims data pro 
vided by the Wisconsin Division of Workers' Compensation are from 
1989 and 1990. They are linked to 24 quarterly earnings reports from 
the Wisconsin Division of Employment Security, ranging from 8 quar 
ters before to as long as 18 quarters after the injury. The sample con 
sists of 6,416 short-term injuries and 47,889 longer-term injuries and 
injuries involving PPD benefits.
California
Reville (1999)8 and the estimates reported below for California 
used uninjured workers as controls. Each injured worker was matched 
to up to 10 uninjured workers at the same employer with earnings 
approximately equal to the preinjury earnings for the injured worker. 
The mean difference in earnings between the injured and control work 
ers in the quarters after injury was then used to estimate losses.9 An
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estimate of cumulative earnings loss is calculated by summing over 
time for every worker the earnings loss in every quarter, discounted (at 
2.3 percent) to the quarter of injury.
As in Washington and Wisconsin, to test for the quality of the con 
trols, Reville (1999) compared the preinjury earnings of the injured 
workers to the comparison workers over the years prior to injury. Con 
trols were matched to injured workers based on the four quarters prior 
to the injury. Eight additional quarters before the first four quarters 
prior are available for testing the controls. The match was found to be 
very close, with an average quarterly difference in earnings of only 
$28, less than 2 percent of the difference found in the quarters follow 
ing injury. 10
The claims data are from the California Workers' Compensation 
Insurance Rating Bureau and consist of workers' compensation PPD 
claims from injuries during 1993 at insured firms. 11 The data are 
matched to quarterly earnings data from the fourth quarter of 1989 
through the second quarter of 1998 from the California Employment 
Development Department. Data on 8,107 claims are matched to earn 
ings data for 28,862 uninjured workers.
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS 
IN THREE STATES
The amount paid for temporary disability benefits differs among 
states. There are, however, only a few dimensions along which tempo 
rary disability benefits vary. Benefits are set as a fraction of the prein 
jury wage, where the fraction varies among states. There are also 
different maximum and minimum benefits, waiting periods, and maxi 
mum numbers of weeks. Most states use the pretax wage as a basis for 
temporary disability benefits. However, because workers' compensa 
tion benefits are not taxed, other states base their benefits on "spend 
able earnings," which are meant to approximate after-tax earnings. The 
rules governing temporary disability payments in the three states we 
examine are summarized in Table 1.
Differences among states in permanent disability benefits are 
harder to categorize along a few dimensions. This reflects the com-
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Table 1 Summary of Income Benefits in California, Wisconsin, and 
Washington
California 1993 income benefits
TTD weekly amount
TTD waiting period 
PPD weekly amount 
PPD weekly benefit maximum




2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of 
$336
3 days
2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum
Maximum: $140 (ratings under 25)
$148 (earnings 25 and above)
Vary by rating:
25th percentile: 24 weeks 
50th percentile: 50 weeks 
75th percentile: 96 weeks
99th percentile: 426 weeks plus life 
pension
2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $246
Wisconsin 1989-90 income benefits
TTD payment amounts
TTD waiting period 
PTD weekly amount
Weeks of PPD benefits 
Lump-sum payments of unaccrued 




2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $363 
(1989) or $388 (1990)
3 days (7-day retroactive penod)
2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $125 
(1989) or $131 (1990)
10 weeks per percentage point 
25th percentile: 13 weeks 
50th percentile: 28 weeks 
75th percentile: 60 weeks 
99th percentile: 526 weeks
2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $363 
(1989) or $388 (1990)
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
Washington 1993-94 income 
benefits
TTD payment amounts





From 60% to 75% of preinjury pretax wage, 
depending on marital status and number of 
dependents; maximum of $2216 per month 
paid in bimonthly installments
3 days
Total awards based on schedule of injuries and/ 
or percentage disability rating system. If 
total award exceeds $6600 dollars, monthly 
payments are made according to TTD 
payment schedule until full award is paid.
Ordinary TTD benefits can be received during 
participation in approved VR program.
plexity of the problem of setting higher benefits for people with greater 
disability based on comparing individuals with different injuries. 12 In 
most states, there are "schedules" that set dollar amounts for particular 
injuries (such as $27,813 for the loss of a thumb in Washington in 
1997), though the schedules differ among states and the ranking of 
injuries is sometimes reversed in different states. Most states also use 
some kind of rating system that ranks different injuries on a scale of 1 
to 100 depending upon physician impairment ratings or ratings derived 
from medical descriptions of impairments (such as the fraction of range 
of motion that is lost in the shoulder). 13 These rating systems are used 
either for all injuries, as in California, or only for unscheduled injuries. 
Like the schedules, these rating systems rank different injuries, and the 
relative ranking of particular injuries in different rating systems can 
vary. Some states pay different amounts depending upon whether you 
have returned to work or returned to the at-injury employer. In addi 
tion, there are differences in weekly amounts and in the number of 
weeks that benefits are paid.
In the remainder of this section, we describe more fully the rules 
determining the size of permanent benefits payments in each of the
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three states being examined and present some descriptive statistics on 
the fraction of claims with permanent disabilities.
Washington
In Washington, there are statutorily determined PPD award 
amounts for a list of specified injuries to scheduled body parts (for 
example, amputation of the leg above the knee). Workers can also be 
given benefits for unspecified injuries to scheduled body parts. In this 
case, a rating for the percentage of impairment is multiplied by the 
scheduled amputation value of the body part. Finally, there are awards 
for unspecified injuries to unscheduled body parts (including, notably, 
backs and necks). In these cases, physicians make use of a set of rules 
and guidelines issued by the Department of Labor and Industry to 
assign a "percentage of total bodily impairment" caused by the injury. 
This percentage is then multiplied by a scheduled total bodily impair 
ment value, which was $118,800 as of July 1994. As Table 1 indicates, 
during the 1993-1994 period, awards below $6,600 (a little over half of 
all awards) were paid out in a lump sum, while awards greater than that 
amount were paid out in monthly installments.
Table 2 reports the percentage of injured workers receiving perma 
nent disability awards in various age categories in Washington, Wis 
consin, and California. The figures in the cells reflect the ratio of


















"Wisconsin Division of Workers' Compensation, authors' calculations 
b Washington Department of Labor and Industries, authors' calculations. 
c Random sample of self-insured indemnity claims data collected by RAND. 
d Workers' Compensation Insurance Ratings Bureau data, authors' calculations.
274 Biddle, Boden, and Reville
claims receiving PPD awards to all claims with income benefits, that is, 
all claims involving compensation for lost time and/or PPD benefits. 
In Washington, 23.4 percent of claims with income benefits in the 
period examined involved PPD awards. However, this percentage rises 
with age and is 39 percent for injured workers 55 years or older.
Wisconsin
Wisconsin has two kinds of PPD benefits, functional impairment 
benefits and earnings capacity benefits. Functional impairment bene 
fits are based upon a physician impairment rating. Earning capacity 
benefits are paid only to workers with nonscheduled injuries (typically 
head, back, or neck injuries) who do not return to work or who are 
rehired at no more than 85 percent of their former wage. Typically, 
workers qualifying for earning capacity benefits have not returned to 
their former employer. Earning capacity benefits use the same formula 
per percentage point of permanent disability, but the disability percent 
ages tend to be much larger than for functional impairment benefits. 
They are determined by reports of "vocational experts" on the effect of 
the impairment on the worker's wage-earning capacity.
Table 1 displays PPD benefit levels in Wisconsin for 1989-1990 
injuries. PPD benefits are subject to a maximum weekly benefit of 
$125 for injuries occurring in 1989 and $131 for those occurring in 
1990. This maximum weekly benefit represents just over one-third of 
the maximum weekly TTD benefit. Each percent of permanent disabil 
ity of the body as a whole is allocated 10 weeks' benefits. For 1989 
injuries, this implies a maximum benefit payment of $1,250 per per 
centage point of disability. Generally, benefits are paid monthly, so 
that monthly maximum PPD benefits for 1989-1990 injuries were 
about $500. Only 18.1 percent of workers with lost-time workers' 
compensation cases received PPD benefits in Wisconsin in 1989-1990 
(Table 2).
California
California's method for setting permanent disability benefits is dis 
tinctive and perhaps the most complex of the three states. All disabili-
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ties are described and ranked in a rating system that is unique to 
California. This rating system includes medical descriptions of impair 
ments as well as work restrictions (such as different ratings for "no 
heavy lifting" and "no very heavy lifting"). It also includes compensa 
tion for "subjectives" such as chronic pain, even in the absence of med 
ical evidence to support it.
As a result of this relatively permissive description of permanent 
disability, California has a considerably larger fraction of claims with 
permanent disability. As seen in Table 2, more than 40 percent of indi 
viduals receiving income benefit payments also receive permanent dis 
ability benefits. As in Wisconsin and Washington, the fraction with 
permanent disabilities increases with age, so that for workers over 55, 
almost half receive permanent disability benefits. 14
California is also unique in the extent to which benefits are 
adjusted to account for the individual circumstances of the injured 
worker. On the assumption that the same injury will lead to different 
losses depending upon the occupation of the injured worker, Califor 
nia's disability rating system assigns different values for the same 
injury in different occupations. For instance, an injury that affects 
speech will lead to higher benefits for a radio announcer than for a 
bricklayer; however, an injury that affects the shoulder will lead to a 
higher benefit for the bricklayer. Finally, on the assumption that recov 
ery is harder with age, higher benefits are paid for older workers.
Table 1 shows that the maximum benefit levels for temporary and 
permanent disabilities in California are similar to those in Wisconsin 
(and difficult to compare with Washington's). The formula for weeks 
is very complex, with the number of weeks for each additional disabil 
ity rating point increasing with the disability rating. Using the actual 
distribution of PPD awards, the table shows the number of weeks of 
PPD benefits by quartile of award for Wisconsin and California. In 
general, California has longer periods of PPD than Wisconsin.
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EARNINGS LOSS AND REPLACEMENT RATE 
ESTIMATES BY STATE
In Table 3, we report the losses for all three states, together with 
the total income benefits paid, the preinjury average quarterly earnings, 
and the pretax replacement rate. Total income benefits paid includes 
temporary total disability and permanent partial disability benefits in 
all three states. In addition, in California and Wisconsin, injured work 
ers are allowed to accept a cash settlement for the future value of the 
medical care in exchange for releasing the insurer or employer for any 
liability for future medica expensesl. This is not allowed in Washing 
ton. Finally, all three states pay a vocational rehabilitation (VR) main 
tenance allowance, which is paid while the worker is unable to work 
due to participation in VR. 15 Losses are reported in each state for 3.5 
years and 10 years after injury. In all three states, the estimates at 3.5 
years are based on observed postinjury earnings. Estimates at 10 years 
are based on projecting the losses an additional 6.5 years, discounted 
and based on the loss estimated for the final year observed.
Table 3 shows that losses in Washington and Wisconsin are very 
similar; losses in California appear to be considerably higher. Califor 
nia income benefits paid are also considerably higher than those in 
Washington and Wisconsin, but not high enough to cover the differ 
ences in losses. 16 This is shown in the far right column of Table 3, 
which reports the pretax replacement rate at 10 years among states. In 
Washington and Wisconsin, the replacement rate is over 45 percent, 
while in California, the replacement rate is below 40 percent. 17


































a Dollar values in 1984 dollars. 
b Projected.
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Although useful for comparing among states, the after-tax replace 
ment rate might be preferred as a measure of adequacy because work 
ers' compensation benefits are tax-free. In after-tax dollars, the 
earnings loss would be 20-30 percent lower, and therefore the replace 
ment rate would be higher. However, two other sources of bias are in 
the opposite direction. First, the choice of 10 years for the replacement 
rate is arbitrary. In work in progress by the authors using California 
data, losses are found to continue at much the same annual level even 
with seven years of observed postinjury earnings. Since virtually all 
injured workers have already received all workers' compensation bene 
fits by five years, but losses may continue for many years after that, the 
replacement rate for longer periods would be lower. Also, fringe bene 
fits are a significant source of compensation. 18 Some fringe benefits are 
tied to earnings, and others may be lost if the disabled worker cannot 
return to the preinjury job. 19
Table 4 shows losses over the observed period of 3.5 years and 
losses projected to both 6.5 years and 10 years for three age groups. 
Estimates are reported only for Washington and Wisconsin, because 
data limitations prevent the calculation of these estimates for Califor 
nia. The table shows that, in both states, losses increase with age. In
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Wisconsin, injured workers under 35 experience losses of $13,832 over 
the 3.5 years following injury, while workers over 55 experience losses 
almost twice as large. In Washington, the increase in lost earnings with 
age is less dramatic, with workers under 35 losing $14,782 over the 3.5 
years following injury, and injured workers 55 and over losing an esti 
mated $17,691.
Because earnings increase with age, and higher-paid workers will 
lose more for the same amount of lost work time, when comparing 
among age groups it is useful to normalize the lost earnings by prein- 
jury earnings. Dividing the loss by the preinjury quarterly earnings 
provides a measure of lost earnings in terms of quarters of lost earnings 
at the preinjury earnings level. Using this measure, the age pattern of 
losses for injured workers in Wisconsin is different than in Washington. 
In Wisconsin, workers over 55 lose the equivalent of almost one year of 
preinjury earnings during the 3.5 years after injury, compared with less 
than nine months (three quarters) for each of the other two age groups. 
This suggests that older disabled workers in Wisconsin experience 
more time out of work following the injury than younger disabled 
workers. In contrast, the youngest disabled workers in Washington 
experience the largest earnings losses relative to the preinjury earnings. 
Injured workers in Washington under 35 experience over nine months 
(three quarters) of lost preinjury earnings; by comparison, workers 
over 55 experience less than seven months of losses.
Projecting losses to 10 years after injury produces results for Wis 
consin that are qualitatively similar to the losses for 3.5 years: older 
disabled workers experience considerably larger losses measured abso 
lutely or in months of lost earnings. At 10 years postinjury, months of 
lost earnings in Washington become similar among age groups. In 
both states, replacement of lost earnings during the first 10 years after 
the injury is considerably lower for workers over 55. In Figure 1, the 
replacement rate of 10-year losses by age group is shown for Washing 
ton and Wisconsin. For the two age groups below 55, the replacement 
rate is approximately one-half. For the injured workers aged 55 and 
over, the replacement rate in both states is 28 percent.20
Our 10-year projections may provide an overstatement of losses 
for workers over 55, since by age 65, it is likely they will have retired 
even if they had not been injured and therefore would have received no 
further earnings losses.21 For this reason, we also report 6.5-year pro-
Session 3: Chronic Illness and Disability 279
Figure 1 Projected 10-Year Earnings Replacement Rate by Age: 
Washington and Wisconsin PPD Cases
Under 35 35-54 Over 55
Wisconsin D Washington
jections for losses (3.5 observed years and 3 projected years at the last 
quarter's average loss), which presumably are less likely to be biased in 
this manner. The 6.5 year projected replacement rate of 0.41 for Wash 
ington and 0.35 for Wisconsin is lower than even the 10-year projected 
replacement rate for the younger age groups.
The results in Figure 1 and Table 4 suggest that the adequacy of 
replacement rates is lowest for the oldest injured workers. It should be 
noted, though, that the 10-year replacement rate provides a limited 
window during which to observe losses. It is possible that losses 
beyond the observed period for workers in the oldest age category 
(over 55) will be considerably lower or nonexistent because many 
would have retired even had they not been injured. Younger workers 
may lose less during the first few years but over their lifetime may lose 
more.22
Table 5 reports on how well PPD benefits are tailored to lost earn 
ings. As noted earlier, disability ratings are used in all three states to 
predict which workers have greater disability so that higher benefits
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can be targeted to the most serious cases. If this system were success 
ful, we would expect benefits would increase at least in proportion to 
losses. To examine this, the table divides the distribution of income 
benefits into quintiles and calculates the average losses within each 
quintile. We would expect that the losses would increase with the 
income benefit quintile. In California, the lowest benefit quintile had 
losses that are five-sixths the losses of the second lowest quintile; how 
ever, benefits in the first quintile are 30 percent of those of the second 
quintile. An already low replacement rate of 19 percent for the second 
quintile is far lower than that for the first (7 percent). The results for 
Washington are even more dramatic. While the highest quintile 
receives benefits five times larger than those of the lowest quintile, 
losses are only 25 percent higher. Losses in the second and fourth 
quintiles are lower than in the first and third, respectively. In contrast, 
losses in Wisconsin increase monotonically with income benefits, lead 
ing to very similar replacement rates in all but the highest quintile.24
The relative success in equitably distributing benefits in Wisconsin 
may be driven by Wisconsin's two-tier system, which pays earnings 
capacity benefits only to workers who either do not return to work or 
who return at a substantially lower wage. Workers receiving earnings 
capacity benefits will almost always have higher losses. Washington's 
relative inability to target benefits to the more serious cases may be 
driven by the limitations of the impairment-based system used to set 
benefits. It is possible that information on the type of injury alone does 
not capture as much variation in the postinjury outcomes as economic 
factors such as the ability to return to work (the payment of earnings 
capacity benefits in Wisconsin) or the personal characteristics of the 
injured (the occupational and age adjustments to disability ratings used 
in California).
Several recent papers have noted that, particularly in permanent 
disability cases, absence from work following the initial return to work 
is common among workers with occupational injuries (Biddle 1998; 
Butler, Johnson, and Baldwin 1995; Galizzi and Boden 1996; Reville 
1999). For this reason, we depart from the approach often adopted in 
the workers' compensation literature of examining duration to first 
return to work, and instead we examine differences over the years after 
the injury between the fraction of injured workers and controls without 
reported earnings. This allows both the injured workers and the con-
Table 5 The Relationship of Losses and Total Income Benefits, by PPD Benefit Percentile
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trols to move in and out of the labor force, but if the fraction of injured 
workers out of the labor force exceeds the fraction of controls, then we 
assume this is injury-related.24 This estimate of injury-related non- 
employment is reported in Table 6 for 3, 5, 10, and (where available) 
20 quarters after injury.
Table 6 shows that in all three states, injury-related non-employ 
ment continues to be significant even 10 quarters following injury. It is 
clear that California's considerably higher earnings losses are associ 
ated with much higher rates of injury-related non-employment. Both 
the 1992 and 1993 injured workers have injury-related non-employ 
ment exceeding 15 percent for the first 21/2 years, though similar rates 
are never observed in Washington or Wisconsin, not even during the 
first quarter after injury. As shown in Reville and Schoeni (1999), 
injury-related non-employment is higher in recessions, and the differ 
ence between the states may be in part driven by the severity of the 
recession experienced in California in the early 1990s. There may be 
other reasons for the difference, including differences in litigation rates 
among the states and differences in the characteristics of jobs, workers, 
and industries. We plan to explore these differences in future studies.
Table 7 shows non-employment for Washington and Wisconsin by 
age group. In both Washington and Wisconsin, compared with nondis- 
abled workers, workers over 55 with permanently disabling injuries are 
increasingly likely to be out of work as time from the injury increases. 
This suggests that a disabling workplace injury (as with the onset of 
other health conditions) may lead older workers to choose to retire ear 
lier than they would have otherwise.

























a ND = no data available
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Table 7 Injury-Related Non-Employment Rates by Quarters from Injury 
and by Age Group, PPD Cases in Wisconsin and Washington (%)
Quarters 




























This paper examines the losses experienced by workers with per 
manent disabilities in California, Washington and Wisconsin and com 
pares the adequacy of compensation received from those states' 
workers' compensation systems. We find evidence of substantial 
losses from permanently disabling injuries in the three states. The state 
programs differ substantially in the proportion of workers' compensa 
tion cases receiving permanent disability benefits and in the average 
losses sustained by these injured workers, reflecting both differences in 
the laws and practices in those states. In general, California stands out: 
a higher proportion of injured workers received permanent disability 
benefits in California, experiencing higher average losses and receiving 
higher average benefits (but replacing a lower fraction of lost earnings). 
Wisconsin's system appears to lead to better targeting of benefits to 
losses, while Washington's impairment-based PPD schedule leads to 
losses unrelated to benefits paid.
It is possible that some of the differences among the states are 
driven by differences in industry mix, demographics, and economic 
conditions. At this point, we also cannot rule out the possibility that 
the differences are driven, at least in part, by differences in methods
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used. However, our preliminary research (which is still in progress) on 
disabling injuries in Florida, a state with industry mix and demograph 
ics that are similar to those of California, has found losses that are at 
least as close to those in California as to Wisconsin's or Washington's. 
This research has used the same methods we have used in Wisconsin, 
which suggests that the methods do not drive the observed differences. 
In our ongoing research, we are estimating losses with similar control 
groups and will examine how measured interstate differences (such as 
industry mix) affect the disparities in the losses we have measured.
Besides differences in earnings losses, California also pays PPD 
benefits to more than twice the proportion of workers with lost-time 
injuries than do the other two states (see Table 2). This does not neces 
sarily imply that more workers in California suffer long-term losses; as 
noted earlier, California has a relatively more permissive definition of 
permanent disability than the other states, with greater reliance on sub 
jective complaints (such as pain) and on work restrictions. However, 
Biddle (1998) and Boden and Galizzi (1999) both found that individu 
als with long-term temporary disability benefits (more than four 
weeks) but lacking permanent disability benefits have losses that are, 
on average, almost as large as those in PPD cases and that these losses 
continued at least to the end of the period they observed. 25 The long- 
term TTD group is larger in these states than the group receiving per 
manent disability benefits. Since they do not receive PPD benefits but 
have similar losses, these workers also had the lowest replacement 
rates. Within this group, there are certain to be a significant number of 
people who would have qualified for PPD benefits had they been 
injured in California. Accounting for this might reduce the differences 
in replacement rates among states, even if it does not reduce the differ 
ences in earnings losses.
Our data indicate that workplace injuries and illnesses are impor 
tant sources of disability throughout the working life, but that they are 
particularly so for older workers. When older workers are injured, they 
appear to suffer more permanently disabling injuries, and those with 
permanent disabilities experience more injury-related non-employ 
ment. Current evidence on the relationship of age and losses is ambig 
uous. Still, older workers in the states we have studied appear to 
recover a smaller proportion of their losses from workers' compensa 
tion than do other injured workers, at least over the first few years after
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injury. This raises concerns about the extent to which the uncompen- 
sated burden of work-related disabilities of older workers falls on the 
workers and their families or is absorbed by other public and private 
insurance systems.
The mechanisms behind the age-related differences in employment 
and losses are unclear. We do not know the extent to which they are 
simply caused by age-related physiological effects like delayed and 
incomplete recovery, nor do we yet understand the interaction between 
retirement decisions and the onset of work-related disabilities. Health 
and disability has been shown to be a primary reason for retirement 
(Anderson and Burkhauser 1985; Blau, Gilleskie, and Slusher 1997; 
Bound 1991; Sherman 1985; Stern 1988), but the extent to which 
health and disability is driven by occupational factors is unknown. 
Finally, we have questions about how the nature of employer accom 
modations may differentially affect older and younger workers. Stud 
ies have shown that when the employers provide accommodations for 
disabled workers and rehire injured workers, time lost from work is 
reduced substantially and the employment trajectory is improved 
(Burkhauser, Butler, and Kirn 1995; Galizzi and Boden 1996).
The analysis of disability from workplace injuries is likely to prove 
useful not only in its own right, but also in helping us to understand 
more about the labor-market impacts of nonworkplace health shocks 
on older workers. In particular, occupational injuries provide unusu 
ally good availability of administrative data and potential access to 
more detailed data about the behavior of both the supply and demand 
sides of the labor market for disabled workers.
Notes
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Institute for Occupa 
tional Safety and Health, and the State of California Commission on Health and Safety 
and Workers' Compensation.
1. A considerable literature in economics exists on the incentive effects of temporary 
disability benefits. See, for instance, Moore and Viscusi (1990), Krueger (1990), 
and Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin (1995)
2. For a discussion of some theoretical issues in the interpretation of earnings losses 
as a measure of welfare of injured workers, see Reville, Bhattacharya, and Sager 
(1999)
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3. Earnings losses have also been estimated using similar methods in the literature 
on the impact of downsizing. See, for instance, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 
(1993) and Schoeni and Dardia (1996).
4. Workers were categorized into severity groups based on number of days missed 
and whether PPD benefits were received, and workers in different groups were 
allowed to have separate premjury trends of earnings. The specification allowed 
the earnings of workers in the comparison group to follow a linear trend in the 
postmjury period as well, while for each of the injured worker groups, dummy 
variables for the quarter of injury and the five subsequent quarters allowed earn 
ings to follow a flexible, nonmonotonic path following the injury. After this six- 
quarter period, a separate linear earnings trend was specified for each injured 
worker group. Variables were also included to control for the impact of any sub 
sequent injuries on earnings. The Washington estimates were based on a fixed- 
effects specification, while the Wisconsin estimates used a first-differences 
approach. The results showed little sensitivity to the specification used.
5. Boden and Galizzi (1999) used a 3 percent rate, but the estimates presented below 
use a 2.3 percent rate.
6. The use of a fixed-effect regression technique controls for any persistent preinjury 
differences in the level of earnings between injured workers and the workers in 
the comparison group. Even before controlling, however, these differences 
amount to less than 5 percent of quarterly earnings.
7. In each of the three states, workers' compensation claims data are linked to longi 
tudinal quarterly earnings data collected by the state for administration of the 
unemployment insurance (UI) program. The earnings data are obtained for both 
the injured workers and the comparison workers. The UI data reports all within- 
state, before-tax earnings at Ul-covered employers (approximately 95 percent of 
employment in each of the states). If no earnings data are reported for a particular 
quarter for either injured workers or controls, we assume that zero earnings are 
received. Earnings data for the self-insured and for workers who move out of 
state will be missing. This will not bias estimates unless disabled workers are sys 
tematically more or less likely to receive these types of earnings.
8. See also Peterson, Reville, Stem, and Earth (1997).
9. For a general discussion of matching in econometrics, see Heckman, Ichimura, 
and Todd (1997).
10. This test is not directly comparable to the test in Washington and Wisconsin. The 
$28 difference in California is in levels, while the $17 and $8 differences for the 
other states reported above were in changes (or growth).
11. Two-thirds of employees in California work at insured firms (firms that purchase 
insurance). The remaining one-third are employed at self-insured firms.
12. States vary in the statutory justification for permanent disability benefits. Many 
states, such as California, justify it as compensation for loss of future earnings 
capacity. Construction of an ordinal scale to rank injuries and set compensation is 
equally complex with the justifications used in other states, such as compensation 
for "impairment."
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13. The most commonly used rating system is the American Medical Association's 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (1993)
14. Table 2 reports the fraction with PPD by age using a new sample of self-insured 
claims recently collected by RAND. Data on age for workers with temporary dis 
ability benefits are not available for the insured firms examined in this paper.
15. In addition, workers' legal and medical-legal expenses have not been subtracted 
from the indemnity paid to the worker, even though they are usually directly paid 
to attorneys or evaluating doctors.
16. In Reville (1999), estimates of the replacement rate use simulated benefits paid 
out over time according to the schedule using the information from the WCIRB 
data on actual disability ratings and various benefits paid. This was intended to 
insure that the time window for losses and benefits coincide and to eliminate the 
impact of the settlement of medical costs in the replacement rate. This led to 
lower total income benefit payments (reflecting the fact that five years of losses 
were reported and therefore the benefits represented five years of benefits) and 
therefore lower replacement rates. This approach is not adopted here for consis 
tency with the data available from other states.
17. Berkowitz and Burton (1987), using data from claims in 1968, also found thai, 
replacement rates were considerably higher in Wisconsin than in California.
18. According to U.S. Department of Labor (1998), nonwage benefits account for 
approximately 38 percent of wage and salary income.
19. We interpret the replacement rates as the fraction of losses replaced by workers' 
compensation benefits Another interesting estimate would be the fraction of 
losses replaced by all government benefits. While most of the injured workers are 
not disabled enough to receive Social Secunty disability benefits, we suspect thai, 
they are more likely to receive them than their controls, and therefore replacemeni. 
rates counting all benefits would be higher. However, we do not have data on 
Social Security disability benefits for these workers.
20. This, too, may be somewhat exaggerated by the projection method for losses, 
which does not account for the decline in losses associated with retirement.
21. The regression specification includes a fourth-order polynomial in age, and there 
fore we expect that we have accounted for age during the observed period flexibly 
enough to correctly estimate losses even given the decline in labor force participa 
tion after age 65.
22. Benefits for PPD in state workers' compensation systems differentially reflect the 
two opposing effects of age on lost earnings. As noted earlier, in California., 
higher benefits are paid to older workers to compensate them for their diminished 
ability to recover from injury. In contrast, in Colorado, lower benefits are paid to 
older workers (Barth and Niss 1999), presumably because they are closer to 
retirement and will not experience lost earnings over as many years.
23. In all states, the replacement rate results for the highest quintile may be exagger 
ated relative to the lower quintiles by the use of a 10-year projection period. This 
group is likely to have large and long-term losses.
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24. As with earnings, in all three states we found no evidence of significant differ 
ences in labor force participation of injured workers and controls prior to injury.
25. Some people who have not received PPD benefits may nevertheless have perma 
nent impairments that cause long-term earnings losses. This may reflect a limita 
tion in the disability rating mechanism used by the state. Alternatively, long-term 
losses may occur because of labor-market effects that persist after recovery from 
injury. For example, workers who stay off work several months may lose their 
preinjury jobs and their investments in skill and senionty at those jobs. Earnings 
and employment after return could be affected, even if they fully recover from the 
effects of the injury. Finally, some of the long-term losses may be attributable to 
employers' unwillingness to hire people with the stigma of past workers' compen 
sation injuries and illnesses. Employers may believe that long spells of work 
absence mark someone as unreliable or otherwise unacceptable for employment, 
thus limiting employment opportunities and reducing future earnings for this 
group.
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I am pleased to report that the American economy today is healthy 
and strong. Our Nation is enjoying the longest peacetime eco 
nomic expansion in its history, with almost 18 million new jobs 
since 1993, wages rising at twice the rate of inflation, the highest 
home ownership ever, the smallest welfare rolls in 30 years, and 
unemployment and inflation at their lowest levels in three 
decades.
This expansion, unlike recent previous ones, is both wide and 
deep. All income groups, from the richest to the poorest, have 
seen their income rise since 1993. The typical family income is up 
more than $3,500, adjusted for inflation. African-American and 
Hispanic households, who were left behind during the last expan 
sion, have also seen substantial increase in income.
—President William Jefferson Clinton 
Economic Report of the President (1999)
As President Clinton's remarks indicate, the 1990s were an eco 
nomically enriching period for the vast majority of American families. 
Robust economic growth has produced the lowest unemployment and 
inflation rates in 30 years and lifted living standards across the income 
distribution. Importantly, the economic recovery of the 1990s reached 
traditionally economically vulnerable groups including African Ameri 
cans, Hispanics, those with less than a high-school education, and sin-
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gle mothers with children, often lifting their income to levels beyond 
previous business cycle peaks (U.S. Census Bureau 1999).
While President Clinton and Americans generally have every rea 
son to be pleased with the current economic expansion, it is important 
to put this good news into perspective by understanding which, if any, 
groups have been systematically left behind. One group that frequently 
is overlooked in such discussions is people with disabilities, even 
though they constitute a group more likely to be sensitive to economic 
fluctuations than the general population. In this chapter, we examine 
how people with disabilities fared over the 1990s business cycle.
MEASURING ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 
OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Cross-sectional comparisons of the economic well-being of Amer 
icans over time are sensitive to the years over which the comparisons 
are made. Figures la and Ib use two general economic indicators of 
the business cycle used in the Economic Report of the President 
(1999) median real family income and civilian unemployment 
rates to demonstrate this point. (The actual values are reported in 
Appendix Table Al.) As can be seen in these figures, business-cycle 
peaks in 1973, 1979, and 1989 were followed by business cycle 
troughs in 1975, 1982, and 1992. While an up ward-sloping line can be 
drawn across median real family income points in either the peak or the 
trough years over this period, this growth was not accomplished 
smoothly. There were periods of rising median income and falling 
unemployment (1975-1979 and 1982-1989) as well as periods of eco 
nomic decline (1973-1975, 1979-1982, and 1989-1992). Under these 
circumstances, a judicious choice of starting and stopping years could 
yield upward, downward, or constant measures of economic well- 
being.
President Clinton's opening paragraph in the 1999 Economic 
Report of the President focused on the growth years of the 1990s busi 
ness cycle 1993 through 1997 and found that every American was 
made better off during the period. However, to capture how Americans 
fared in the 1990s, it is more appropriate to make comparisons over the
Session 3: Chronic Illness and Disability 293
Figure la Median Family Real Income, 1970-1998
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SOURCE: Year 
Economic Report of the President, 1994 (Table B-29) and 1999 
(Table B33).
Figure Ib Civilian Unemployment Rate, 1970-1998
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SOURCE: Economic Report of the President, 1994 (Table B38) and 1999 (Table B35), 
and Current Population Report P60-206.
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entire business cycle, by comparing peak-to-peak or trough-to-trough 
years. Consequently, we will examine how people with and without 
disabilities have fared during the most recent expansion by comparing 
changes in economic well-being between 1989, the peak of the last 
business cycle, and 1998, the most recent year of data and the highest 
year in our data of the 1990s business cycle. 1
We find that while economic expansion since 1992 has improved 
the economic well-being of most working-age people, the gains have 
been much smaller for working-age people with disabilities than for 
the rest of the working-age population. Furthermore, although the 
gains through 1998 have returned the average person with a disability 
to his or her level of economic well-being in the peak year of the 1980s 
business cycle, the incomes of a large fraction of the population with 
disabilities in 1998 remained well below that of their 1989 counter 
parts. Finally, we find that despite a robust economic expansion, men 
and women with disabilities became less involved in the labor market 
and more dependent on public transfers during the 1990s.
DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
We compare the employment, labor earnings, and economic well- 
being of the noninstitutionalized population with and without disabili 
ties over an 11-year period (1987-1998) using data from the March 
Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly survey of a 
nationally representative sample of U.S. households. The annual 
March Demographic Supplement contains detailed questions about 
household composition, employment, and sources of income, making 
it a valuable source of time-series data on the economic well-being of 
the noninstitutionalized United States population. The sample sizes in 
each year are in excess of 55,000 households.
Defining the Sample
Our examination focuses on the experiences of men and women of 
ages 25 to 61. This limited age range avoids confusing reductions in 
work or economic well-being associated with disability, with reduc-
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tions or declines associated with retirement at older ages, or with initial 
transitions in and out of the labor force related to job shopping at 
younger ages. Men and women in the Armed Forces are excluded from 
our analysis.
DEFINING THE POPULATION WITH DISABILITIES
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) defines dis 
ability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being 
regarded as having such an impairment. This definition of disability is 
much broader than the widely accepted measure developed by Nagi 
(1965, 1969,1991).
The Nagi measure, the dominant one in the social science litera 
ture, distinguishes among three states of diminished health. The first 
state describes the existence of a pathology, the presence of a physical 
or mental malfunction and/or the interruption of a normal process. The 
second level, an impairment, combines a pathology with a functional 
requirement a physiological, anatomical, or mental loss or abnormal 
ity that limits a person's capacity and level of function. The final state, 
disability, is then defined as an inability or limitation in performing 
roles and tasks that are socially expected. For men and, increasingly, 
for women of working age, market work is a socially expected role.
What is most controversial about Nagi's definition is the relative 
importance of pathology and environment in determining how a given 
pathology results in an impairment that then leads to a disability. Less 
controversial is the recognition that the definition gives to disability as 
a dynamic process in which the individual pathology and the socioeco- 
nomic environment interact. The Nagi measure of disability is more 
limited than the ADA measure in that it ignores the broader population 
with disabilities that has successfully integrated into society, as well as 
those who are not integrated into employment because of perceptions 
concerning an impairment that does not limit work activity. For a 
broader discussion of the definition of disability in the context of the 
ADA, see Gordon and Groves (2000).
296 Burkhauser, Daly, and Houtenville
AN EMPIRICAL ESTIMATE OF THE WORKING-AGE 
POPULATION WITH DISABILITIES
Neither the Nagi or the ADA conceptualizations of disability are 
fully captured by our data. CPS information on health is self-reported 
and is couched in terms of work limitations. The problems inherent in 
these types of data are well documented (see Parsons 1980, 1982; Baz- 
zoli 1985; Bound 1991). Still, researchers have shown these measures 
to be highly correlated with more objective assessments of health (see 
Bound 1991; Stern 1989). Moreover, as discussed elsewhere 
(Burkhauser and Daly 1996), we believe such data are capable of iden 
tifying people with serious pathologies.
In the CPS, the population with disabilities is defined by a survey 
question that asks, "Does anyone in this household have a health prob 
lem or disability which prevents them from working or which limits 
the kind or amount of work they can do? If yes . . . , Who is that? 
(Anyone else?)" While this single question measure of disability is 
coarser than a measure based on a more detailed set of self-reported 
questions like those in the National Health Interview Survey or on 
actual medical examination, we believe it is a reasonable first approxi 
mation of the population with disabilities.2
Based on this question, we find that the prevalence of self-reported 
disability increased across almost every age, gender, race, and educa 
tion group between 1988 and 1999. 3 Appendix Table A2 reports the 
prevalence of disability in the working-age population (aged 25 
through 61) for 1988 through 1999. In addition to an increase in the 
prevalence of disability, there have been changes in the composition of 
the population over the decade. Appendix Table A3 reports gender, 
age, race, and education group distributions within the populations 
with and without a disability for the year 1988 through 1999. Women, 
those aged 35 to 54, Blacks, Hispanics, and those with more than a 
high school education comprised a greater share of the population with 
disabilities in 1999 than they did in 1989. However, with the exception 
of women, these same categories have grown among those without dis 
abilities. Therefore, it is unlikely that the changes in relative economic 
well-being between those with and without disabilities that we report 
are artifacts of changes in population composition.
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Measuring Economic Well-Being
Although we are primarily concerned with the economic status of 
individuals, we recognize that most people share resources with other 
coresident individuals and have access to income that does not flow 
directly to them (this is particularly important for nonworking 
spouses). Although most researchers agree that the income-sharing 
unit should be broader than the individual, there remains the issue of 
precisely who should be included in it. Some U.S. income distribution 
scholars have defined the unit as encompassing people related by blood 
or marriage who coreside, i.e., the CPS family sharing unit definition 
(see, for example, Karoly and Burtless 1995; Danziger and Gottschalk 
1995). Others use the broader, household-based, common residence 
definition.4
In this study, we use the CPS household sharing unit definition. 
We define household income as the sum of all income received by indi 
viduals residing in a single residence. 5 This is pretax, posttransfer 
income.6' 7 To account for the fact that $500 a week provides a higher 
standard of living for a single-person household than it does for indi 
viduals belonging to larger households, we adjust household income by 
an equivalence factor. Since there is no universally accepted scale, we 
assume an elasticity with respect to household size of 0.5. 8 Because 
we are comparing income across years, we adjust income using the 
CPI-UXI; all income values are in 1998 dollars. Finally, to eliminate 
potential measurement error at the bottom of the distribution and top- 
coding at the top of the distribution, we delete the top and bottom 1 
percent of the given earnings or household income distribution in each 
year. 9 However, when we analyze the percentiles and deciles of the 
distribution of household income, we delete the top and bottom 5 per 
cent.
Measuring Labor Force Activity and Wage Earnings
The analysis focuses on the role that employment and labor earn 
ings play in the economic well-being of men and women with disabili 
ties. Individuals who report that they work at least 52 hours annually 
(at civilian jobs or businesses, including temporary, part-time, or sea 
sonal work) are considered to have been employed in the year. 10
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Annual labor earnings include income from all market sources, includ 
ing primary and secondary jobs and bonus income. Self-employment 
income is excluded from the calculation of labor earnings.
Measuring Government Transfer Receipt
An important component of income for many individuals with dis 
abilities is government-provided transfers. Throughout this chapter, 
transfers are classified in two ways: individually based and disability- 
related (disability benefits), and household-based and of any type or 
form (public transfers). Disability benefits include income from work 
ers' compensation, the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 
veterans' benefits, and Supplemental Security Income. Public transfers 
include all cash benefits not specifically related to health.
HOW THOSE WITH AND WITHOUT DISABILITIES 
FARED IN THE 1990s
As Figure 1 showed, 1989 marked the initial peak and 1992 the 
trough of the 1990s business cycle. While the final peak of the 1990s 
business cycle has not yet been reached, the most recent year of CPS 
income data (1998) is used in Table 1 to compare the economic well- 
being of working age (aged 25 through 61) men and of women with 
and without disabilities and to examine how it changed over the 
period. 11
Both mean and median household-size-adjusted income for our 
four groups fell as the economy moved down from its 1989 business 
peak to the 1992 business cycle trough. Importantly, the households of 
men and women with disabilities experienced a greater percentage 
decline. Likewise, six years of recovery (1993-1998) lifted the mean 
real household-size-adjusted income of all groups. However, for those 
with disabilities, the recovery did not bring the same economic rewards 
observed for the population without disabilities. 12 Mean income for 
men with disabilities rose between 1992 and 1998, but the percentage 
increase was less than that for men without disabilities 7.0 percent 
for men with disabilities compared with 14.3 percent for men without
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Table 1 Mean and Median Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income and 
















































































































SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March 
1990-1999.
Current Population Survey, 
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Force are excluded. In 
our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report having a health 
problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount 
of work they can do.
b Disability status is for the year following the income year. In 1994 there were several 
changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample 
weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 
1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability ques 
tions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the 
population with disabilities either through changes in the sample weights or in the 
way respondents answered disability questions.
c When calculating percentage change, we use the average of the two years as the base.
d All dollar amounts are in 1998 dollars. Income is household size by dividing income 
by the square root of household size. Negative sources of income were converted to 
zero. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household size-adjusted income 
distribution are excluded from the analysis.
e An individual is in poverty if his or her household's income falls below the house 
hold's threshold income, which is determined by the Census Bureau and considers 
household size and composition.
disabilities. Income growth was sufficient to return mean real house 
hold-size-adjusted income for men with disabilities to its 1989 high, 
but just barely, and relative to men without disabilities, the growth in 
household-size-adjusted income between 1989 and 1998 was small. 
The circumstances for women with disabilities were similar. The mean 
real household-size-adjusted income of women with disabilities was 
greater in 1998 than in 1989, but the percentage gain was less than for 
men and women without disabilities.
Looking at the median rather than the mean of household-size- 
adjusted income for our four groups yields a bleaker picture for those 
with disabilities. In 1998, median real household-size-adjusted income 
of men and women with disabilities remained substantially below its 
1989 peak; in contrast, among men and women without disabilities, 
median income was more than 5 percent higher than its 1989 peak. 
Table 1 also contains information on the prevalence of poverty among 
men and women with and without disabilities. The fluctuation in the 
poverty rates across these groups provides further evidence of the 
importance of business cycle effects on economic well-being. The
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peak-to-trough movement at the start of the 1990s increased the preva 
lence of poverty in all groups, but recovery reduced poverty rates back 
to or below their 1989 levels for all but men with disabilities. Poverty 
among men with disabilities continued to rise over the entire period.
Accounting for Declines in Economic Well-Being of 
Working-Age People with Disabilities
In all modern industrial societies, earnings from work is the princi 
pal source of income for working-age people. Business cycles have a 
powerful effect on household economic well-being because they 
greatly impact both employment and labor earnings. Table 2 shows the 
sensitivity of the average employment, rate, average hours of work, and 
average annual labor earnings over the 1990s business cycle for men 
and women, with and without disabilities. 13 The movement from peak 
to trough at the start of the 1990s had its most powerful effect on men, 
especially those with disabilities. They experienced lower average 
employment, and those men who did work had lower average annual 
hours of work and lower average annual earnings.
Recovery returned men without disabilities to near their 1989 peak 
in average employment and above their 1989 peak in mean hours 
worked and mean and median annual earnings. The story is much less 
sanguine for men with disabilities. Not surprisingly, average employ 
ment fell among men with disabilities between 1989 and 1992, but sur 
prisingly, it continued to fall between 1992 and 1998. In 1998, the 
average employment rate for men with disabilities was 34.4 percent, 
well below their trough average employment of 41.6 percent. As a 
result, men with disabilities were less integrated into the labor market 
in 1998 then they were in 1992, the trough year of the recession. For 
those men with disabilities who were employed, average hours of work 
and mean annual earnings also declined significantly between 1989 
and 1992, but then rose as the economy recovered. However, the 
growth in mean earnings and hours was below that experienced by 
working men without disabilities.
In general, women fared better than men during the 1990s. Aver 
age employment, average hours worked, and mean earnings of women 
without disabilities rose between 1989 and 1992 and grew even more 
with the economic recovery. The gains for women with disabilities
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Table 2 Employment Rates, Mean Annual Hours, and Mean Real
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SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 
1990-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Force are excluded In 
our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report having a health 
problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount 
of work they can do.
b Disability status for the year following the income year. In 1994 there were several 
changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample 
weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 
1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability ques 
tions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the 
population with disabilities either through changes in the sample weights or in the 
way respondents answered disability questions.
c When calculating percentage change, we use the average of the two years as the base.
d Include only those who work 52 hours or more and have positive earnings. For mean 
earnings only those with positive earnings are included All dollar amounts are in 
1998 dollars. The bottom and top 1 percent of the earnings distribution are excluded 
from the analysis.
were less pronounced but still surpassed those for men with disabili 
ties. Like their male counterparts, employment for women with dis 
abilities fell throughout the period, but for women with disabilities who 
remained employed, average hours and mean labor earnings grew rap- 
idly.
The dramatic drop in employment of men and women with disabil 
ities, even during the strong recovery period following 1992, provides 
one explanation for the decline in household-size-adjusted income 
shown in Table 1. Although those with disabilities who continued to 
work saw their real earnings increase, only about one-third of the popu 
lation in 1998 was employed.
Table 3 provides a more detailed look at the various sources of 
household income for our four groups and how they changed over the 
1990s business cycle. 14 Mean real household income is divided into 
five components own labor earnings, the labor earnings of other 
household members, own public disability transfers, all other sources 
of public transfers, and all other sources of household income. The 
sum of the means of these five income sources equals mean household 
income. Own labor earnings and the labor earnings of other household 
members are quite sensitive to the 1990s business cycle, falling (except
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Table 3 Mean Real Income from Various Household Income Sources for 
Civilians Aged 25-61, by Gender and Disability Status3
($) Percentage change0
Measure/grousb 1989 1992 1998
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8,029 6,834 6,352 -16.1 -7.3 -23.3
3.6 152 18.7
-2.4 -5.2 -7.5
18,097 17,533 19,884 -3.2 12.6 9.4





172 155 145 -11.0 -6.6 -17.5
2,261 2,628 3,551 15.0 29.9 44.4
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Table 3 (continued)
Measure/group15
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Table 3 (continued)
SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 
1988-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 and people in the Armed Force are 
excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report hav 
ing a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the 
kind or amount of work they can do. All dollar amounts are in 1998 dollars. Nega 
tive sources of income were converted to zero. In addition, the bottom and top 1 per 
cent of the household income distribution are excluded from the analysis. These 
results are not adjusted for household.
b Disability status for the year following the income year. In 1994 there were several 
changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample 
weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 
1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability ques 
tions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the 
population with disabilities either through changes in the sample weights or in the 
way respondents answered disability questions
c When calculating percentage change, we use the average of the two years as the base.
d Public disability transfers include Social Security income, disability-related veteran's 
payments, worker's compensation, Supplemental Security income, and disability 
income from other government sources.
e Other transfers include the public disability transfers of other household members and 
other personal or household public transfers (public assistance and welfare, other 
forms of veteran's payments, unemployment compensation, and government educa 
tion assistance).
for women without disabilities) during the early peak-to-trough years 
and rising for all but those with disabilities thereafter. The labor earn 
ings of other household members uniformly fell peak-to-trough and 
rose thereafter for all but the households of women with disabilities. 
Not surprisingly, own public disability transfers are a negligible 
part of the household income of men and women without disabilities, 
but they are a sizable part of the household income of men and women 
with disabilities. Public disability transfers rose in real terms between 
1989 and 1998 for both men and women with disabilities and offset, in 
part, the decline in their own labor earnings. Among men with disabil 
ities, real mean public disability transfers increased by 13.5 percent 
between 1989 and 1998; for women the increase was even larger, jump 
ing by 44.4 percent during the period. The increase in real public dis-
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ability transfers over the 1990s came primarily from rapid growth in 
the value of SSI and SSDI benefits; in contrast, workers' compensation 
and veterans' benefits fell in real terms over the period. 15 All other 
public transfers rose during the peak-to-trough years but fell with 
recovery. On net, other public transfers rose for both men with and 
without disabilities over the 1990s business cycle, while remaining 
steady or falling for women with and without disabilities.
All other sources of household income fell during the peak-to- 
trough years and rose thereafter for all groups. However, over the 
entire period, these sources fell for men and women with disabilities 
while growing for those without disabilities. Total mean household 
income fell from peak to trough and rose thereafter. Over the entire 
1990s business cycle, total mean household income rose for men and 
women without disabilities and fell for men and women with disabili 
ties. Because we do not adjust for changes in household size in Table 
3, gains in real mean household income are somewhat smaller here 
than when we do adjust for household size in Table 1, since household 
size declined over the period.
Table 4 reinforces the point made in Table 3, namely, that declines 
in labor earnings may explain much of the differences in the fortunes 
of those with and without disabilities over the 1990s. The table shows 
how the shares of the five sources of household income changed over 
the period. Working-age men without disabilities provided 57.0 per 
cent of household income in the business-cycle peak year 1989. This 
fell to 55.1 percent in trough year 1992 but rose to 56.7 percent by 
1998. In contrast, the share of household income provided by the labor 
earnings of men with disabilities fell over the entire period. Their own 
public disability transfer income was the main source of increased 
income for the households of men with disabilities. Again, increases in 
the share of income provided by SSI and SSDI contributed to this rise. 
The share of income provided by SSI nearly doubled between 1989 
and 1998, from 19.5 percent to 29.3 percent, while the share provided 
by SSDI grew, from 46.4 percent to 51.3 percent. 16
Working-age women without disabilities provided an increasing 
share of household income over the entire period. In contrast, the share 
of own labor earnings in the households of women with disabilities 
declined over the period, but by less than that of men with disabilities. 
The largest increase in shares for the households of women with dis-
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Table 4 Share of Various Household Income Sources for Civilians Aged 


























































































































































































SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 
1988-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 and people in the Armed Force are 
excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report hav 
ing a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the 
kind or amount of work they can do. All dollar amounts are in 1998 dollars. Negative 
sources of income were converted to zero In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent 
of the household income distribution are excluded from the analysis. These results 
are not adjusted for household.
b Disability status for the year following the income year. In 1994 there were several 
changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample 
weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 
1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability ques 
tions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the 
population with disabilities either through changes in the sample weights or in the 
way respondents answered disability questions.
c When calculating percentage change, we use the average of the two years as the base.
d Public disability transfers include Social Security income, disability-related veteran's 
payments, worker's compensation, Supplemental Security income, and disability 
income from other government sources.
e Other transfers include the public disability transfers of other household members and 
other personal or household public transfers (public assistance and welfare, other 
forms of veteran's payments, unemployment compensation, and government educa 
tion assistance).
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abilities over the period was in own disability transfers, as was the case 
with men with disabilities.
GAINS IN ECONOMIC WELL-BEING ACROSS 
THE DISTRIBUTION
The measures of the income distribution discussed above are 
designed to summarize an entire distribution with one value. Yet few 
distributions can be completely characterized by one parameter. This 
is particularly true when attempting to describe outcomes for heteroge 
neous populations such as the population of people with disabilities. 
Thus, in the remaining analysis we move away from simple summary 
measures and examine how income, employment, earnings, and public 
transfer receipt has affected the entire distribution of those with disabil 
ities.
Table 1 showed that on average men and women with disabilities 
fared less well then the rest of the population over the 1990s. Figures 
2a and 2b allow us to look within these averages. Figure 2a shows the 
change in real household-size-adjusted income between 1989 and 1998 
by percentile for the households of women of working age, with and 
without disabilities; Figure 2b shows the same for men. 17 Each line 
cuts the horizontal axis at the percentile at which real income in 1998 
equals real income in 1989, i.e., the "crossover point." 18 Values above 
the zero axis mean that persons in that percentile were better off in 
1998 than in 1989; values below the zero axis mean that persons in that 
percentile were worse off in 1998. Thus, this figure provides a quick 
summary of winners and losers across the income distribution over 
peak years in the 1990s business cycle.
By 1998, economic growth had "lifted all boats" among the popu 
lation of working-age men and women without disabilities, moving 
them above their 1992 lows and their 1989 business-cycle peak levels. 
While the gains were not uniform, men and women without disabilities 
at each percentile had more real household-size-adjusted income in 
1998 than they did in 1989. The results for women with disabilities 
(Figure 2a) were much different, with those at the top and the bottom 
of the income distribution gaining and those in the middle losing. By
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Figure 2a Women—Change in Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income, 

















SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 
1990 and 1999.
Figure 2b Men—Change in Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income, 
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1998, the real household-size-adjusted incomes of women with disabil 
ities below the 35th and above the 75th percentiles had surpassed their 
1989 peak levels. Yet, women with disabilities in the middle 40 per 
cent of the distribution had lower real household-size-adjusted incomes 
than their counterparts in 1989.
The results for men with disabilities (Figure 2b) are even gloomier. 
Those men below the 15th percentile stayed approximately at the same 
level of real household-size-adjusted income as their counterparts in 
1989. Those between the 15th and 75th percentiles had less real 
household-size-adjusted income in 1998 than did individuals in equiva 
lent percentiles in 1989. Only men in the top 20 percent of the distri 
bution were better off than their 1989 counterparts. Thus, while by 
1998 the entire distributions of men and women without disabilities 
had moved above their 1989 highs, nearly 40 percent of women with 
disabilities and 80 percent of men with disabilities had been left 
behind. Most surprisingly, most of those left behind during the 1990s 
had household-size-adjusted incomes in the middle, rather than at the 
lower end, of the distribution.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 showed that, on average, men and women with 
disabilities worked less, earned less, and received more public transfers 
during the 1990s expansion than they did in 1989, the peak of the 
1980s business cycle. In Figures 3, 4, and 5, we look behind these 
averages and examine how these patterns differed across the distribu 
tion of people with disabilities. Figures 3 and 4 show employment 
rates and receipt of public transfer rates for men and women with dis 
abilities in 1989 and 1998, by deciles of the household-size-adjusted 
distribution of income. 19 This allows us to examine employment rates 
for individuals with disabilities who were at equivalent deciles of the 
income distribution in 1989 and 1998.
Figure 3b shows that employment rates for men with disabilities 
were lower in 1998 than in 1989 for all but the highest decile of the 
household-size-adjusted income distribution. Not surprisingly, 
employment rates in 1989 and 1998 were lowest for those at the lowest 
deciles of the income distribution. But, consistent with the results in 
Figure 2b, the largest gaps in employment rates between the two years 
occurs in the middle deciles of the income distribution. For example, 
the average employment rate gap in the bottom three deciles was 9.4 
percentage points; in contrast, the average gap in the 4th to 7th decile
Session 3: Chronic Illness and Disability 313
Figure 3a Women with Disabilities—Employment Rates by Decile
of the Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income Distribution, 
1989 and 1998a
Lowest 9 Highest
SOURCE: Authors'calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999. 
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent
of the distribution.
Figure 3b Men with Disabilities—Employment Rates by Decile















SOURCE: Authors'calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1990
and 1999. 
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent
of the distribution.
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Figure 4a Women with Disabilities—Percentage of Individuals whose 
Household Receives Public Transfers, by Decile of the 


















SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999. 
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent of the
distribution.
Figure 4b Men with Disabilities—Percentage of Individuals whose 
Household Receives Public Transfers, by Decile of the 
Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income Distribution, 
1989 and 1998a
SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999. 
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent of the
distribution.
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Figure 5a Women with Disabilities—Differences in Mean Own Earnings 
and Household Transfer Income, by Decile of the Household- 




to 1.000  




SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999. 
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent
of the distribution.
Figure 5b Men with Disabilities—Differences in Mean Own Earnings 
and Household Transfer Income, by Decile of the Household- 




SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999. 
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent of the
distribution.
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was 11.8 percentage points. The results for women with disabilities 
(Figure 3a) are similar. In both years, employment rates are highest at 
higher deciles of the household income distribution. However, as was 
true for men with disabilities, the largest declines in employment 
between 1989 and 1998 the biggest gaps occur in the middle of the 
income distribution.
Figures 4a and 4b repeat this exercise for public transfer receipt, 
defined as the percentage of men and women living in a household 
receiving some type of public benefit. 20 For both men and women, the 
percentage of the decile population receiving public transfers rose in 
all deciles. Again, consistent with the results in Figures 2 and 3, the 
largest increases in benefit receipt came in the middle of the house 
hold-size-adjusted income distribution. Men and women in the bottom 
three deciles were more likely to receive transfers in each year, but the 
difference in the proportion receiving benefits by decile evened out 
substantially during the 1990s.
Figures 3 and 4 showed the proportion of the population of men 
and women with disabilities employed and receiving benefits in 1989 
and 1998. Figure 5 shows how mean labor market earnings and the 
mean value of public benefits changed between these two years, in 
terms of the dollar difference in mean own earnings and mean transfer 
income in 1989 and 1998, by decile of the household-size-adjusted 
income distribution for men and women with disabilities. The results 
in Figure 5 illustrate why the household incomes of those in the middle 
of the distribution (Figure 2) declined between 1989 and 1998. For 
men (Figure 5b) between the 5th and 7th deciles of the household-size- 
adjusted income distribution, the dollar decline in own earnings 
between 1989 and 1998 was larger than the dollar increase in public 
transfers. 21 For men at most other deciles of the household-size- 
adjusted income distribution, gains in public transfers were more than 
sufficient to offset the declines in own earnings and to push the house 
hold income of men at these deciles above that of men at equivalent 
percentiles in 1989. 22 The story is similar for women (Figure 5a). 
Declines in own earnings in the middle of the income distribution were 
only partially offset by increases in the value of public benefits, leaving 
a large fraction of middle-income women with disabilities worse off 
than their counterparts in 1989.
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CONCLUSIONS
We confirm President Clinton's report that strong economic growth 
since the recession of 1992 has lifted the economic well-being of most 
working-age people from the depths at the trough of the 1990s business 
cycle. However, working-age men and women with disabilities fared 
less well than those without disabilities. When one looks over the 
entire 1990s business cycle, the contrast in outcomes between those 
with and without disabilities is even starker. Men and women without 
disabilities gained across the entire income distribution between the 
peak year of the 1980s business cycle, 1989, and the most recent year 
of data for the current expansion, 1998. In contrast, men and women 
with disabilities in the middle of the distribution of household income 
failed to regain the incomes of their counterparts in 1989. While the 
employment and labor earnings of men and women without disabilities 
were quite sensitive to the 1990s business cycle (falling in recession 
and rising with recovery), the employment of men and women with 
disabilities, surprisingly, fell over the entire 1990 business cycle 
(although less so in recovery than in recession). This shocking finding 
explains much of the decline in economic well-being of working-age 
people with disabilities, despite increases in their disability transfer 
income. What is responsible for the decline in the labor market attach 
ment of people with disabilities, over both the economic decline of the 
early 1990s and the longest peacetime economic expansion in our his 
tory, is a major policy puzzle that must be solved before the rewards of 
economic growth are shared by all.
Notes
This research was funded in part by the United States Department of Education, 
National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, cooperative agreement 
No. 13313980038. It does not necessarily reflect the view of the National Institute on 
Disability and Rehabilitation Research or the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
1. Because we have not reached the peak of the 1990s business cycle, our analysis 
will underestimate the net peak-to-peak gams over that cycle. Nonetheless, our 
1989/1992/1998 comparisons describe a relative pattern which is unlikely to be 
greatly altered as additional years of information become available.
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2. It is important to note that self-perception of a disability as captured by this ques 
tion can be influenced by social context. For instance, reports of a work limitation 
may change over time, even holding the underlying health condition constant, 
because access to accommodation may change one's perception of a work limita 
tion over time. See Kirchner (1996) for a fuller discussion of this issue and the 
uses of the CPS to analyze "access-oriented" policies. See the appendix for a 
fuller discussion.
3. As we discuss in the appendix, small changes were made to the CPS question on 
disability in 1994, the year the CPS moved to computer-assisted interviewing. 
Although we do not examine this in our analysis, both the question change and the 
move to computer-assisted interviewing may explain the nearly 1 percentage 
point increase in the prevalence of disability reported in 1994 (Table A2).
4. Atkmson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995) and Burkhauser, Crews, and Daly 
(1997) argued that using the family definition, rather than the less restrictive 
household-based definition, will produce a bleaker picture of the income distribu 
tion because it treats a larger number of individuals as single-person households 
even when they reside and share the benefits of living with others.
5. In the CPS data, income includes all cash income received from private and public 
sources. It does not include noncash or in-kind benefits or the imputed income 
from owner-occupied housing. We convert all negative sources of income to zero.
6. The CPS data do not provide net-of-tax income information. Many income ine 
quality studies do not adjust for taxation (see, for example, Karoly and Burtless 
1995; Danziger and Gottschalk 1995), but it would be useful to do so. We have 
done so elsewhere with other data sets; see, for instance, Burkhauser and Poupore 
(1997).
7 Specifically, household income is the sum of income from labor earnings, self- 
employment, fanning, alimony, dividends, rent, and interest, as well as income 
payments from the Social Security system, unemployment and workers' compen 
sation systems, and state and federal public assistance programs.
8. Others who also use an equivalence scale of this approximate value include 
Karoly and Burtless (1995) and Atkmson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995). 
Equivalence scales contain assumptions about the returns to shared living. Many 
such scales, even complicated ones, can be approximated well by a single-param 
eter scale (see Buhmann et al. 1988). An equivalence scale with an elasticity with 
respect to household size of 1 (the per-capita scale) implies no economies of 
scale. An elasticity of 0 (i.e., with no size adjustments to household income) 
implies that an infinite number of individual can live equally well with a given 
household income as a single person household with that income. See 
Burkhauser, Smeeding, and Merz (1996) for a discussion of the sensitivity of dif 
ferent equivalence scales in cross-national comparisons. The household size elas 
ticity implicit in the U.S. Bureau of the Census poverty scales is approximately 
0.5 (Buhmann et al. 1988). While most poverty studies in the United States use 
this official scale, it has been severely criticized (see, for example, Citro and 
Michael 1995).
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9 Deleting the bottom and the top 1 percent of the household-size-adjusted income 
distribution does not materially affect our results.
10. Annual hours are calculated by multiplying number of weeks worked by average 
hours worked per week
11. For a complete time-series (1987-1998) of mean and median household-size- 
adjusted income for men and women with and without disabilities, see Table A4.
12. Given that we are using cross-sectional data, a natural concern is that we are sim 
ply picking up compositional changes in the population of people with disabili 
ties. To test for this possibility we did a simple shift-share analysis, controlling 
first for changes in age, race, education, and household size and controlling sec 
ond for these demographic variables and changes in employment rates The 
results of this analysis (Table A5) show that if the composition of the population 
with disabilities was the same in 1998 as it was in 1989, the economic outcomes 
for those with disabilities would have been worse than those we report. This sug 
gests that the findings we report are not an artifact of demographic shifts, but 
rather the result of changing economic rewards for the population with disabili 
ties.
13. For a complete time series of employment rates, mean annual hours worked, and 
mean and median annual earnings for men and women with disabilities, see 
Tables A6 and A7.
14. For a complete time series of the shares of these various sources of household 
income, see Table A8.
15. See Table A9 for the complete time series of mean public nondisability and dis 
ability transfers, by program.
16. See Table A10 for the complete time series of shares of public nondisability and 
disability transfers, by program.
17 For each of our four groups, we first estimate real household-size-adjusted income 
for each percentile of our sample in 1998 and compare it to this same variable for 
1989. The difference in their two means is reported in Table 2.
18. For examples using this technique, see Danziger and Gottshalk (1995), Burtless 
(1996a, 1996b), and Burkhauser, Crews, and Daly (1997).
19. The lowest "decile" only contains those in the 6th through 10th percentiles. The 
highest "decile" only contains those in the 96th through 100th percentiles
20. The results for household public transfer receipt are similar to those obtained 
using own public disability transfer receipt.
21. The real value of other sources of income, such as other household earnings, did 
not change significantly for any decile of the household-size-adjusted income dis 
tribution between 1989 and 1998.
22. An exception to this is men with disabilities in the highest decile of the house 
hold-size adjusted income distribution. For these men, large gains in the earnings 
of other household members offset declines in own earnings.
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Appendix
Current Population Survey Data 
and Disability Measurement
Limitations of Using the CPS to Measure 
the Working-Age Population with Disabilities
Although the Current Population Survey (CPS) has extensive economic in 
formation, a number of factors make it less than ideal for examining the popu 
lation with disabilities. First, the CPS does not survey institutionalized 
individuals. Second, all information is reported by a single respondent in the 
household (a "responsible adult"). This person may or may not be the person 
in this household with a disability and hence may not accurately report infor 
mation about that person's disability. Third, the CPS has very limited self-re 
ported information on health. Despite these shortcomings, the consistency of 
the time-series and the coverage of the U.S. population make it a reasonable 
source of information on the economic fluctuations of the population with dis 
abilities.
Changes in CPS Disability Question in 1994
In our chapter, persons are considered to have a disability if they report or 
are reported as having a health problem or disability that prevents them from 
working or limits the kind or amount of work they can do. From 1988 to 1993, 
CPS interviews were conducted by individuals without the help of computer- 
assisted personal or telephone interviewing. Starting in 1994, interviewers 
were prompted with names and possible inconsistencies by computer software. 
As part of this change, the questions we use to define disability,
Does anyone in this household have health problem or disability which 
prevents them from working or which limits the kind or amount of work 
they can do? If yes . .., who is that? (Anyone else?),
were changed to
(Do you/does anyone in this household) have a health problem or disability 
which prevent (you/them) from working or which limits the kind or 
amount of work (you/they) can do? If yes..., who is that? (Anyone else7)
In addition, sample weights based on the 1980 census were replaced with 
sample weights based on the 1990 census. Furthermore, the Monthly Basic 
Survey was revised and three new disability questions were added. It is possi 
ble that these changes affected the measurement of the population with disabil 
ities either through changes in the sample weights or in the way respondents 
answered disability questions.
Session 3: Chronic Illness and Disability 323
Table Al Macroeconomic Indicators of 
the Business Cycle
Real median family 


























































































SOURCE: Economic Report of the President, 1994 
(Tables B-29 and B38) and 1999 (Tables B33 and 
B35), adjusted to 1998 dollars using CPI-U, and 
Current Population Report, P60-206, p. 13.












































































































































































































SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.
a Persons less than age 25 or more than age 61 and people in the Armed Forces are excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have 
a disability if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work 
they can do.
b ln 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample weights based on the 
1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new dis 
ability questions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either 
through changes in the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions
c Spanish ethnicity superceded race; we receded Hispanics to be non-White, non-Black, and non-other race.
d Beginning in survey year 1992, educational attainment questions in the CPS were changed to reflect credentials and degrees rather than 
grades (years) complete.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.
a Persons less than age 25 or more than age 61 and people in the Armed Forces are excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have 
a disability if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work 
they can do. Disability status is for the year following the income year.
b ln 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample weights based on the 
1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new dis 
ability questions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either 
through changes in the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.
c Spanish ethnicity superceded race; we recede Hispanics to be non-White, non-Black, and non-other race
d Beginning in survey year 1992, educational attainment questions in the CPS were changed to reflect credentials and degrees rather than 
grades (years) complete.






































































































































SOURCE: Authors' calculations are based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded In our study, persons are considered to have a disabil 
ity if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work they can 
do. Income is household size by dividing income by the square root of household size. Negative sources of income were converted to 
zero. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household size-adjusted income distribution are excluded from the analysis. Dis 
ability status is for the year following the income year.
b ln 1994 there were several changes in the CPS It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample weights based on the 
1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new dis 
ability questions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either 
through changes in the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.
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Table AS Mean Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income When
Controlling for Changes in Age, Race, Education, Household 
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SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 
1990-1999.
a We controlled for changes in population characteristics by imposing the 1989 propor 
tion in each subpopulation when we calculated the 1998 mean. Those less than age 
25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded. In our study, persons are 
considered to have a disability if they report having a health problem or disability 
which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work they can do.
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Table AS (continued)
b Disability status is for the year following the income year. In 1994 there were several 
changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample 
weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 
1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability ques 
tions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the 
population with disabilities either through changes in the sample weights or in the 
way respondents answered disability questions.
c All dollar amounts are in 1998 dollars. Income is household size by dividing income 
by the square root of household size. Negative sources of income were converted to 
zero. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household size-adjusted income 
distribution are excluded from the analysis.
d When calculating percentage change, we use the average of the two years as the base.
Table A6 Employment Rates and Mean Annual Hours of Civilians Aged 25-61 Who Worked, by Gender and 
Disability Status3 b
Employment ratec (%) Mean annual hours for the employed































































































































SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have a disabih'ty 
if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work they can do. 
Disabih'ty status is for the year following the income year.
b In 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample weights based on the 
1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new dis 
ability questions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either through 
changes in the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.
c Employment is defined as working 52 hours or more annually.
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Table A7 Mean Real Earnings of Civilians Aged 25-61 Who Worked 










































































SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 
1988-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded. In 
our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report having a health 
problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount 
of work they can do. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the earnings distri 
bution are excluded and only those who work 52 hours or more annually with positive 
earnings are included in the analysis. Disability status is for the year following the 
income year.
b ln 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted 
survey interviews. Sample weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with 
sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, 
and three new disability questions were added. It is possible that these changes 
effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either through changes in 
the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.


















































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have a disability 
if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work they can do. 
Negative sources of income were converted to zero. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household income distribution are 
excluded from the analysis.
b Disability status is for the year following the income year. Beginning hi survey year 1994, computer-assisted interview were used, 
which slightly modified the question we use to define disability.
c Public disability transfers include Social Security income, disability-related veteran's payments, worker's compensation, Supplemental 
Security income, and disability income from other government sources.
d Other transfers include the public disability transfers of other household members and other personal or household public transfers (pub 
lic assistance and welfare, other forms of veteran's payments, unemployment compensation, and government education assistance).
Table A9 Mean Public Transfer Real Income from Various Sources for Civilians Aged 25-61, by Gender and 
Disability Status" (1998 $)












































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Force are excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have a disability 
if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work they can do. 
In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household income distribution are excluded from the analysis. These results are not 
adjusted for household. All dollar values are in 1998 dollars. Disability status is for the year following the income year.
b In 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample weights based on the 1980 Cen 
sus were replaced with sample weights based on the 1990 Census The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability questions 
were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either through changes in the sample 
weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.
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Table A10 Shares of Public Transfer Income from Various Sources for
Civilians Aged 25-61 Who Receive Public Transfer Payments, 
by Gender and Disability Status3 (%)
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Table A10 (continued)


























































































































































































calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
(continued)
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Table A10 (continued)
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded. In 
our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report having a health 
problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount 
of work they can do. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household 
income distribution are excluded from the analysis. Disability status is for the year 
following the income year.
b ln 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer assisted 
survey interviews. Sample weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with 
sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, 
and three new disability questions were added. It is possible that these changes 
effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either through changes in 
the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.
Health, Disability, and the
Aging Workforce from the
Employer's Perspective
Bruce G. Flynn 
Watson Wyatt Worldwide
Each year, the Washington Business Group on Health and Watson 
Wyatt Worldwide survey large employers regarding their disability 
management practices. This year's survey collected responses from 
178 large organizations (greater than 1000 employees) representing all 
segments of the economy (finance, manufacturing, high technology, 
etc.)- The survey results indicate that employers have seen their dis 
ability costs level off or even decrease during the last three years, in 
large part due to state workers' compensation reform and a competitive 
insurer marketplace for disability coverage (Figure 1, on p. 352).
However, many attribute a significant portion of the stability of 
short-term disability (STD)/workers' compensation (WC)/long-term 
disability (LTD) costs to the emergence of integrated disability man 
agement programs that seek to control disability costs through early 
identification, medical case management, and early return-to-work 
(RTW) interventions in the workplace. Approximately 43 percent of 
large employers now report having implemented integrated disability 
management (DM) programs (up from 26 percent four years ago). 
Such programs encompass a broad range of activities including safety 
training, case management, transitional work programs, and supervi 
sory training (Figure 2). The effectiveness of these programs is typi 
cally linked to a reduction of disability benefit costs.
The survey further reveals that the most effective disability cost 
containment outcomes are correlated with implementation of multiple 
disability management program activities (Figure 3a, b, c). The inte 
gration of multiple program elements across occupational and non- 
occupational disability programs also resulted in improved disability 
benefit cost control outcomes (Figure 4).
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Despite DM program developments, the strategy of choice for 
many organizations has been and continues to be to actively assist indi 
viduals in obtaining Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) benefits 
(Hunt et al. 1996). Thus, when private sector employers fail to accom 
modate individuals and return them to work, the final solution is one of 
cost-shifting to public disability programs. Although DM and accom 
modation activities by employers have slowed the departure of individ 
uals with disabilities from the workforce, it appears inevitable that 
some portion continue to migrate to public sector disability systems 
(Burkhauser, Butler, and Kirn 1995).
Exploring the connection between the impacts of DM programs 
and their effects on the costs and utilization of public disability benefits 
is the purpose of a research program undertaken by the Rehabilitation 
Research and Training Center (RRTC) on Workplace Supports at Vir 
ginia Commonwealth University in collaboration with WBGH, Watson 
Wyatt, and the UnumProvident insurance company. Current studies 
have documented the migration of workers who develop a work-limit 
ing disability from private to public sources of income replacement, 
referred to as the Progression of Disability Benefits (PODB). In the 
next phase of this research, the rate of PODB on an employer-by- 
employer basis will be compared for employers who have implemented 
DM programs and those without DM programs. It is expected that 
employers with active DM programs will "pass through" fewer dis 
abled employees (from STD and WC to LTD, and on to SSDI) than 
those who do not engage in active disability management.
Still, significant challenges loom as the workforce ages:
  Health care: a shift in the needs of disabled workers from medical 
care for acute injuries and conditions to care for chronic, ongoing 
health problems will challenge the health system to respond with 
effective prevention and disease management services which will 
maintain employees' ability to be productive at work.
  Functional outcomes: the integration of health and disability 
management will increasingly focus on improvement of func 
tional outcomes (not simply clinical outcomes). Development of 
valid and meaningful measures of functional improvement will 
require collaboration between health and disability researchers,
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purchasers, insurers, policy experts, and quality/accreditation 
evaluators.
  Workplace flexibility: accommodation of the restrictions of 
employees with disabilities requires flexible work policies with 
respect to work assignments, work design, and work scheduling. 
Successful disability management efforts with aging workers will 
hinge on the availability of telecommuting, flexible time, and 
work redesign options.
Thus, maintenance of a productive workforce as the average age 
increases will require concerted effort from health care providers, poli- 
cymakers, insurers, and employers to optimally manage chronic condi 
tions, track and respond to disability trends in the workforce, improve 
or maintain functional abilities, and retain or return employees with 
disabilities to work. The following public policy initiatives would sup 
port the efforts of employers to attain these goals:
  An integrated, seamless disability benefit system linking income 
support and return-to-work services regardless of the cause of an 
individual's disability;
  Confidentiality regulations that protect individual medical infor 
mation while assuring that employers and insurers have access to 
the health and disability information needed to improve employee 
and organizational health and productivity;
  Tax incentives for employers who practice effective disability 
management; and
  Safety, health, and disability discrimination regulation which pro 
motes workplace flexibility and rewards efforts of innovative 
employers.
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Figure 3a Effectiveness of Top Four Disability Management Activities in 
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Figure 3c Effectiveness of Top Four Disability Management Activities in 
Decreasing LTD Costs
Transitional/ 
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Center for Medicare Advocacy
Patricia Nemore 
Center for Medicare Advocacy
Ms. Gottlich:
Since my boss is sitting in the back of the room, I have to say that I 
also just joined the Center for Medicare Advocacy. With Alfred Chip- 
lin, who is an Academy Member, and Toby Edelman, who also used to 
be at the National Senior Citizens Law Center, we're establishing the 
Healthcare Rights Project.
Trish and I have decided that we're the tokens in this conference. 
We're the token nonresearchers, nonacademics. We're advocates and 
attorneys, and our comments are going to be based on our clients, who 
are really the real people whom Michele Singletary talked about.
I'm going to be talking about employer-sponsored insurance and 
Medicare. Trish is going to be talking about Medicaid. I can talk real 
fast because I'm from New York.
In terms of employer-sponsored insurance, I wanted to raise three 
issues that are crucial for people with chronic illness and people with 
disabilities. They are the voluntariness of the program, the cost of the 
program, and the lack of recourse available to participants and benefi 
ciaries in employer-sponsored health insurance plans.
We've heard a lot today that the health insurance system is volun 
tary. You can look at the numbers of people who are covered under 
employer-sponsored health insurance as a glass half full or a glass half 
empty. I think of it as a glass half empty. I think that there are a lot of 
people who work for employers that offer health insurance who are 
either not covered by their plan or who can't afford to participate in the 
plan.
But when we talk about voluntariness of the employer-sponsored 
system, it's more than the voluntary nature of offering a plan. It's the 
voluntary design of the plan. Some of the benefit plans are really good, 
as Wally Maher said this morning, and some of the plans are really
355
356 Gottlich and Nemore
awful. And I've had clients say to me I'm not going to enroll in this 
plan because it costs too much and I get nothing out of it. It doesn't 
help me for the kinds of things that I need.
The other issue with voluntariness is the ability of the employer to 
change the health plan whenever the employer wants to with very little 
input from the employee community. We as lawyers are familiar with 
the case, the McGann case and the Owens case in which employers 
decided to terminate coverage for AIDS-related illnesses after benefi 
ciaries filed claims for AIDS-related illnesses.
Employers are also terminating retiree health plans, increasing co- 
payments and deductibles in retiree health plans as a result of new 
accounting standards. And if you look at the statistics, the number of 
people covered by retiree health plans has decreased in the past 10 
years. That leads us to cost. We've already heard about the cost of 
COBRA health care continuation insurance. You need to remember 
that COBRA offers a special benefit for people who have been found 
eligible for Social Security disability, and those individuals can pur 
chase an extension of COBRA from months 19 through 29 until they 
become eligible Medicare. The kicker there is that the premium is 150 
percent of the cost, and that's often unaffordable for a lot of people 
who really need health insurance.
The other issue of cost is the increase in the cost of premiums, 
deductibles, and co-pay. People who used to be able to afford to pur 
chase or buy into or be covered by their employer plans can no longer 
be covered by those plans because of the costs.
The third issue that I've done a lot of work on is recourse, and I'm 
going to give you examples. I cannot tell you the number of clients I 
have seen who are people with chronic illness, who had been covered 
under a plan, a health plan with very good benefits, who are suddenly 
told that they are no longer eligible for those particular benefits or cov 
ered for the services that they need. There's not been a change in the 
health plan. There's not been a change in their health status. There's 
no cap on the benefit. It's just that there is some twitch by the 
employer; maybe they'll claim that something that was skilled services 
is no longer skilled services. That's very frequent.
And the recourse of the individual is to file an appeal. While under 
ERISA you can take legitimately 360 days to complete the appeals pro 
cess. There is no expedited review as there is under Medicare managed
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care or under Medicaid. So for clients who are poor, they can't afford 
to continue paying for the service out of pocket. Their choice is to 
forgo the service, to change their lifestyle; I've had individuals who 
could have been cared for at home and end up going to a nursing home 
or going on Medicaid. I've seen too many people who should be get 
ting benefits under their employer-sponsored plan switch to Medicaid. 
It means the employer is off the hook, but we as taxpayers are paying 
for the benefit.
Medicare does better for people with disabilities. Of the 39 million 
Medicare beneficiaries, 5 million are younger people who are eligible 
because they receive Social Security disability benefits. Karen did a 
good job of explaining why Medicare provides such a good benefit for 
people with disabilities. It's a stable benefit. Once you're eligible for 
Medicare, you're eligible Medicare and the population that we're talk 
ing about generally does not go off Social Security disability benefits, 
so they don't lose their access to Medicare. But Medicare also has 
some problems for people with chronic conditions. The first one is the 
Medicare coverage package. We hear a lot about the issue of prescrip 
tion drugs, and I work on that issue as well as a lot of people in this 
room, but another bigger issue is the lack of coverage for chronic care. 
There are home health benefits. There are limited long-term care bene 
fits. They are not sufficient. There's going to be a roundtable discus 
sion tomorrow morning. I encourage people to go hear that discussion, 
because it's really an important issue for people with disabilities.
The other issue is one that the Alzheimer's Association has been 
working on, which is that routine services that are provided under 
Medicare are pursuant to local medical review policies, not provided to 
people with certain disabilities. So the Alzheimer's Association has 
started to look at several of the local medical review policies and dis 
covered that things like MRIs, routine blood work to determine 
whether or not you have dementia or maybe have a vitamin deficiency, 
or some rehabilitative therapies are not available to somebody with a 
diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease, or dementia, or sometimes multiple 
sclerosis, or Lou Gehrig's disease to certain kinds of chronic ill 
nesses.
The problem with the local medical review policies is that they're 
not made up by HCFA. There is no national review of these policies. 
And, in fact, if you go through the administrative process and you get
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to the administrative law judge, the ALJ is not bound by these policies; 
but they are the first barrier and very few people appeal.
Another issue that affects people with disabilities is the issue of 
medigap coverage. As most of you know, people who are on tradi 
tional Medicare often will buy a medigap policy to supplement their 
Medicare coverage. The Medicare statute guarantees that medigap 
policies will be issued to people who become eligible for Medicare, 
based on age. So if you're 65 and you become eligible for Medicare, 
there's a window in which you are guaranteed to be issued a medigap 
policy regardless of your health condition or your health status. 
There's no such guarantee for people with disabilities. The Depart 
ment of Health and Human Services tried to get that included in the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997. It was not passed. It's a very important 
issue for people with disabilities. The other thing that is interesting is 
that in a lot of states there are no medigap policies available for people 
with disabilities or else the policies that are available are low-rated pol 
icies.
I'm going to conclude with one anecdote. When I was in Tennes 
see, the State Health Insurance Counseling Program told me they'd 
received a phone call from a man who was on Medicare because of dis 
ability. He had previously worked in the State Insurance Office, so he 
was very familiar with the insurance policies. He tried to get a medi 
gap policy. The only policy that was available to him was very costly 
and it was rated D. So he said, I as an insurance commissioner am not 
going to pay a lot of money for a policy that is a worthless policy. It's a 
very important issue.
Ms. Nemore:
Last week, Vicki and I attended the Families USA Health Action 
2000 conference, which, as you might expect, was a little bit different 
in tone from this conference, and we heard in the opening plenary the 
exhortations of Michael Moore, the film maker who produced "Roger 
and Me" and "The Big One," basically exhorting us to take to the 
streets with cameras in hand to document the failings of our health care 
system. And so it's an interesting shift for me to come to your confer 
ence and hear the presentations of researchers who I would hope are 
providing the research base for us to move into public policy stances 
that are consistent with the name of the National Academy for Social
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Insurance. I feel like we haven't heard a lot about the concept of social 
insurance today, and I hope that that topic will continue to emerge in 
the remaining hours of the conference today and tomorrow.
Vicki and I are on the panel as presenting a consumer perspective 
on the issues of health care for people with chronic disabilities; neither 
Vicki nor I are consumers of Medicare or Medicaid, and I think it's 
really important for us all to be aware of that. We are advocates for 
those people, but we are not consumers of those programs. And I sus 
pect if you had consumers of those programs presenting a perspective, 
they would be a lot less polite than I think this forum warrants us to be.
That said, I would like to remind us of some things about the Med 
icaid program and what its role is in coverage of people with chronic 
disabilities, people with disabilities, and generally with the more needy 
segments of our society.
The Medicaid program is a needs-based program, so in order to get 
benefits you have to have low income and resources. It is a program 
based on both categorical and financial eligibility. You have to fit into a 
category. You have to be a child who needs care or the parent of a child 
who needs care under the old AFDC segment, or you have to be a per 
son in the SSI segment who is aged, blind, or disabled. Generally, 
most of Medicaid requires that you fit into one of those two categories, 
and you have to meet the financial income and resource tests.
A good thing about Medicaid is that it does focus resources on the 
people most in need and on people with very high medical expenses. 
Another good thing about Medicaid is that it has a core package of ser 
vices that are required to be provided by all states. There is also in 
Medicaid a whole range of services that are not required to be provided 
by states, that are optional, and I'll get a little bit more into that in a 
minute. That can be a serious problem for people. It's one of the less 
salient features of the program in terms of meeting people's whole 
needs.
It's an entitlement program. If you fit into the categories and you 
fit the financial eligibility, you are entitled to Medicaid. That makes it 
different from CHIP; the new CHIP program for children is not an enti 
tlement, and that makes a big difference. There are issues about how 
we expand public coverage and which direction to go.
A really important aspect of Medicaid that we often hear compared 
with the private health insurance sector is due process rights under
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Medicaid. The review system in Medicaid is really very good. It 
doesn't always work as well as it's supposed to, but what's on paper is 
a constitutional guarantee of due process, due to the Goldberg v. Kelly 
case from 1969 that says people in brutal need have a constitutional 
right to due process, and there is a fair hearing process and review pro 
cess that's really better than what we who have private sector insurance 
have, and it's really better than Medicare. So that's a very good aspect 
of it. And there is a huge body of case law that fleshes out what peo 
ple's rights are in Medicaid, which has some very, very strong positive 
elements of what it means to be entitled to a core package of services.
What does Medicaid do for people with disabilities? The easiest 
route in is receipt of SSI disability. Generally, until our recent move 
into trying to help people back into the labor force, that meant that you 
were not working. So in order to get the SSI coverage, you were a dis 
abled person who was unable to work.
The one category of Medicaid coverage that is an exceptionto the 
"unable to work" norm is called the qualified severely impaired indi 
vidual category. This is for people who were on SSI, were not work 
ing, have gone back into the workforce, and but for their earnings they 
would still be entitled to SSI. So it allows you to disregard all your 
earnings and still get Medicaid coverage. That's required for the states 
to include in their program.
One of the things that is important to remember about Medicaid is 
that there are a lot of categories, and that's a significant drawback to the 
policy. That is something that makes Medicare as a public program far 
more attractive. You get Medicare because you're 65 or you get Medi 
care because you're disabled, period. You don't have to fit into one of 
27 different categories.
There are a couple of required Medicaid categories of SSi-related 
people who might be disabled people who are entitled to Medicare. 
There are also 16 options that states can choose, and that's where some 
of the new work incentives pieces from the last couple of years, have 
come in. There is a buy-in: states can choose to have a buy-in program 
for people with incomes up to 250 percent of poverty. They can 
choose, out of the work incentive package that was passed in this past 
session of the Congress, to cover people between the ages of 16 and 65, 
and the state can set the income and resource levels. That's a very sig 
nificant change from normal Medicaid, because even if you fit into the
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working disabled category where your earnings are disregarded, SSI 
has resource limitations which are very, very strict, and a lot of people 
can't meet those. So under this new option, states can expand, elimi 
nate, do what they want with respect to resources. There is another cat 
egory for states to choose to cover people who have gone back into the 
workforce and are actually found no longer disabled, but who still have 
a severe medical condition, and the state can choose to cover those 
people as well without the income and resource limits.
Again, the problems are that these are state options. States have to 
choose them in order for them to be of any value to people.
The Medicaid program requires states to cover a core package of 
services, which includes in-patient, out-patient, lab, x-ray, doctors' vis 
its, and a couple of other important things that aren't necessarily partic 
ularly relevant for people with disabilities. The things that are most 
necessary probably for a lot of people with disabilities are all state 
options: drugs, prosthetic devices, durable medical equipment, physical 
therapy, other kinds of rehab, private duty nursing, and personal care.
All states provide drug coverage. Most states provide most of 
those other services and supplies, but they are state options. A state 
can choose to pull out of those services without any legal ramifications. 
It can obviously have serious political ramifications and obviously do 
terrible harm to people who need the services, but they can opt out of 
providing those.
There are a number of people with disabilities who get coverage 
under both Medicare and Medicaid, and they don't intersect necessar 
ily very well. Medicaid actually has better home health provisions, 
which can be very important and beneficial to people with disabilities.
One of the pieces of the work incentives legislation that was passed 
this past year was to provide grants for the states to develop an infra 
structure to help people going back to work who are disabled. One of 
the requirements for a state to get that grant is that it makes personal 
care services available to people in the workforce. This is a tremen 
dously important benefit and could be very valuable to people.
That is a brief overview of what Medicaid offers. Medicaid is so 
complex, and the access to the program through the process of apply 
ing and showing how much income you have and how many resources 
you have and providing all that verification is an enormous barrier to 
people. We've heard over and over again, "I don't want the govern-
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ment messing in my business." "I don't want to have to show that." 
That's a huge difference between Medicare and Medicaid. To get 
Medicare, you just show you're disabled or over 65, and you're entitled 
to Medicare based on your earnings. And that is one of the most seri 




These papers address the topic of chronic illness, disability, and 
related policy issues for an aging workforce. Biddle, Boden, and 
Reville ask about the adequacy of workers' compensation benefits for 
those with long-term or permanent disabilities; Burkhauser, Daly, and 
Houtenville ask how well the disabled have fared in terms of work and 
income over the last business cycle; Gottlich and Nemore provide a 
primer on obtaining health care insurance coverage.
What might we like to know about the circumstances that led to 
these papers? Here are a few pertinent questions.
1) How well do our insurance/protection systems perform for older 
workers who develop chronic illness or suffer an accident that 
leads to a disability with long-term consequences? Can we learn 
something from alternative approaches among the states that can 
guide us in better designing workers' compensation? How well 
do our other programs that provide benefits to the long-term dis 
abled perform as a safety net?
2) Overall, how well are the disabled doing, and how has this 
changed in the last decade? Are the disabled gaining in this 
booming labor market? How are they doing in terms of earn 
ings? Are they doing as well as other groups; if so, which 
groups? How hard were they hit in the last recession and what 
might this suggest for the future when macroeconomic condi 
tions change? How well do transfers do in maintaining the 
income of persons with disabilities and the families in which 
they live?
3) Do persons with disabilities have access to comprehensive health 
insurance? If working, what are their rights to employer-pro 
vided coverage? To individual insurance? What role does the 
public sector play in terms of direct provision, helping gain pri 
vate coverage? If persons with disabilities were to regain or
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improve health, what is their access to coverage? Does the "sys 
tem" inhibit the return to work of disabled individuals? What are 
the recent changes designed to minimize this negative incentive 
to return to work?
4) And, finally, we would like to derive a sense of how well the dis 
abled are doing overall in earnings, income, total compensa 
tion, and health insurance coverage. How are they faring 
compared with how they would have been expected to fare if not 
disabled? How well are they faring in terms of avoiding poverty?
Addressing these issues is clearly a tall order; however, I am going 
to use this framework to think about these papers. I discuss them in the 
order they were presented.
BIDDLE, BODEN, AND REVILLE
The first paper, by Biddle, Boden, and Reville, analyzes the experi 
ence of three states with regard to the replacement of earnings by 
workers' compensation. It is an interesting presentation of those poli 
cies, including the schedule in each of the three states and the philoso 
phy underlying these approaches. Learning about replacement of lost 
earnings is more difficult in the case of workers' compensation, 
because there are continuing earnings in most cases, in contrast with 
the traditional income replacement programs such as Social Security 
(SSDI). The calculation when individuals have earnings is much more 
complicated than when they do not.
The authors calculate a unique replacement rate: replacement of 
earnings that the individual would have expected to receive if not 
injured. This way of asking the question poses a technical or econo 
metric difficulty: how to know the correct counterfactual, or what the 
person would have earned if not injured. The authors use different 
approaches in each state; the biggest difference is between California 
and the other two states. (It would be preferable if the authors could 
use a similar approach, but it is not clear whether this is possible given 
data constraints.)
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The Comparison Groups for the Counterfactual 
Are Troublesome
Why use individuals who had "some accident"? Is this the appro 
priate counterfactual? Why use individuals in the same firm, since this 
leads to very small sample sizes and many firms have very heteroge 
neous workers? What do they do with individuals who work in smaller 
firms where there are few similar employees? I'd prefer to see the 
authors use employees of the same occupation, age, gender, and indus 
try to develop the counterfactuals. This should be feasible among 
states.
Methodology
Using fixed effects may overcorrect for factors that directly influ 
ence earnings. They want to correct for unobserved factors such as 
motivation, drive, etc., but they also correct for young children at home 
(which changes over time) and for on-the-job training, which also 
changes over time.
Discount Rate
The rate they use, 2.3 percent, is rather low; they should test for 
sensitivity.
Results
Perhaps most interesting is the relative success of a two-tiered sys 
tem, such as that of Wisconsin, where payments are better targeted on 
those with the greatest need. Thus, the comparison using quintiles pro 
vides insight on the relative success of these alternative workers' com 
pensation programs. This is a system that uses a functional impairment 
benefit along with an earnings capacity benefit, and the advantage of 
this, at least as indicated by the results, appears to be that they can tar 
get payments to individuals who do not return to work or are rehired at 
a much lower proportion of their former wage.
The comparison among states also suggests that there is a trade-off 
between the percentage of awards that provide cash for permanent dis 
ability and the replacement rate (which is not surprising). Unfortu-
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nately, since the statistical match and dates differ somewhat among 
states, the paper cannot fully eliminate the role of state differences in 
comparing the states.
BURKHAUSER, DALY, AND HOUTENVILLE
I turn next to the paper by Burkhauser, Daly, and Houtenville, who 
address an interesting question: how well have disabled persons and 
their families fared in this labor market during an economic boom? 
They cover two aspects: how persons with disabilities fare in the labor 
market, and the probability of application to, and the resulting leniency 
and generosity of, transfers to persons with disabilities.
During a labor market expansion, especially a sustained one, we 
would expect a decline in unemployment among all groups, including 
those with disabilities. We expect opportunities to substantially 
increase for most persons and, given a sustained increase, to improve 
for those with the poorest labor market opportunities, including the dis 
abled.
We also expect that with welfare reform (TANF) there will be 
some increase (shift over) of claims for SSDI and SSL A recent Lewin 
report (1999) tracks some of this, and we know that there has been a 
considerable expansion of the earned income tax credit (EITC), 
designed to make work pay for lower-income workers with children. 
We don't know a great deal about health coverage of this population, 
although we do know that insurance coverage is down for adults, espe 
cially those with health difficulties (and there may be associated incen 
tives concerning working).
Approach
The authors use annual CPS data. The key identification issue is 
who is disabled, which they base on a general question on disability: 
whether the respondent is limited in ability to work or kind and amount 
of work. This is a very general question, as the authors recognize. The 
years covered in the analysis are 1988-1999. This is undoubtedly the 
best data source, but the disability measure is limited, and there are sig-
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nificant underreporting issues, especially of income from transfers that 
have increased over time. 1
The authors first examine the pattern of disability, finding an 
increase through 1994 and then a decline, as we would expect. One 
can see in particular a decline in the number of young people with 
reported disabilities, such that mean age is up over the period. In addi 
tion, there appear to be more females with disabilities; and in terms of 
education, high school graduates show the biggest increase. Overall, 
the pattern of demographic changes might lead one to expect a decline 
in earnings and earnings-related transfers. (On average, females earn 
75 percent on the dollar.) This would be the case without a change in 
the macroeconomy, simply focusing on demographic characteristics.
Minor Issues
Why use a 0.5 equivalence scale? There is at least some increasing 
agreement that it is preferable to use two- and three-parameter scales 
for the poverty measure, as they better incorporate economies of scale. 
I would like to see a sensitivity test using alternative scales.
Studies of income distribution are heavily affected by the different 
procedures that researchers choose to measure inequality. A major 
issue is to assess the direction and the extent of the change in inequality 
when different adjustments for household size and composition are 
allowed. For example, Coulter, Cowell, and Jenkins (1992) found that 
when the value of e was increased from zero to 1, inequality first 
decreases and then increases, forming a U- shape. They explained the 
theoretical relationship between equivalence scales and inequality: the 
well-being (W,) of an individual is a function of four different vari 
ables: total household income (//), household size (5), elasticity of 
scale (e), and household characteristics (r\):
An example of a two-parameter scale is that for OECD: 
HW =
1 + 0.7(A-1) + 0.5C
368 Wolfe
where A are adults and C are children. So, there is an issue with regard 
to the relatively arbitrary value of an equivalence scale utilized.
There is an issue regarding the sample as well: Why call someone 
with 1 hour of work per week a member of the labor force? What 
would happen if they looked only at those who work a minimum of 20 
hours per week for at least half of a year? The authors might perform a 
sensitivity analysis to see how sensitive the results are to this broad 
definition.
Bigger concerns include the EITC, other noncash forms of com 
pensation, and a change in underreporting. The EITC was greatly 
expanded over this time period, which is most important for those with 
low earnings and with children. While it is not clear how important 
this issue is to this population, it seems clear that omitting the EITC 
leads to an understatement of income. There is systematic underreport 
ing, but it is not consistent across types of income. Most recently there 
has been a big shift concerning transfers: a large decline in reporting 
relative to administrative totals, so underreporting is likely to add to the 
decline in reported (but not in actual) income. This problem has grown 
worse in recent years. For example, Douglas Besharov (1999) has 
stated that
assertions about declines in Medicaid coverage are often based on 
analyses of the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey 
(CPS), the government's primary data source for measuring 
employment, earnings, poverty, welfare receipt, and a range of 
other important outcomes. Unfortunately, the survey appears to 
miss about one-third of AFDC/TANF, food stamp, and Medicaid 
recipients. Perhaps even more important, this problem has been 
getting^worse in recent years, a deterioration that has important 
implications for judging the impact of welfare reform.
According to the CPS, between 1993 and 1997 the number of chil 
dren under 15 enrolled in Medicaid declined by 3.2 million. But reli 
able administrative data from the Health Care Financing Admin 
istration (HCFA) show an increase of 400,000. For the period 1995- 
1997, HCFA data also show a decline of 700,000 children, but the CPS 
shows a much larger decline of 1.7 million. These kinds of discrepan 
cies document the importance of underreporting.
Another issue concerns the measurement of income. Is the mea 
sure reported the one that the analysts should be interested in, or is it a
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fuller measure of disposable income and close substitutes? If the latter, 
then there are two questions: 1) whether and how to value noncash 
income, such as health insurance and, for those of low income, food 
stamps; and 2) how to measure disposable income rather than gross 
income (subtract taxes).
Noncash income to U.S. families has grown substantially in the 
past 25 years. In the 1980s, over half of government transfer spending 
for the poor was in the form of noncash benefits, according to the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census. This growth of benefits to the poor has been 
paralleled by a growth of nonwage compensation to wage earners, 
induced in part by tax laws exempting such compensation from income 
and payroll taxes. By 1990, employer costs for nonwage compensation 
had grown to over one-quarter (27.6 percent) of total compensation 
costs, up from 19.4 percent in 1966. By excluding this form of income 
and its distribution, the story is incomplete.
To conclude, it may well be true that persons with disabilities have 
not done as well, and this clearly seems to be the case for earnings. 
The authors might improve this study if they included an imputed value 
for EITC; conducted a Oaxaca decomposition to see how much is 
change in characteristics (more women, older); tested for sensitivity to 
equivalence scale used; and adjusted for underreporting following Cen 
sus Bureau methodology. Finally, there is a puzzle regarding applica 
tions for benefits. A recent Lewin study (1999) found a sharp decline 
in SSI applications after 1993. While these are not strictly comparable, 
the big difference is surprising.
The pattern that the authors find, however the largest declines in 
employment in middle-income groups, far bigger increases in dollars 
of SSDI awarded to women, and lower income among women and men 
in the middle-income group compared to 1989 levels seems unex 
pected and surely worthy of further exploration to try to understand 




The final paper, by Gottlich and Nemore, is a useful guide for any 
one interested in learning how to obtain benefits under three different 
sets of programs (private, Medicaid, or Medicare), taken one at a time. 
This is very useful to someone who wants to know the options for cov 
erage. For researchers and policymakers, it might be more useful to 
draw them together to obtain a picture of the probability that older per 
sons with disabilities could obtain private, social security, or public 
health insurance (Medicaid or Medicare) coverage. And, the authors 
could usefully add a discussion of the issue of returning to work; that 
is, if a person has coverage through one system, such as Medicare, and 
wishes to return to the work force, what are the options and probabili 
ties of private coverage? Finally, it would be very helpful to have some 
sense of adequacy of coverage; that is, are these folks at high risk of 
lacking coverage? Of lacking coverage for some required care? Are 
high deductibles or high required co-pays an issue that needs to be con 
sidered? If these are policy problems, it would be a welcome addition 
if the authors would make suggestions for obtaining and improving 
coverage.
Other questions could be asked. Is ERISA a problem in terms of 
persons with disabilities obtaining coverage, or does it help? Are there 
antidiscrimination laws that might aid this population under ERISA? 
Is an individual with a specific medical condition who is returning to 
work more likely to be covered with a firm under ERISA or under state 
law? (And does the answer differ by state?) Are there likely to be 
labor market consequences if there is increased regulation on the provi 
sion of coverage? There is an issue that links this paper to the others, 
and here I quote from Daniel Weinberg (1995):
Of key concern to understanding well-being is the valuation of 
medical benefits, both the government health programs Medi 
care (medical aid to the elderly) and Medicaid (medical aid to the 
poor) and employer-provided health insurance. The valuation of 
medical benefits is particularly difficult, because coverage of high 
medical expenses for someone who is sick does nothing to 
improve his or her poverty status (although the benefits clearly 
make him or her better off). Even if one imputes the value of an 
equivalent insurance policy to program participants, these benefits
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(high in market value due to large medical costs for the fraction 
who do get sick) cannot be used by the recipients to meet other 
needs of daily living. However, not having coverage clearly 
detracts from economic well-being and possibly health itself.
The bottom line of this message is that we need to incorporate the 
value of coverage (or lack of it) in order to get a more comprehensive 
view of the well-being of persons with disabilities over time, across 
characteristics, and in comparison with persons who are not disabled.
OVERVIEW ISSUES
Is the best way to learn about the success of a program to address 
the replacement rate? I would like to see more on dollar value of bene 
fits. I would like to have the authors address the role of workers' com 
pensation in reducing or eliminating poverty, an income concept like 
net income of individual and family. What is presented is earnings loss 
and replacement of lost earnings, a valid measure of economic well- 
being, nonetheless.
As in the Burkhauser paper, I would like a full measure of income, 
including EITC, taxes, and other disability-related transfer programs 
benefits such as SSDI and SSI, to see what has happened to income and 
to poverty rates over this time period. How are those worst off among 
the disabled who receive workers' compensation faring?
To conclude my comments, these three studies bring readers a 
sense of the economic well-being and access to health care of persons 
with disabilities. At some level the papers all critique the others: earn 
ings and income as defined in the Burkhauser study does not include 
the value or even the-presence of health insurance, which is clearly 
very important for this population. Workers' compensation is only one 
part of income. We would like to know more about its role and interac 
tion with other transfers and with earnings. The studies are also linked 
in trying to answer an additional question: "Does the potential for high 
medical expenditures influence future earnings opportunities?"
Ultimately these studies are purely descriptive. They do not ask 
whether a change in one program, such as health care coverage, would 
influence such choices as whether or not to work and number of hours,
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nor whether better labor market opportunities change the generosity of 
workers' compensation. The studies all add to our knowledge of the 
situation of persons with disabilities with regard to income and access 
to health care coverage, but our picture is still incomplete. In the 
future, we would like to add to the picture painted by Burkhauser, 
Daly, and Houtenville the presence and value of health care coverage 
and workers' compensation benefits (though they may be included), to 
adjust for underreporting of various sources of income, and take 
account how these change with the state of the economy, with the 
workers' compensation policy of the state, and state and ERISA laws 
regarding health insurance coverage.
Note
1. According to the Census Bureau, ". . . for many different reasons, there is a ten 
dency in household surveys for respondents to underreport their income. From an 
analysis of independently derived income estimates, it has been determined that 
income earned from wages or salaries is much better reported than other sources 
of income and is nearly equal to independent estimates of aggregate earnings" 
(Coder and Scoon-Rogers 1996).
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Retirement Trends and Policies
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The United States and other industrial nations face key challenges 
associated with a graying population. Depressed birth rates and rising 
longevity have increased the dependency ratio throughout the industri 
alized world. Population projections of the Social Security Trustees 
suggest the U.S. aged-dependency ratio the ratio of Americans older 
than 64 to Americans aged 20 to 64—will increase almost 70 percent 
between 2000 and 2030. The increase will be even larger in some 
other rich countries. As the U.S. population grows older, the cost of 
paying for pension and health benefits must rise, boosting tax burdens 
and impairing the nation's ability to pay for other government obliga 
tions. The burden imposed by an aging population would rise more 
gradually if workers could be persuaded to delay their retirements and 
continue contributing to the health and pension systems.
In this chapter, we consider long-term trends in retirement, as well 
as recent trends that signal at least a pause in the historical pattern of 
earlier withdrawal from the workforce. We also discuss public policies 
that might reinforce the very recent trend toward greater labor force 
participation among older workers.
RETIREMENT TRENDS
At the beginning of the last century, retirement was relatively 
uncommon but not unknown. Two out of three American men past age 
65 were employed, but one-third were not (U.S. Department of Com 
merce 1975, p. 132).' By middle of the twentieth century, retirement
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was far more common. Fewer than half of men 65 and older held a job 
in 1950. By 1985, the proportion at work fell still further. Just 16 per 
cent of men over 65 were employed or actively seeking a job; 84 per 
cent were outside the active labor force. The percentage of women 
past 65 who were employed or looking for work also shrank during the 
first four decades after World War II, though this was mainly because 
the average age of women past 65 was rising. The reduction in 
women's employment was far smaller than among men in part because 
the percentage of older women who worked outside the home was 
quite low in the 1940s.
The decline in labor force participation at older ages has not been 
confined to the United States. It is characteristic of all rich industrial 
ized countries. In most European countries, employment rates among 
the elderly are now significantly below those in the United States 
(Quinn and Burkhauser 1994). Along with a shrinking work week and 
rising paid employment among married women, earlier retirement 
among men has been a distinctive feature of economic progress in all 
the developed countries.
Trends in the United States
The pattern of declining work among older men is clearly evident 
in Figure 1. Each line in the figure traces the labor force participation 
rate of older American men, by age, in a different year of the past cen 
tury.2 (A person is considered to be a labor force participant if he or 
she holds a job or is actively seeking work.) The top line shows age- 
specific participation rates of older men in 1910. Note that there is a 
clear pattern of labor market withdrawal with advancing age. Even at 
age 72, however, the male participation rate in 1910 was over 50 per 
cent. Participation rates in 1940, 1970,1984-1985, and 1998-1999 are 
displayed in the lower four lines. Each of these lines shows a charac 
teristic pattern of labor market withdrawal as men grow older. The cru 
cial difference between 1910 and later years is that the fall-off in labor 
force participation begins at an earlier age and proceeds at a faster 
pace.
The decline in male participation was neither smooth nor uniform 
over the century. By far the largest proportionate declines in participa-
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tion occurred among men past the age of 65. In 1998-1999, for exam 
ple, the participation rate among 72-year-olds was only one-quarter of 
the equivalent rate in 1910. The fall-off in participation was smaller at 
younger ages. In general, large declines in participation occurred in 
the early and middle parts of the century for the oldest age groups; 
major declines occurred after 1960 among younger men. The largest 
percentage declines among men older than 70 occurred between 1910 
and 1940. The fastest declines among 65- to 69-year-olds took place 
between 1940 and 1970. The biggest declines among men under 65 
did not occur until after 1960, after the earliest age of eligibility for 
Social Security benefits was reduced to 62. A striking feature of Figure 
1 is that there has been no decline in older men's participation rates 
since the mid 1980s. After a long period of decline, the participation 
rates of older men stabilized or even increased slightly after 1985.
The story for older American women is different. Older women's 
participation rates in the post-World War II era have reflected two par 
tially offsetting phenomena: the early retirement trend of older workers
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in general and the increasing labor force participation of married 
women. As a result of the latter, the participation rates of older women 
did not exhibit the dramatic postwar declines seen among men. 
Instead, as shown in lower panel of Table 1, age-specific labor force 
participation rates generally increased among women. Between 1950 
and 1998-1999, the female participation rate rose 39 percentage points 
at age 55, 26 points at age 60, 8 points at age 65, and 7 points at age 70. 
What is similar to the male experience is the shift in trends after 
1985. As with men, there is a noticeable break from the earlier trend in 
older women's labor force participation. Between 1970 and 1985, 
older women's labor force participation rate barely increased at all, and 
it even declined among people past age 62. In contrast, female partici 
pation rates surged in the 15 years after 1985. Figure 2 shows the 
annual percentage-point change in participation at selected ages in the
Table 1 Labor Force Participation Rates at Selected Ages by Sex, 
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Session 4: Is Working Longer and Retiring Later Possible? 379
Figure 2 Annual Change in Labor Force Participation Rate at Selected 





SOURCE: Authors' tabulations based on Munnell (1977), p. 70, and March Current 
Population Survey files for 1984, 1985, 1998, and 1999.
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two different periods. The top panel shows trends in the participation 
rate of older men, and the lower panel shows trends at the same five 
ages for women. At age 62, the male participation rate fell 1.5 percent 
age points a year from 1970 to 1985. The rate among 62-year-old 
women declined 0.2 points a year over the same period. Between 1985 
and 1999, the male participation rate at age 62 rose 0.3 percentage 
points per year; the female rate increased 0.7 points per year. At each 
age, the rate of increase in participation rates accelerated, the rate of 
decline in participation rates shrank, or a decline in participation rates 
was reversed. The similarity of the break points in the male and female 
time series is striking (Quinn 1999b). Women's participation rates at 
older ages have risen strongly over the past 15 years, while among 
older men, the long-term decline in participation rates has ended and 
may even have reversed.
Historical information about participation rates can be used to 
trace out the long-term trend in retirement. Figure 3 shows the trend in 
the "average" male retirement age if we define that age as the youngest
Figure 3 Average Retirement Age of American Men, 1910-1999
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SOURCE: Authors' tabulations of data in Ransom, Sutch, and Wllliamson (1991) and 
Munnell (1977) and in March Current Population Survey files for 1963-1999.
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age at which fewer than half the men in the age group remain in the 
workforce. Under this definition, the average male retirement age fell 
from 74 years in 1910 to 63 years in 1998-1999, a drop of about 1.2 
years per decade. The tabulations in Figure 3 also indicate, however, 
that the trend toward earlier male retirement has recently slowed and 
may even have ceased.
The decline in the average retirement age has occurred in an envi 
ronment of rising life expectancy among older Americans, especially in 
the period since 1940. Falling mortality rates among the elderly added 
almost four years to the expected life span of a 65-year-old man and 
more than 5.5 years to the life expectancy of a 65-year-old woman after 
1940. Since expected male life spans increased about 0.8 years per 
decade during a period in which the retirement age dropped 1.2 years 
per decade, the amount of the male life span devoted to retirement 
climbed about 2 years per decade, adding almost 12 years to the 
amount of time men spend in retirement. Retirement now represents a 
substantial fraction of a typical worker's life. For many workers, 
retirement will last longer than the period from birth until full-time 
entry into the job market.
Trends in Other Rich Countries
The long-term trend toward earlier retirement in the United States 
has been matched and usually surpassed by equivalent trends in 
other rich countries. In a recent survey of the determinants of retire 
ment in rich countries, OECD economists produced estimates of the 
average retirement age in 24 high-income nations (Blbndal and Scar- 
petta 1998). They estimated the average age at which men and women 
withdrew from the active workforce for selected years between 1950 
and 1995. Their estimates show that the average retirement age has 
declined in nearly all of the countries since 1950. In 1950, the average 
retirement age for men was 65 or higher in almost all the 24 countries. 
By 1995, the male retirement age had fallen everywhere except Ice 
land. In most countries, the drop in the average retirement age was at 
least three years. In a quarter of the countries, an average male now 
leaves the workforce before attaining age 60. The drop in the average 
retirement age of women has been even faster.
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As one of the richest OECD countries, the United States might be 
expected to have one of the lowest retirement ages. Instead, it has one 
of the highest. In 1950, its average retirement age placed the United 
States in the middle of the 24 countries surveyed by the OECD. By 
1995, it had one of the oldest retirement ages. Only four out of the 24 
countries had a higher male retirement age (Iceland, Japan, Norway, 
and Switzerland) and only five had a higher female retirement age (Ice 
land, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Turkey). Figure 4 shows the 1960- 
1995 trend in average retirement ages in the seven largest OECD econ 
omies, separately for men and women. In all seven countries, women 
retire at a younger age than men. (The male/female gap in retirement 
ages averaged 2.5 years in 1995.) In all seven countries, the average 
retirement age of both men and women has fallen over time; but, the 
decline has been smaller in the United States, and especially in Japan, 
than in the other five countries.
Some of the recent divergence in retirement trends is due to differ 
ences in the state of the overall job market. The United States and 
Japan maintained much lower unemployment rates than the other five 
countries through most of the 1990s. The tighter labor markets in those 
two countries probably encouraged older workers to remain employed 
longer than they would have if the unemployment rate approached 
European levels. It is also likely, however, that cross-country differ 
ences in old-age and disability pensions, unemployment benefits, and 
health insurance coverage played important roles in keeping older 
American and Japanese workers in the labor force (Gruber and Wise 
1999).
The retirement-age trends displayed in Figure 4 obviously have 
different implications for a nation depending on whether its working- 
age population is growing or shrinking. The extra burden implied by 
an earlier retirement age is easier to bear if the working-age population 
is expanding rapidly, either as a result of natural population increase or 
immigration. In this respect, Canada and the United States enjoy a sig 
nificant advantage over the other five countries. High immigration and 
moderate fertility rates ensure substantial labor force growth in North 
America over the next few decades, even if U.S. and Canadian retire 
ment ages should continue to fall. Germany, Italy, and Japan face 
much less favorable prospects; fertility in all three countries is 
extremely low, and immigration into Japan is negligible. The three
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Figure 4 Estimates of the Average Age of Transition out of Active 
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countries face a future in which their active working populations will 
decline, even if the average retirement age remains unchanged (Bos- 
worth and Burtless 1998). If the average age at retirement continues to 
decline, these countries will face even heavier burdens in supporting 
their growing elderly populations.
EXPLAINING THE TRENDS
Research by economists and others has shed valuable light on the 
evolution of retirement in the United States. Most of the early research 
on American retirement trends was conducted by analysts in the Social 
Security Administration using survey information from retired workers 
receiving Social Security benefits or workers who had recently retired 
(Quinn et al. 1990, pp. 43-53; Quinn 1991, pp. 119-123). In the earli 
est surveys of new retirees, an overwhelming majority of male respon 
dents said they retired because they were laid off by their last employer 
or were in such poor health that further work was unappealing or 
impossible. In the 1940s and early 1950s, fewer than 5 percent of new 
retirees reported leaving work because of a wish to retire or enjoy more 
leisure; about 90 percent left because of poor health or a layoff. These 
explanations for retirement dominated survey responses and the 
research literature from the 1940s through the early 1970s. Only a 
very small percentage of retired men reported leaving work because 
they wanted to retire. An early analyst suggested that "most old people 
work as long as they can and retire only because they are forced to do 
so ... [O]nly a small proportion of old people leave the labor market 
for good unless they have to" (Quinn 1991, p. 120).
In recent surveys of new Social Security beneficiaries, a larger per 
centage of pensioners reports leaving work because of a desire to enjoy 
additional leisure or to retire. By the early 1980s, the desire to leave 
work explained nearly half of all retirements among men 65 or older, 
while poor health accounted for only a little over 20 percent and invol 
untary layoff about 15 percent of retirements. The proportion of work 
ers who say they have retired for purely voluntary reasons is plainly on 
the increase.
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Many people will accept these responses at face value, but there 
are reasons to be skeptical of the story they tell. From 1940 through 
the early 1970s, well over a third of respondents explained their entry 
into retirement as the result of involuntary job loss. While this expla 
nation might seem plausible, labor economists recognize that millions 
of workers lose their jobs each year without choosing to retire. The 
overwhelming majority of workers who state that job loss was the rea 
son for their retirement lost several jobs earlier in their careers, but on 
no previous occasion did their layoffs cause them to permanently exit 
the labor force. When forced into unemployment at younger ages, 
these same workers looked for another job and eventually found one. 
It is natural to ask why job loss pushed them into retirement on this one 
occasion but not on the others.
Even the explanation of "poor health" should be treated with cau 
tion. Social Security beneficiaries may account for their retirement 
with the explanation that bad health left them no alternative, but it 
seems reasonable to ask whether their decision to retire would have 
been different if Social Security or other pensions were unavailable. In 
the early postwar era, some retirees may have explained their employ 
ment status in terms of job loss or bad health because the desire for 
more leisure was not yet considered an acceptable reason to be without 
a job. As retirement has come to be considered a normal and even 
desirable part of life, workers may feel less reason to describe their job- 
lessness as involuntary.
Wealth, Health, and the Physical Demands of Work
However we interpret the survey responses of people who collect 
pensions, it should be plain the long-term trend toward earlier male 
retirement has had an important voluntary component. The trend in 
survey responses suggests this is true, and a growing body of research 
evidence also supports the conclusion. The simplest and probably 
most powerful explanation for earlier retirement is rising wealth. The 
United States and other industrialized countries have grown richer over 
time. Real per capita GDP in the United States has more than doubled 
since 1960, increasing about 2 percent a year. Some of this increased 
wealth has been used to purchase more leisure. Americans stay in
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school longer than they once did, enter the workforce later, work fewer 
hours per year, and leave the labor force earlier.
For many of today's retired workers, the increases in wealth flow 
ing from greater national prosperity have been augmented by windfall 
gains from two sources: higher prices for the houses they own and gen 
erous benefits from Social Security and Medicare. Because the Social 
Security system has historically been very generous, most generations 
retiring up to the present have received larger pensions than their con 
tributions alone could have paid for if the contributions had been 
invested in safe assets. Workers who retired under Social Security 
before the mid 1980s received pensions well in excess of the benefits 
they would have received if Social Security offered normal returns on 
their contributions (Leimer 1994; Geanakopolos, Mitchell, and Zeldes 
1998). Retired Americans continue to receive Medicare benefits that 
are vastly larger than those that could be financed solely out of their 
contributions and the interest earnings on those contributions. This 
fact is well known to students of social insurance, who recognize that 
most early contributors to a pay-as-you-go retirement system obtain 
exceptional returns on their contributions. The exceptional returns on 
Social Security and Medicare taxes, like those on owner-occupied 
homes, have increased the amount of consumption that older Ameri 
cans can afford. One way workers have used these windfall gains is to 
retire at a younger age.
While some researchers have attributed most of the postwar 
decline in male labor force participation to the introduction and liberal 
ization of Social Security, most specialists think the impact on retire 
ment has been considerably smaller. Because of the long-term rise in 
productivity, workers are much wealthier today than they were at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. This would have led workers to 
retire earlier than previous generations, even in the absence of Social 
Security and Medicare. Social Security, Medicare, and employer- 
sponsored retirement plans were established and expanded in part to 
help workers achieve the goal of living comfortably without work in 
old age. If these programs had not be developed, it is likely that work 
ers and employers would have found other ways to achieve the same 
goal.
Of all the explanations advanced for earlier retirement, two of the 
least persuasive are declining health and the changing physical require-
Session 4: Is Working Longer and Retiring Later Possible? 387
ments of work. While nearly all good retirement studies find that 
health plays an important role in the timing of retirement, there is no 
convincing evidence that the health of 60-year-olds or 65-year-olds 
was declining over the period in which older Americans' labor force 
participation rates were falling. Declining mortality rates as well as 
recent evidence about the trend in the physical disabilities of the aged 
suggest instead that the health of Americans is improving, at least in 
early old age. Moreover, analyses of the growth of different kinds of 
occupations and in their physical requirements imply that the physical 
demands of work are now easier to meet than they were in the past. A 
much smaller proportion of jobs requires strenuous physical effort; and 
a larger percentage requires only moderate or light physical exertion 
(Manton and Stollard 1994; Baily 1987). Of course, within every gen 
eration there will be workers who are in poor health and who work in 
physically demanding jobs. These workers will be among the first to 
retire. But it seems unlikely that general health deterioration or wide 
spread increases in the physical demands of employment can explain 
the general tendency for recent generations to retire earlier than work 
ers in the past.
Financial Incentives
Besides increasing most current retirees' lifetime wealth, the 
Social Security system also affects the financial attractiveness of 
remaining at work. Most workers can choose to collect Social Security 
starting at age 62, and many do. The effect of Social Security on retire 
ment behavior before age 62 depends on the Social Security tax and on 
the benefit formula that links eventual monthly pensions to a worker's 
past covered earnings. Employers and workers pay a combined tax 
equal to 12.4 percent of wages into the system. The tax thus reduces 
workers' wages by about 12 percent in comparison with the wages they 
would earn if the program did not exist. On the other hand, contribu 
tions allow a worker to earn credits toward a Social Security pension. 
The pension entitlement goes up as the worker's covered lifetime 
wages increase. Whether the increase in the pension entitlement is 
large enough to compensate a worker for his extra contributions is an 
empirical question. Low-wage workers typically receive favorable 
treatment under the Social Security benefit formula, so they often
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receive a generous return on their extra contributions. High-wage 
workers usually receive lower returns. For any worker who is less than 
62 years old, Social Security affects the marginal return from working 
by reducing net current pay by about 12 percent and increasing the 
present value of future Social Security pensions. Whether this 
increases or reduces the willingness of a worker to continue working 
depends on the exact amount of the future pension increase (which 
depends on the worker's expected longevity) and on the worker's feel 
ings about the relative value of current versus future income and the 
attractiveness of immediate retirement.
Starting at age 62, Social Security has a different kind of effect on 
the retirement decision. When a worker delays receipt of retirement 
benefits by working another year after the earliest age of eligibility, two 
things happen, one good and one bad. The bad news is that the worker 
passes up the chance to collect a Social Security check. The good news 
is that future retirement benefits will be higher because average life 
time earnings are recalculated and because the monthly pension check 
is increased for every month of delay in asking for benefits. If a worker 
is entitled to a $500-per-month pension, for example, she sacrifices 
$500 in retirement income every month she postpones retirement past 
age 62. If her regular monthly pay is $10,000, this represents a small 
sacrifice. But if her usual pay is $1,000, the sacrifice amounts to half 
her wage. Between the ages of 62 and 64, the Social Security formula 
offers average workers a fair compensation for giving up a year's bene 
fits. Monthly benefits are adjusted upwards about 8 percent for each 
year's delay in claiming them. For workers with average life expect 
ancy and a moderate rate of time preference, this adjustment is just 
large enough so that the sacrifice of a year's benefits is compensated by 
eligibility for a higher pension in the future. After age 65, however, the 
benefit formula has historically been less generous toward delayed 
retirement. Postponement of retirement after that age was not fairly 
compensated by increases in the monthly pension. For most workers 
this is true even taking account of the fact that the basic pension calcu 
lation gives them extra credit for their most recent wages.3 In essence, 
the Social Security formula forces workers who delay retirement after 
65 to accept a cut in the lifetime value of their Social Security pay 
ments. This is a clear inducement to retire no later than age 65.
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It is worth noting that almost no workers are "average." A benefit 
calculation rule that is age-neutral or actuarially fair on average can 
still provide strong financial incentives to retire for a worker who has 
below-average life expectancy. This worker may not expect to live 
long enough for the future benefit increase to make up for the benefits 
he gives up by delaying retirement for one more year. Similarly, a 
worker who applies a high discount rate when evaluating future bene 
fits may not be impressed that the pension adjustment is "fair" for an 
average worker. For workers who are impatient to consume, an 8-per 
cent hike in benefits starting one year from today may not be enough to 
compensate for the loss of 12 monthly benefit checks over the next 
year. Even an actuarially fair pension adjustment might be insufficient 
to persuade workers who are tired of their jobs to delay retirement.
One reason that many people must retire in order to collect a Social 
Security check is that the program imposes an earnings test in calculat 
ing the annual pension. Workers who are between age 62 and 64 and 
who earn more than $10,800 a year lose $1 in annual benefits for every 
$2 in earnings they receive in excess of $10,800. Until recently, work 
ers between 65 and 69 lost $1 in benefits for every $3 in annual earn 
ings in excess of $17,000. (Pensioners age 70 and older did not face an 
earnings test.) At one time the earnings limits were much lower, dis 
couraging pensioners from work and possibly encouraging them to 
postpone claiming a pension until they were confident their earnings 
would remain low.
Many employer-sponsored pension plans are structured similarly 
to Social Security pensions. Workers who are covered under an old- 
fashioned defined-benefit plan earn pension credits for as long as they 
work for the employer that sponsors the plan (sometimes up to a maxi 
mum number of years). The longer they work under the plan, the 
higher their monthly pension. Most defined-benefit plans are struc 
tured to encourage workers to remain with the employer for a minimal 
period (say, 10 years) or until a critical age (say, age 55). Workers who 
stay for shorter periods may receive very little under the plan. On the 
other hand, workers who stay in the job too long may see the value of 
their pension accumulation shrink. This would happen if the plan 
offered benefits to workers starting at age 55 but then failed to signifi 
cantly increase the monthly benefit for workers who delayed retirement 
after age 55. If a 55-year-old worker can collect a monthly pension of
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$1,000 when he retires immediately and a monthly check of $1,001 if 
he delays his retirement one year, he will clearly lose a substantial 
amount of lifetime benefits nearly $12,000 for each year he post 
pones receipt. The worker essentially suffers a pay cut when he 
reaches age 55, and the cut is equal to the loss in lifetime benefits he 
suffers by postponing retirement. Such a pay cut might seem illegal 
under U.S. age discrimination laws, but it is perfectly legal as long as 
the pay cut is reflected in reduced lifetime pensions rather than reduced 
money wages. Many employers find this kind of pension formula to be 
an effective prod in pushing workers into early retirement.
There is one important difference between Social Security and 
employer-sponsored defined-benefit pensions. Social Security imposes 
an earnings test on income received from all employment, including 
self-employment. Employer-sponsored pensions may impose an even 
tougher earnings test, but the test applies only to earnings received 
from the sponsoring employer or group of employers. Workers who 
wish to claim a pension may be forced to leave the job on which they 
earned the pension, but they are not forced to leave work altogether. 
Nevertheless, the effects of employer-sponsored pensions on retire 
ment may be similar to those of Social Security, because many older 
workers find it hard to get attractive job offers after they have retired 
from their career jobs.
This explanation of the financial incentives in Social Security and 
employer-sponsored pensions sheds some light on the retirement 
trends discussed earlier. Social Security is now the main source of cash 
income of households headed by someone 65 or older. The program 
provides slightly more than 40 percent of the total cash income 
received by the aged. Among aged households in the bottom 60 per 
cent of the elderly income distribution, Social Security provides over 
three-quarters of cash income. Until 1941, Social Security provided no 
income at all to the aged. Today the program replaces about 42 percent 
of the final wage earned by a full-career single worker who earns the 
average wage and claims a pension at age 65. If the worker has a non- 
working dependent spouse, the benefit replaces 63 percent of the 
worker's final wage. Benefits are clearly large enough so they can be 
economically significant in influencing the choice of retirement age.
The distributions of male retirement ages in 1940, 1970, and 1998- 
1999 are plotted in Figure 5. The chart shows the percentage of men
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leaving the labor force at each age from 56 to 72, computed as a frac 
tion of the men in the labor force at age 55.4 The calculations are 
based on the data displayed in Figure 1. Not surprisingly, the retire 
ment-age distributions for 1970, and especially for 1998-1999, are 
skewed toward the left. Labor force withdrawal occurred at earlier 
ages in those years than it did in 1940. Both the 1970 and 1998-1999 
distributions show evidence of clustering in retirement at particular 
ages. In 1970, the peak rate of retirement occurred at age 65; by 1998- 
1999, the peak occurred at age 62. There are peaks in the distribution 
of retirements in 1940 at ages 65 and 70, but these are far lower than 
the peaks in 1970 and 1998-1999, when the timing of retirements was 
influenced by Social Security.
Our description of the financial incentives in Social Security sug 
gests a simple explanation for the clustering of retirements at ages 62 
and 65, at least in years after 1940. Workers who continued to work 
beyond age 65 gave up Social Security benefits for which they were not 
fairly compensated. This feature of the benefit formula clearly encour 
ages retirement at age 65. The clustering of retirements at age 62 can 
be explained using similar logic. Starting in 1961, age 62 became the 
earliest age at which men could claim a Social Security pension. 
Before 1961, there was no evidence of clustering in retirements at age 
62, but by 1970, retirement was more common at 62 than at any other 
age except 65. By the mid 1990s, age 62 was by a wide margin the 
most popular age of retirement. In principle, the Social Security for 
mula fairly compensates "average" workers if they delay claiming a 
pension past age 62. As we have seen, however, a worker with a high 
rate of time preference or short life expectancy might not regard the 
compensation as fair. In that case, we should expect many workers to 
prefer retiring at age 62 rather than a later age.
Of course, the clustering of retirements at ages 62 and 65 may be 
due to factors other than Social Security. It is hard to believe, however, 
that health or work opportunities decline abruptly at particular ages. 
Another explanation is that some workers were affected by mandatory 
retirement rules. This explanation may have been valid in 1940 and 
1970, when mandatory retirement rules covered up to one-half of 
American workers, but it is not persuasive today. Amendments to the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act passed in 1986 prohibit 
employers from dismissing workers solely on account of their age.
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The simplest alternative explanation for the clustering of retire 
ment ages is that workers are affected by employer-sponsored pension 
plans, yet many older workers are not covered by an employer plan. 
The Current Population Surveys suggest that employer-sponsored pen 
sions do not provide a large percentage of income to older Americans 
except in more affluent households. But, for those workers who are 
covered by a private pension plan, the financial incentives in the plan 
may provide powerful incentives for workers to leave their career jobs 
at a particular age.
Health Insurance
Unlike most other industrialized countries, the United States does 
not provide universal health insurance to its citizens. Instead, most 
working-age Americans receive health insurance coverage as part of an 
employer's compensation package. In 1995, 72 percent of American 
workers between 18 and 64 had health insurance coverage under an 
employer-based plan, either through their own employer or through the 
employer of another family member. Some workers obtain insurance 
through publicly provided Medicaid or privately purchased health 
plans, but 18 percent of American workers were left uninsured. Some 
employers offer continuing health insurance to their workers, even 
after they leave the firm. In 1995, of those full-time employees in 
medium and large firms who had health insurance on their jobs, 46 per 
cent also had retiree health coverage before age 65, and 41 percent had 
retiree coverage at ages 65 and older. The percentage of the labor force 
employed by firms offering such protection is shrinking, and many 
employers now require their retired workers to pay for more of the cost 
of the plans (EBRI 1997a).
The nation's peculiar health insurance system provides a compli 
cated set of incentives for retirement. Health insurance is particularly 
important for workers who are past middle age but not yet eligible for 
Medicare, because many of them face high risk of incurring heavy 
medical expenses. Workers with health insurance on the job who 
would lose it if they retire have an obvious incentive to remain on the 
job, at least until age 65 when they become eligible for Medicare. 
Those with postretirement health benefits have less incentive to remain
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employed, although how much less depends on how the insurance 
costs after retirement are shared between the employee and employer.
As with Social Security and private pensions, there is considerable 
evidence that health insurance coverage before and after retirement has 
an important influence on individual retirement decisions. Gustman 
and Steinmeier found, for example, that the effects of insurance plans 
are similar in nature to those of employer-sponsored pension plans 
(Gustman and Steinmeier 1994). If workers can become eligible for 
retiree health benefits only after a delay, the availability of the plan 
tends to delay workers' retirements until they gain eligibility. After eli 
gibility has been achieved, the availability of retiree health benefits 
encourages earlier retirement than would occur if no benefits were 
offered. Quinn estimated that men and women in career jobs in 1992 
were 8 to 10 percentage points less likely to leave their jobs over the 
next four years if they would lose health insurance coverage by doing 
so (Quinn 1999a). Inferring the overall effect of health insurance 
incentives on retirement patterns is tricky, however. A number of com 
ponents of employee compensation, including wage rates, pension cov 
erage, health insurance, and retiree health benefits tend to be highly 
correlated with one another. This makes it difficult to distinguish sta 
tistically between the separate effects of each component of compensa 
tion. Nonetheless, the rising importance of health insurance coverage 
to older Americans suggests that the evolution of the public and private 
health insurance system may have had a sizable impact on retirement 
patterns.
The Change in Retirement Trends after 1985
There are two types of explanation for the slowdown or reversal of 
retirement trends in recent years. One hypothesis is that permanent 
changes in the environment for retirees have encouraged additional 
work by older Americans. Under this conjecture, the long-term trend 
toward earlier retirement is over. Another view is that temporary cycli 
cal factors are responsible for a pause in the historical retirement trend. 
When these cyclical factors are behind us, the historical trend toward 
earlier retirement will resume. Although it will be many years before 
we can be sure of the relative importance of these explanations, it is
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possible to assess some of the permanent and temporary factors that 
have influenced recent retirement trends.
The most important cyclical factor affecting retirement is the state 
of the economy. The American economy is currently growing strongly, 
and the unemployment rate is near a 30-year low. The second half of 
the 1980s and the 1990s saw lengthy economic expansions and strong 
employment growth. There was only one recession after 1985. These 
factors made it easier for workers to find jobs when they were dis 
missed and more likely to find the terms and conditions of employment 
that they desire. In contrast, economic growth was much lower even in 
the 15 years after 1970. That period saw three recessions, and two of 
those recessions in 1974-1975 and 1981-1982 were the worst of 
the postwar era. Weak labor demand discourages jobless workers from 
persisting in their job search. Strong demand creates employment 
options for older workers who want to keep working.
Although we think a strong economy has contributed to the recent 
rise in older Americans' participation rates, it is probably not a big part 
of the story. The economy also grew strongly and unemployment 
reached very low levels in the 1960s, yet older men's labor force partic 
ipation rates fell in the decade and older women's participation rates 
changed very little (see Table 1). In earlier work, Quinn estimated the 
impact of the business cycle on older workers' participation rates and 
found that changes in the overall unemployment rate account for a rel 
atively small proportion of the change in participation trends since 
1985 (Quinn 1999b). Most of the change in participation trends since 
1985 is probably due to factors other than the cyclical movement in 
economy-wide unemployment.
It is easier to point to factors that have permanently changed in a 
way that encourages later withdrawal from the job market. One impor 
tant change is that the nation's main pension program, Social Security, 
is no longer growing more generous. Workers who retired between 
1950 and 1980 retired in an environment in which Social Security ben 
efits were rising, both absolutely and in relation to the average earnings 
of typical American workers. Most workers received pensions that 
were higher than those they would have obtained if their Social Secu 
rity contributions had been invested in safe assets. The maturation of 
the Social Security program meant that fewer workers who retired after 
1985 received windfalls from the program. The Social Security
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amendments of 1977 and 1983 brought an end to a four-decade expan 
sion and liberalization of benefits. In fact, the amendments trimmed 
retirement benefits modestly in order to keep the program solvent.
Congress has changed Social Security rules and the pension for 
mula to make work late in life more attractive. The amount of income 
a recipient can earn without losing any Social Security benefits has 
been increased, and the benefit loss for each dollar earned over the 
exempt amount was reduced (from 50 to 33 cents) for pensioners 
between 65 and 69. In 2000, the earnings test was eliminated alto 
gether for workers aged 65 and older. In the 1977 and 1983 Social 
Security amendments, Congress also increased the reward that workers 
receive for delaying initial benefit receipt past the normal retirement 
age (NRA). Instead of penalizing work after the NRA, Social Security 
is becoming more age-neutral. When this formula change is fully 
implemented, for workers attaining age 62 after 2004, the adjustment 
for delayed benefit receipt will be approximately fair for retirements up 
through age 70. It is nearly so today. There will be no financial pen 
alty for delaying retirement beyond the normal retirement age.
Important changes have also occurred in the private sector. There 
has been a sharp increase in the relative importance of defined-contri- 
bution pension plans and a continuing decline in the importance of 
defined-benefit plans. Defined-contribution plans are age-neutral by 
design, and therefore they have none of the age-specific work disincen 
tives that are common in traditional defined-benefit plans. As a grow 
ing percentage of workers reaches retirement age under defined- 
contribution plans, there will be less reason for workers to leave their 
jobs to avoid a loss in lifetime retirement benefits.
Some changes in the environment for retirees are the result of pol 
icy initiatives aimed specifically at encouraging more work at older 
ages. For example, mandatory retirement has been nearly eliminated 
in the United States. In the early 1970s, about half of all American 
workers were covered by mandatory retirement provisions that 
required them to leave their jobs no later than a particular age, usually 
age 65. In 1978, the earliest legal age of mandatory retirement was 
raised from 65 to 70, and in 1986, mandatory retirement provisions 
were outlawed altogether for the vast majority of workers. The 
increase and eventual elimination of mandatory retirement ages not 
only increased the options open to older employees who wanted to
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remain on their jobs, but also sent an important message to Americans 
about the appropriate age to retire.
This message was reinforced by a provision of the 1983 Social 
Security amendments that is gradually raising the normal retirement 
age in Social Security from 65 to 67. The higher NRA will become 
fully effective for workers who reach age 62 in 2022. So far as we 
know, the United States was the first industrial nation to pass a law lift 
ing the retirement age under its main public pension program. 
Although few workers may be aware of the higher retirement age, 
many are affected by it already. Workers reaching age 62 in 2000 face 
a normal retirement age of 65 years and 2 months, which means that 
they will qualify for age-62 pensions that are 1 percent smaller than 
age-62 benefits under the traditional NRA. The delay in the eligibility 
age for unreduced pensions has an effect on benefit levels that is almost 
identical to across-the-board benefit cuts.
These changes suggest that the future will not look like the past. 
The relative attractiveness of work and retirement at older ages has 
been altered in favor of work, though the changes may have produced 
only modest effects so far. The break in the early retirement trend that 
occurred in the mid 1980s suggests that changes in the retirement envi 
ronment are having an impact in the expected direction.
SHOULD WE ENCOURAGE LATER RETIREMENT?
Even if the trend toward earlier retirement has stopped or reversed, 
it is natural to ask whether the nation should take additional steps to 
encourage later retirement. One reason for doing so is concern over 
public finances. Social Security is the largest item in the federal bud 
get. In 1995, Social Security outlays represented 4.6 percent of GDP 
and a little less than 22 percent of overall federal spending. After the 
income tax, the program is the most important source of federal tax 
revenues. Over the next 10 to 15 years, the financial outlook for Social 
Security is relatively secure, even under pessimistic assumptions about 
the state of the economy. When the baby-boom generation reaches 
retirement age in the second decade of the century, however, benefit 
payments will begin to climb much faster than tax revenue. Outlays
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will exceed taxes and will eventually exceed tax revenues plus interest 
payments earned by the trust funds. Under the intermediate assump 
tions of the Social Security Trustees, the trust funds will begin to 
shrink. Unless benefits are trimmed or tax rates increased, the trust 
funds will eventually fall to zero, making it impossible under current 
law to make timely benefit payments. The financial condition of the 
Medicare program is more perilous than that of Social Security. The 
reserves of the system are smaller, and they will be depleted much 
sooner than the OASDI trust funds.
Restoring both Medicare and Social Security to long-term sol 
vency will be costly. The federal budgetary cost of achieving solvency 
would obviously be smaller if workers' eligibility for benefits under 
the two programs were delayed. In the remainder of this chapter, we 
focus on options to encourage later retirement under the Social Secu 
rity program.
The solvency of Social Security, like that of any pension program, 
depends on four crucial elements: 1) the contribution rate imposed on 
workers and their employers; 2) the pension fund's rate of return on its 
investments; 3) the age of eligibility for pensions; and 4) the average 
monthly pension paid to retirees. The first two elements determine the 
annual amount of funds flowing into the system, and the last two deter 
mine the annual amount flowing out of the system. Each of the four 
elements must be carefully calibrated to ensure that benefit promises 
are matched by expected future revenues. If a pension program is 
exactly solvent and one of the four elements changes, some adjustment 
in the other three elements may be necessary to restore the solvency of 
the program. For example, if the rate of return on pension fund invest 
ments falls, it will be necessary to increase the contribution rate, delay 
the age of eligibility for pensions, or lower monthly pensions in order 
to restore the pension program to solvency.
Improvements in life expectancy increase the funding requirements 
of a pension plan. If contributors live one additional year in retirement, 
the plan must find enough extra resources to finance the added benefit 
payments. To keep the pension system solvent, this requires higher 
contributions to the program, a higher rate of return on investments, a 
delay in the retirement age, or a reduction in monthly benefits. It is 
worth emphasizing that this is true for every type of pension plan, 
whether public or private. If Social Security had never been estab-
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lished, increases in American life spans over the past half century 
would have required private pension plans to increase their contribu 
tion rates, find investments that yield higher rates of return, delay the 
age of eligibility for pensions, or reduce monthly pension payments.
A large part of Social Security's long-term funding problem arises 
because of good news about longevity. 5 Americans now live longer 
than their parents and grandparents did. Their children and grandchil 
dren can be expected to live longer than we do. The improvements in 
longevity mean that living Americans will survive much longer past 
age 65 than was true when Social Security was established in the Great 
Depression. The longevity increases provide the equivalent of a benefit 
increase to Social Security recipients. The benefit increase must be 
paid for if the system is to remain solvent.
Political Unpopularity
While it might seem logical to raise the retirement age in Social 
Security to reflect improvements in longevity, that logic has so far 
escaped the general public. American voters and workers routinely 
reject the idea of a higher retirement age when it is suggested as a solu 
tion to Social Security's problems. Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Sha- 
piro recently summarized the findings of 18 polls that asked Americans 
about their attitudes toward an increase in the retirement age (Jacobs 
and Shapiro 1998, pp. 381-384). The polls were conducted over a 20- 
year period ending in 1997, and each poll was administered to at least 
750 respondents. With rare exceptions, solid majorities of respondents 
reject any proposed hike in the retirement age. The size of the majority 
opposing a higher retirement age was higher in the 1990s than it was in 
the 1980s. Political leaders apparently take their cue from the polling 
numbers. Nearly all of the presidential candidates in both political par 
ties have expressed strong opposition to the idea of a higher Social 
Security retirement age. 6
Americans' hostility to a higher retirement age does not provide 
much guidance to policymakers, however. Solid majorities also 
oppose other basic steps that would solve Social Security's long-term 
funding problem. Most poll respondents are against higher payroll 
taxes, lower monthly benefits, and investment of Social Security 
reserves in stocks, where they would earn a higher return (Jacobs and
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Shapiro 1998; EBRI 1997c, p. 11). Many workers may oppose a 
higher retirement age in Social Security because they intend, or at least 
hope, to retire several years before attaining the early eligibility age for 
Social Security benefits. When asked in an EBRI poll when they hope 
to start retirement, one-third of active workers answered "age 55 or 
younger." When asked when they actually expect to retire, however, 
only 15 percent thought their retirements would occur before age 56 
(EBRI 1997b, Chart 1). If the Social Security retirement age were 
increased, early retirement would become a less affordable dream.
Other Options
There is no compelling reason to raise either the Social Security 
retirement age or the average retirement age, of course. If Americans' 
incomes continue to grow 1 or 2 percent a year, some fraction of the 
increase can be used to finance comfortable incomes during longer 
spells of retirement. This means, however, that more of the income 
earned by active workers must be set aside to pay for longer retire 
ments. This could take the form of higher payroll or income taxes to 
pay for Social Security benefits to the currently retired or higher per 
sonal saving to make up for the loss of monthly Social Security bene 
fits if Social Security pensions are trimmed to preserve solvency. 
There is some evidence that workers understand this trade-off. When 
forced to choose between the option of making larger contributions to 
pay for retirement or accepting smaller pensions after they retire, most 
workers opt to make larger contributions. By a 2-to-l majority, work 
ers favor higher payroll taxes over reduced Social Security pensions 
(EBRI 1997b, Chart 6). This suggests a simple conclusion: Americans 
would rather set aside more of their wages for retirement than postpone 
their retirement.
Workers can offset the effect of higher retirement contributions by 
working longer hours during their prime working years. There is some 
evidence this is occurring. American work patterns have changed 
slowly but significantly over the past generation. Since the 1960s, 
three major trends have affected adults' use of time. Women have 
joined the paid workforce in record numbers; men have retired from 
their jobs at younger ages; and both men and women have devoted 
more years to formal schooling. The effects of these trends on average
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work effort can be seen in Figure 6, which shows changes in weekly 
hours of paid work between 1968 and 1998. The weekly average is 
calculated as the total hours of work during the survey week divided by 
the total number of men and women in the indicated age group. People 
who do not work are included in these estimates. (The estimates would 
show higher average hours if they reflected the work effort only of peo 
ple who held jobs.)
In spite of the trend toward earlier male retirement since 1968, the 
figure shows a sizable jump in the total amount of time that Americans 
spend at work. The increase in hours was driven almost entirely by the 
surge in women's employment. The CPS interviews show only a small 
change in average weekly hours among men and women who actually 
hold a job. Averaging across all ages, women worked 49 percent more 
hours in March 1998 than they did in March 1968 (20.3 hours a week 
in 1968 versus 13.6 hours in 1968). The rise was due to a 45 percent 
jump in the fraction of women holding jobs. Partly offsetting the rise 
in women's employment was the dip in men's paid work. Most of the
Figure 6 Average Hours of Work by Age Group in the U.S. Population, 
1968 and 1998
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drop occurred as a result of decreasing employment among men past 
age 54. Across all age groups, the male employment rate fell 6 per 
centage points (or 8 percent) between 1968 and 1998, but it fell 15 per 
centage points among men between 55 and 64 and 9 points among men 
past 64.
The combined effects of the shifts in male and female work pat 
terns are displayed Figure 6. Averaging the trends of both men and 
women, we see that hours spent on the job increased for people 18 to 
54 years old and declined for people past age 54. Older Americans 
clearly enjoyed more free time in 1998 than did their counterparts in 
1968, mainly because of earlier male retirement. For adults between 
25 and 54, however, the estimates imply that paid employment con 
sumes a much bigger percentage of available time. The employment 
rate of people in their prime working years jumped 11 percentage 
points (almost 17 percent) between March 1968 and March 1998, 
boosting the average amount of time spent in jobs from 28 hours to 32 
hours a week. This increase is equivalent to five extra 40-hour work 
weeks a year for adults between 25 and 54. In short, Americans are 
working longer hours between 25 and 54. The increase in hours should 
help them pay for shorter hours and longer retirements when they are 
older than 55.
HOW COULD WE ENCOURAGE LATER RETIREMENT?
Assuming that it is desirable to do so, how might we encourage 
American workers to delay their retirements further? In this section we 
consider some alternatives and discuss their likely impact on future 
trends in the average retirement age.
Changing the Incentives in Social Security
Since the eligibility age for pensions is one of the main features of 
Social Security affecting its solvency, it is sensible to consider adjust 
ments in the eligibility age to help restore the system's financing. One 
possibility is to accelerate the increase in the normal retirement age 
already scheduled under present law. Instead of phasing in the increase
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over 23 years (with a 12-year hiatus between the change from 65 to 66 
and the change from 66 to 67), Congress could phase in the NRA 
change over just 12 years. This would mean that the higher NRA will 
be fully implemented for workers reaching age 62 in 2011, rather than 
2022.
A second possibility is to increase the NRA automatically in line 
with increases in life expectancy after 65. A majority of members of 
the 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council proposed increasing 
the NRA as necessary after 2011 to maintain a constant ratio of retire 
ment years to potential years of work. Retirement years is defined as 
life expectancy at the NRA, and potential years of work as the number 
of years from age 20 to the NRA. Under the Social Security Trustees' 
intermediate assumptions, this proposal would push up the NRA to age 
70 by about 2080. The Social Security Actuary estimates that the com 
bination of accelerating the NRA increase and then increasing the 
NRA in line with longevity improvements eliminates nearly one-quar 
ter of Social Security's long-term funding gap.
Lifting the NRA while leaving the early eligibility age (EEA) 
unchanged produces almost exactly the same effect on retired workers' 
Social Security benefits as a proportional reduction in the full pension 
(usually referred to as the "primary insurance amount," or PIA). Even 
though most people describe an increase in the normal retirement age 
as a "delay" in the retirement age, it is in fact closer to a reduction in 
the monthly benefit amount. Workers can still obtain pensions at the 
same age as before, but their monthly pensions are smaller, no matter 
what age they choose.
There are some important non-economic differences between rais 
ing the NRA and cutting the full Social Security pension, however. 
First, increasing the NRA signals to workers that the same monthly 
benefit can be obtained by postponing retirement, which may encour 
age some workers to delay retirement rather than accept a lower pen 
sion. Sponsors of employer pension plans might also be induced to 
modify their plans to encourage delayed pension acceptance if the 
Social Security NRA were increased. Second, in light of the well- 
known improvements in life expectancy, American workers might find 
increases in the retirement age to be more understandable and fairer 
than equivalent reductions in full pensions. By increasing the retire 
ment age rather than reducing full pensions, Congress conveys the
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message that the benefit level is appropriate, but the timing is not  
workers ought to postpone their retirements.
Congress might increase the early eligibility age (EEA) at the same 
time and at the same pace as it increases the NRA. An increase in the 
EEA is fundamentally different from an increase in the NRA. If the 
EEA is increased above age 62, 62-year-old workers will be prevented 
from obtaining old-age pensions. Under current law they can collect 
reduced old-age pensions or they can apply for Disability Insurance 
(DI) pensions. When the possibility of obtaining old-age pensions is 
eliminated, some 62-year-olds who otherwise would have received old- 
age pensions will apply for DI. This will increase Social Security 
administrative costs, because eligibility is much more expensive to 
determine in the DI program. It may also impose serious hardship on 
workers whose DI applications are denied.
These consequences of increasing the early eligibility age make 
many people reluctant to tamper with it. Many policymakers are more 
uneasy about a reform that denies benefits completely to an identifiable 
class of people than they are about one that reduces benefits modestly 
to a much wider population. It is important to recognize why Social 
Security has an early eligibility age, however. If workers could apply 
for benefits as soon as they accumulated enough earnings credits, some 
low-income workers would be tempted to apply for benefits in their 
late fifties or even their late forties. At such ages, however, their 
monthly benefits would be very low, because early pensions are 
reduced below the full pension in proportion to the number of months 
between the age a worker claims benefits and the NRA. The low level 
of the initial pension might not represent a problem for a worker who is 
50 or 60 years old and can supplement monthly pensions with modest 
wages or an employer-sponsored pension. But, it could cause serious 
hardship when a worker reaches age 68 or 70 and finds she is no longer 
able to work and the company pension no longer covers the cost of gro 
ceries and the monthly rent. The existence of the early entitlement age 
prevents short-sighted workers from applying for pensions that will be 
too small to support them throughout a long retirement.
When the NRA eventually reaches 67, workers claiming early pen 
sions at age 62 will receive 70 percent of a full pension, a 30 percent 
reduction below the full pension rather than the current 20 percent 
reduction. If the NRA were eventually increased to 70 and the early
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eligibility age remained unchanged, workers claiming pensions at age 
62 would receive monthly benefits as low as 52 percent of a full pen 
sion probably too little to live on for a low-wage worker with few 
other sources of income. If the NRA is increased above 67, it seems 
sensible to increase the early eligibility age as well. Since Social Secu 
rity is intended to assure a basic floor of support for retired Americans, 
it seems perverse to allow full-career workers to claim benefits so early 
that their monthly benefit will be too low to live on. This implies that 
the early eligibility age must eventually be raised above 62 if the NRA 
rises much above age 67. In order to implement this reform in a 
humane way, Congress might consider liberalizing eligibility require 
ments for Disability Insurance benefits starting at age 62. People who 
have worked in physically demanding occupations and are in impaired 
health could be given access to benefits that permit them to retire with 
a decent standard of living, even if they do not meet the strict standard 
for health impairment that is used to evaluate DI applications today.
Effects of Changing the NRA and EEA on 
Actual Retirement Ages
It is natural to ask whether increasing the early and normal retire 
ment ages would have much effect on when workers actually retire. 
Almost all researchers who have examined this question agree that 
such reforms would tend to increase the average age at retirement, 
though the effect may not be large. This conclusion was reached in a 
great majority of economists' studies conducted in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Most studies found that even large changes in Social Security 
would cause only small changes in the average retirement age. Burt- 
less and Moffitt (1985) estimated, for example, that increasing the nor 
mal retirement age in Social Security from 65 to 68 would add only a 
little more than four months to the full-time working careers of men 
who have no disabilities.7
One way to assess the impact of Social Security reforms is to 
examine differences in retirement patterns among people who face dif 
ferent incentives because the program has been changed in an unantici 
pated way. In 1969 and again in 1972, Social Security benefits were 
increased much faster relative to wages than at any time in the recent 
past. By 1973, benefits were 20 percent higher than would have been
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the case if pensions had grown with wages as they did during the 1950s 
and 1960s. In 1977, Congress passed amendments to the Social Secu 
rity Act sharply reducing benefits to workers born in 1917 and later 
years (the "notch" generation) in comparison with the benefits avail 
able to workers born before 1917.
Burtless (1986) studied the first episode, and Krueger and Pischke 
(1992) examined the second. Both studies reached an identical conclu 
sion: major changes in Social Security generosity produced small ini 
tial effects on the retirement behavior and labor force participation of 
older men. Burtless found, for example, that the 20 percent benefit 
hike between 1969 and 1973 caused only a two-month reduction in 
average retirement age of men who were fully covered by the more 
generous formula. This is equivalent to a reduction in the labor force 
participation rates of 62-year-old and 65-year-old men of less than 2 
percentage points. The effects of the 1977 amendments found by Krue 
ger and Pischke were even smaller.
These findings suggest that an increase in the normal retirement 
age will probably have only a small effect on the age that male workers 
withdraw from the workforce. It is harder to predict the effects of an 
increase in the early retirement age because we do not have good 
enough historical evidence to evaluate the impact of this kind of 
change. When the earliest age of eligibility for Social Security retire 
ment benefits was decreased from 65 to 62 (in 1956 for women and in 
1961 for men), labor force participation rates fell significantly and 
much faster than they had previously. The reversal of this policy would 
likely have a larger impact than the change in the normal retirement 
age, especially for low wage workers who have no other sources of 
retirement income except Social Security. The magnitude of the 
increased labor force participation would depend, in part, on how 
employer pensions responded to the change in Social Security rules 
and the extent to which eligibility criteria for DI benefits were loos 
ened.
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EMPLOYER RESPONSES
Some people wonder how employers would respond to changes in 
the early and normal retirement ages in Social Security. Would firms 
with defined-benefit pension plans increase their early retirement 
incentives to offset the loss of the Social Security incentives or to make 
their plans more age-neutral? If workers wanted to delay their retire 
ments to become eligible for more generous Social Security pensions, 
could the economy create enough extra jobs to employ them? Would 
employers discriminate against older job seekers, making it hard for 
them to find and keep jobs?
Historical evidence about the job-creating capacity of the U.S. 
market is reassuring. Over the long run, the U.S. labor market seems 
capable of absorbing large numbers of extra workers without a signifi 
cant rise in joblessness. From 1964 through 1989, when the baby- 
boom generation reached adulthood and entered the job market, the 
labor force grew by 50.4 million persons, or slightly more than 2 mil 
lion new entrants a year. Most of this surge was driven by the jump in 
U.S. fertility between 1946 and 1964, but part was also due to a grow 
ing demand for employment by women, who entered the workforce in 
record numbers. From 1964 to 1989, the number of Americans holding 
jobs climbed by 47.7 million, or slightly more than 1.9 million workers 
a year. In other words, about 95 percent of new job seekers in the 
period were able to find jobs, though the number of people available 
for work swelled by two-thirds. The unemployment rate rose only 
slightly, increasing from 5.0 percent to 5.2 percent.
Many people find it surprising that so many extra job seekers can 
be absorbed by the labor market. They overlook a basic reality of flex 
ible labor markets like those in the United States. In the long run, 
employers are free to change their product lines and production meth 
ods to exploit the availability of a newly abundant type of labor, and 
they can adjust relative wages in response to the entry and exit of dif 
ferent classes of workers.
In the 1970s, for example, the wages received by younger workers 
fell in comparison with those earned by older workers, in large mea 
sure because younger workers became much more abundant. Faced 
with a huge increase in the availability of workers who had limited job
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experience, employers adopted production methods that took advan 
tage of less experienced workers. Restaurant meals were prepared and 
served by eleventh-grade students and high school dropouts rather than 
by experienced cooks or waiters. Gardening and domestic cleaning 
were performed by unskilled and semiskilled employees rather than by 
homeowners themselves. In the end, 95 percent of new job seekers 
were successful in finding jobs. Of course, many of the new jobs were 
not particularly well paid. The huge increase in the abundance of less- 
experienced workers is one reason that pay in many jobs fell.
If older workers were forced to wait for two or three extra years for 
full Social Security retirement benefits to begin, many would choose to 
remain in their career jobs for a few months or years longer than work 
ers presently do. Older workers who lose their jobs would try harder 
and more persistently to find new jobs. The jobs that many would find 
would pay lower wages than the jobs they previously held, as is the 
case for most workers who leave career jobs today. The availability of 
increased numbers of older workers would almost certainly depress the 
relative wages of aged job seekers. Yet, low U.S. fertility means the 
future labor force will grow slowly, placing some pressure on employ 
ers to retain older workers and make jobs attractive to older job-seek 
ers.
Although some observers are pessimistic about the willingness of 
employers to accommodate the special needs of an aged workforce, 
such pessimism seems misplaced. Employers have created millions of 
part-time jobs to accommodate the needs of students and mothers who 
are only available to work short weekly hours. People who work on 
part-time schedules pay a price for short hours in terms of low weekly 
earnings and lost fringe benefits, but they accept these jobs nonethe 
less. Comparable accommodations could be made for the special 
needs of older workers. Many older workers who want jobs to tide 
them over between the time their career jobs end and eligibility for full 
Social Security pensions will be able to find suitable employment.
Other Policies
As noted above, Social Security rules are moving toward age-neu 
trality. Employer pension coverage is shifting toward defined-contri- 
bution plans, which have none of the age-specific retirement incentives
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present in traditional defined-benefit plans. Mandatory retirement has 
been eliminated for the vast majority of American workers, and equal 
employment opportunity laws forbid employment discrimination based 
on age. Federal policies have been enlightened in these areas and are 
partly responsible for the changes in men's and women's retirement 
patterns over the past 15 years. Are there other policies that would 
improve the employment prospects of older Americans? Several come 
to mind:
  Permit workers aged 65 or older to opt out of additional Social 
Security contributions. If this option were chosen, workers 
would also forego the increases in future benefits that these earn 
ings would have caused. A variant of the same idea would be to 
exempt earnings up to some dollar limit from F.I.C.A contribu 
tions as well as Social Security benefit recalculation. This would 
lower employers' cost of hiring older workers, because their pay 
roll tax liabilities would fall, and it would make older workers rel 
atively more attractive to hire and retain. It would also require 
Congress to find a source of revenue to make up for payroll taxes 
lost as a result of the reform.
  Allow employers to offer prorated fringe benefits for employees 
working less than full-time hours, rather than requiring them to 
provide the same fringe benefits to all employees working more 
than 1,000 hours per year (as the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, or ERISA, currently mandates). The present law 
encourages employers to restrict the hours worked by part-time 
employees to fewer than 1,000 per year. Giving employers more 
flexibility would allow older employees and employers to work 
out mutually agreeable fringe benefit packages that might keep 
more older workers employed.
  Make Medicare the first source of health insurance coverage for 
workers over age 65. Current law requires that the employer's 
health plan serve as "first payer" for a worker who has dual insur 
ance coverage. Employers could provide additional insurance 
coverage if they chose. The reform would lower employers' cost 
of hiring or retaining older workers. Of course, it would also 
increase Medicare outlays, which in turn would require lawmak 
ers to find additional sources of revenue for that program.
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  Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit to include workers aged 65 
and older who have no dependent children. This would provide a 
federal earnings subsidy to aged low-wage workers who are cur 
rently ineligible for the credit, and it could boost the available 
supply of older workers.
  Repeal the earnings test to eliminate the perception that pension 
ers who continue to work after age 62 lose Social Security bene 
fits by doing so. It is true that workers do lose benefits during any 
year in which their earnings exceed the exempt amount. But for 
the average worker, the actuarial adjustment before age 65 returns 
all or most of the foregone pensions through higher future bene 
fits. Of course, most workers are not average, and those who 
anticipate shorter than average life expectancies or who have high 
discount rates will still find the earnings test a disincentive to 
work Even for average workers the existing test can act as a work 
disincentive. Most Social Security recipients seem unaware of 
the benefit adjustment, so the current earnings test discourages 
them from earning more than the exempt amount. The repeal of 
the earnings test would probably increase recipients' earnings 
modestly, and the long-term budgetary cost would be negligible.
In an economy as strong as the one we have enjoyed over the past 
five years, none of these reforms may be needed to encourage higher 
employment among the aged. But if voters and policymakers want to 
provide incentives that will delay workers' exit from the labor force or 
change employers' attitudes toward older job applicants, some or all 
the reforms could be helpful.
CONCLUSION
After a long period of decline, the trend toward earlier retirement 
came to at least a temporary halt in the mid 1980s. The labor force par 
ticipation rates of American men past age 60 leveled off, and in the past 
few years they have actually increased slightly. Participation rates 
among older women have risen significantly since 1985, though this 
trend may be the result of the historic shift in women's attitudes toward
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career employment rather than to a change in their retirement behavior 
per se. Along with workers in Japan and Scandinavia, Americans now 
leave the paid workforce later than workers anywhere else in the indus 
trialized world.
The question is, do Americans retire at an age that will ultimately 
prove unaffordable? As life spans increase, the fraction of life spent in 
retirement will rise unless we delay our exit from paid work. Improved 
longevity places heavier burdens on active workers if retirees are sup 
ported by contributions from current payrolls. Even without any fur 
ther improvement in longevity, the long-term decline in birth rates has 
slowed labor force growth and will eventually increase the ratio of 
retired to active workers. This will place extra pressure on retirement 
programs like Social Security and Medicare that depend on payroll 
taxes for most of their funding. To reduce this pressure, the country 
could adjust the age of eligibility for early and/or normal retirement 
benefits and take other measures to encourage workers to postpone 
their exit from the labor market. These steps would directly improve 
the finances of Social Security and Medicare. They would encourage 
some workers to delay their departure from career jobs and induce oth 
ers to find bridge jobs to tide them over until full retirement benefits 
begin. The United States has already taken several steps in this direc 
tion, and these steps have contributed to the recent growth of employ 
ment among older Americans.
Although most workers today claim that they expect to keep work 
ing after age 65, or after "retirement," most oppose additional changes 
in the retirement system that would push them to retire at a later age. A 
majority resists the idea that a higher retirement age is needed to pro 
tect Social Security. The United States is a rich country and will 
become wealthier in the future. It can certainly afford to maintain cur 
rent retirement patterns if its citizens choose to spend their additional 
wealth in this way. The important public policy issue is the importance 
of this goal in comparison with other legitimate uses of the rise in 
wealth.
Proponents of a higher retirement age often focus on the long-term 
trend in older people's employment rates without considering what has 
happened to work effort and productivity among people before they 
reach the retirement age. They worry about the budget cost of retire 
ment at age 62 without reflecting on the fact that younger workers may
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be paying for their longer and healthier retirements by working harder 
and more productively in their preretirement careers. As long as pro 
ductivity continues to improve, American society and individual work 
ers can choose how they want to allocate the income gains that flow 
from higher productivity. The evidence of the twentieth century sug 
gests they will use at least part of it to pay for a longer retirement.
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1 Retirement patterns were much more difficult to measure among women because 
most worked primarily within the home (and without pay) during most of their 
adult lives.
2. Labor force participation rates for 1910,1940, and 1970 are based on responses to 
employment questions in the decennial censuses. See Ransom et al. (1991), espe 
cially pages 45-46, and Munnell (1977), page 70. Rates for 1984-85 and 1998- 
99 are the arithmetic average participation rates on the March Current Population 
Survey (CPS) files for 1984, 1985, 1998, and 1999. Participation rates measured 
on the Census differ somewhat from those measured by the CPS, partly because 
the main goal of the CPS is to obtain reliable labor force statistics. Adjusting the 
decennial Census statistics to make them strictly comparable to the CPS estimates 
would have only a slight effect on the patterns displayed in Figure 1, however.
3. Before their 62nd birthdays, workers who contnbute to Social Security for an 
additional year obtain better future pensions because the basic pension formula is 
based on workers' average lifetime wages. Between ages 62 and 64 workers who 
contribute to Social Security obtain that benefit enhancement plus an actuarial 
increase equal to about 8 percent of the basic pension to compensate them for giv 
ing up one year's benefit payments.
4. If the labor force participation rate at age 63 is designated LFPR63, the retirement 
rate at age 63 is calculated as (LFPR^ - LFPR^) + LFPR55- This calculation 
ignores the complications involved in computing true cohort distributions and the 
effects of mortality rates, immigration, and temporary withdrawal from the labor 
force. It offers a picture of the timing of labor market withdrawal based on the 
participation choices of men aged 55 through 72 in a particular year.
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5 Much of the future funding problem is due to the maturation of the program (most 
future retirees will reach the retirement age with enough earnings credits to 
receive a full pension), slow growth in the future working population, and a long- 
term slowdown in the rate of real wage growth (which has deprived the system of 
anticipated revenues). Increased longevity explains only part of the system's 
funding shortfall.
6. In the GOP presidential candidates' debate in Manchester, New Hampshire, on 
December 5, 1999, Steve Forbes, Senator John McCain, and Governor George W. 
Bush all expressed views on increasing the retirement age Forbes described the 
idea as a "betrayal": "that's not fair to the people. They were made a promise and 
it should be kept." McCain said that a retirement age increase was unnecessary. 
Governor Bush flatly ruled out the possibility he would ask for a retirement-age 
increase for people already near retirement, and he expressed "hope" such a step 
would not be needed for younger workers. The Democratic presidential candi 
dates have been equally vehement in their opposition When asked by Tim Rus 
sell whether he supported or opposed hiking the retirement age, Vice President 
Gore responded "Tim, I strongly oppose raising the retirement age." When Gore 
posed the same question to Bill Bradley, Bradley responded "We said no. We said 
no.... OK?" (Meet the Press, December 19, 1999)
7. Other economists' predictions are discussed in Joseph Quinn et al. (1990).
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Employer Perspective on 
Retirement Trends and Policies
to Encourage Work 
among Older Americans
Anna M. Rappaport 
William M. Mercer, Inc.
As a response to the chapter by Gary Burtless and Joseph F. Quinn, 
I here consider the environment for employers and how they are 
responding to the challenges of an aging society.
EMPLOYERS, POLICY, AND OLDER-WORKER ISSUES
The Burtless and Quinn paper focuses on older workers. When 
employers focus on human resource issues, they generally do not focus 
on a particular demographic subset of employees, but rather on the 
business and on the people needed to get the work done. However, 
when worker shortages occur, employers seek out any method they can 
to fill in the gaps.
Burtless and Quinn focus on the impact of Social Security and 
Medicare benefits, as well as that of pensions and retiree health, on 
workers' decisions to retire. They also note that employment discrimi 
nation is banned, but they do not explore the many requirements of age 
discrimination legislation. They then provide a list of ideas for policy 
changes that might encourage later retirement. They approach these 
ideas from a policy and individual perspective, rather than an employer 
perspective.
I contend that employers need to be careful if they provide special 
programs or focus on particular demographic groups. The United 
States protects older workers through age discrimination legislation. 
(Other groups are protected as well by different legislation, but the 
requirements differ.) Age discrimination requirements are complex
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and apply to many aspects of employment. These requirements must 
be considered in structuring human resource programs, whether the 
programs target older workers or not. Employers, in considering new 
programs, must first focus on business need, but in addition they should 
focus both on compliance and on avoiding litigation. Involuntary ter 
minations of employment and real or perceived unequal treatment can 
lead to costly litigation, whether the employer's action was justified or 
not. That is why employers should exercise care throughout the entire 
employment process. Whether these requirements deter employers 
from implementing otherwise desirable programs is unknown. It 
would be helpful to have research on the implications of this legislation 
to better understand how it impacts human resource programs and pol 
icies and whether it has served as a deterrent to innovation.
Some benefit plan requirements definitely serve as a deterrent to 
programs that would facilitate older worker employment and phased 
retirement. It would be desirable to offer programs that allow for par 
tial payment of pensions and continued work. However, such pro 
grams are not feasible under current U.S. law. Programs may not allow 
payment of pensions during periods of continued work prior to normal 
retirement age, usually age 65. Plans may provide for payment of pen 
sions during periods of continued work after normal retirement age, but 
this practice is rare. The author located anecdotal information about a 
retailer and a financial institution who allow continued payments to 
part-time workers after retirement. The number of retirees electing to 
work is substantial. There is no provision for plans to make partial 
payments during periods of reduced work. A desirable next step would 
be a review of pension legislation to seek out changes needed to 
accommodate phased retirement. Congress has given a strong signal 
that it supports the notion of phased retirement in its unanimous vote to 
repeal the Social Security earnings test. It needs to support that deci 
sion with appropriate changes in private pension regulation.
DEFINITION OF RETIREMENT
Burtless and Quinn define retirement based on exit from the labor 
force. They define the average age at retirement as the point when half
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of men have left the labor force. This definition works well from a 
social perspective, but not from an employer perspective.
From an employer's perspective, the common definition of a retiree 
is one who has retired from that organization, and what is important is 
whether benefits are being paid, not whether the individual has found 
other work. Other work, in the form of bridge jobs, is common. 
Retirement often takes place in steps, with multiple retirements before 
a person leaves the labor force. This phenomenon is not new. Tradi 
tionally, it was common in the military and certain types of public ser 
vice (such as police and fire) to retire early, get a benefit, and then go 
on to further employment, maybe several times.
Today, most gradual or phased retirement uses one or more bridge 
jobs at an organization other than that of the long-term employer. A 
key question is whether more employers will develop programs to 
encourage long-term employees to phase down within their own orga 
nizations rather than accepting a bridge job elsewhere.
We need to give further consideration to the definition of retire 
ment. It has been suggested that we should seek a new set of terms to 
describe different life stages. I do not seek new terms, but rather a dif 
ferent idea. If phasing down through a series of bridge jobs is com 
monplace, then the idea of retirement as a one-time event does not 
work any more. We might think of retirement in terms of a financial 
situation: focus on a period of building assets and a period of using 
assets to replace or supplement current earnings. The point of retire 
ment is the crossover point. Of course, labor force participation rates 
would not help us measure retirement on that basis.
COST/BENEFIT OF USING OLDER WORKERS
Equity markets demand better performance from companies, and 
employers, in turn, put greater demands on employees. This raises the 
question, are there advantages in having a workforce with one set of 
demographics versus another?
I am not aware of any definitive research on this topic. The value 
and cost of using older workers likely offers both advantages and dis 
advantages. Older workers have more experience, which can lead to
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better judgment. This experience is extremely valuable for some types 
of jobs, particularly those with a long learning curve and a lot of need 
for human capital, particularly firm-specific human capital. Customers 
also value long-term relationships and generally do not like to see the 
people they are doing business with change frequently. In many cases, 
employers lose valuable history when a long-term employee leaves an 
assignment. On the other hand, with changes in organizations and 
technology, current education and training gain importance. If skills 
are not maintained, the value of long-term experience is largely lost. In 
addition, some experienced people focus on the past and resist change. 
The ideal is to have to a balance of experience, current training, and 
willingness to embrace change.
In recent interviews, top managers at a major financial institution 
made these comments:
  Some jobs have high firm-specific human capital, whereas others 
have low firm-specific human capital but a lot of technical knowl 
edge. Employees in the latter jobs move between jobs easily, and 
long service does not add much value. An example of the first 
group is the account manager for a major account, and a foreign 
securities trader is an example of the second.
  Burnout can be a factor, particularly for high-stress jobs. At the 
point of burnout, it is important for both the employer and 
employee that the employee make a change and move on, either 
within the organization or outside of it.
  Customers and the organization both value continuity of service; 
however, that does not mean people will stay until traditional 
retirement age.
  Technology will replace many jobs, particularly in the back 
office. Some of these employees can be retrained and placed in 
other jobs, but it will not work out for others.
The bottom line is that human resources policies should support 
long service but not lock people into jobs that they no longer want. I 
also encountered parallel issues in a specialized manufacturing envi 
ronment. The engineering and technical staff, as well as the account 
representatives, have a lot of knowledge that is important to the firm.
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Yet for many jobs, the training period is short, and experience adds lit 
tle value after an initial period, whether that is one day, one month, or 
one year.
Also, significant cost issues must be reviewed for both pay and 
benefits. In traditional seniority-based pay systems, longer-term 
employees got paid more, and older employees with longer service 
were likely to be among the higher paid. Where the value contributed 
by a longer-service person is not commensurate with the higher pay, 
the organization can save money by replacing higher-paid, longer-ser 
vice employees with lower-paid, shorter-service employees. Employ 
ers today address this issue by using different types of compensation 
programs that are much less linked to seniority.
Employee benefits in the United States may comprise 30 40 per 
cent of cash compensation. Older workers may have higher benefit 
costs depending on the structure of the programs. Some general com 
ments on benefit costs follow.
  Traditional defined-benefit plans (based on final average pay) cost 
more for both longer-service and older employees. For large 
employers in the private sector, the average value of a traditional 
pension plan is 3-5 percent of pay. Pension benefits and costs in 
public employment tend to be much higher.
  Defined-contribution plans, unless they have formulas linked to 
age or service, have the same cost regardless of age or service. 
Employer contributions to defined-contribution plans range from 
no contribution to 15 percent of pay.
  Medical care for individuals generally costs more with increasing 
age (except for maternity benefits, which have a high cost for 
younger employees). Per employee costs are also influenced by 
number of covered dependents. The average number of depen 
dent children is likely to increase by age and then decline. How 
the cost of a health benefit plan varies by employee age depends 
on the structure of the plan, the numbers of covered dependents, 
and the plan's cost-sharing provisions. Employer spending per 
active employee averaged $4,097 in 1999 according to the 1999 
Mercer Foster Higgins National Survey of Employer Sponsored 
Health Plans. Spending per active employee includes the cost of 
coverage for the employee and covered dependents.
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  Vacation time often increases with length of service, so it costs 
more for longer-service employees.
  Life insurance and disability benefits become more expensive 
with increasing age.
  Many factors affect absences, and no generalization can be made 
about patterns of absence and age.
The bottom line is that experienced employees bring greater value 
to some jobs and that older employees do cost more in many benefit 
programs. Whether the net impact of these factors is an advantage or 
disadvantage in employing more longer-service employees depends on 
the situation.
Companies who offer continued health care to retirees have an 
added cost for this benefit. As indicated by Burtless and Quinn, the 
availability of retiree health benefits is an important factor in individual 
retirement decisions; a lack of retiree health benefits prior to Medicare 
eligibility is a barrier to retirement. Benefit costs can be a major factor 
in competition. For example, in the auto industry, the major traditional 
car companies had mature workforces and provided substantial bene 
fits to retirees. They were competing against start-ups who were either 
foreign companies manufacturing in the United States or joint ventures 
and overseas companies. The companies with mature workforces had 
a substantial cost disadvantage, partly due to benefit costs. These com 
panies had to downsize and ultimately restructure to remain competi 
tive.
ENVIRONMENT FOR EMPLOYER 
RETIREMENT PROGRAMS
In the year 2000, the environment provides a backdrop for the 
employer response to employee benefit issues. Some of the key factors 
that affect private businesses are as follows.
  Employers are facing shortages of skilled workers for certain 
jobs. The recruitment and retention of employees has become a 
high-priority issue for many businesses. This issue creates a good 
situation for focusing on creating better opportunities for older
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workers. However, Burtless and Quinn indicate that economic 
conditions are not a major factor in determining older worker 
labor force participation rates.
Business is becoming more global. Many global businesses are 
working to create common cultures.
Mergers and acquisitions have become commonplace. Some of 
the deals are large, and they often cut across countries. Often, the 
aftermath of the deal is to sell lines of businesses that do not fit 
the large organization, which results in one large organization and 
several smaller ones. Many mergers result in the dislocation of a 
substantial number of employees. Nearly all require revisiting 
the appropriate retirement programs in the new organization. To 
integrate organizations, it is usually necessary to provide a com 
mon pension program for future periods. In some of these situa 
tions, employers offer new benefit packages after the merger. It is 
common to use early retirement window programs to help imple 
ment postmerger changes and workforce adjustments.
The common trend is to have employees assume more responsi 
bility for their own retirements, including stressing the impor 
tance of employee saving, and employers are offering more 
opportunities for employees to save. However, Americans save 
relatively little; this strategy is therefore likely to disappoint many 
people.
U.S. equity markets have performed with uneven results. While 
some organizations have seen huge increases in the value of their 
stocks, others have not. Markets demand strong performance, 
which drives the fine-tuning of organizational structure. Key 
employees commonly receive stock options, and many employ 
ees get stock purchase opportunities. In many organizations, 
company stock is an important source of employee wealth that 
will facilitate retirement.
The compensation systems of emerging e-commerce businesses 
have focused much more attention on stock options and owner 
ship opportunities. These businesses, particularly start-ups, can 
have a large part of their compensation package based on stock.
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Traditional businesses as well as new start-ups are feeling the 
impact of this competition.
Technology and electronic business are changing the way busi 
ness is being done. Employees are faced with constant and, at 
times, overwhelming change. Only some workers adapt well to 
change. Dealing with employees who do not adapt well can be 
awkward.
Employers use a variety of employment systems. These systems 
include full-time, part-time, contract work, use of temporary 
employees, and increased use of individuals working as consult 
ants and doing projects on a consulting basis. Some of the most 
attractive opportunities for using older workers may be outside of 
full-time employment.
There is a widespread belief that employment patterns are chang 
ing and that employees will change jobs more frequently in the 
future. Trend data on length of service with current employer by 
age group show a long-term trend of modest reductions in male 
length of service and increases in female length of service. The 
biggest reductions are for males at and just before early retire 
ment age. Male and female tenure patterns are becoming more 
similar. The data show modest change and do not match the per 
ceptions of radical change.
Companies are taking employee performance more seriously and 
working diligently to measure it. In addition, there is much less 
tolerance to retain a marginal performer. The demands of the 
competitive environment and equity markets push companies to 
improve productivity.
Regulatory and legislative requirements have increased greatly 
over the last 25 years, and employment-related litigation can be 
costly. Employers need legal advice when developing virtually 
all employment policies and practices.
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PRIORITIES FOR HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
During 1999, William M. Mercer, Incorporated, surveyed large 
employers in the United States, the United Kingdom, and continental 
Europe to better understand their priorities and the factors driving 
retirement strategies. Table 1 shows the priorities of the multinational 
respondents to this survey.
Controlling cost levels and attracting new talent were the most 
important workforce issues faced by respondents, with more than 9 in 
10 rating each as critical or major. The biggest difference between 
U.S.-headquartered companies and companies headquartered in the 
United Kingdom or continental Europe was that 28 percent of U.S. 
respondents cited retaining employees longer as a critical issue, com 
pared with only 5 percent of U.K./Europe respondents.
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The Mercer results include responses from 230 organizations with 
international operations; 63 percent are headquartered in the United 
States, 12 percent in the United Kingdom, 23 percent in continental 
Europe, and 2 percent in Australasia. The respondents' international 
operations range from one location outside the headquarters country to 
almost 200, averaging 23. U.K./Europe-based companies averaged 30 
countries of operation, compared with 17 for U.S.-based respondents. 
Forty-four percent of respondents have at least 10,000 employees 
worldwide. These results point to employers trying to retain workers 
longer, but doing it in a way that controls costs. I view the use of alter 
native employment arrangements as particularly promising in that 
regard.
RETIREMENT PLAN STRUCTURES AND TRENDS
In the United States, we can define differences in retirement plan 
trends by size and type of employer. Larger private-sector employers, 
those with at least 1000 employees, often include in their retirement 
packages a combination of a base plan (which is paid for totally by the 
employer) and a savings plan (usually a 401 (k) plan). The savings plan 
generally provides for employee contributions and often an employer 
match, typically 50 percent of the amount paid by the employee up to 6 
percent of pay. The base plan may be a traditional final average pay 
plan, a hybrid plan (like a cash balance plan), or a defined-contribution 
plan. Traditional plans are still most common, but hybrids are growing 
in popularity. Many employers also offer employees and dependents 
continued health care on a cost-shared basis. Nearly all provide a com 
bination of tax-qualified plans and supplemental plans; the supplemen 
tal plans are used to make up amounts that cannot be paid in a tax- 
qualified plan.
In addition, these employers may offer other programs that help 
the employee build assets for retirement and help the employee own 
company stock. Medium-sized employers are more likely to use a sin 
gle plan, most often a defined-contribution (DC) plan, which includes 
an opportunity for employees to save. Such plans are usually managed 
through a single outsourced vendor such as a major mutual fund com-
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pany. Medium-sized employers are unlikely to offer retiree health ben 
efits. Most small employers, those with under 50 employees, do not 
offer any retirement benefits. Those that do offer retirement benefits 
are most likely to offer only a defmed-contribution plan.
The use of defmed-contribution plans has grown in the United 
States, with these plans part of a combined program in larger organiza 
tions and the sole program in medium and smaller organizations. 
Many countries experience parallel trends. A recent study "Defined 
Contribution Retirement Plans around the World: A Guide for Employ 
ers", published by William M. Mercer, Incorporated, shows the growth 
in popularity of defined contribution plans and the truly global nature 
of this trend. Table 2 shows the percentage of companies having plans 
today and projected to have them in 2003 for selected countries.
WHAT CAN EMPLOYERS DO?
Many employers are concerned about retention, but relatively few 
have focused on delaying retirement beyond normal retirement age as a
Table 2 Employers Sponsoring Defined-Contribution 






































method of increasing retention. However, many of those employers 
who had large "cliffs" in their retirement plans have focused on this 
issue. A cliff is a liberal early retirement benefit, so an employee who 
qualifies for this benefit gets a subsidized benefit. For example, the 
benefit might be available at age 55 with 30 years of service. Such 
benefits encourage people to stay until the point of the cliff and then do 
little to encourage staying after that point. They artificially bunch 
retirements. Many of the employers who had cliffs have redesigned 
plans to eliminate them for future employees. A variety of transition 
plans are used to phase-out such provisions. Benefits already earned 
are protected by law, but benefits to be earned in the future are not. 
Plans generally reserve the right to the plan sponsor to change benefits 
to be earned in the future. When plans are changed, most larger organi 
zations offer transition benefits greater than what is legally required to 
protect employees near retirement, because they often will have made 
plans based on expected benefits. Eliminating cliffs smooths out retire 
ments by removing or reducing incentives to retire at a particular point 
in time.
For those employers who want to encourage longer work, a variety 
of strategies is available. The most important strategy is creative work 
options. Some older workers would prefer to continue working, but 
with a different schedule and pace than full-time workers. This option 
particularly applies to professional and technical people, who have 
faced increasing demands and schedules for a number of years. Inno 
vative work options are an important first step. Pension design needs 
to be considered together with innovative work options ensure benefits 
make sense in light of the work options. As indicated by Burtless and 
Quinn, defined-contribution plans are age neutral with regard to 
encouraging retirement. The same is true for cash balance plans. 
However, neither type of plan automatically goes to the next step and 
supports phased retirement. Optimal support of phased retirement 
requires legal changes.
Some of the work options used today involve temporary and con 
sulting work. Under such arrangements, generally no provision is 
made for benefits and no implication of continued employment beyond 
the immediate project or assignment. The individual can, however, be 
hired for further assignments. Many organizations prefer such arrange 
ments, which involve no long-term commitment and less legal risk,
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although they may require higher out-of-pocket spending for the spe 
cific assignment. Some organizations use retiree pools as a method of 
enabling their retirees to secure temporary work in the company. 
Another important issue is to establish a culture that values experience 
as well as provides training to maintain skills and stay up to date.
To be successful with a program to encourage older workers to stay 
longer, an organization needs to have a strong performance manage 
ment system fairly applied to all employees. This system is necessary 
so poor performance can be dealt with fairly. When an organization 
fails to manage performance effectively, it can sometimes look to 
retirement as a substitute for managing performance.
Medical benefits are also important. Many people seeking bridge 
jobs need medical coverage. Offering some medical coverage to part- 
timers would be a way to attract this group. Cafeteria benefits are also 
a good idea as employees can tailor their benefits to personal needs.
NEXT STEPS
The ideas for further work and exploration include the following:
  Research the impact of age discrimination legislation on pro 
grams to encourage later work.
  Identify policy changes needed to accommodate phased retire 
ment programs that would permit partial payment of benefits 
together with continued work.
  Investigate alternative definitions of retirement and the implica 
tions of using them.
Burtless and Quinn have also suggested several ideas for further policy 
incentives. It would be helpful to expose these ideas to various stake 
holders to get their reactions.

Living Longer, but Able to Work?
Glenn Pransky 
Liberty Mutual Center for Disability Research
and 
University of Massachusetts Medical School
There is ample evidence that retirement is much more common and 
is occurring at younger ages than at any previous time in U.S. history. 
Despite earlier suggestions that this trend is caused by declines in the 
average health of older working populations (Verbrugge 1984), more 
recent data has effectively rebutted this assumption by demonstrating a 
significant wealth effect (Yeas 1987; Shephard 1995). Social welfare 
policy now seeks to postpone publicly financed retirement. Whether 
this will succeed or not depends on the ability of those who would 
retire on Social Security but are now expected to work longer to 
sustain continued and substantial employment. In part, this will be a 
function of their health status and functional capacity, manifest as the 
capacity to work in those jobs that will be available to them.
The work status of an individual at any point in time is a function 
of retirement choices, functional capacity, and the requirements of 
employment. Involvement in the workforce can be viewed on a contin 
uum from regular, full-time employment to informal, part-time or 
occasional work. Salary, benefits, and other dimensions of work may 
vary independently of the level of involvement. Retirement choices 
reflect an individual's economic resources (including wage replace 
ment benefit adequacy and availability), preferences, employment 
alternatives, and outlook, as well as societal norms.
The ability to work is also an important influence on the retirement 
decision. This is best understood in relation to the demands of a partic 
ular job and is determined by prior skills and training, the effects of 
normal aging processes, and the presence of chronic diseases. Job 
demands include cognitive, interpersonal, and physical requirements; 
they may be expressed as typical or minimal requirements and may be 
moderated by accommodations. In order to appropriately assess the 
effect of aging and health on capacity to work, the contribution of all of 




There is no doubt that Americans are living longer (Table 1). 
Much of the reduction in mortality over the past decade is attributed to 
improvements in the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of cardiovas 
cular and other chronic diseases, as well as to lifestyle modifications 
such as improvements in diet, exercise, and rates of cigarette smoking.
Has success in mortality reduction resulted in an aging population 
with more morbidity, less ability to function, and thus less average 
work capacity at a given age? Or, have gains in morbidity paralleled 
gains in mortality, so that there is a prolongation of disease-free and 
highly functional years of life? A definitive answer would require 
repeated, objective measures of illness and function for large succes 
sive cohorts of Americans near retirement age information that is not 
now available. Most attempts to address these questions have relied 
upon data from large, national, cross-sectional self-report surveys 
(Current Population Survey, the National Health Interview Survey 
[NHIS], and the Health and Retirement Study), or smaller longitudinal 
datasets from specific studies, such as the University of Pennsylvania 
graduates study.
The NHIS has been conducted as a stratified, cross-sectional sur 
vey of thousands of Americans each year since 1957. Detailed ques 
tionnaires ask about health, functional limitations, medical care, and 
socioeconomic status. Table 2 shows the dramatic age-related increase 
in men in the prevalence of selected self-reported chronic diseases and






























(Accessed May 2000); Kramarow et al. 1999.
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Table 2 National Health Interview Study, Disease/Condition Prevalence 
by Age (per 1000 Males)
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SOURCE: Adams, Hendershot, and Marano 1999.
limitations in ability to perform one's major life activity. Major life 
activity is defined as working or keeping house in those age 45-64. 
The reported prevalence of several chronic conditions increased signif 
icantly from 1981 to 1996. This likely represents a real change, but 
may be due to reporting biases as a result of better and earlier disease 
detection (Verburgge 1984, 1989). Despite these increases, the impact 
of these conditions on function appears to be significantly less in 1996 
than in 1981, especially in the elderly. This is consistent with greater 
prevalence yet lower functional impact of these conditions. Data from 
a smaller but more detailed Finnish longitudinal study of municipal 
workers further supports this premise (Tuomi 1997). Only 11 percent 
of workers with chronic illness said that their health was good in 1981, 
but the number was 42 percent in 1992. Similar findings also appear in 
the Health and Retirement Study (Crimmins et al. 1995), where the 
age-related increase in prevalence of chronic diseases was higher than 
the age-related increase in disability incidence.
Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate trends in self-reported work disability 
by age, emphasizing that those who have some functional limitations 
are much less likely to be working as they age. These responses are 
somewhat biased by current employment and retirement status. Per 
sonal beliefs also influence responses; for example, surveys of those 
with cardiac conditions have demonstrated self-reported work limita-
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Table 4 Persons with and without Work Disability Who are Employed or 
















































SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau 2000.
tions that are inconsistent with objective evidence of normal function 
and disease status (Fitzgerald 1993).
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that an increased risk of chronic 
disease and associated functional limitation is an expected conse 
quence of surviving into old age. Although the rates of illness and 
functional limitations increase with age, in some cases in a nonlinear 
fashion, there is no evidence of a specific age threshold where dramatic 
and consistent effects occur (Garg 1991). Although this observation
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could be a consequence of limitations in available data, the consistency 
of findings across studies lends credence to this conclusion.
One consistent finding is a major concern in relation to Social 
Security postponement. Low-income persons are most likely to be 
entirely dependent on Social Security for retirement. In the NHIS data, 
the rates and severity of illness and disability are inversely related to 
income. The American Changing Lives survey (House 1994) also doc 
umented a dramatic difference in significant functional limitations in 
low-income persons versus higher-income persons in every decade of 
age after 45 years old. A recent longitudinal study of university alumni 
found that healthy lifestyles were correlated with more disability-free 
years of life (Vita 1998); however, there is a strong inverse correlation 
between negative health risk behaviors and income. Thus, survey 
results and economic projections that are not stratified by income may 
not be helpful in answering questions about Social Security postpone 
ment.
AGING AND WORK CAPACITY
The effects of the normal aging process may be a much more com 
mon potential limitation to extending regular employment for most 
workers than are specific diseases. Many studies have documented 
age-related decrements in sensory, cardiovascular, motor, and cognitive 
function, and decreases in long-term memory, reaction time, learning 
ability, isometric strength, and job performance (Garg 1991; Robertson 
and Tracy 1998; de Zwart, 1995). Average changes over a 40-year 
working lifespan were frequently on the order of 5-15 percent. How 
ever, those studies that employed a longitudinal design have often 
found that the most consistent age-related change is increased variance, 
greater than the mean change for most measures (de Zwart, Frings- 
Dresen, and VanDijk 1995; Robertson and Tracy 1998). Thus, it 
appears that there is more variation in physical and cognitive abilities 
among older people than among the young. This would also argue 
against a standard cut-off age for retirement. In a classic review of 
studies of age-related changes in job performance, Doering (1983) 
concluded that the results were mixed and inconclusive, although older
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workers did appear to consistently have difficulties in those rare jobs 
that required maximal levels of physical exertion.
Work capacity is significant only in relation to the demands of a 
specific job. Studies of persons with severe disabilities who are highly 
motivated to seek and maintain employment demonstrate that "objec 
tive" measures of ability to engage in gainful employment are poor pre 
dictors of actual employability. Many older workers with impairments 
gradually transition out of physically demanding jobs as they age. 
Thus, to understand the effects of health on work, job demands and 
accommodations, job selection, and motivation must all be considered 
(WHO 1993). Studies of older workers suggest that specific workplace 
design, training, organization, and accommodation approaches will 
increase employability (Shephard 1995).
As the economy evolves, the range of jobs available to older work 
ers will change (Table 5), presenting both opportunities and challenges. 
As work shifts to less physically demanding jobs, many functional lim 
itations will become less important. However, increased cognitive 
demands, new technologies, and requirements for longer work hours
Table 5 Projected Job Growth for the Top Ten Occupations, 1998-2008
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may present more challenges for older than for younger workers. Inno 
vative training, work organization, and accommodation strategies will 
be required in order to engage and retain them in these jobs (Sterns and 
Doverspike 1988).
CONCLUSION
Although an impressive body of literature is available on health, 
aging, and work, few conclusions are broadly generalizable. Recent 
findings of improvement in the average work capacity of older workers 
does not necessarily lead to a positive conclusion about the feasibility 
of continued work for those who will depend upon Social Security. 
Further research is needed to define and evaluate these issues for those 
who will primarily depend upon this source of income in their later 
years.
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Who can argue that older people staying active, engaged, and pro 
ductively working is a bad thing? Brookings Institution's Gary Burt- 
less and Boston College economist Joseph Quinn want older people to 
work more. They show that the institutional rules of Social Security, 
social norms, economic prosperity, and employer pension and health 
plans affect retirement behavior, and they offer changes in tax laws and 
pension rules that would "incent" more older people to work. Yet, 
there is considerable disagreement over how much choice people 
should have between working or not after a certain age.
There is a lot right about Burtless and Quinn's study. It is a compi 
lation of these experts' empirical findings on retirement and work and 
the detailed interactions of the Social Security's complex delayed 
requirement credits and earnings test. They sweep over a century of 
behavior lucidly in order to build the case for specific and easy-to- 
understand changes in the Social Security system and tax laws. There 
are, however, serious weaknesses that ultimately make their case for 
raising the retirement age in Social Security their major policy pre 
scription fail. The paper ignores the important differences between 
the longevity of whites and blacks, the employ ability of older women 
compared with that of men, and the relative importance of Social Secu 
rity benefits for married couples versus single women. Their proposals 
benefit employers as a group and the highest-earning professionals. 
The benefits of increasing the retirement age (thus cutting benefits) are 
not tremendous; Quinn and Burtless admit that increasing longevity is 
not the major reason for the Social Security system's projected short 
fall (their note 18). Moreover, the benefits of maintaining the system 
are large. Workers will pay higher taxes to keep the retirement age 
from increasing.
Joseph Quinn and Gary Burtless describe how older people in the 
United States have connected themselves to their work over the last 
century. Men are retiring at younger ages except during the last 
decade. Women are increasing their paid work at all ages. Allowing a
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paragraph's worth of celebration of the working class's achieving some 
leisure at the end of their working lives due to increasing wealth, the 
paper's main focus is to structure policies so that the elderly workers 
work longer.
The protagonist in the paper is the "U.S. taxpayer" and the burden 
on this central player is the "burden imposed by an aging population," 
which could be lessened if workers "could be persuaded to delay their 
retirements and continue contributing to the health and pension sys 
tems." If people are to be persuaded to work longer, then the paper 
rightly identifies reasons about why people and by that they mean 
mostly men have been persuaded to retire earlier (except in the most 
recent decade). One theory is that workers have poor health; a second 
is that older workers face labor market discrimination; and a third is 
that workers want to retire and can increasingly afford it.
The authors reject the first theory by asserting the physical jobs 
requiring youngish bodies are on the decline, and that, on average, peo 
ple live longer. Let us look closely at this bit of received wisdom: first, 
at the cost of this longevity and, second, at the extent and distribution 
of it. Figure 1 shows that increased longevity and work ability of the 
elderly is overblown. The top line shows that life expectancy for a 65- 
year-old male has increased only a few years since 1950 age 78 to 
age 81 an increase, but not a dramatic one. What is dramatic, as 
Burtless and Quinn also emphasize, is that male labor force participa 
tion rates are falling. This is a clear demonstration of how workers 
have chosen to spend the increases in the nation's productive capacity. 
The "gap" between work and death also represents a long hard fight for 
victory that workers pay for from employers and the state.
Averages hide crucial differences. Unlike whites, African-Ameri 
can males are not enjoying significant increases in longevity. Since 
five years ago, white males at age 65 live 2.6 percent longer almost 
two years while an African-American male's expectation went up 
seven months. Even worse is that the lower expected longevity of an 
African-American male entering the work force at age 20 in 1994 
means that on average he'll retire for less than two months at full bene 
fits. Robert Ball warns us that the Social Security system cannot right 
work and social injustices, but raising the normal retirement age has 
profound differential effects by race (Table 1).
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Figure 1 Workers Won Retirement: The Gap between Death and Work, 
1950-1994
90
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SOURCE: Steurele and Bakija (1994).
In addition to the variation in longevity among groups, it seems 
that the desire to work past 65 is concentrated in a few select groups. 
Only 4 percent of the elderly in the lowest income quintile have earn 
ings, whereas almost 40 percent in the top have earnings (EBRI1995). 
This corroborates other evidence that higher-income professionals are 
most likely to voluntarily work past normal retirement age (Bovbjerg 
1998).
Quinn and Burtless acknowledge, and I agree, that people with 
jobs requiring stamina and brawn should get early retirement through 
the disability insurance system; this is an administrative change and 
helps those too old to work but not entirely disabled to retire. This pro 
posal increases costs.
The authors argue that retirement became more acceptable as it 
became more affordable, and that social norms alone affect behavior
442 Ghilarducci
Table 1 Longevity by Race and Sex, 1979-1980 and 1995
in 1979-1980 in 1994 Increase in longevity 
Race/sex (yr.) (yr) in 15 years (%)
Expected age at death for 
those at age 20
White male 72.5 74.4 2.6
White female 79.4 80.4 1.3
Black male 66.4 67.1 1.1
Black female 74.9 75.5 0.8
Expected age at death for 
those at age 65
White male 79.3 80.6 1.6 
White female 83.6 84.1 0.6 
Black male 78.3 78.6 0.4 
Black female 82.1 82.2 01 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce 1997.
(controlling for all the other factors). In support of the social approba 
tion hypothesis, they suggest that that ADEA of 1978 that gradually 
eliminated most mandatory retirement ages may have encouraged the 
recent increases in work among the elderly by reducing age discrimina 
tion and sending a signal to older Americans that work was socially 
acceptable.
The fact that the social signal affects some groups—like white, 
upper-income professionals—more than others is not a factor in their 
analysis. Most workers do not want to retire later and they are willing 
to pay for it. Most importantly, "encouraging" working more by low 
ering pensions has high costs paid by some and benefits reaped by oth 
ers.
To this point, I am reminded of a conversation I overheard in 1997 
between the former President of the Bricklayers and Allied Craftwork- 
ers Union, John Joyce, and Estelle James, lead author of the World 
Bank's 1994 pension study, which had a theme similar to that of Burt- 
less and Quinn. She complained about his remarks given in a speech as 
misinterpreting the World Bank's support for advance funding and par 
tially privatizing the world's pay-as-you-go retirement systems. Our
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argument is complicated, she protested. Such policies would protect 
the old and promote economic growth.
He turned, facing her directly and said, "Don't you want workers 
to work longer?"
"Yes," she said, "That's part of it."
The union president replied, "Then you are taking something away 
and giving nothing back."
I recall the conversation to make meaningful two observations that 
Burtless and Quinn acknowledge in their otherwise unambiguous call 
for older retirement ages. First, they argue that it may desirable to raise 
the retirement age but U.S. workers don't want to work longer. (They 
show us that older Americans work longer than most workers in OECD 
nations.) Eighteen polls over a 20-year period ending in 1997 showed 
that Americans oppose raising the retirement age. Burtless and Quinn 
imply that people may be responding to the survey this way because 
they want to retire even earlier, before age 55. However, Burtless and 
Quinn concede that workers may understand the cost of what they 
want; they cite a recent EBRI poll that showed that, by a 2:1 majority, 
"workers favor higher payroll taxes over reduced Social Security pen 
sions."
Indeed, when given a chance, Americans are willing to pay for 
what they want. Union demands reflect the preferences of the average 
worker rather than the marginal or last worker hired in nonunion set 
tings (Freeman 1981). The preferences of union and nonunion workers 
between pensions and wages are startling. According the Employment 
Cost Index in the 10-year period between 1980 and 1990, union work 
ers had negative real wage increases but positive two-digit increases in 
pension contributions. Nonunion workers had the opposite experience: 
real wages increased by a bit, but pension costs plummeted. There are 
many factors—age of the workforce and industries—that can explain a 
huge difference in compensation patterns, but the simplest is consistent 
with other evidence. When asked, as they are when they vote for a col 
lectively bargained contract, workers are ready to pay for their end of 
career leisure with reduced wages (Ghilarducci 1997). In other ways, 
U.S. workers have also demonstrated they will pay to retire. Payroll 
taxes increased by 16 percent in 1983 when Congress endorsed many 
of the recommendations of the Greenspan Commission.
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Quinn and Burtless also acknowledge that households are also pay 
ing for retirement by increasing hours of work when they are younger. 
The average hours of work by the U.S. population has increased signif 
icantly since 1968. Workers between 25-54, on average, work 14 per 
cent more hours than they did 30 years ago, because more women took 
jobs.
Quinn and Burtless have six proposals.
1) Raise the age at which full Social Security benefits can be 
received to age 67 (or an age that is increased according to 
increases in average longevity). This lowers benefits.
2) Exempt older workers from payroll taxes. This, of course, 
strains the Social Security program.
3) Make employers prorate fringe benefits for part time workers so 
that firms will more likely hire older workers for more than 35 
hours if the cost of hiring them for less increases. This will raise 
the cost to employers.
4) Make Medicare the first insurance payer. This will raise Medi 
care costs but might reduce the employers' costs for older work 
ers.
5) Raise the EITC for older workers. This is paid for by general 
revenue.
6) Repeal the earnings test so that workers receive full Social Secu 
rity benefits regardless of earnings. This helps those earning 
over $17,000 per year.
Who wins and who loses?
• Employers win in three ways from Burtless and Quinn's propos 
als. First, there are significant wage subsidies for employers hir 
ing older workers inherent in expanding the EITC, repealing the 
earnings test, making Medicare the first payer, and lowering pay 
roll taxes. These reduce wage costs. Second, increasing the sup 
ply of workers reduces the bargaining power of all workers and 
puts downward pressure on wages. Third, higher-income work 
ers would pay for an expanded EITC through general revenues 
generated by the progressive federal tax system. Proposal three,
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however, requiring employers to partly pay for the fringe benefits 
of part time workers, may increase costs if employers don't 
switch part-time workers to temporary status.
• Higher-income older workers win. Workers who would have 
worked longer anyway—white-collar professionals—are reward 
ed by getting a larger delayed retirement credit and by the elimi 
nation of the earnings test. Higher-income workers also benefit 
more than lower-income workers do because they are unlikely to 
retire at the earlier ages and take the lower pension.
• Middle-class workers lose. Instead of raising the retirement age, 
the Social Security system can raise payroll taxes. Lower-income 
workers—those in the first two quintiles—are almost fully subsi 
dized by the EITC. So middle-income workers would have to 
pay the bulk of this increased cost if the earnings cap is not 
expanded. However, since these workers are more likely to retire 
at age 65 or earlier, then they pay for their retirement and "get 
something back" from their taxes.
• Blue-collar workers, workers in stressful jobs, and jobs sensitive 
to the business cycle will lose when the normal retirement age 
increases because they are much more likely to leave at the earlier 
ages and accept a lower pension.
• Older women lose. Women who do not work longer, and conse 
quently receive a lower pension, will have lower earnings. This 
group is already at greater risk of poverty; the poverty rate for 
older single women is 22 percent, compared with 4 percent for 
older couples (who are more likely to get income from earnings). 
The wage gap between older men and women is also higher, sug 
gesting that work opportunities for older women are more limited 
than for older men.
• Workers of all ages lose. If older workers have to work two to 
three years longer to get full benefits, then the increased supply of 
older workers searching for jobs depresses bargaining power and 
wages.
The gap between death and retirement shows a potential labor 
force ready to work if other sources of income—like Social Security 
and pensions—are made less certain and generous. In the year 2000,
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approximately 4.2 million Americans over the age of 65 are expected 
to be in the labor force. If the labor force participation rates rise to the 
1950s level because of smaller Social Security benefits, the number 
jobs created would have to triple or unemployment will soar, which in 
turn will suppress wages. Burtless and Quinn assure us that the "job- 
creating capacity" of the American economy will accommodate this 
increase supply of workers. They credit the "flexible" U.S. labor mar 
ket's ability to absorb workers. They acknowledge that "if older work 
ers were forced to wait for two or three extra years for full Social 
Security retirement benefits to begin," many would work longer in their 
jobs or spend more time looking for work. This would "certainly 
depress the wages of aged job seekers."
British Philosopher Bertrand Russell helps us step back from the 
costs and benefits of reducing pensions and encouraging older people 
to work by commenting on the urge behind the urge. He writes in the 
1935 essay In Praise of Idleness (p. 17),
The idea that the poor should have leisure has always been shock 
ing to the rich . . . When I was a child, shortly after urban working 
men had acquired the vote a number of public holidays were 
established. I remember hearing an old Duchess say, "What do 
the poor want with holidays? They ought to work.
In sum, this paper does not make the case for increasing the retire 
ment age; the current projected numbers of retirees can be paid for 
through a modest increase in the payroll tax, which by all evidence 
seems to be acceptable to the American public. Moreover, the cost 
incidence of raising the retirement age would benefit high-income pro 
fessional workers and employers at the expense of middle-income and 
women workers. Given the persistent problem of growing income ine 
quality, any proposal that increases the gap between the top and bottom 
is unadvisable.
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Policy Options for Filling Gaps in 
the Health Insurance Coverage of 
Older Workers and Early Retirees
Len M. Nichols 
The Urban Institute
This chapter offers answers to two questions concerning the health 
insurance of Americans between the ages of 55 and 64: 1) who has the 
greatest need for health insurance policy intervention? and 2) which 
types of policies are likely to be most effective for these subgroups? 
The chapter draws upon recent literature and other chapters of this 
book. I present a brief analysis of a broad range of policy options, as 
well as some quantitative simulation exercises which highlight key fea 
tures of alternative targeted coverage strategies. While care was taken 
to make the estimates realistic, all simulations are at best illustrative of 
certain principles and should not be interpreted as definitive estimates 
of the cost or coverage impacts of particular proposals. Finally, I use 
the lessons from the examples to explore a relatively new way of think 
ing about financing subsidies for the purchase of health insurance. 
This view may have particular relevance for the age 55-64 cohort as it 
grows in the coming decades.
WHO HAS THE GREATEST NEED FOR HEALTH 
INSURANCE POLICY INTERVENTION?
Recent policy discussions of coverage expansion options often 
focus on children or their parents, partly because members of the age 
55-64 cohort are among the non-elderly most likely to have health 
insurance in the United States (Campbell 1999; Swartz and Stevenson 
2001). Swartz and Stevenson report that only 15 percent of this group 
lacked health insurance in 1998, compared with 30 percent of 18- to 
24-year-olds and 24 percent of 25- to 34-year-olds. Only the prime age
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working population, 45-54, had a lower incidence of being uninsured 
(13.6 percent).
However, a compelling case can be made that the consequences of 
being without health insurance are potentially much more damaging to 
this oldest pre-Medicare cohort than to other non-elderly citizens, for 
two reasons. First, the financial risk of no coverage is greater.
Table 1, constructed with 1987 National Medical Expenditure Sur 
vey (NMES) data, makes the point about higher financial risk. It 
reports ratios of per capita spending amounts for all adults, not just 
workers, by age and health status category. It shows that a 55- to 64- 
year-old man in good health (self-reporting excellent or good) should 
expect to spend 2.5 times as much as a young man (21-29) in equally 
good health. But the age-cost gradient is steeper for men in bad health 
(fair or poor), at 4.2. For women, the direction is the same, but the 
severity of the effect is less, largely because maternity costs are associ 
ated with younger women. Interestingly, the pure health status gradi 
ent is identical across genders at 2.7. Thus, the near-elderly in bad 
health can expect to spend 2.7 times as much as their cohort counter 
parts in good health.
Table 2 shows the percentage of each age cohort, by gender, that 
reported fair or poor health status in the 1987 NMES. These data show 
that the incidence of bad health increases dramatically with age. So, 
while they are relatively well covered as a group, 55- to 64-year-olds 
are indeed more likely to be financially vulnerable to the absence of 
health insurance coverage than other non-elderly Americans; they can 
expect to spend more if uninsured for both age and declining health 
status reasons.
Table 1 Per-Capita Spending Ratios by Gender, Age, and Health Status
Males Females
Good health3 Bad health Good health Bad health
Ages 55-64 / 21-29 2.5 4.2 1.3 1.9 
Age 55-64, bad/good health — 2.7 — 2.7
SOURCE: Author's calculations using 1987 NMES data. 
a Good health = excellent or good; bad health = fair or poor
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Table 2 Share of Each Age Group in Fair or Poor 
Health Status (%)
Age Men Women 
21-29 8^8 12X) 
30-54 14.8 18.1 
55-64 34.1 35.6 
SOURCE: Author's tabulations using 1987 NMES.
Second, potentially greater vulnerability from having no health 
insurance is greater health risk. Many studies have found that the unin 
sured enjoy less access to care and that both their health status and 
mortality risk are worse than is the case for the insured (Franks, 
Clancy, and Gold 1993, Franks et al. 1993). None as yet (to my knowl 
edge) have found an age-related dimension to worsened outcomes or 
greater health risk from being uninsured, but this is surely a testable 
hypothesis. If it turns out to be true, this would strengthen the case for 
why the 55- to 64-year-old cohort should be a policy priority. If the 
hypothesis is false, then the case for helping 55- to 64-year-olds is 
mostly financial (there would still be access differentials relative to 
need, since their average need is greater than younger cohorts).
Having established that the age 55-64 cohort deserves policy 
attention, who within the cohort is the most deserving? The usual and 
correct answers are the low income and those with low (fair or poor) 
health status. These two groups always fare less well in the U.S. sys 
tem of voluntary insurance markets, because comprehensive health 
insurance is now very expensive relative to low incomes and because 
insurers protect themselves against adverse selection by imposing lim 
its, restrictions, and outright refusals to insure at any price for some 
preexisting conditions (Chollet and Kirk 1998; GAO 1998). Among 
the 55-64 cohort, those living in family units with income less than 
200 percent of poverty (hereafter, low-income family units) comprise 
half the uninsured in the cohort, and those with fair or poor status 
regardless of income comprise 26 percent of the uninsured in the age 
group. Seventeen percent of the uninsured in this cohort are both low- 
income and in bad health.
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It is important to remember, as Swartz and Stevenson (2001) and 
Pollitz (2001) report, that public insurance programs play a vital role 
for the sickest in this age group, covering about 10 percent of all 55- to 
64-year-olds but over half of those who report not working because 
they are ill or disabled. Given the size of the uninsured population who 
report fair or poor health status to survey researchers, the public pro 
grams are clearly not able to cover all those who need coverage and 
can't afford to buy it on their own. Still, without Medicare and Medic- 
aid's disabled and medically needy programs, the coverage problem of 
this age group would be much worse. Also note that because Medicaid 
and Medicare cover the most disabled of the cohort, the risk of adverse 
selection from expanding voluntary coverage options for this age group 
is somewhat reduced.
Swartz and Stevenson report that some subgroups are particularly 
likely to be uninsured. The unmarried, especially women, and those 
who had lost a spouse to death or changing circumstance (separated 
and divorced) of both genders were more likely to be uninsured. 
Never-married women are particularly vulnerable. Women in general 
are more likely to rely on nongroup insurance (Swartz and Stevenson 
2001), which is less stable in an underwriting environment (which pre 
vails in most of the United States) than is group or public insurance. 
Thus, the most in need of policy intervention are the low-income and 
the less-healthy, especially women.
Predictable Future Strains
This picture is bleak enough for those who are other than healthy, 
married, high-income workers, but two trends make it imperative that 
policymakers begin to consider coverage expansion options for this 
population in a serious way: the size of the aging baby-boomer cohort 
and the decline of employer-sponsored retiree health insurance. In 
1998, there were 22.9 million people between the ages of 55 and 64; by 
2008, there will be 35.2 million. So whatever unique problems they 
have in getting and keeping health insurance coverage, these problems 
are going to increase in aggregate magnitude by roughly half in the 
coming decade.
In addition, a major pillar of coverage for 55- to 64-year-olds, 
employer-sponsored retirement health insurance (RHI), is eroding.
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Partly due to an accounting rule change that created strong incentives 
to drop RHI and immediately improve a company's balance sheet and 
stock price, and partly due to the changing labor market in which RHI 
is perceived as less crucial to attract good workers in an increasingly 
mobile global economy, there is a clear tendency on the part of 
employers to reduce the generosity of postretirement health insurance 
offerings (GAO 1998; McArdle et al. 1999). Between 1985 and 1993, 
the fraction of workers with access to employer-sponsored retirement 
health insurance declined from about 75 percent to about 50 percent 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1995). Perhaps most ominously, even large 
firms are both dropping RHI and charging early retirees higher and 
higher premiums for such coverage (McArdle et al. 1999; Loprest and 
Zedlewski 1998). Employer surveys indicate that fewer workers are 
likely to have access to RHI in the future (McArdle et al. 1999).
Of course, the other side of the coin is that the absence of good 
early retirement health insurance options probably keeps workers in 
the labor force longer (Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese 2000; Karoly and 
Rogowski 1998; Gruber and Madrian 1995). If public policy were to 
make generous subsidies widely available, rates of declines in labor 
force participation by older workers could regain their 1970s momen 
tum (Blau and Gilleskie 1997). Of course, some retirements are invol 
untary and health-related, even though the person might not be 
disabled enough to qualify for Medicare or Medicaid. Striking a bal 
ance here is clearly important, and thus any new subsidy proposal must 
be mindful of likely labor force (and payroll tax base) effects. These 
effects have been established qualitatively, but no consensus has been 
reached on the magnitude of likely responses to subsidies of varying 
degrees. This is an important and active area of research. 1
WHICH TYPES OF POLICIES ARE LIKELY TO BE MOST 
EFFECTIVE FOR THE NEEDIEST SUBGROUPS, THE 
LOW-INCOME AND THOSE WITH HEALTH PROBLEMS?
There are two key dimensions to coverage expansion policies for 
the near-elderly: the subsidy mechanism and the range of market 
opportunities for insurance or health services on which the beneficiary
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may spend the subsidy. The interactions of these dimensions is crucial 
in determining the ultimate effect of any policy initiative, and thus they 
really should be considered in tandem. To that end, I present Table 3, 
which should be thought of as a 4 x 3 matrix, each cell of which is a 
potential type of coverage expansion policy. This table tries to help the 
reader see that both dimensions are key to understanding the full set of 
implications about each policy alternative.
In this section, I briefly discuss some pros and cons of each 
approach.
COBRA Extensions
What I mean by mandates are laws forcing employers to make 
COBRA coverage available to workers for longer periods of time after 
they leave the firm. Under current law, if an employer offers insurance 
to active workers, then workers who sever employment (in firms with 
more than 20 workers) for any reason must be offered the option of 
continuing to enroll in the employer's plan—in exchange for paying 
102 percent of the total premium—for as long as 18 months (and 
longer under certain circumstances). COBRA provides bridge cover 
age to Medicare for many individuals who retire before age 65 
(Loprest and Zedlewski 1998). The idea behind extending COBRA is
Table 3 Policy Options for Filling Health Insurance Coverage Gaps for 
55- to 64-Year-Olds
Existing nsk
Current Reformed pools5 or New 
nongroup nongroup Group Purchasing 
Subsidy mechanism market market3 Authority















a Guaranteed issue, premium restrictions, etc.
b Purchasing co-ops, FEHBP, Medicaid, Medicare, state high-risk or HIPAA pools.
c NA = not applicable.
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to permit access to the group market longer, maybe 36 months or until 
the age of Medicare eligibility is reached (this is sometimes offered as 
a complement to proposals to raise the age of Medicare eligibility to 
67). The virtue of extending COBRA is that access to a shared-risk 
pool (the employer group) would be enhanced at low (nominally zero) 
cost to the federal government.
The downsides to COBRA extensions are 1) it does nothing for 
nonworkers save dependents of recent retirees; 2) while lower than 
most nongroup premiums, 102 percent of the employer premium is still 
more than many early retirees can afford to pay; and most seriously, 3) 
it constitutes an implicit tax on existing workers and firms, since wages 
will (on average) be lowered to pay for the higher premiums required 
to cover the cost of retirees. There would also be a second-order reduc 
tion in federal tax revenues, since wages are taxed and employer-pro 
vided health insurance premium payments are not. Thus, COBRA 
extensions are not "free" and, on the whole, do not seem to be a partic 
ularly effective way of extending coverage to those in this cohort who 
need it most. Recall, many of those most in need for early retiree 
health insurance worked for firms that did not offer employer-spon 
sored insurance to active workers. Having access to COBRA is fairly 
highly correlated with income in the first place (Loprest and Zedlewski 
1998).
Public Program Expansions
An administratively straightforward way to expand coverage for 
those most in need would be to change eligibility for Medicaid or 
Medicare or both. These programs already serve the very sick and dis 
abled (see Pollitz [2001] for a brief overview of each), and Medicaid 
also covers many low-income individuals, though typically much 
younger than this cohort. This approach, like the COBRA extension, 
would permit coverage expansion to avoid the complexities and ineffi 
ciencies of the private nongroup insurance market. These complexities 
can be severe, as we discuss presently.
The downsides to public program expansion are partly technical 
but mostly political. The technical problem is in "slightly" increasing 
the range of conditions or functional diagnoses that are considered 
"disabled" enough to merit inclusion in either Medicare or Medicaid.
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There is concern and some evidence that medical judgments are incon 
sistent and elastic, leading to an "endogenous" assignment of disability 
that could expand public program rolls well beyond the intent of the 
law and agreed upon medical need (Kubik 1996).
The larger objections to public program eligibility expansions are 
political. The obvious point is the considerable resistance in the Con 
gress to expanding any entitlement program, especially our entitlement 
insurance programs. In addition, if Medicaid—the joint state and fed 
eral program—is the preferred vehicle (and in general it has been the 
program expanded to accept broader definitions of disability in recent 
years), then truly effective expansion requires states to share the new 
federal goals, for they will be asked to spend their own money on this. 
The variance in state coverage and enrollment of different types of 
Medicaid eligibles suggests that this "goal sharing" should not be taken 
for granted.
Tax Credits
In contrast to public program eligibility expansion, there is cur 
rently something of a groundswell of bipartisan political support for 
tax credits that could be used for the purchase of health insurance. 
Briefly put, many are attracted to the principle of tax credits, even if 
there is no agreement yet on key details. This movement seems to be 
propelled by a confluence of forces in support of one or more of the 
following: 1) tax equity (why subsidize employer premiums but not the 
self-employed or nonworkers?); 2) individual choice (partly philosoph 
ical and partly a more subtle form of the current backlash against man 
aged care, led by those who have a strong stake in the fee-for-service 
system and blame employers for foisting managed care on workers); 3) 
target efficiency (which tax credits can be designed to be); and 4) tax 
cuts (as tax credits can be described for political purposes). Two recent 
papers have analyzed tax credits of various forms (Gruber and Levitt 
2000; Pauly and Herring 1999b) for the general non-elderly popula 
tion.
The major downside of tax credits is that they must be adminis 
tered within the income tax system. This makes it difficult to reach 
those who have no federal tax liability and do not file tax returns 
(approximately 45 percent of the uninsured in all age brackets [Gruber
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and Levitt 2000]). The tax system is a cumbersome avenue for any eli 
gible person of a means-tested program. (The opposition of Treasury 
professionals to administering subsidies through the tax system is leg 
endary inside the Beltway). Thus, using the tax system to administer a 
subsidy is likely to result in lower enrollment than would subsidies of 
equal size that could be obtained with less applicant and administrative 
burden. Second (and related), for tax credits to work well for the target 
low-income population, they must be both refundable (for those with 
zero or low tax liabilities) and available when premiums must be paid, 
i.e., up front, not in April of the following year. The low-income popu 
lation cannot finance health insurance with an interest-free loan, other 
wise they wouldn't need a subsidy in the first place. Refundability and 
prepayment raise serious year-end reconciliation complexities and 
potential reductions in target efficiency. Finally, as Pauly and Herring 
show and others have long stated (Blumberg 1999), tax credits must be 
fairly large to do any good at all for the low-income population. This is 
not a critique of tax credits per se, but rather a statement that they may 
work better for lower middle-income people than for the truly low- 
income population.
Direct Subsidies
Direct subsidies (a new program, not an extension of Medicare or 
Medicaid) could be designed to have the technical advantages of tax 
credits (target efficiency, horizontal equity) without the administrative 
disadvantages of using the tax system for a means-tested subsidy pro 
gram. This is not to say that the administrative difficulties of setting up 
a new subsidy program are trivial. But the motivating idea of a "new 
and different" subsidy program would be to provide direct purchasing 
power (and, perhaps, health plan purchasing expertise; more on this 
later in the discussion of market opportunities) without the regulations 
and complex vendor-relations histories of Medicare and Medicaid.
One downside of a new direct subsidy program is shared with tax 
credits, and that is that the subsidies must be large to engender much 
new coverage. The resulting public price tag contributes to direct sub 
sidies' major political problem, the absence of a widely shared new 
political vision for a new expansive health insurance entitlement.
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Using the Current Nongroup Market
The nongroup health insurance market is functional in all 50 states 
and works better than its reputation in some health policy circles, at 
least according to a new book by Mark Pauly and Brad Herring 
(1999a). They make one overarching and controversial empirical 
claim: risks are pooled to nearly equal (and imperfect) degrees by 
large-group, small-group, and nongroup insurers. They conclude that 
there is no systematic empirical evidence of aggressive risk rating by 
nongroup insurers.
Even if one accepts Pauly and Herring's new empirical claims (and 
I suspect they will remain controversial for at least a while yet), their 
fundamental deduction is that the primary differences between insur 
ance markets stem from their inherently different administrative load 
ing costs. Group insurance can exploit economies of scale and thus 
costs less than nongroup insurance can. Thus, high administrative 
costs are a major downside of the current nongroup market.
Other reports about the actual workings of the nongroup market are 
not so sanguine on the relative absence of aggressive risk rating (Chol 
let and Kirk 1998; GAO 1997; Hall 2000). Also, recall that risk rating, 
as well as age rating (which is ubiquitous and quite reasonable given 
the expenditure facts presented in Table 1), means that people in our 
cohort will pay higher equilibrium premiums under the current non- 
group market's relative laissez faire regulation, even if they can on 
average find policies to buy as Pauly's empirical results suggest. So, 
paying more for a given set of benefits plus paying a higher administra 
tive load is the reality for 55- to 64-year-olds in the unreformed non- 
group market.
Reforming the Nongroup Market
Almost all discussions of the actual behavior of nongroup insurers 
(Hall 1999; Chollet and Kirk 1998), as opposed to the empirical results 
of Pauly and Herring, invariably lead to calls for some kind of reforms 
(Swartz and Garnick 2000; Chollet and Kirk 2000; Hall 2000). The 
basic idea is that guaranteed issue and restrictions on premium vari 
ances would guarantee access at affordable prices for most people try 
ing to purchase coverage in the nongroup market. A reformed
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nongroup market could indeed look a great deal friendlier to the garden 
variety 55- to 64-year-old than it does in most states today (Pollitz 
2001 ;BCBSA 1999).
However, reforms that increase access for older and sicker would- 
be purchasers raise average premiums and are quite likely to raise by a 
substantial amount the premiums of most of those who were purchas 
ing in the prereform environment (Nichols 2000). Empirical evidence 
on the effect of nongroup reforms is scant if not rare, but the studies 
that have been done uniformly find that nongroup reforms do indeed 
reduce net insurance coverage overall (Marsteller et al. 1998; Zucker- 
man and Rajan 1999; Sloan and Conover 1998). Thus, while reforms 
would undoubtedly help some (perhaps especially those 55-64 with 
the greatest health needs), these reforms would also likely cause others 
to pay more and might cause them to go without coverage altogether.
Perhaps those who would obtain or would retain coverage in a 
reformed nongroup insurance environment have worse health status 
than those who voluntarily drop coverage because of premium 
increases. This is an important area of future research which is not 
well known at the moment. There are also case studies of how reforms 
have been implemented with relatively little obvious downsides 
(Swartz and Garnick 2000; Hall 2000; Nichols 2000). But these suc 
cessful implementation strategies require a degree of political will 
(e.g., requiring group insurers to offer products in the nongroup mar 
ket) that is not present in most states and does not appear to be present 
in Congress either.
Buying into Existing Risk Pools
If an unreformed nongroup market is unpalatable to most observers 
and a reformed nongroup market is fraught with tradeoffs for the 
unsubsidized to bear, then allowing 55- to 64-year-olds to take their tax 
credit or direct subsidy into a group setting to purchase health insur 
ance makes a tremendous amount of sense. Large pools exist and 
could be expanded at much lower administrative costs than either type 
of nongroup market could offer. Furthermore, they provide natural and 
existing risk-pooling mechanisms. Among the more attractive options 
are statewide purchasing cooperatives for employees of small busi 
nesses (CHIP in California), the Federal Employees Health Benefit
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Plan (FEHBP), or state employee plans (e.g., CALPERS in California). 
In addition, administrative and marketing efficiencies would result if 
new subsidies of whatever form were allowed to be used to buy into 
Medicare or Medicaid. Finally, state high-risk pools or the mecha 
nisms created by states to comply with HIPAA "federal eligibles" 
could also be opened up to the new beneficiaries at relatively low 
administrative costs.
The downside of using existing pools is that existing members 
might not be willing to be rated collectively with the new enrollees, 
especially if they turned out to be higher than average risks, even con 
trolling for age. Conversely, the new enrollees might not like being 
charged actuarially fair premiums with high-risk pool members, if that 
were the mechanism of choice. But once the decision is made to rate 
the populations separately, some of the administrative efficiencies of 
group purchase would be lost.
Allowing the newly subsidized 55- to 64-year-olds to buy into pub 
lic programs would not raise cost issues, because these programs are 
and would remain free to currently qualified beneficiaries. However, if 
the new enrollees got substantially different benefit packages—for 
example, if they got prescription drug coverage through a Medicare + 
Choice HMO—there might be stronger equity-based opposition raised 
by current beneficiaries. Further, deciding what price to charge the 
"buying" enrollees is no simple matter for a public program, for here 
the relative risk-rating heterogeneity and controversies seep back into 
the calculation.
Organizing New Risk Pools and Purchasing Authorities
Alternatively, with a new federal health insurance subsidy program 
targeted directly at 55- to 64-year-olds, the government could set up a 
whole new purchasing agency, modeled after the best private or public 
health plan purchasing agencies, that would organize enrollment and 
health plan options for the new beneficiaries. This entity could write 
RFPs and negotiate with health plans and insurers, while coordinating 
enrollment, beneficiary plan choice, and financial transactions to maxi 
mize administrative efficiencies for all. Eligibility standards would 
have to be established and enforced, but these functions have to be per 
formed somewhere by someone. Creating a whole new purchasing
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agent would have the major virtue of allowing the new program to 
establish its own relations with beneficiaries, vendors, and insurers 
without the legacies and resentments each might bring from the Medic- 
aid or Medicare programs. It may also be the only quick way to get 
creative about risk adjusting and competitive bidding, both of which 
may be particularly helpful for insuring the 55-64 population, as we 
shall discuss later after presenting some simulation results.
The downside of a new agency is that it would surely cost more to 
run at the outset than the marginal cost of adding these functions to 
existing Medicare or Medicaid programs. Plus, it would be vulnerable 
to the charge of government proliferation, since a new federal entity 
would be born. These disadvantages would have to be weighed against 
the potential long-run advantages of freedom from existing programs' 
rules. The ultimate judgment may hinge upon how much like a private 
sector "sponsor,"—e.g., the Buyer's Health Care Action Group in Min 
nesota or the Pacific Business Group on Health in San Francisco— 
Congress would want this new purchasing agent to be. The more free 
dom to contract and aggressive use of government bargaining power on 
behalf of beneficiary choices and welfare are valued, the more likely 
the optimal choice would be a new entity. However, if the public orga 
nization of subsidized beneficiaries' purchase of participating health 
plans is intended to be as passive as most Medicare and Medicaid 
health plan purchasing has been to date, i.e., if policymakers think of 
the program as a provider support device as much as a beneficiary sub 
sidy mechanism, then creating a new entity is not likely to be worth the 
political and administrative trouble.
A FEW SPECIFIC POLICY SIMULATIONS
In this section, I present some simulation results of the policy 
options that seem promising and efficient enough to be feasible in our 
current political environment of parsimony towards coverage expan 
sions (i.e., they are on a financial scale commensurate with Vice Presi 
dent Gore's proposal to cover parents of Medicaid and CHIP children 
and Governor Bush's modest tax credit proposal). Table 4 presents 
some contextual facts and basic assumptions.
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Table 4 Some Basic Facts and Assumptions





Low income and bad health 2.6
Est. standard premium ($) 2,500
Est. high-risk premium ($) 6,750
Est. community rate ($) 3,900
SOURCE: 1999 CPS and author's calculations in 1998 dol 
lars.
First, recall that there are approximately 23 million people between 
55 and 64 today. About 3.4 million are uninsured, while another 2 mil 
lion purchase coverage in the nongroup market, and thus their hold on 
health insurance is more tenuous than those insured through work (past 
or present) or in public programs. About 6 million people in this 
cohort have incomes below 200 percent of poverty, and 5.4 million 
report fair or poor health status. Finally, 2.6 million are estimated to 
have both low income and bad health status.
The key assumption in all policy analyses of coverage expansions 
is the premium that must be paid for the desired insurance product, for 
this parameter simultaneously determines both total program cost and 
enrollment (conditional on the income distribution) in the likely event 
that some (maybe all) will be made eligible for a partial subsidy. With 
out exaggeration, one can state that the reliability, representativeness, 
and quality of publicly available premium data for the nongroup mar 
ket range from fair to poor. I consulted studies of the nongroup market 
(GAO 1998; Chollett and Kirk 1998; Chollett 2000; Kirk 2000; Swartz 
and Garnick 2000; Hall 2000; Pauly and Herring 1999a), high-risk 
pools (Communicating for Agriculture 1999), analyses of Medicare 
buy-in proposals (Loprest and Moon 1999; CBO 1998), and both 
NMES and MEPS data (the latter supplied by John Eisenberg). The 
premium assumptions in Table 4 represent a judgmental average of all
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the above sources, where each source estimate or fact was adjusted to 
account for the particular nature of the underlying pool.
For example, high-risk pool premiums must be adjusted for the 
fact that they are set below the actuarial value, but claims and adminis 
trative costs are published along with premium receipts, so this is fairly 
simple. What is not published is the degree to which adverse selection 
into high-risk pools is likely worse than would result from the kinds of 
subsidy programs for the persons aged 55-64 who are uninsured (and 
thus not in a state high-risk pool) today. CBO and others made analo 
gous adjustments from the published estimates of nongroup premiums 
when predicting who would take a Medicare buy-in option. In addi 
tion, MEPS data were provided for workers only, and they are healthier 
than nonworkers in every age cohort. The NMES per capita spending 
data are in the public domain, and the data based on them that I pre 
sented in Tables 1 and 2 are for all 55- to 64-year-olds. They include 
nonworkers, obviously, but have the disadvantage of also including 
publicly insured individuals who are unlikely to switch into the new 
subsidy program and are most likely to be the sickest of all. Plus, the 
NMES data are from 1987, and while they can be "aged" using HCFA's 
national health account growth rates, the delivery system is quite dif 
ferent today, so the age- and health status gradients may have changed 
(though I suspect not much). 2
I welcome suggestions for better ways to estimate premiums for 
these kinds of policies, but I believe these estimates are at least "in the 
town the ballpark is in," to invoke Bob Reischauer's famous descrip 
tion of health reform estimates, and that will suffice for discussion pur 
poses at least. The important fact to note about them is the gap 
between the high-risk premium ($6,750) and the standard premium 
($2,500). The former are computed for those with fair or poor health 
status, and the latter for those in excellent or good health. The commu 
nity rate ($3,900) represents the weighted average of each type of per 
son if all nonpublicly insured 55- to 64-year-olds were to become 
insured through the hypothetical new subsidy program and the ratio of 
(fair + poor) -=- total is the same as in 1987.
Table 5 summarizes and compares the three subsidy policy initia 
tives I explore in some detail. My objective is to maximize coverage of 
the target population at minimum cost, so in each case, I assume a 
direct subsidy (to maximize participation and target efficiency) and that
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Table 5 Subsidy Options Simulated
Income-based subsidy for 55-64 year olds
100% for those below poverty
Sliding scale between 100-200%
Not available for those m public, with ESI/RHI
Group purchase mechanism 
Health status-based subsidy for 55-64 year olds
100% for those with fair or poor health
Not available for those in public, with ESI/RHI
Group purchase mechanism 
Income and health status-based subsidy for 55-64 year olds
100% for low income with bad health
Not available for those in public, with ESI/RHI
Group purchase mechanism
beneficiaries will be allowed to select plans through some kind of 
group purchasing mechanism, the exact nature of which is not speci 
fied. To be conservative, I assume this group purchasing agent is less 
efficient than either Medicare or large employers, and I therefore 
assign an administrative load on expected health care costs (which 
includes eligibility determination costs plus the agency's and the 
insurer's administrative costs) of 20 percent. Other institutional 
assumptions are that beneficiaries will be guaranteed issue (i.e., no one 
can be denied coverage because of health status) and that the newly 
subsidized population will be rated separately from participants in cur 
rent markets. In each case, I assume the subsidy is targeted and avail 
able only to those who are not currently enrolled in a public program 
and do not have access to ESI/RHI, but I presume that 90 percent of 
current participants in the nongroup market who are made eligible will 
participate in the program, and that 10 percent of those with ESI/RHI 
will drift over into the program either by choice or because their 
employers will induce or force them to.
The first policy is targeted to low-income 55- to 64-year-olds. It 
would provide 100 percent of the cost of a plan (presumed to cost the
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community rate of $3,900 in the income-related case) for all persons 
55-64 who have incomes at or below poverty and who are not eligible 
for Medicare or Medicaid and without access to ESI or RHI. Starting 
at incomes just above 100 percent of poverty, subsidies (and participa 
tion) decline along a sliding scale to 0 at 200 percent of poverty.
The second policy is targeted at those who have the greatest health 
needs. It would grant a 100 percent subsidy to all persons with fair or 
poor health, regardless of income. The price of coverage for each of 
these persons is presumed to be $6,750. Eligibility for this kind of pol 
icy could be determined or certified by physicians, in a process similar 
to the individual functional assessment test now given to potentially 
"disabled" Medicaid enrollees. Alternatively, and preferably from my 
point of view, one can imagine using a kind of underwriting process, 
similar to that used by nongroup insurers all the time, but in coopera 
tion with the purchasing authority so it can be standardized across 
plans. Postenrollment encounter data could be required of participat 
ing health plans to assess the accuracy of ex ante assessments, and this 
would work best if a competitive bidding process was also imple 
mented to set the price the government pays for this population.
In essence, this option is for the government to become an orga 
nized purchaser for those between 55 and 64 and in poor health. 3 In 
principle, there is no reason that moral hazard on the part of insurers 
should be debilitating for this scheme, and competitive bidding (and 
concomitant data reporting requirements just like private sector orga 
nized purchasers use) may be all that is necessary to minimize this risk 
and monitor the effectiveness of competition. If insurers can define 
health states that we agree deserve this kind of subsidy, then we can 
write an RFP for covering people who possess them and competitive 
bidding should be able to elicit a fair price for the government to pay. 
"Fair + poor" self-reported health status is merely a simplified way I 
can approximate a concept like "bad health" using nationally represen 
tative survey data. Using all of those currently reporting fair and poor 
health in the analysis of this option probably represents an upper bound 
of the numbers of people that AHRQ and private insurers would 
declare to be possessors of the appropriately targeted health states, i.e., 
those that lie between current definitions of disabled and the health sta 
tus level underlying the concept of "standard" risk in the insurance 
industry. Competitive bidding is a powerful tool for eliciting cost-
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based prices of services that has typically been absent when Medicaid 
and Medicare disability determination were being made. At a mini 
mum, it seems worth provoking a conversation about how this might be 
implemented, if people do agree that helping those with low health sta 
tus is a primary goal for coverage expansion policy, especially for the 
55-64 population which has a far greater percentage of members with 
fair + poor health status than the nonelderly age cohorts (remember 
Table 2).
The third policy explored is a combination income-health status 
subsidy. The idea is to provide 100 percent for all the low-income per 
sons who also have fair or poor health status. Again, the subsidy would 
not be available to those who have public coverage or access to ESI/ 
RHI.
Table 6 reports the bottom line results of these policy simulations.4 
No subsidy approach dominates in all dimensions, so that a case can be 
made for and against each of the subsidy targets. They were of course 
designed to illustrate certain prototypical features of each subsidy type.
The income-only subsidy covers the most people and is relatively 
target-efficient. The health-status-only subsidy costs more, but covers 
the vast majority of those with a compelling and unmet health-status- 
related demand for health insurance. The income + health status sub 
sidy is cheaper and more efficient than the health-status-only subsidy 
alone, for it covers 55 percent of the fair + poor people at 65 percent of 
the cost of the health-status-only subsidy scheme. This is because the 
fair + poor are more numerous in the lower income ranges.
Table 6 Simulated Results of Policy Options
Basis for subsidy
Newly covered (millions)
% of uninsured newly covered
% of uninsured in fair/poor health covered
Total cost ($, billions)




















SOURCE: Author's calculations using CPS, NMES, MEPS, and other data.
Session 5: Filling Gaps in Health Coverage 469
The relative efficiency of income + health status-based subsidies 
for this population is appealing to the economist in me, but it does 
leave out those in poor health at higher incomes. One might infer that 
those who remain uninsured do so voluntarily, since their families have 
means, but two facts about the current nongroup market in most states 
give pause to reaching this conclusion. First, in most states, insurers 
are allowed to refuse to sell in the nongroup market except to the rela 
tively small number of HIPAA eligibles. Pauly and Herring report that 
if the underwriting process leads a nongroup insurer to think that a per 
son's health merits a premium of 3 times standard, they most often 
refuse to sell at all. Recall that the NMES data support the existence of 
a 2.7 health status multiple within the 55-64 age cohort. If nongroup 
insurers measure applicants' health risks relative to the population stan 
dard, as seems likely, then many of those with fair or poor health status 
who are uninsured despite having higher incomes may very well have 
had trouble finding a willing seller. Second, even if they could find a 
willing seller at actuarially fair prices, the $6,750 price I estimated is 
more than 10 percent of income until income exceeds 8 times poverty 
(for single individuals). And of course, some insurers may offer a price 
far above the actuarially fair one in order to discourage purchases by 
individuals who are feared to be quite sick.
This price/income fact made me think about an addition to the 
income + health-based subsidy, an addition that relates to a choice 
between subsidies and separate group purchase mechanisms on the one 
hand versus subsidies and a reformed nongroup market on the other.
Suppose that instead of creating a new group purchasing entity, we 
gave the newly eligible subsidies and sent them off into a reformed 
nongroup market to purchase would they could. This approach would 
likely include some kind of community rating (CR) requirement, at 
least within age cohorts. Let h = the high-risk premium and c = the 
community rate. The idea is that the unsubsidized, those with incomes 
above 200 percent of poverty, say, could buy a policy at c. In that 
sense, you could say they were "community rate-protected," in that 
they would never pay more than c.
Because I am wary of trying to accomplish wholesale reform of the 
nongroup market in today's political climate, I recommended creating 
the separate group purchase mechanism and the types of subsidies I 
have described. But we could easily create a subsidy just for the
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amount above the community rate, h - c, for those who have incomes 
between 200 percent of poverty and 800 percent of poverty. That way, 
those with fair + poor health and incomes above 200 percent would pay 
c, the exact community rate they would have paid if we had reformed 
the nongroup market, but we could avoid the collateral damage to those 
whose premiums would have been increased. Presumably, most if not 
all of those in fair or poor health with reasonable incomes would gladly 
pay c to get guaranteed issue health insurance.
Table 7 reports the results of this type of subsidy. The first column 
is the same as column 3 from Table 6, the income + health status sub 
sidy. The "CR Protection alone" column reports what this h - c sub 
sidy does for those with incomes between 200 and 800 percent of 
poverty, and the final column combines it with the income + health sta 
tus subsidy we've already analyzed. There we see that the total cost is 
still modest, the target efficiency on those with fair or poor health is 
very good, and the overall target efficiency in cost per newly insured 
person is improved from that obtained with the income + health status 
subsidy without CR protection.
Finally, Table 8 compares the required net increase in average fed 
eral income tax rates necessary to finance the income + health status + 
CR protection subsidy (0.108 percent, that is, one-tenth of 1 percentage 
point) with the average premium increase in the nongroup market for 
55- to 64-year-olds if the same number of subsidized purchasers 
entered the nongroup market with guaranteed issue and community rat- 
Table 7 Simulated Results of Community-Rating Protection
Basis for subsidy
Newly covered (millions)
% of uninsured newly covered
% of uninsured in fair/poor health covered
Total cost ($, billions)























SOURCE: Author's calculations using CPS, NMES, MEPS, and other data.
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Table 8 Alternative "Tax" Rates from Subsidizing Low-Income 
+ High-Risk Protection (%)
Increase in average federal income tax rate required to 0.108 
finance Income + Health + CR
Increase in average premium from putting same number 23.9 
of high risk into nongroup market with CR
Share of nongroup market that would be high risk under 45.2 
reform
ing (23.9 percent). This large premium increase results because the 
fraction of nongroup purchasers who would be in fair or poor health in 
that cohort would basically double to 45.2 percent. I have no doubt the 
tiny income tax increase would cause much less disruption than this 
large premium increase, except perhaps in certain ideological circles 
which oppose all publicly financed coverage expansions.
CONCLUSIONS
The need for health insurance policy options for the 55-64 group is 
compelling now and is going to intensify as the baby boomers expand 
that cohort in the next decade. The financial risk of going without cov 
erage is high for members of this cohort, the health risks could be sub 
stantial (we do not know a great deal about this at the present time), 
and a traditional pillar of pre-Medicare coverage, employer-sponsored 
retiree coverage, is expected to continue to decline in prevalence.
Reasonably inexpensive and targeted subsidy programs can be 
devised and implemented that would go a long way toward covering 
the neediest near-elderly, those with low incomes and low health status. 
The subsidy and purchasing entity that achieves the best overall out 
come, in my view, has the virtue of highlighting the fact that subsidies 
most efficiently eradicate need when they reflect both income and 
health status dimensions of people's lives.
Researching and writing this paper has forced me to reflect on 
many dimensions of coverage expansion options. I would like to con 
clude by offering the following normative principles for health insur-
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ance subsidy policy that seem particularly applicable to the 55- to 64- 
year-old cohort and maybe others as well.
• No poor person should pay for health insurance. (Corollary: No 
person who makes more than 10 times poverty should tell a per 
son in poverty what that poor person can afford to pay.)
• No person with poor health should pay more than the actuarially 
fair community rate unless their income is high.
• The people of the United States can afford to offer substantial 
relief to 55- to 64-year-olds with low incomes who are also in bad 
heath, and indeed to most of those in poor health regardless of 
income.
• We can offer this relief with very modest income tax rate 
increases. This is a much less costly financing mechanism—in 
terms of social disruption—than forcing nongroup insurers to 
charge community rated premiums to all purchasers.
Notes
I am grateful to Kathy Swartz, Rich Johnson, Karen Pollitz, Alan Monheit, Marilyn 
Moon, Bo Garrett, Linda Blumberg, and Frank Sammartino for many helpful conversa 
tions and to Joseph Llobrera for timely research assistance. I remain solely responsible 
for all errors or omissions. The views expressed herein are mine alone and not those of 
the Urban Institute, its Trustees, or its sponsors. My address is 2100 M Street, NW, 
Washington, DC, 20037; (202)261-5697; lnichols@ui.urban.org.
1. See Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese (2000) for a summary of recent and ongoing 
work.
2. Berk and Monheit (1992) show that the distribution of health expenditures has 
been remarkably stable since 1929, so that the skewness (10 percent of the popu 
lation accounting for 70 percent of the spending) that was present in the 1987 data 
is very likely to still be present.
3. The hypothetical new program needs a name. For this cohort, all concepts are 
"near-something" (-Medicare, -work, -elderly, etc.). "Near" makes me think of 
something off in the distance, somehow better than what we have now. This all 
suggests Avalon, the mythical Arthurian island, shrouded in mist, where the Lady 
of Lake lives, where Arthur was taken after he was slain, and from whence Cam- 
elot will return, if it ever does. It could be the Avalon Purchasing Authority 
(APA), with apologies to the American Psychological Association.
4. In each case I assumed that a 100 percent subsidy would engender an 85 percent 
participation rate from the currently uninsured who were targeted, 90 percent
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from current nongroup purchasers who would be eligible, and 10 percent of cur 
rent ESI and RHI holders who are ineligible but expected to drift. I also assumed 
that participation would decline linearly as the subsidy falls to zero.
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The fact that older women are less likely to have health insurance 
coverage than they were a decade ago is not surprising, but the fact that 
they are about half as likely to have individual coverage than a decade 
ago is surprising. That they are about half as likely as younger women 
to have health insurance coverage as a dependent is sobering, as is the 
fact that nearly a quarter of older working women with health problems 
have no health insurance at all.
From the CPS, we have evidence that small firms are more likely 
than large firms to employ low-wage workers. We also see persistently 
lower wage levels among women, and especially among older women. 
It shouldn't altogether surprise us that these paths converge in a way 
that disadvantages older women in the workforce.
So there are a couple of problems to be solved. Len was charged 
with solving those problems—and did indeed think outside the box— 
and he certainly is a good seller of his perspective. But his discussion 
raised at least two questions in my mind: what would be the source of 
coverage for this population and what would be the source of subsi 
dies? These are low-wage individuals and low-wage families; as was 
mentioned in the last session, we know that these families require sub 
sidies to buy insurance. While I wouldn't expect to dictate what an 
individual should pay for health insurance, I would guess it would be 
something less than a tithe, less than 10 percent of family income. 
Therefore, I would guess that virtually all families below 200 percent 
of poverty, and perhaps higher, would need a significant subsidy to buy 
health insurance.
Len raises several possibilities for pooling risk, including FEHBP 
and state employee plans. We have been the route of mandated 
employer coverage in the private sector, and we abandoned it for a cou 
ple of reasons. Groups of any size don't like to accept individuals. 
From an underwriting perspective, individuals are a very different cast 
of characters. Employee plans are groups that form not for the purpose 
of insurance, individuals arrive explicitly for coverage, raising signifi-
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cantly the potential for adverse selection. People who seek coverage 
when they are sick are more expensive than the population average and 
more expensive than a group community rate. The only question is 
how much more expensive will these people be? It is not a question of 
whether individuals would like to be pooled with employee groups, 
but, from an insurance perspective and from an underwriting perspec 
tive, the two are very different. We have to worry also about people 
dropping away and destabilizing the group when they believe that they 
no longer need health insurance. Pools of employees don't pose that 
problem to the extent that pools of individuals do in a voluntary sys 
tem.
The program that Len envisions is appealing in some dimensions, 
but I would argue it is very unappealing in others, such as equity. Why 
would we want to construct yet another narrow program for a narrow 
subset of the deserving whomever? Why does an older woman who is 
sick and of low income deserve coverage more than a younger woman 
who is sick and of low income, or an older man who is sick and of low 
income? I don't understand why we would discriminate across a popu 
lation on the basis of age and gender, when in fact we don't allow that 
discrimination in any other aspect of our civic life.
We already have some programs expressly for people who are low 
income and people who are sick: Medicaid and Medicare. We have 
additional, usually very small programs in many states. In 28 states, 
there are more or less well-functioning high-risk pools. I would like to 
spend a few minutes talking about what those high-risk pools are and 
why HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
that Karen Pollitz talked to you about yesterday, might be a model for 
helping them to work better.
As I mentioned, 28 states have high-risk pools, although in five big 
states—California, Florida, Louisiana, Illinois, and Utah—they are 
closed to new enrollment. Despite the fact that high-risk pools are 
struggling in these and many other states, there are only seven states in 
this country that have no provision at all for high-risk individuals. 
Among the states that provide for high-risk individuals, one requires 
guaranteed issue and risk adjustments. Another caps the proportion of 
high risk that any one insurer must accept relative to its total business. 
TennCare blends Tennessee's high-risk pool with its Medicaid and 
CHIP programs. But the most common model is a separate high-risk
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pool, and the most common source of funding for these high-risk pools 
is an assessment on commercial insurers and Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
plans.
Well, you see the problem. States that fund a high-risk pool with a 
tax on insurers in effect reward employers who are self-insured. In 
turn, the tax base to support high risk becomes smaller as employers 
remove themselves from it. Hence, without federal action helping 
high-risk pools, they may be a lost cause; but with federal action on the 
model of HIPAA, they might work quite well by reaching across group 
plans, individual plans, insured plans, and self-insured plans, treating 
them as an insurance system that would support high-risk individuals 
without access to group coverage.
There are other aspects of high risk that might be fixed with 
HIPAA-type federal legislation. Many states have narrowed insurers' 
rating practices, especially in the small-group market but also in the 
individual market. At present, six states limit rate variation for health 
to less than two to one in the individual market, and eight states pro 
hibit health rating altogether in this market. The latter is the commu 
nity rate that Len talked about; there are indeed problems with low-risk 
people dropping coverage. But if there were a high-risk pool that 
would readily accept and fully subsidize excess risk, the community 
rate could be much lower in the general market.
In fact, the literature on the effect of a community rate on coverage 
in the individual market is extremely meager. I have not yet seen a 
study only of the individual market that evaluates the impact of regula 
tion. Nevertheless, Len's comment that some kinds of regulation 
depress coverage in the small-group market seems true from what we 
know thus far, and it is probably also the case in the individual market. 
Yet, if a high-risk pool accepted all extreme risks, then one would 
expect the standard rate in the conventional market could be signifi 
cantly lower and prohibition of health rating would not depress cover 
age. For example, Minnesota has the largest high-risk pool in the 
country, with over 25,000 people participating. Minnesota is a market 
in which insurers underwrite aggressively, and the high-risk pool actu 
ally has a distribution of risk. Its rates are affordable because of the 
distribution of risk in the pool as well as the usual subsidy to the pool.
At present, 11 states limit age rating in the individual market sig 
nificantly, and 3 states prohibit rating on age altogether in the individ-
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ual market. Eleven states also limit composite rating: that is, all rate 
factors taken together cannot produce greater variation in rates than the 
statutory limit. Those markets have not fallen apart, and they deserve 
closer investigation as potential models for new federal law constrain 
ing insurer rates, especially in the presence of a state program to absorb 
high risk.
In closing, I would argue that a principal danger is to try to fix too 
much. That is especially a danger when looking at private/public com 
binations that rely heavily on private markets to resolve problems of 
noncoverage. One example of attempting to fix too much may be 
states' efforts to reduce the waiting period for coverage of preexisting 
conditions, eliminating it or making it very brief. There I would argue 
that HIPAA offers a reasonable model. HIPAA provides that, if you do 
not come from an insurance plan, you have a waiting period on preex 
isting conditions up to 12 months, with a 6-month look-back. It is not 
perfect, but it recognizes the frailties of a voluntary system. If we are 
not going to require coverage, either of individuals or employers, then 
we must deal in reasonable improvements, knowing that they assure 
neither seamless protection nor universal coverage, especially for peo 




I've been asked to comment on this general issue from an 
"employer perspective," and I would like to remind everyone that we 
cannot easily generalize about the employer perspective because 
employers are such a diverse group. Employer reactions can vary very 
widely depending on their business, their locale, the size of their busi 
ness, their labor costs, their margins, their competition, their employee 
relations, and even their individual company cultures.
When you step up from individual employers to larger groups of 
employers—the business groups and the employer trade groups—you 
will find that there is somewhat more consistency across employer 
groups, but even at that level there are very significant differences 
when you are talking about employer positions on public policy. So, 
there is a wide diversity among the employer group, and as I speak on 
the employer perspective, I urge you to remember that.
THE UNINSURED
Let me say by way of context that the problem of the uninsured is 
indeed viewed as an employer problem as well, in two ways. For one 
thing, employers intuitively realize that they are paying more for health 
care because the costs of uncompensated care are being reflected in 
what they pay providers. The second thing is that large employers also 
realize that they are covering more individuals than they would have to 
cover under their plan if other employers offered coverage. So the 
problem of the uninsured is recognized by most of the large employers 
that we at Hewitt Associates deal with, but (with some notable excep 
tions), employers generally don't feel, at least at the individual com 




I think that you will see some thought leadership emerging on this 
issue and more attention devoted to it. But you'll find that employers 
have not devoted a lot of thought to the uninsured in their daily opera 
tions. For example, I am meeting with a company tomorrow which has 
spent $1.4 billion on health care this year for retirees and active 
employees. When you are spending $1.4 billion, it is hard for you to 
relate to what is needed for the uninsured, because your population is 
so well insured and so well covered. And large employers generally 
insure their employees at a very high rate.
TAX CREDITS
Len and others have talked about tax credits and tax incentives. In 
my experience, the combination of individual tax credits for the unin 
sured combined with a subsidy—such as an ability to buy into Medic- 
aid or state Children's Health Insurance Programs—employers would 
not lose a lot of sleep over that. If there were a direct and transparent 
tax increase on business associated with the subsidy, then I think you 
would get a different and stronger reaction. As the policy realm is 
evolving right now, it seems the individual tax credits would be most 
likely considered as a way of extending coverage for the uninsured and 
not as a way of replacing the current employer coverage or the current 
federal income tax exclusion, which would be potentially a major con 
cern for employers.
From personal experience, I would like to add one administrative 
caution about tax credits. Len talked about the need to have refundable 
tax credits and to have the money paid up front. Well, I agree, but that 
is also a guaranteed formula for an overpayment. And as someone who 
has had to work with Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries and 
Social Security beneficiaries, attempting to take back money from a 
low-income group or a barely moderate-income group is not a politi 
cally pleasant exercise, let me assure you.
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PROGRAM COORDINATION
Whenever public policy uses subsidies and tax credits and govern 
ment programs in relationship to the private sector, there arises the 
question of coordination. It is an important question but often over 
looked, particularly in the legislative developments that we see now. In 
my view, the idea of combining a government share of an insurance 
premium and an employer's share of the premium would not be well 
received by employers. A lot of companies that we deal with tend to 
want to avoid interactions with government agencies, especially when 
money is trading hands.
For example, in a recent study we did for the Henry J. Kaiser Fam 
ily Foundation, Hewitt asked how many employers would accept the 
direct government subsidy under President Clinton's prescription drug 
proposal. About 25 percent said they would accept it, while many of 
the others don't want anything to do with it. There are lots of reasons 
for employers to do something different than accepting the subsidy, but 
one reason among several was their dread over docu-mentation, audits, 
etc., and the attendant bureaucracy when money crosses hands between 
the federal government and a private sector benefit sponsor.
Likewise, in the area of retiree health, whether it is extending 
Medicare coverage to pre-Medicare eligible retirees or reforming 
Medicare options for post-65 retirees, there are bigger issues of coordi 
nation because of the existence of Medicare.
COBRA
Len also mentioned that the extension of COBRA continuation 
coverage is an attractive policy option, but also an option that is not 
free. When you talk to large employers and employers of any size, 
there is a real disconnect between what they think are the costs of 
COBRA and what the legislators think are the costs of COBRA. For 
example, according to the latest survey that I've seen by Charles D. 
Spencer & Associates, the actual average claims cost of COBRA bene 
ficiaries is 156 percent of the cost of active employees. Because the 
employer can only charge a 2 percent additional premium for that 
COBRA coverage, what you get, in effect, is another 54 percent or so 
that is coming from the individual's former employer and from the
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employees at the individual's former company; there is that subsidy 
that passes back. So not only is COBRA not free, it is still subsidized 
to a significant degree by the individual's former employer.
Now when you talk about extending current COBRA eligibility 
periods( from the current 18 to 36 months available) up until age 65, 
you can see that the employer subsidy of COBRA would be much, 
much higher. Even allowing for the employer to charge 125 percent of 
the premium as some have proposed wouldn't come even close to cov 
ering those costs. So that proposed policy change is bound to generate 
opposition from employers on the matter of cost and also on a certain 
matter of equity for active employees.
Mandates
Mandates are a nonstarter for businesses. They are scary for 
employers, conjuring up images of high costs, limited flexibility, and 
stiff imposition of government rules. For better or for worse, those 
feelings are well established and in my opinion have not evolved since 
the 1993-1994 debate. I think we are still there. I would not expect 
mandated coverage to become feasible on a large scale for employers 
anywhere in the near term.
Retiree Health Coverage
On retiree health coverage, and in particular regarding pre-65 retir 
ees, again citing the Hewitt report for the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foun 
dation, we found a continuing decline in employer provision of retiree 
medical benefits. Most large companies with more than 1,000 employ 
ees are likely to provide retiree medical coverage. They are also more 
likely to provide coverage for pre-65 retirees than for post-65 retirees, 
because there is no Medicare available for pre-65 retirees. But even 
among this group, there has been a very significant decline. And based 
on questions that we asked employers about what kinds of changes 
they would consider over the next three to five years, we expect contin 
ued retrenchment in the employer-provider system. As many as 30 per 
cent said they would "seriously consider" eliminating retiree health 
coverage on a prospective basis in the next three to five years, meaning
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for new hires. Current retirees and near retirees are likely to be grand- 
fathered under any situation.
I think the continuing decline in retiree coverage surprised some 
analysts who expected that after the accounting rules were adopted in 
the early 1990s—the FAS 106 rules, that forced such a big change 
among employers—a lot of people thought it was a one-time reaction 
to those accounting rules and that it would stabilize. Well, it hasn't, 
and our data shows it is not only continuing to decline, but has acceler 
ated slightly.
I do think there are some options out there that could slow the ero 
sion of employer-provided retiree coverage that wouldn't cost a great 
deal of new money and may even raise money in some ways. So, I 
would say in general that it is worth discussing policy measures that 
would slow the erosion of employer coverage. In doing so, we must 
also recognize that we have to be creative about how we would do that 
and also recognize that it may be an evolution toward a newer model— 
a model in which alongside the direct provision of a defined-benefit 
system there also might be room for a defmed-contribution approach as 
well.
Here are some specific ideas.
1. A recent report from an ERISA Advisory Council work group 
suggests that it is a good idea to use pension surplus assets to 
fund and prefund retiree medical expenses for this same group of 
employees in the pension plan and with guaranteed protections 
for those employees in the pension plan. There is a huge wealth 
of surplus pension assets, particularly as a result of the recent 
stock market performance, and applying those assets to stabilize 
retiree medical is probably not a bad idea.
2. There are also some relatively small changes in the tax code that 
would help, such as allowing employers to take future inflation 
into account when prefunding retiree medical benefits through 
what's called a Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association 
(VEBA); that's another positive change.
3. A third idea is talking about development of some kind of indi 
vidual account that would allow employees and employers to 
save for retiree health expenses. The key to the tax treatment here
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would be that the accumulated funds would be usable by the 
retiree for health care expenses only and without incurring tax 
able income for the purchase of coverage, which is not available 
to a broad extent in the tax treatment of 401(k) plan withdrawals 
right now.
So, creation of a dedicated account where employers and 
employees could contribute could be a meaningful contribution to 
meeting retiree health care expenses later on. And, it would also 
facilitate coordination with Medicare, in the sense that the retir 
ees could then allocate the money to a plan of their choice for 
supplemental or high-option coverage that they wanted or for out- 
of-pocket expenses associated with that plan, without incurring 
taxable income.
In this sense, it really is something very compatible with what Len 
has talked about, but in a different setting. Len says there are two key 
dimensions to expand coverage policies for the near elderly: the sub 
sidy mechanism and the range of market opportunities the beneficiary 
will have in which to use that subsidy. I think you could substitute for 
subsidy the employer and the employee contributions and the tax bene 
fits conferred thereon. In essence, what you need is money and a place 
where you can buy coverage at an affordable price. We don't always 
need to think of employer coverage as a specific comprehensive benefit 
plan, and I think we should broaden our horizons to think of a combi 
nation of both defined-benefit and defined-contribution approaches, not 
just one traditional approach.
Speaking of saving for retiree medical expenses, I don't think that 
this issue gets enough publicity on the retirement side of the equation 
in terms of underscoring that individuals do need to factor into their 
target replacement ratios future retiree medical expenses. Nor do I 
think Social Security in its replacement ratios gets credit for the Medi 
care coverage that is also provided with the additional PICA payroll 
taxes. In other words, a 40-50 percent average replacement ratio is a 
lot more when the lifetime Medicare coverage is added on.
A couple of years ago, we did some very rough estimates, rough 
calculations that we did internally. For example, for someone without 
employer retiree health coverage who is age 40 and earning $25,000, 
we estimated that individual would need to save between 7 and 13 per-
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cent of pay at age 40 for retiree health expenses if they were to retire at 
age 62. Naturally the amount required as a percentage of pay goes 
down with income, but it rises with age. At age 50, a worker making 
$25,000 would have to save between 15 and 25 percent of pay if he/she 
had no employer retiree health coverage.
CLOSING
I would like to close with a couple of comments. Len talked about 
his preferred option of creating a new group purchasing entity to facili 
tate group market conditions, and Deborah has commented on that too. 
I have to tell you that from an employer perspective, "Avalon" sounds 
like the 1993-1994 HIPCs (health insurance purchasing cooperatives). 
It conjures up this image that, if it is government-initiated, it is going to 
be unwieldy, expansive, and bureaucratic, and employers are going to 
be nervous about it as a group.
I also think we may be at the beginning of a stage where we are 
going to see some new intermediaries emerge in the marketplace who 
may be able to create some of these markets on their own. For exam 
ple, with the use of the Internet, some of the relatively big administra 
tive loads that Len and also Deborah talked about, there is a potential 
for those administrative costs to come way down in a highly electronic 
Internet environment. We can also foresee the development of new 
intermediaries that would create a virtual marketplace where the 
money could be applied and also reduce administrative costs substan 
tially by using the Internet and other means, such as standardization of 
health plan offerings to increase efficiencies and lower costs.
Finally, in Len's simulations, the cost of the insurance premium 
modeled reflects a premium for fairly comprehensive health care cov 
erage. Comprehensive coverage has traditionally been the standard of 
coverage advocated by most policy analysts, and it certainly remains a 




Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured
Well, this has been a good panel, and I have learned a lot from all 
the presentations.
From Len Nichols, I have learned that when you go and think out 
side the box, sometimes you come back to the box as the best option. 
And that is what I am going to talk about: the box of public programs 
and where they fit into the solution. What I have been listening to 
today has convinced me that we ought not to throw out the good in our 
public programs, since we seem to encounter even more problems 
when we try to replace them with new strategies—when we go outside 
the box.
Before I begin to explain why I feel this is true, I would like to 
mention a few issues that we shoulda bear in mind. First, people with 
out health insurance at any age are vulnerable, and our health insurance 
agenda for the uninsured should not segment people by age. It should 
segment them by need, and need is the greatest among the lowest 
income people at all ages. Today we are focusing on a group of partic 
ularly vulnerable people within the low-income population, because 
we know that uninsured children are healthier than their older counter 
parts—the non-elderly group that we are talking about today. This 
group also merits special attention because, while we have made politi 
cal advances in coverage of children (because they are popular and 
cheap to cover), we have not done so for the population we are talking 
about today, a group that is more expensive to cover because they have 
greater health needs.
Second, in focusing on the most vulnerable populations, I think it 
is very important to go beyond the work that John Eisenberg and his 
colleagues at AHCPR did in looking at workers in the near-elderly age 
group and look at those in that age group that are outside of the work 
force, as they may in fact be among the most vulnerable. The non- 
workers may in fact be those who have higher health needs, 
contributing to their departure from the workforce. Most importantly, I 
think we need to look at the fact that there are some significant differ-
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ences in this group and the general population in terms of the duration 
of periods without insurance. These individuals often tend to be out of 
the workplace if they are uninsured. Therefore, they are more likely to 
have long and extended stays of uninsurance instead of being in the 
transitions from one job to another, which is the case with many of the 
younger uninsured.
Finally, I would like to remind you of some of the problems with 
retiree benefits. Frank McArdle talked a little bit about the work he did 
for the Kaiser Family Foundation on this topic. Deborah Chollet also 
did some related work for the Kaiser Foundation on the individual mar 
ket, which I think really points out the vulnerability of the people in the 
near-elderly age group in terms of access to the individual market and 
affordable insurance. Her work highlights that states don't absolutely 
protect older Americans from being excluded from insurance coverage 
because of preexisting conditions and shows that the cost of coverage 
can be as high as a $1,000 a month for a 60-year-old male without pre 
existing conditions in a high-cost state.
With those issues in mind—the need to help the most vulnerable 
groups, the problems with access to employer coverage, and the barri 
ers in the individual market—we can turn to understanding this popula 
tion. We did some work back in 1996 looking at the very low-income 
population, those under 200 percent of poverty, in the 50- to 64-year- 
old age group. We found some striking differences in health status 
between younger and older uninsured low-income people. Nearly half 
(46 percent) of those age 50 to 64 in our survey reported fair or poor 
health, compared with 18 percent of those 18 to 24 and 24 percent of 
those 25 to 49. Health status has been shown to be a solid indicator of 
health needs. So that as hard as the problem is and will remain helping 
low-income people to gain access to insurance, low-income older peo 
ple have some greater health needs that magnify the challenge.
In addition, differences in access to care between low-income peo 
ple without insurance and low-income people with insurance is strik 
ing. When we looked at access to care for uninsured people who were 
sick—people reporting their health status as fair or poor in the age 50 
to 64 group with incomes under 200 percent of poverty—29 percent of 
that group said they had no physician visits in the prior year, and 22 
percent reported that they had no usual source of care. These figures 
contrast sharply with those for individuals with Medicaid or private
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insurance who are equally low income and equally in poor health, only 
8 percent of whom report any of these difficulties.
Clearly all of the evidence on health needs and insurance differen 
tials with the pre-elderly group makes a strong case for helping this age 
group as well as for the younger uninsured. And when we look at how 
Medicaid performs against private insurance for this age group—they 
are typically not eligible yet for Medicare—we see that Medicaid is 
performing as well as private coverage in guaranteeing access and 
improving coverage.
So, what that leads me to conclude is that we should really look at 
the public programs, both Medicare and Medicaid, as a strategy for 
protecting this population. First, I think we really need to look very 
carefully at Medicare. It hasn't been discussed much here today, but 
we have some policymakers proposing raising the age of eligibility for 
Medicare. That clearly is a totally counterproductive policy to the 
needs of this near-elderly group we are talking about. I did a call-in 
show in New Hampshire, and I had about seven uninsured people call 
in, of whom five were in the age 60- to 65-year-old group saying, "I am 
uninsured and I am waiting for Medicare. I am trying to do all these 
things to keep my health going or I am postponing different tests 
because I need to wait until I am eligible for Medicare." So, one strat 
egy that I would strongly recommend is looking at ways to let people 
gain Medicare coverage on a buy-in basis earlier than age 65, with sub 
sidies for the lower income. Clearly, raising the age of eligibility of 
Medicare would be a counterproductive step.
I would also urge that for people who retire early and take Social 
Security benefits at 62, their ability to access Medicare at that point be 
changed to allow them to be able to gain Medicare coverage along with 
their retirement coverage. We know that workers who retire early tend 
to be people who have health problems, so this is a particularly vulner 
able group that may in fact not have any access to the individual insur 
ance market when they retire if they can't gain access to Medicare.
Second, I would also urge that we really take a harder look at the 
policies we have today for coverage of adults under the Medicaid pro 
gram. Medicaid has increasingly become—with its decoupling from 
welfare—a program for children and pregnant women. We are now 
talking about extending coverage to the parents of children who are 
covered by Medicaid, but we are not talking about what happens to sin-
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gle adults and childless couples, who no matter how poor now are inel 
igible in almost every state for the Medicaid program.
If we want to look at a direct, cost-effective, and efficient way to 
cover low-income adults, we really need to look at decategorizing 
Medicaid and making it an insurance program by income, not by cate 
gory, and really begin to focus on bringing in low-income adults below 
the poverty level. That would help a substantial number of the people 
in this age group. We can overcome the state variations in Medicaid 
coverage that Len Nichols noted by doing the unpopular thing of man 
dating coverage across states at a specific income level, as we have 
done for children.
The experience with children has shown that public coverage at the 
lowest incomes work. But regardless of the specifics of the policy, we 
really need to take a much harder look across the age spectrum at how 
our low-income program, Medicaid, and its companion CHIP, are cov 
ering not just children, but the adults in those states.
And, finally, I would urge that as we look at all of this, we have the 
ability to afford coverage as our main criteria, and we do not try to link 
any of these efforts to the health status of individuals. I have looked at 
Len Nichols' proposal several times, and I know it is fairly attractive to 
say we would provide coverage to those who are in fair or poor health. 
However, I don't think we are quite ready to develop the instruments 
and measures that would enable us to do so. What we see especially in 
this age group is that health status can change quite dramatically from 
one day to another, and we really don't want to link your ability to get 
health coverage to whether you were sick yesterday or are sick today.
In conclusion, I think that as we look forward to trying to provide 
better coverage for all Americans, we ought to focus not just on chil 
dren and not just on their parents, but on people of all ages that are 
without health insurance. It doesn't matter what your risk is. If you 
are uninsured, you face problems. And we ought to really look at 
building upon the Medicare program and the Medicaid program as 
strategies to provide that protection quite efficiently and with help to 
those most in need among the low income through the Medicaid pro 
gram.
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